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INTRODUCTION 
1. ABSTRACT 
The thesis explores society’s prejudice and intolerance toward mental illness. It 
provides a narrative reference to stigma, which is drawn primarily from the 
biosocial science disciplines, and applies it to the law and its implementation. It 
examines the limited success that health policies, legislation, cultural interventions 
and anti-stigma campaigns have had in reducing stigma to which the better 
achievements appear to have resulted from short term, specialist education and 
contact programs targeting young people. It investigates the impact that labelling 
and harmful stereotypes, which inform biased decision-making have on the 
opportunities for people experiencing mental illness to receive fair and equitable 
legal outcomes.  In this regard, the thesis explores Michael Perlin’s controversial 
notion of sanism: an irrational but socially acceptable prejudice directed against 
people with mental illness. Perlin argues that the legal system is so embedded with 
stigmatising myths and negative stereotypes that its discriminatory actions largely 
go unnoticed, or unacknowledged, or are justified as legal actions and behaviours 
that are acceptable in the circumstances; those circumstances being that the person 
has a mental illness.  
Perlin’s ideas have developed primarily from thirty years of personal observation, 
which to date have not been critically tested.  This thesis set about examining 
Perlin’s sanism propositions through a combination of doctrinal and empirical 
research. The doctrinal analysis centred upon conflicted parenting decisions, which 
identified the presence of sanism in legal decision-making and legislation. 
Secondly, a review of 296 Australian family law conflicted parenting order cases 
decided between 2006 and 2011was conducted.  The findings indicated that parents 
who have an experience of a mental illness, or merely appear to the court to have a 
mental illness, are at significant risk of having their parental responsibilities 
severely restricted, or removed entirely, on the basis of their stereotypification as an 
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unfit parent and their categorisation as an ‘unacceptable risk’ to the wellbeing and 
safety of their child.  
The empirical assessment of Perlin’s views regarding sanist law students is the first 
of its kind. A survey study was conducted that examined attitudes about people 
experiencing mental illnesses generally, and legal clients particularly of (N=204) 
students entering law school and (N=81) students exiting law school. Overall, the 
results supported Perlin’s perspectives. They indicated that the student’s attitudes 
were, to a high degree, authoritarian and benevolently prejudicial. There were few 
significant differences based on variables of gender and self identification of a 
mental illness although the data revealed a large, culturally significant difference 
between domestic and overseas respondents and female respondents were 
significantly more benevolent in their attitudes than the males.  The final 
component of the research involved an evaluation of the Tasmanian Mental Health 
Tribunal Representation Scheme (MHTRS) which has operated since 2003. It uses 
a therapeutic jurisprudence model to train volunteer law students to represent 
people appearing before the Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal. It was anticipated 
that participating in the MHTRS would reduce sanist attitudes among students; 
however, this study did not establish a consistently positive change in the attitudes 
of the participant respondents. Overall, the thesis provides valuable insight into the 
planning of future strategies designed to reduce the prejudice and discriminations 
that people with a mental illness experience when confronting the legal system. 
2. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The first purpose of this thesis is to examine Perlin’s claims that the legal system is 
embedded with the hidden prejudice associated with mental illness: sanism. 
Exposing sanism in this way will contribute to both a reduction in the 
discriminatory treatment of service users experiencing a mental illness and an 
improvement in the opportunities available for this disadvantaged group to achieve 
fair and just legal outcomes.  Other than Perlin’s numerous articles and the small 
number of others authored by supporters of his concepts of ‘sanism’ and 
‘pretextuality’, the majority of legal commentators have, as yet, failed to recognise 
or address the socially acceptable prejudices perpetrated by the legal system’s 
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mentally powerful against the mentally vulnerable. Sanism, it seems, offers the last 
bastion of acceptable prejudice.   
To understand why and how these prejudices continue to pervade policies, laws and 
legal and social practices, it is necessary to examine contextually the concepts of 
mental health and mental illness within their medical, social and legal parameters. It 
is also important to precurse the discussion with a sociological exploration of the 
concept of stigma so as to understand how negative attitudes and beliefs create 
social distance; erect institutional barriers between the ‘powerful’ and the 
‘powerless’; and justify as acceptable, outcomes which would be unacceptable if the 
party did not have a mental illness. Once stigma and sanism are exposed in this 
way, and the unacceptable is no longer acceptable, it will be necessary to develop 
and implement policy and program change initiatives to effect positive cultural and 
systemic change.   
The second purpose of this thesis is to promote as a future change initiative, the 
establishment of mental health clinical legal education programs similar to the 
therapeutic jurisprudence model presented in Chapter Seven.  An evaluation of the 
Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme was undertaken.  Data was 
collected from a questionnaire completed by 285 University of Tasmania law 
students responding to questions about mental illness generally, and legal clients 
experiencing mental illness specifically. Although the research did not achieve a 
significantly clear measure of the positive impact that the program had on students, 
it did provide valuable insight into the need for further research on the topic as well 
as constructive information on how survey procedures can be improved.   
3. JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS 
The PhD is awarded on the basis of a thesis prepared under supervision that makes 
an original, significant and extensive contribution to knowledge and understanding 
in the relevant field of study.  To this end, the thesis undertakes a narrative analysis 
of the social phenomenon of stigma and sanism through the examination of an 
extensive number of medical, legal and social science academic publications. It also 
examines policies, laws and practices utilised by political and social institutions 
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with the intention of reducing the stigma, and decreasing the discrimination 
associated with mental illness in the legal system.  
Stigma infects the lives of people experiencing mental illness by diminishing their 
self-esteem and robbing them of social opportunities. Although it is widely 
accepted that stigma gives cause to prejudice, social rejection, isolation and 
discrimination, this is not so when it comes to the law. The perception of neutrality, 
impartiality, fairness and justice tend to override thoughts that prejudice and 
discrimination associated with mental illness might be both inherent and embedded 
in the law’s doctrines, statutes and practices as Michael Perlin contends.  It is a very 
thorny road to acceptance that the legal system’s biased and pretextual treatment of 
parties experiencing mental illness can deny, or significantly limit basic rights and 
freedoms.  
Support for Perlin’s sanist theory is increasing, although it seems, mostly amongst 
mental health professionals and consumers. Other than Perlin’s own extensive 
writings, there has been very little academic discussion on the topic, and virtually 
no empirical research undertaken to support or dispute Perlin’s claims.  This thesis 
fills the void by offering (1) academic discourse on the social acceptability of 
mental health prejudice, (2) original research of recent Australian family law 
parenting order cases in an attempt to identify a sanist judicial approach to decision-
making when a parent is believed to have a mental illness, and (3) a large, original 
quantitative and qualitative research study that examines the attitudes of law 
students to mental illness generally, and to legal clients with a mental illness 
specifically.  It compares the attitudes of respondents who had participated in a 
mental health therapeutic jurisprudence clinical legal education program with non-
participants to determine whether participation improves attitudes.   
The thesis provides evidence that helps make Perlin’s concept of sanism more 
visible, and less socially acceptable, and it offers recommendations for initiating 
positive change mechanisms among law students. It has the overall aim of 
decreasing the prejudice and disadvantage that a very vulnerable group of 
individuals presently face when they confront the legal system. 
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4. LANGUAGE OF THE THESIS 
Words are important. If you want to care for something, you call it a ‘flower;’ 
if you want to kill something, you call it a ‘weed.’1   
People who experience a mental illness are commonly represented as being 
essentially different from the rest of society. They are detrimentally defined by their 
illness and consequently, distanced and excluded.  Stereotypical misconceptions 
and fears provide fertile ground for the propagation of stigma, prejudice and 
discrimination. The use of dated and inaccurate descriptors can enable the 
perpetuation of negative stereotypes, and reinforce the incredibly powerful and 
potent attitudinal barriers that are encountered daily by people who have a mental 
illness.  Using the right kind of language can promote awareness of mental illness 
and provide a better understanding of the needs and concerns of people who 
experience mental illness and their associated mental health problems.  
Language itself is a totality of determined notions and concepts, and not just 
words grammatically devoid of content.2 
The object of language is to describe the user’s view of mental illness, and people 
who have a mental illness, and while terms such as ‘nut case’ and ‘psycho’ help to 
form language, they can also impose limits of empathy on speakers. This thesis 
supports the proposition that the language used does matter.  It accepts that the use 
of ‘people first language’3 is an objective way of acknowledging, respecting, 
communicating and reporting on mental health issues in a way that helps to 
eliminate generalisations, assumptions and stereotypes by focusing on the person 
rather than their illness.  As their illness does not define who the person is but 
simply identifies something that they experience, the thesis will follow a linguistic 
framework that consistently uses the more cumbersome term ‘people who 
experience mental illness’ as a broad reference to individuals who have either a 
diagnosed or undiagnosed, treated or untreated mental disorder or mental illness/or 
                                                 
1 Don Coyhis, member of the Mohican Nation from the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation in Wisconsin in 
William White, ‘The Rhetoric of Recovery Advocacy: An Essay on the Power of Language’ (Research Paper, 
2001) <http://naabt.org/documents/LANGUAGEBillWhite.pdf>.  
2 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith editors and translators), (Smith International Publishers, 1971) 323.  
3 Kathie Snow, ‘People First Language’ (2008) < http://www.acdd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/People_First_Language.pdf >. Written in 1991 but updated regularly, it is accepted as 
the definitive disability language use manual.  
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are experiencing mental health problems or psychiatric disabilities rather than use 
the widely accepted, simpler and more euphonious term, ‘the mentally ill’.   
Establishing the consistency of the language to be used throughout the thesis was a 
difficult exercise due largely to the historical and comparative aspects of a subject 
that spans medical, legal, sociological, theoretical and empirical perspectives over 
many eras. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge the unavoidable level of 
language changeability that will become evident reading the thesis. Commentators 
and researchers use descriptive terms common to their discipline with early 
commentators and researchers referring to the ‘insane’ or ‘the lunatic’ while recent 
social commentators focus on the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘disadvantaged’.  Health 
professionals tend to refer to them as patients or sufferers while services and 
practitioner specific focused bureaucrats, administrators and service delivery 
personnel identify them as ‘consumers’, ‘service users’, ‘users’, ‘stakeholders’, 
‘participants’ or ‘clients’.  The people who experience mental illness may 
themselves identify as a patient, consumer, psychiatric survivor or even a victim. 
They may embrace ‘mad pride’ and reclaimed ‘mad speak’ and choose to refer to 
them self as ‘mad’ or ‘a crazy person’. 
In the United States, ‘mentally retarded’ or ‘mentally challenged’ are acceptable 
while in the United Kingdom and Australia, ‘mentally retarded’ is offensive. 
Instead, the terms ‘mentally ill’, ‘mentally disordered’ or ‘psychiatrically disabled’ 
are prominent in use. Although many commentators now prefer the term ‘mental 
disorder’ rather than ‘mental illness’, the term ‘mental illness’ is used throughout 
this paper as an overarching descriptor for the collective of mental disorders.   
According to the Australian government, ‘mental illness’ is defined as a general 
term that refers to a group of illnesses, in the same way that ‘heart disease’ refers to 
a group of illnesses and disorders affecting the heart.
4
 Mental illness is also widely 
accepted in common language usage as the appropriate descriptor for the cause 
behind the manifestation of unacceptable behaviour. The use of the term ‘mental 
illness’ also supports the goal of the empirical research undertaken which was to 
identify encompassing, general attitudes towards people experiencing mental illness 
                                                 
4 ‘What is Mental Illness’, Mental Health and Workforce Division of the Australian Government Department of 
Health and Ageing, 
<http://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/38442/what_is_mental_illness.pdf> 
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rather than garnering respondents’ attitudes to particular subgroups of people with 
specific diagnoses such as schizophrenia, depression or anxiety.  
‘Health’ is conceived from the medical and legal perspectives as a biomedical 
construct and from the sociological perspective as a functioning and well-being 
construct and its discussion and analysis within the thesis flows across all three 
perspectives. The term ‘mental health’ is used most frequently because it is 
consistent with common language and encapsulates the topic areas discussed in the 
thesis such as ‘mental health care and treatment’ by ‘mental health professionals’, 
‘mental health problems’ and ‘mental health law’.  It is also used positively in 
reference to the preventative promotional aspects of public health policies.  
It is not the intention of this thesis to homogenise the spectrum of language used in 
the literature that underlies much of the content of the thesis, and so, to a large 
extent, the text tries to keep in step with the language common to the discussion 
occurring in a particular section i.e. discussions relevant to hospitalisation may refer 
to people with a mental illness as patients although generally throughout the thesis, 
the term will be avoided because of its strong medical inferences. Finally, it is 
important to highlight the fact that particular terms always carry different 
connotations for different people as mental health language continues to be used 
interchangeably, and perspective specifically, despite the best intentions of this, or 
any other, paper.    
5. RATIONALE FOR METHOD OF INQUIRY  
The rationale for the student survey was to test two research questions: (1) do law 
students have prejudicial attitudes toward mental illness that change during their 
period of legal education, and (2) does positive attitudinal change occur if the 
student participates in a program similar to the Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme (MHTRS)? The inquiry utilised both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods, the first of which drew data from the responses to a 
questionnaire consisting of approximately 80 questions intended to identify student 
attitudes toward mental illness, mental health laws, and the legal representation of 
people with a mental illness. Before commencing the survey roll-out, ethics 
approval was provided by the University of Tasmania Ethics Committee.  Surveys 
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did not collect any identifying particulars, and in those cases where participants did 
provide identifying details, this information was removed and only de-identified 
particulars were reported. The survey was then completed by 204 first year law 
students who were in the first 6 weeks of commencement their legal studies and by 
81 final year law students during the last 6 weeks of their legal education.  The 
analysis of the responses was influenced by the developmental continuum from first 
year education to final year education.  
6. METHOD FOR SEARCHING AND SELECTING 
MATERIAL  
The literature reviewed for the thesis included Australian and international 
academic journals as well as a significant amount of grey literature consisting of 
unpublished and non-commercially published government reports, policy 
statements and issues papers, conference proceedings, pre-prints and post-prints of 
articles, theses and dissertations, research reports, letters, newsletters and bulletins 
and fact sheets. The grey literature was largely sourced from the mental health 
websites of government and non-government organisations.   
Three approaches were taken in searching the literature. The general literature 
approach searched the PubMed, PsychINFO, Scopus and Google Scholar databases 
as well as other health and social science related sources using the University of 
Tasmania University Library services for journal articles and population studies on 
mental illness, mental health stigma, attitudinal change and mental illness stigma 
reduction directions and interventions. Search keywords were used individually and 
in combinations, and included ‘mental illness’, ‘mentally ill’, ‘mental health’, 
‘deinstitutionalisation’, ‘stigma’, ‘stigma reduction’, ‘intervention’, ‘antistigma’, 
‘education’, ‘attitudinal change’, ‘social distance’, ‘contact’ and ‘political 
correctness’.  On completion of the electronic search, manual searches of the 
citations listed in identified articles and studies were undertaken.  In addition, the 
bibliographies of relevant references were searched to identify related references 
not found in the electronic database search.  
The second approach undertook a search of the legal literature.  LexisNexis, Austlii, 
NZllii , LII, Ballii, WorldII and Google Scholar were interrogated for relevant legal 
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journal articles, cases and legislation.  Search keywords were again used 
individually and in combinations and included ‘mental illness’, ‘psychiatric report’, 
‘mentally ill parent’, ‘neglect’, ‘abuse’, ‘sanism’, judicial bias’ and ‘decision-
making’. Pejorative search terms such as ‘lunatic’ and ‘psycho’ were also used.  As 
was the case with the general literature search, the bibliographies of some of the 
literature revealed further relevant references that were not found in the electronic 
database search.  
The third approach primarily relied on Google, an online search engine database to 
search for relevant grey literature.  A large number of websites were identified that 
were found to hold relevant resources. These included government websites such as 
the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing, various Australian 
state and territory government health directorates, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services and the U.K. Department of Health. Countless non-
government sites were also accessed which included the World Health 
Organization, Mental Health Council of Australia, Sane, Mind Australia and Mind 
United Kingdom, Schizophrenia Society websites, mental health consumer websites 
and psychiatric colleges.  The bibliographies of relevant references were searched to 
identify related references and a manual search of library catalogues was 
undertaken to further identify relevant resources. Past policies that were not 
available electronically were obtained through personal request from the relevant 
body, or through Document Delivery when no longer held in hard copy print form.  
Google was also used to search for global media reports related to mental illness. 
Newspaper and television articles provided an important contribution to the thesis 
as they presented an, often immediate, measure of the public’s mood toward many 
of the key factors that fuel mental illness stigma such as community integration, 
treatment non-compliance and the limited availability of community support 
services, violence and sentencing.    
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
10 
7. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The stigma associated with mental illness is pervasive and widespread.
5
 
6
 Society 
has had a long and ubiquitous history of negative response to the changing notions 
of mental illness ranging from the primitive belief in divine or demonic affliction to 
the scientific rise of medical theories and psychotherapeutic models of moral 
blameworthiness to the current, biologically based explanations of mental 
disorders.
7
  Society’s marginalised members have always experienced 
discrimination as a result of the stigmatiser’s belief in erroneous myths and negative 
stereotypes that lead to prejudiced attitudes which, in turn, lead to discriminatory 
actions.
8
  But throughout history, it has been people who experience mental illness 
that have induced the most negative of all of public attitudes and social 
discriminations.
9
   
Stigma has been conceptualised by a number of diverse disciplines and has been 
attributed various meanings and definitions, none of which are definitive, and all of 
which are subject to academic debate.
10
  Contemporary understanding of stigma is 
grounded in the sociological and psychological theoretical traditions that stem 
largely from Erving Goffman’s classic revisionist concept laid down in his seminal 
book, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity.
11
 Based primarily on 
dyadic social interaction, the central feature of Goffman’s view of social stigma is 
that individuals who possess attributes or characteristics that fall short of social 
expectations are devalued and dehumanised, irredeemably tainted and discounted
12
 
and disqualified from full social acceptance.
13
  
                                                 
5 Liz Sayce, ‘Stigma, discrimination and social exclusion: What's in a word?’ (1998) 7 Journal of Mental 
Health 331.  
6 Arthur H Crisp et al., ‘Stigmatisation of people with mental illness’ (2000) 177 British Journal of Psychiatry 
4.  
7 Heather Stuart, ‘Fighting the stigma caused by mental disorders: past perspectives, present activities, and 
future directions’ (2008) 7 World Psychiatry 185.  
8 Matthew Schumacher, Patrick W Corrigan and Timothy Dejong, ‘Examining cues that signal mental illness 
stigma’ (2003) 22 Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 467.  
9 Phyllis A Gordon et al., ‘"Attitudes regarding interpersonal relationships with persons with mental illness and 
mental retardation’ (2004) 70 Journal of Rehabilitation 50.   
10 Bruce G Link et al., ‘Measuring Mental Illness Stigma’ (2004) 30 Schizophrenia Bulletin 511.  
11 Erving Goffman, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity (Prentice-Hall, 1963).  Goffman’s 
book can be credited with conceptualizing stigma and creating a framework for the wealth of academic study 
during the past 47 years. 
12 Ibid 3.    
13 Ibid 9.  
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Goffman viewed mental illness as one of the most deeply discrediting and socially 
damaging of all stigmas.
14
 He, as were many of his contemporaries such as Szasz
15
 
and Scheff
16
, was highly critical of the role that mental hospitals played in 
reinforcing the stigma associated with diagnostic labelling and psychiatric 
treatment.
17
  Some commentators continue to hold the view that psychiatrists 
contribute to stigma through the careless use of diagnostic labels and inappropriate 
treatments.
18
  Generally, social theorists have moved away from the early focus on 
stigma as a derivative of the social organisation of psychiatry.  Stigma’s creation 
and continuance is now considered the result of a much more complex interplay of 
social-structural, interpersonal and psychological factors.
19
   
Corrigan deconstructed public stigma into three elements: stereotypes, prejudice 
and discrimination.
20
 Thornicroft later revised Corrigan’s definition by including 
problems of (1) knowledge (ignorance or misinformation), (2) attitudes (prejudice), 
and (3) behaviour (discrimination).
21
  Discrimination exists in society’s norms, 
values and institutions and is separated into three types (1) individual (2) 
institutional and (3) structural.
22 
 Corrigan’s theory of structural discrimination23 is 
widely believed to be the most egregious form of indirect discrimination because of 
the pervasive impact that society's basic institutions have on people’s lives.24 
Pervasive, pernicious, and resistant to change,
25
 stigma is embedded within 
society’s institutions especially, according to Perlin, its legal system.26 
                                                 
14 Stephan P Spitzer and Norman K Denzin (eds) The mental patient (McGraw-Hill, 1968) Erving Goffman, 
The moral career of the mental patient, 226.  
15 Thomas Szasz, ‘The myth of mental illness’ (1960) 15 American Psychologist 113.  
16 Thomas J Scheff, Being mentally ill: a sociological theory (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967).  
17 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Doubleday 
& Co. Anchor Books, 1961).  
18 Norman Sartorius, ‘Iatrogenic stigma of mental illness’ (2002) 324 British Medical Journal 1470.  
19 Jo C Phelan and Bruce Link, ‘Conceptualizing Stigma’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 363.  
20 Patrick W Corrigan, On the Stigma of Mental Illness Washington (American Psychological Association, 
2005). See also Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, The paradox of self-stigma and mental illness (Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 2002) 35.   
21 Graham Thornicroft et al., ‘Stigma: ignorance, prejudice or discrimination?’ (2007) British Journal of 
Psychiatry 190, 193.  
22 Patrick W Corrigan, Fred E Markowitz and Amy C Watson, ‘Structural Levels of Mental Illness: Stigma and 
Discrimination’ (2004) 30 Schizophrenia Bulletin 481. 
23 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16.  
24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).  
25 Heather Stuart, Julio Arboleda-Florez and Norman Sartorius, Paradigms Lost: Fighting Stigma and the 
Lessons Learned (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
26 Michael Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000).  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
12 
In his book, The Hidden Prejudice of Law: Mental Disability on Trial
27
, Michael 
Perlin provides a comprehensive critique of mental health law in the United States.  
He argues that legal decision-making, when mental illness is a factor, is tainted by 
bias and an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational 
prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes.
28
  He labels 
the irrational prejudice associated with mental illness, rooted in stereotypes, myths, 
superstition, and deindividualisation, ‘sanism’. Contentiously, he claims that sanism 
pervades the legal system, where it is mostly invisible, and largely socially 
acceptable. And, in combination with pretextuality, the legal system’s pattern of 
discriminatory and dishonest artifices, they distort both the legislative and judicial 
processes to prevent people experiencing a mental illness from receiving equal 
treatment under the law.
29 Perlin’s claims are not unsupported, however.  Porter, for 
example, suggests that judges are susceptible to critical thinking errors because they 
adopt myths and false stereotypes which they rely on to justify their biased view of 
the facts, using them to support their initial, unreliable assessments, particularly 
regarding dangerousness and trustworthiness.
30
  
Perlin defines sanism as attitudinal disease
31
and irrational prejudice.
32
 Large 
distinguishes prejudice and stigma.  For him, stigma is about society’s intolerance, 
lack of acceptance, and lack of compassion for people who are different
33
 while 
prejudice is about pre-judged negative feelings and opinions that a person forms out 
of ignorance, or without thought or reason.
34
 Phelan suggests that the conceptual 
models of stigma and prejudice have much in common.
35
 Thornicroft views stigma 
as the overarching term for stereotypical ignorance, prejudice and discrimination
36
 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  
28 Michael L Perlin, ‘“Things Have Changed:” Looking At Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through 
The Sanism Filter’ (2003) 46 New York Law School Law Review 535.  
29 Michael L Perlin, ‘Simplify You, Classify You: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability 
Classification Systems’ (2008/09) 25 Georgia State University Law Review 607.  
30 Stephen Porter, Leanne ten Brinke and Chantal Gustaw, ‘Dangerous decisions: the impact of first impressions 
of trustworthiness on the evaluation of legal evidence and defendant culpability’ (2010) 16 Psychology, Crime 
& Law 477, 478.  See also Norbert L Kerr, Robert J MacCoun and Geoffrey P Kramer, ‘Bias in Judgment: 
Comparing Individuals and Groups’ (1996) 103 Psychological Review 687.  
31 Michael L Perlin, 'They’re An Illusion to Me Now': Forensic Ethics, Sanism and Pretextuality (Research 
Paper No 07/08 # 27, New York Law School Legal Studies, 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1130923>. 
32 Michael L Perlin, ‘'His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill': How Will Jurors Respond to 
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?’ (2009) 42 Akron Law Review 885.  
33 Matthew Large and Christopher J Ryan, ‘Sanism, stigma and the belief in dangerousness’ (2012) 46 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 1099.  
34 Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie University Press, 5th ed, 2009).  
35 Jo C Phelan, Bruce G Link and John F Dovidio, ‘Stigma and prejudice: one animal or two?’ (2008) 67 Social 
Science and Medicine 358.  
36 Thornicroft, above n 21.    
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while Poole presents stigma as an overarching oppression constructed on a 
foundation of sanist beliefs, attitudes and practices.
37
 Parry argues that prejudicial 
beliefs and discriminatory behaviours are elements of both stigma and sanism 
because ‘sanism produces stigma and stigma leads to sanism’.38 Although sanism 
features an ideological rationalisation or justification for stigmatising and 
marginalising the ‘Other’, the dominant principle shared by all ‘isms’, it is also set 
apart from them.  Sanism brings with it additional and unique elements.  Sanism is 
largely invisible, socially acceptable, and frequently practised.
39
   
There has been a substantial amount of social science research conducted over past 
decades that has examined the concepts of stigma, prejudice and discrimination, 
identified key indicators in the promotion of positive social change, and 
recommended strategies designed to reduce stigma and decrease discrimination. 
Corrigan’s study examining the effect of the anti-stigma strategies of education, 
contact and protest found that education and contact were effective while protest 
was not.
40
 Angermeyer suggested increasing the public’s knowledge of mental 
illness through communication strategies, offering more community supports for 
people experiencing mental illness and their families; changing mental health care 
by improving the quality of care services provided to consumers; and providing 
education and training including to lawyers and judges.
41
  A later study of 
Corrigan’s found that while education yielded positive results, contact with a person 
experiencing a mental illness produced stronger results.
42
 Alexander and Link 
concluded that as any type of contact with a person experiencing a mental illness 
increased, the perception of the person as physically dangerous decreased, as did the 
desire for social distance from them.
43
 Reinke and Corrigan found that a significant 
                                                 
37 Jennifer M Poole et al., ‘Sanism, ‘Mental Health’, and Social Work/Education: A Review and Call to Action’ 
(2012) 1 Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, Research, Polity, and Practice 20.  
38 John D Parry, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A Comprehensive 
Reference Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Criminal Justice Professionals (American Bar Association, 2009) 
48.  
39 Richard Ingram, ‘Sanism in Theory and Practice’ (Workshop, 2nd Annual Critical Inquiries, 9-10 May 2011) 
<http://www.socialinequities.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Ingram.Sanism-in-Theory-and-
Practice.CI_.2011.pdf>. 
40 Patrick W Corrigan and David L Penn, ‘Lessons from social psychology on discrediting psychiatric stigma’ 
(1999) 54 American Psychologist 765.  
41 Matthias C Angermeyer, Beate Schulze and Sandra Dietrich, ‘Courtesy stigma: A focus group study of 
relatives of schizophrenia patients’ (2003) 38 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 593.  
42 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Challenging two mental illness stigmas: Personal responsibility and 
dangerousness’ (2002) Schizophrenia Bulletin 293.  
43 Laurel A Alexander and Bruce G Link, ‘The impact of contact on stigmatizing attitudes towards people with 
mental illness’ (2003) 12 Journal of Mental Health 271.   
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period of discourse contact needs to occur between the public and the person with a 
mental illness for contact to be an effective strategy.
44
  
One of the major findings of a recent comprehensive review of public stigma 
research undertaken by Angermeyer found that there was strong evidence that 
negative attitudes are positively associated with age.
45
 In the nineteen fifties, 
Whately concluded that the variance that he found associated with age was likely a 
form of culturally generated liberalism.
46
 He interpreted the positive responses 
amongst younger people as a probable reflection of the liberal attitudes of 
contemporary society: a manifestation of the cultural changes occurring. He found it 
untenable that the negative responses of older people were the yield of a 
psychological conservatism produced by growing old, preferring instead the 
hypothesis that the unfavourable responses reflected the learned attitudes of a less 
enlightened bygone past. Whately’s argument was that age shared a large part of its 
common factor variance with education, income and occupation which, he 
concluded, usually correlated with liberal, humanitarian attitudes.
47
  
Angermeyer did not find that a consistent relationship existed between the socio-
demographic characteristics of age, education or familiarity of the respondents and 
the beliefs they held about people who experienced mental illness. Although 32 
studies had indicated that negative attitudes were positively associated with age, 10 
had concluded that age did not matter.  Only one study found that the reverse 
relationship existed. That study had examined attitudes towards the compulsory 
admission of people experiencing a mental illness and reported that the older the 
person (aged 56 -76) did not accept the psychiatric hospital as an appropriate setting 
and were opposed to compulsory admission.
48
  One explanation for the negative 
response may be that older people apply a more learned approach to forming their 
attitudinal responses.  Rather than weighting responses in the existence of age 
specific cultural differences, the older person’s personal sense of proximity to the 
                                                 
44 Rebecca Reinke et al., ‘Examining Two Aspects of Contact on the Stigma of Mental Illness’ (2004) 23 
Journal Of Social And Clinical Psychology 377.  
45 Matthias Angermeyer and S Deitrich, ‘"Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental illness: 
a review of population studies’ (2006) 113 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 163, 174.  
46 Charles D Whatley, ‘Social Attitudes Toward Discharged Mental Patients’ (1959) 6 Social Problems 13, 316 
– 317.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Christoph Lauber et al., ‘Public Attitude to compulsory admission of mentally ill people’ (2002) 105 Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 384.  
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eventual loss of their own autonomy is the primary predictor directed by their own 
awareness of the stigma associated with people experiencing mental illness.
49
 
The review of the education characteristic found that there was strong evidence that 
negative attitudes are negatively associated with educational attainment. Of the 38 
studies in which education was a variable factor, 20 demonstrated that a positive 
relationship existed between educational level and the attitudes towards people 
experiencing mental illness. Most telling was that the more highly educated 
respondents tended to distance themselves less, and were more liberal in their 
views, but were also more accepting of compulsory admission.
50
 However, almost 
an equal number of studies (18) reported that there was no relationship between 
negative attitudes and education at all.
51
  
Of the 61 studies that included the characteristic of familiarity with mental illness, 
i.e. personally have, or have had a mental illness, or who have had personal contact 
with someone who has a mental illness, it was reported in half (30) of studies that 
people had more positive attitudes.  An equal number of studies (30) found, 
however, that there was no association at all between familiarity and attitudes.  The 
final study reported the greater familiarity with mental illness the person had, the 
more negative their attitudes.   It established that in general, the willingness to react 
prosocially increased in proportion to the intensity of the exposure to mental illness, 
and did so across all groups of respondents including those dealing with the a 
person experiencing mental illness on a professional or volunteer basis. The 
exception to the rule was the group of respondents who themselves had undergone 
psychiatric treatment. This group chose to increase their social distance.
52
  
Major and O’Brien proposed that mental illness stigma is relationship and context 
specific: it does not reside in the person but rather within a specific social context.
53
  
Stigma can affect the stigmatised via the activation of negative in-group stereotypes 
                                                 
49 Whatley, above n 46. 
50 Lauber, above n 48.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger ‘"The effect of personal experience with mental illness on 
the attitude towards individuals suffering from mental disorders"’ (1996) 31 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology, 321.  
53 Brenda Major and Laurie T O’Brien, ‘The Social Psychology of Stigma’ (2005) 56 Annual  Review of 
Psychology 393.  
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that can lead to behaviour that assimilates to the stereotype.
54
 
55
  Even in the 
absence of discriminatory behaviour on the part of others, behaviour can be affected 
as a result of the associative linkages in memory between stereotypes and the 
behaviours they imply. Activating stereotypes can produce stereotype-consistent 
behaviour through an ideomotor process,
56
 even among people who are not 
members of the group, so long as they are aware of the stereotype; the stereotype is 
activated in a situation; and the stereotype is applicable to the behavioural domain.
57
 
This phenomenon is seen in the family cases discussed in Chapter Six at 6.1.  
Acting bizarrely is a sufficient indicator for some decision-makers that a party has a 
mental illness even though the expert medical evidence presented to the court 
clearly states that they do not.   
Drawing from the theoretical and practical experience literature, numerous stigma 
reducing and discrimination decreasing stratagems have been advanced.  
Interpreting this evidence, it appears that short term, specialist education programs 
featuring the element of contact which are directed toward young university 
students have the best chance of changing attitudes, reducing stigma and decreasing 
discrimination. One program that satisfies these characteristics is the Mental Health 
Tribunal Representation Scheme.  It is discussed in Chapter Seven and its value in 
positively changing attitudes is evaluated in Chapter Eight.   However, the evidence 
base supporting prejudice and stigma change is underdeveloped, which makes 
speaking authoritatively on the most effective change practices impossible.
58
 The 
complexity of mental illness stigma, the broad spectrum of the different types of 
interventions undertaken, the different desired program outcomes of changing 
knowledge, changing attitudes or changing behaviours, the different target groups 
receiving intervention, the scale of intervention and the different evaluation 
measures used all converge to complicate comparisons across studies.  Further 
research that better sets down an empirical basis for planning evidence-based 
                                                 
54 John A Bargh, Mark Chen and Lara Burrows, ‘Automaticity of social behavior: direct effects of trait 
construct and stereotype activation on action’ (1996) 71 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 230.  
55 Ap Dijksterhuis et al., ‘On the relationship between associative strength and automatic behaviour’ (2000) 36 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 531.  
56 S Christian Wheeler, W Blair G Jarvis and Richard E Petty, ‘Think unto others: the self-destructive impact of 
negative racial stereotypes’ (2001) 37 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 173.  
57 Major and O’Brien, above n 56.  
58 George N Christodoulou (ed), Advances in psychiatry, Vol. 2. (World Psychiatric Association, 2005), Helen 
Stuart and Norman Sartorius, Fighting stigma and discrimination because of mental disorders, 79. 
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interventions to correct mistaken beliefs about mental illness and positively alter 
attitudes toward people experiencing mental illness is essential.
59
 
60
   
8. DEVELOPMENT OF THESIS  
The thesis contains eight chapters. Chapter One indentifies the conceptual and 
definitional problems that have confused and confounded the development and 
implementation of clear and consistent mental health policies across Australian 
jurisdictions. Even at the international level, ‘mental health’ lacks clear definitions 
and conceptual agreement and is subject to different interpretations and inconsistent 
applications. This is demonstrated in the results of the author’s previous original 
research assessment of the compliance of Australia’s mental health acts with 
international human rights requirements. This data has been updated by the author’s 
review of the legislative changes that have occurred during the intervening five year 
period.  
It examines the development of aspirational public mental health policies that focus 
on the social well-being of the individual, and are intended to change how society 
responds to the person’s needs and interests. It explores this paradigm shift away 
from the previous wholly person-centric medical model policy approach to mental 
illness toward the socially inclusive, disability approach that identifies social 
situations as the real cause of discrimination and prejudice. It continues on to 
explain that these policies have had little impact on altering the general expectation 
that it is the person who must internally change by taking medication to stop the 
manifestations of their socially unacceptable behaviours. To this end, the law is an 
important public health tool used to strongly reinforce the social want to ‘control 
and treat’. Despite the lofty intentions of contemporary mental health policies, 
competing and conflicting paradigms, vagaries, ideological differences, and 
language deficiencies have meant that they have had little influence on reducing the 
stigma associated with mental illness.  
                                                 
59 Ibid 82.   
60 Thomas P LeBel, ‘Perceptions of and responses to stigma’ (2008) 2 Sociology Compass 409.  
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Chapter Two discusses similar conceptual and definitional problems associated with 
what ‘mental illness’ means apparent in law.  It shows that the law has wholly 
incorporated the biomedical notions of mental illness, and the generalised, broad, 
vague, ambiguous, and circular treatment it has given to what it actually means has 
permitted and masked the arbitrariness and discrimination in the law’s application.  
The flawed and unreliable diagnostic process that clinically labels an individual as 
‘mentally ill’ makes them vulnerable to the prejudices and discriminations in the 
legal system, rooted as it is in the medical model of treatment and control, and 
reliant on psychiatric predictions of risk and future behaviour of the individuals to 
which the system has been forewarned, possess characteristics of unreliability, 
incredibility, unpredictability and dangerousness.  
Chapter Three is important because it explores the phenomenon of stigma, a 
construct that is best understood in terms of its three components: stereotypes, 
prejudice and discrimination. It discusses how these components combine in the 
context of social power to devalue human characteristics and perpetuate social 
inequality.  It explains the historical factors of deinstitutionalisation and drug 
therapy advancements that led social scientists to begin investigating the public’s 
attitudes to people experiencing mental illness. It presents the major stigma theories 
and demonstrates the existence of the implicit association of mental illness with the 
moral concepts of ‘helpless’, ‘bad’ and ‘blameworthy’ which inextricably links the 
public’s loathing of mental illness with its fear of violence. It discusses structural 
prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices found in the legal system. 
Chapter Four explores the policy and legal efforts to reduce the stigma associated 
with mental illness. It discusses the public health disease approach to altering the 
public’s negative attitudes by improving its mental health literacy, and convincing it 
that mental illness is an ‘illness like any other’.  It examines the ideology of 
political correctness and the enactment of anti-discrimination laws. These strategies 
seek to eliminate prejudice and discrimination by altering society’s informal and 
formal rules, thereby, effecting positive change in public thought, language and 
behaviour.  The impact that these measures have had on reducing mental illness 
stigma has been limited, which may be a reflection of the complex relationship 
between negative attitudes and the wrong behaviours that they drive.  
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Stigma is an expression of society’s intolerance toward difference, its rejection of 
abnormality, and a justification for the authoritarian and benevolent responses of 
intimidation, coercion, humiliation and exclusion directed toward people who are 
stereotypically categorised as weak, irrational, unpredictable, dangerous and 
inferior. The chapter shows that statutes and administrative directives, commonly 
viewed as tools for righting the injustices of structural stigma have, in fact, had the 
unanticipated effect of reinforcing public stereotypes and prejudices, and promoting 
further disadvantage to people experiencing mental illness that are brought into 
contact with the legal system.  
Chapter Five explores the dualistic concepts of sanism and pretextuality which, 
according to Michael Perlin, permeates mental health law.  It explores sanism and 
stigma which, although conceptually different, possess the same irrational 
prejudices, making distinguishing them from each other difficult.  Sanism which 
Perlin describes is the specific prejudice associated with mental illness is the 
construct of stigma but unlike other ‘isms’ such as racism and sexism, it is a 
prejudice that is both largely invisible and socially acceptable because it is 
embedded within society’s beliefs and attitudes, language and humour.  
Chapter Five also examines sanism’s connective concept pretextuality; the term 
Perlin uses to describe the corrupted legal processes that he argues infects the legal 
system.  Legal actors interpret and accept information based on their own sense of 
morality and their personal sense of justice, or what is right.  The law is applied 
through pretexts.  Data is distorted and evidence is suppressed. Courts willingly 
accept false or misleading testimony and engage in superficial or dishonest 
decision-making. Sanism and pretextuality are used in combination to achieve a 
desired social result rather than offer a fair legal outcome to parties experiencing a 
mental illness. 
Chapter Six lays the lens of sanism, stigma and discrimination over the family law 
system. It explores the controversial claims of Perlin that were discussed in Chapter 
Five through an examination of decision-making in child protection and family law 
matters when a parent has a mental illness. It demonstrates that these parents are 
widely stigmatised as incapable of ‘good parenting’. They are labelled as harmful to 
the safety and healthy development of their children.   
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Chapter Six assesses the different and often conflicting risk of harm thresholds used 
by the child protection and court systems to control unsuitable and undesirable 
parenting. It shows that when a parenting matter is brought before a court that it is 
required to assess the parent’s parenting skills and to measure the risk of harm that 
they represent to their child’s well-being, the court’s interpretation of its obligation 
to protect children ‘at risk’ often results in a parent who has experience of a mental 
illness being viewed as an ‘unacceptable risk’. Once tagged with this label, it is 
likely that they will have their parental responsibilities severely restricted, or will 
lose them altogether.   
These practical legal repercussions of parental mental illness are discussed in the 
perlustration of Australia’s primary family law legislation, the Family Law Act 
1975.  This shows that courts interpret statutory concepts such as the ‘best interests 
of the child’ and ‘meaningful relationship’ by using the adversity approach which is 
inherent in the social science research, and fundamental to the social-scientific risk 
assessment tools.   
Chapter Six continues on to present the results of an original investigation of 296 
Australian family law parenting orders made between 2006 and 2011.  The case 
studies confirm that courts do label, stereotype and discriminate in circumstances 
where a parent has experience of mental illness. Even in situations where there is 
clear medical evidence provided to the court that the parent does not have a mental 
illness, some courts appear willing to disregard the non-diagnosis as a failure on the 
part of the experts: they were deceived and manipulated by the ‘mentally ill parent. 
And contrary to the medical evidence, courts imply that the parent is ‘mentally ill’ 
because it determines the demeanour or behaviour of the parent is unacceptable 
measured against the judge’s personal measure of suitable expectations of mental 
normality. The implication of the parent’s mental illness justifies the judicial 
decision to restrict or remove parental responsibilities because in matters 
concerning a child, it is a risk that the courts are loathed to take. 
The first six chapters examine the reality of what stigma and sanism are, and 
explores the negative impact that they have on the vulnerable, marginalised and 
disempowered groups in society.  Human beings are motivated to defend and justify 
the prevailing social, economic and political norms which they class as good, 
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legitimate and desirable even when inequality is perpetrated and ‘Others’ are 
disadvantaged. Stereotypes are used to categorise the group as different and less 
worthy so that the inequalities, unfairness and disadvantage can become invisible or 
acceptable. Stereotypical, prejudicial and discriminatory beliefs about mental illness 
are evident in the policies and laws that societies create, enact, interpret and act on. 
Prejudice and intolerance are human failings from which, as Perlin states, the legal 
system is not immune.  
As Perlin contends, the legal system is sanist but it is people who are at the system’s 
core and sanism is a disease of attitudes.   Chapter Seven presents as one option for 
change, the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme (MHTRS) which has 
the potential to heal the disease while future lawyers are still in school.  The 
MHTRS is a short term, structured, therapeutic jurisprudence clinical legal 
education program that combines appropriate mental health education with a 
contact stratagem. It is a best evidence approach to positively changing the attitudes 
of law students while meeting the need for legal representation for clients appearing 
before mental health tribunals and boards of review. Debunking myths and 
stereotypes and providing opportunities for personal contact with people who have 
a mental illness, has the potential of helping future policy-makers, legislators, 
judges, lawyers and legal administrators to break down the legal system’s sanist 
barriers from within.   
Chapter Eight is an empirical chapter that quantitatively tests the level of attitudinal 
prejudice that law students have on entering university law studies. It compares the 
data against that data collected from the group of final year law students exiting law 
school. The comparative analysis focuses on differences of gender and personal 
experience of mental illness. It also assesses the impact that students’ participation 
in the MHTRS has on attitudes. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to reliably validate some of the attitudinal assertions Perlin has made 
over the years. Although the results of the study did not return many significant 
results, it has laid the groundwork for future research on this topic.  If a reduction in 
stigma, and a decrease in the discriminations experienced by people who have a 
mental illness when they come into contact with the legal system are to occur, it is 
important that strategies are developed, tested, implemented and evaluated that 
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tackle the sanist myths and stereotypes held by the young and ideological new 
generation of legal professionals. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the main points made throughout the 
paper. It summarises the major concepts examined in each chapter. It then presents 
the major findings of the empirical study that examined the attitudes of 285 law 
students from the University of Tasmania. Finally, it sets out the recommendations 
that have been reached at the conclusion of this dissertation titled ‘Sanism, a 
socially acceptable prejudice: addressing the prejudice associated with mental 
illness in the legal system’. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MENTAL HEALTH: AN AREA OF CONCEPTUAL 
AND DEFINITIONAL CONFUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, mental health has developed into a public health industry, albeit, 
an industry beset by problems of competing and conflicting paradigms, ideological 
differences, and language deficiencies. It has become the global domain of policy-
makers that use aspirational language for its rhetorical power to achieve social 
objectives rather than offering any real interpretive value. Although intrinsically 
concerned with the detrimental impact that mental illness has on the physical, 
emotional and social well-being of the individual and their community, policy-
makers have taken a somewhat apathetic approach toward the development of a 
single, clear and coherent mental health model.  
Australian policy makers have substantially failed to address the botherations 
associated with public mental health policies globally; initiate a unified approach to 
overcoming the jurisdictional divides; or establish a pattern of unambiguous and 
consistent messaging. Instead of turning their attention to developing a unique, 
clear, precise, ideologically appropriate mental health model, policy makers are 
increasingly turning to the disability health model, a model that suffers from its own 
particular vagaries and definitional limitations. It is a model that appears 
ideologically incompatible, inadequate, and incongruous with meeting the needs of 
people experiencing mental illness.  
Chapter One is contextually important to the thesis because it presents an entry 
portal into the poorly defined and conceptually confused mental health policy area 
that is the foundation on which the law stands, and relies. It undertakes a 
comparative examination of Australia’s recent primary mental health policy 
documents.  The results demonstrate that the social model approach to mental 
health has made inroads into policy development. It has overtaken, in some 
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jurisdictions, the psychosocial model, which has itself challenged the absolute 
dominance of the biomedical model.  But rather than taking a unified approach 
toward superseding current, outdated models with a paradigm better able to meet 
the contemporary and future needs and interests of individuals and society,
1
 policy-
makers have created a mental health environment in which different models must 
co-exist.
2
   
The chapter contrasts the positive acceptance of health and wellbeing as desirable 
attributes against the negative perception of mental health as disease and illness. It 
discusses the effectiveness of the population health approach to mental health.  
Although health is recognised as a positive and desirable human attribute, health 
promotion, and the social agenda of recent mental health policies have not 
significantly altered the view of mental health as a negative concept, rooted in 
abnormality which, as a state of being, is a highly undesirable human condition. 
This concept is discussed more fully in the following chapter while Chapter Three 
discusses how stigma associated with mental illness has, in fact, increased despite 
the prolific output of public policies intent on its reduction.    
Mental health policies represent a government or organisation’s commitment to 
actively address issues of mental ill health within its population. It requires a 
concurrent commitment to provide sufficient human and financial resources so as to 
achieve the intended outcomes. This has not occurred. There has been an inability, 
and/or a reluctance to implement the newly favoured social model approach of 
mental health policies into clinical operational practice. Unlike the physical and 
social impairment origins of the disability paradigm, mental health has the medical 
model of treatment and care at its centre. According to this model, when funding is 
limited, prioritisation is given to treatment and hospitalisation.
3
  Policies that focus 
on issues outside this traditional view of mental health’s medical ‘core business’ 
have little impact on operational practices in what is the permanently inadequately 
funded and resourced mental health sector. Without adequate financial 
                                                 
1 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 1970).  
2 Jerry Tew (ed), Social Perspectives in Mental Health: Developing Social Models to Understand and Work 
with Mental Distress (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2005).  
3 Most countries spending less than 1% of its health budget on mental health; The World Health Organisation, 
‘The World Health Report 2001 – Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope’ (Report, WHO, 2001) 
<http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf>. 
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commitment, a social policy, regardless of its quality, cannot be effective in 
changing negative attitudes if it is given limited practical application.   
A perlustration of Australian mental health policies exposed theoretical and 
definitional inconsistencies among the Commonwealth’s own policies. Also 
identified were inadequacies in state and territory mental health acts regarding their 
compliance with human rights requirements laid down in international instruments 
such as the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care
4
 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.
5
 Even at the international level, mental health policies lack clear 
definitions and conceptual agreement, and are subject to different interpretations 
and inconsistent applications.
6
   
The term ‘mental health’ is itself, a euphemism for ‘mental illness’, ‘mental 
disorder’, ‘mental disease’, ‘psychiatric illness’ and ‘psychiatric disability’. The 
terms are used interchangeably as synonyms,
7
 as much in public policy documents 
as in public conversation, to explicate the socially unacceptable behaviours of 
people stereotyped as irrational, incompetent and dangerous. They are descriptors 
that aid in the identification of the ‘them’ social group which belongs outside, and 
away from the ‘us’ group, a topic discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.   
A research question addressed in Chapter Eight is whether the attitudes of law 
students who have participated in a short, structured clinical legal program founded 
on the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence are positively influenced by the 
experience.  According to Michael Perlin
8
, the legal system is inherently biased 
against mental illness. He argues that lawyers commonly provide incompetent 
representation in matters in which mental illness is a pertinent factor
9
; legislators 
enact laws that promote the differentness of people experiencing mental illness;
10
 
                                                 
4 Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, GA Res 46/119, 
UN GAOR, 75th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/46/119 (17 December 1991).  
5 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007 adopted by the 
General Assembly by resolution A/RES/61/106 ratified by Australia 17 July 2008.  
6 Lance Gostin, ‘Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: The European Convention of Human 
Rights’ (2000) 23 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 125.  
7 R E Kendell, ‘The distinction between personality disorder and mental illness’ (2002) 180 The British Journal 
of Psychiatry 110, 111.  
8 Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000) 55.  
9 Ibid 50.  
10 Ibid 48.  
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judges deliver unfair rulings; and legal academics largely ignore reporting on the 
legal system’s unsatisfactory practices11 because they are all ignorant to their own 
prejudices which are hidden behind a curtain of social acceptance.   
A first step in lifting the curtain of acceptance that hides the legal system’s 
prejudice is to expose the complexities, confusions and vagaries that exist in the 
mental health policy area. These problems provide evidence for; contribute to; and 
maintain the presence of stigma and discriminations associated with mental illness. 
Mental health policies have failed to provide the legal system with a strong guiding 
platform from which the law can best interface with mental illness, bring about 
social change
12
 and ensure that people experiencing mental illness are not 
disadvantaged when they come into contact with the legal system.  
2. THE CONCEPT OF HEALTH 
HEALTH 
BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
The concept of health is viewed as a positive, valued and desired attribute
13
: a 
priceless and indispensable element of living.
14
 It is characterised as a concurrence 
of the physical, psychological, and social although there is some concern that the 
words ‘physical’, ‘mental’ and ‘social well-being’ indicate the ‘need for economic, 
social, political and judicial influences that are way beyond those of health 
professionals.’15  Public health policies strive to attain healthier lives for 
populations by preventing disease through education and regulation and promoting 
healthier lifestyles. The importance given to health as a desirable human value is 
sufficiently weighted that it displaces, in the balance, the rights of adult, rational 
citizens to make decisions regarding behaviours that would not otherwise be subject 
to political and legal intervention.     
                                                 
11 Ibid 56.  
12 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Second Edition) 
(University of Chicago Press, 2008) 
13 Christopher Boorse, ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’ (1977) 44 Philosophy of Science 542.  
14 Alvin Concha et al., ‘Concept Of Health And Health Needs Of Suburban Residents In A Developing 
Country: Qualitative Study’ (2003) 2 Asia Pacific Family Medicine 107.  
15 Saxby Pridmore, Download of Psychiatry, Chapter 32. Chapter 32, p.2, 
<http://eprints.utas.edu.au/287/40/Chapter_32__Medicalization_of_suffering.pdf > 
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In 1948, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Constitution defined health as ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity’.16 This was a new, transformative definition that offered a 
world vision of health for everyone. The meaning was extended beyond the 
prevailing negative medical concept of health at the time - the absence of disease 
17
 
- to the attainment of a positive state of complete well-being. WHO would later 
expand the meaning even further by stating that health was ‘a positive concept 
emphasising social and personal resources, as well as physical capacities’.18  
WHO listed the fundamental conditions and resources necessary for achieving and 
maintaining health: peace, shelter, education, food, income, a stable eco-system, 
sustainable resources, social justice and equity.
19
 It acknowledged that if this 
expression of community health was to be achieved and maintained, legislators and 
policy-makers had to ensure that laws and policies were put in place that 
emphasised an individual’s social well-being rather than focusing on the medical 
concepts of disease, illness and treatment objectives. While Australia’s health 
policies largely reflect this focus change, Australian mental health laws remain 
mired in the medical concepts of disease, illness and treatment objectives.  
The current positivist sense of health may be classed as an ideal of presumptive 
good, framing what are normatively accepted as appropriate behaviours, and setting 
the standard for internal and external assessments of personal well-being and 
effective functioning.  To be situated within this state of health is a desired human 
value of the highest order.
20
 This end value is achieved and maintained by relying 
on lesser values such as the provision of health care by skilled and knowledgeable 
professionals; access to well-resourced and well-equipped health facilities and 
services; and health services that satisfy a wide range of needs including cultural 
and social interests that extend beyond merely the pathological. This ideal is rarely 
                                                 
16 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health 
Conference, New York, 19 June - 22 July 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States 
(Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948. The 
definition has not been amended since 1948. 
17 Boorse, above n 13.   
18 Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion First International Conference on Health Promotion, Ottawa, 21 
November 1986 - WHO/HPR/HEP/95.1 
<http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/>  
19 Ibid.  
20 Michael J. Stahl (ed), Encyclopedia of health care management (Sage Publications, 2004) 123.  
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achieved in practice as health systems commonly suffer from funding and 
resourcing deficiencies which lead to access and service restrictions.  
From the vantage of the goodness and desirability of health, illness is viewed as 
stemming from the medical concept of ‘disease’ which is a pathologically abnormal 
condition, and culturally, highly undesirable.
21
  Disease is a negative attribute, and 
being ill results in the ‘temporary’ suspension of well-being: a period of lapse from 
the norms and directions of a healthy society will exist.
22
  Deviation from the health 
norm brings with it external value judgments regarding the person’s physical and 
mental capacity, decision-making abilities, vulnerability, and level of 
responsibility.
23
 These are matters that are often determined within the legal 
framework of protection and control legislation such as guardianship,
24
 mental 
health
25
 and drug and alcohol
26
 legislation.  Mental health is largely associated with 
illness and disease, abnormality, and fear and avoidance.  
2.1 Population health 
The term, ‘population health’ lacks a clear understanding of its meaning and 
scope.
27
  It does not have a specific definition although public policies and 
academic articles commonly replicate the vastly altered definition of public health 
eugenist, C.E.A. Wilson, as ‘the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging 
life and promoting health through the organised efforts and informed choices of 
society, organisations, public and private,  communities and individuals.’28 Public 
health systems have adopted a dichotomous policy approach of prevention and 
population health. Preventative policy efforts seek to eliminate factors that cause or 
contribute to illness while population health seeks to enhance existing health by 
focusing on individual and community strengths.
29
   
                                                 
21 Juha Räikkä, ‘The social concept of disease’ (1996) 17 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 353, 354.   
22 Ibid 357. 
23 Ibid 356. 
24 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas).  
25 Mental Health Act 1996 (WA).  
26 Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968 (Tas).  
27 David Kindig and Greg Stoddart, ‘What Is Population Health?’ (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 
380.  
28 C E A Wilson, ‘The untilled fields of public health’ (1920) 51 Science 23, 30. 
29 Bonnie Pape and Jean-Pierre Galipeault, ‘Mental Health Promotion for People with Mental Illness’ 
(Discussion Paper, Mental Health Promotion Unit of Health Canada, April 2002) <http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/publicat/mh-sm/mhp02-psm02/pdf/mh_paper_02_e.pdf>.  
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Population health is generally regarded as a ‘conceptual framework for thinking 
about why some populations are healthier than others as well as the policy 
development, research agenda, and resource allocation that flow from this 
framework.’30 Rose proposed that the most efficient way to prevent health problems 
in the individual is to reduce the whole population’s level of risk.31 Achieving this 
outcome of improved health and well-being requires a multiphase approach with the 
development of public health policies that first, build public consensus and an 
authorising environment, identify the problem, increase knowledge from research 
and experience, create public awareness, and set a national agenda.
32
   
The distinction between population health and mental health promotion is even less 
clear.  ‘Population health focuses on the range of conditions that determine health 
and their impact on the population in general, viewed through various life stages, 
and addressed through intersectoral strategies.’33  Mental health promotion is 
concerned with participation and the impacts of social/environmental factors on 
health but, unlike population health, it stresses individual and community control 
over mental health concerns.
34
  
The recent trend of naming specific life conditions as a disease in the social sense of 
the word has caused some concern regarding the ‘medicalisation of life’35, a 
phenomenon that had its policy genesis in WHO’s broad definition, a topic 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. This new social sense of disease has 
triggered a concomitant belief that particular public health practices or actions are 
justified, even obligatory.
36
   
Categorising and labelling people as alcoholics, gamblers, drug users and tobacco 
users for example, marks them as different, suffering from a disease, and ill, all of 
which are conditions that impose on the state an obligation to intervene in the 
person’s life.  It does this via its combined political, medical, and legal institutions 
                                                 
30 T Kue Young, Population Health: Concepts and Methods (Oxford University Press, 1998) 4.  
31 Geoffrey Rose, The Strategy of Preventive Medicine (Oxford University Press, 1993).  
32 Alvin R Tarlov, ‘Public Policy Frameworks for Improving Population Health’ (1999) 896 Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences 281.  
33 Pape and Galipeault, above n 29, 6. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Peter Conrad and Kristin K Barker, ‘The Social Construction of Illness: Key Insights and Policy Implications’ 
(2010) 51 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 67.  
36 Räikkä, above n 21, 357.  
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to direct them back toward experiencing healthy well-being, and equally, to prevent 
others falling victim to ill health.  
3. THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH 
Whether we like it or not, the term mental health ... is firmly established in the 
thought and actions of several groups: First, under the guidance of voluntary 
and governmental agencies, the public has taken hold of the term in spite of 
(or, perhaps, because of) its ambiguity.37  
Generally, ‘mental health’ refers to the enhancement of the state of mental well-
being in an already well population.
38
 However, the level of clear scientific 
guidance that is present in general health tends to be absent in the mental health 
sector where terms are more fluid, lack clear delineation, and are generally used 
synonymously.  There also seems to be a conceptual and textual avoidance existing 
in mental health, a likely product of the complexity of the subject matter but it may 
also be a reflection of the stigma that permeates the topic area.    
The term ‘mental health’ is itself a theoretical construction of governments, mental 
health professionals, families, and other interested groups such as the powerful drug 
lobby to place a positive spin on the negative attributes of disease and illness.
39
  By 
euphemising terms, the public perception that mental illness is a cause for shame, 
and needs to be hidden, or disguised to make it more socially palatable is 
reinforced.  Confused, deficient and false assumptions contribute to the 
inconsistencies and vagaries of language and concepts that are apparent in mental 
health discussion.   
Unlike the polar opposites of illness and health in general health parlance, in mental 
health the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ are conceptually blurred. Using 
the standard health model as a reference guide, mental illness is an umbrella, 
psychopathological term that covers a range of mind-related diseased states with a 
broad spectrum of behavioural disturbances: mental disorders. The social approach 
                                                 
37 Marie Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (Ayer Company Publishers, 1999) 5. 
38 Jayashri Kulkarni, ‘The Cost of Mental Illness’ (Report, Monash Alfred Psychiatry Research Centre, 2010) 1 
<http://www.maprc.org.au/sites/www.maprc.org.au/files/THE%20COST%20OF%20MENTAL%20ILLNESS
%20FINAL_0.pdf>. 
39 Katherine Weare, Promoting mental, emotional, and social health: a whole school approach (Routledge, 
2000).  
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to mental health, a topic discussed more fully in 4.0, views a ‘mental disorder’ as a 
product of society’s failure to ensure adequate and appropriate services that meet 
the needs of people who experience a mental illness.  Although, arriving at a 
positive or precise definition of mental disorder using the social standard is 
difficult.
40
  
In Australia, the combined civil, criminal and administrative processes relevant to 
the legal rights of, and impositions on, people experiencing mental illness is known 
as mental health law.
41
  Clinical, rehabilitation and support services are called 
mental health services.
42
 Hospitals, community treatment centres and other service 
delivery locations are called mental health facilities. Statutes authorising 
involuntarily detention and treatment are called mental health acts.
43
  Psychiatrists, 
psychologists, psychiatric nurses and allied health staff working directly with the 
symptoms and behaviours caused by a mental disorder are called mental health 
professionals. The person experiencing a mental illness is a mental health patient, a 
person labelled as ill, suffering, in need of medical treatment, and potentially 
requiring intervention and control by the state. There are few, if any positive 
attributes associated with the role of the mental health patient who is at the 
epicentre of mental health law.  
3.1 Defining mental health 
Mental health is described by WHO as a state of being in which an individual is 
able to realise their own abilities: cope with the normal stresses of life; and is able 
to work productively and fruitfully; and make a contribution to their community.
44
  
The mentally well person has: 
the capacity to think rationally and logically, and to cope with the transitions, 
stresses, traumas, and losses that occur in all lives, in ways that allow 
                                                 
40 Michael S King, ‘Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book’ (Report, The Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Incorporated, 2009) 79.  
41 In other countries such as the United States of America, it is called Mental Disability Law.  
42 The definition of mental health services contained in the Fourth Mental Health Plan 2009-2014 states that it 
“Refers to services in which the primary function is specifically to provide clinical treatment, rehabilitation or 
community support targeted towards people affected by mental illness or psychiatric disability, and/or their 
families and carers. Mental health services are provided by organisations operating in both the government and 
non government sectors, where such organisations may exclusively focus their efforts on mental health service 
provision or provide such activities as part of a broader range of health or human services.” P.84 
43 The Tasmanian legislation is the Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas).  
44 World Health Organization, Strengthening Mental Health Promotion. Geneva: World Health Organization 
(Fact Sheet, No. 220); 2001b. 
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emotional stability and growth. In general, mentally healthy individuals value 
themselves, perceive reality as it is, accept its limitations and possibilities, 
respond to its challenges, carry out their responsibilities, establish and 
maintain close relationships, deal reasonably with others, pursue work that 
suits their talent and training, and feel a sense of fulfilment that makes the 
efforts of daily living worthwhile.45  
An examination of Commonwealth mental health policy documents demonstrates 
the problems posed by existing definitional inconsistencies.  The results of this 
policy survey indicate that arriving at a consensus Australian definition for mental 
health is unlikely because ‘such a complex and multifaceted concept in a short 
simple statement is just not appropriate or possible’.46  Both the first National 
Mental Health Plan
47
 and the Second National Mental Health Plan
48
 broadly defined 
‘mental health’ as:  
the capacity of individuals and groups to interact with one another and the 
environment in ways that promote subjective well-being, optimal development 
and use of cognitive, affective and relational abilities, and the achievement of 
individual and collective goals consistent with justice.49   
The Third Plan, with far more verbosity, defined ‘mental health’ as:  
A state of emotional and social wellbeing in which the individual can cope 
with the normal stresses of life and achieve his or her potential. It includes 
being able to work productively and contribute to community life. Mental 
health describes the capacity of individuals and groups to interact, inclusively 
and equitably, with one another and with their environment in ways that 
promote subjective wellbeing, and optimise opportunities for development and 
the use of mental abilities. Mental health is not simply the absence of mental 
                                                 
45 Dianne Hales and Robert E Hales, Caring for the Mind: The Comprehensive Guide to Mental Health (Bantam 
Books, 1995) 34. Myers et al devised a wellness model to promote healthy functioning. It has at its centre five 
life tasks - essence or spirituality, work and leisure, friendship, love and self-direction and 12 sub tasks - sense 
of worth, sense of control, realistic beliefs, emotional awareness and coping, problem solving and creativity, 
sense of humour, nutrition, exercise, self care, stress management, gender identity, and cultural identity. See 
also J Melvin Witmer and Thomas J Sweeny, ‘A holistic model for wellness and prevention over the lifespan’ 
(1992) Journal of Counseling and Development 140.  
46 Weare, above n 39, 12.  
47 Department of Heath and Ageing, ‘National Mental Health Plan’ (Plan, Australian Government, April 1992) 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/8E185E7F3B574CCFCA2572220005FF0D/$F
ile/plan92.pdf>. 
48 Australian Health Ministers, ‘Second National Mental Health Plan’ (Plan, Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Family Services, July 1998). 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/0284E597D0DD5B95CA257261001083A7/$F
ile/plan2.pdf>. 
49 Ibid 26.  
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illness. Its measurement is complex and there is no widely accepted 
measurement approach to date. The strong historical association between the 
terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ has led some to prefer the term 
‘emotional and social wellbeing’, which also accords with holistic concepts of 
mental health held by Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders and some 
other cultural groups, or alternatively, the term ‘mental health and 
wellbeing’.50 
It is this definition which highlights a number of the difficulties associated with 
trying to arrive at a single explanation for the concept of mental health. It 
acknowledges the ‘strong historical’ connection between the terms ‘mental health’ 
and ‘mental illness’ but it does not provide any details as to where, and with whom, 
this association lies.  The comment may refer to the public’s recent memory of 
lunatic asylums
51
 as places where strangely different and dangerous people were 
locked away, sometimes for life, from decent, normal people.  Linking the two 
terms and connecting them with negative associations helps perpetuate stigma.  
Rather than trying to define ‘mental health’ for the purpose of clarity and 
consistency, the government has simply noted a discussion that needs to occur but 
that to date has been avoided because it is perceived to be too difficult a task.  The 
interchangeability of the established language and the development of new, positive 
alternative terminology such as ‘emotional and social wellbeing’ do not suggest 
mental health sector growth and strength but rather, point to a disorganised and 
confused attempt to distance itself from the stigma associated with mental illness. 
Defining ‘mental health’ by including disclaimers and preferential alternatives 
suggests policy analysts are ill-equipped to work within the fluid mental health 
parameters. The definition concedes that there is no widely accepted measurement 
approach by which mental health can be measured.  
The current Fourth Mental Health Plan inexplicably omitted a definition for mental 
health from its glossary of terms altogether, which may suggest that it chose to 
follow the WHO tactic which is that the best way to define mental health is simply 
                                                 
50 Australian Health Ministers, ‘National Mental Health Plan 2003-2008’ (Plan, Australian 
Government, July 2003) 35 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/EE630ADE7F40F80FCA2572220002D081/$Fi
le/plan03.pdf>.  
51 Royal Derwent Hospital was Australia’s oldest mental asylum operating from 1827.  It was only closed in 
2000. 
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to avoid trying to do so. Definitions should not, however, be avoidable in public 
policy.
52
 They are useful for thought and language.
53
 Commonly accepted endoxa, 
they remain acceptable until challenged, moving theories, concepts and practices 
forward. They are the premises for complex patterns of reasoning, 
compartmentalising unfamiliar entities into familiar categories.
 54
  ‘Definitions are 
crucial argumentative instruments in law. They support the classification of entities 
in legal categories, and consequently warrant the enforcement of legal 
consequences.’55 Mental health law is built on the concept of mental health, yet the 
language of mental health lacks the clarity, precision and consistency that the law 
requires.  Without clarity, precision and consistency, law lacks predictability
56
 and 
may lead to arbitrary applications of preferential language and differences in 
conceptualising mental health, impacting detrimentally on people experiencing 
mental illness.   
Although a standardised definition of ‘mental health’ may be contentious, lack 
clarity, and be misinterpreted, a bigger problem occurs when terms are 
interchangeable, contradictory, or there is a definitional void altogether.  Mental 
health does not simply confine itself to the provision of medical care but can 
significantly impact on an individual’s legal right to liberty, bodily integrity, life 
choices and financial autonomy - all matters for judicial determination.  If 
individual and collective goals consistent with justice
57
 - qualities of fairness, 
equality, and practical conformity with the law - are to be achieved for people 
experiencing a mental illness, a clear and consistent understanding of mental health, 
as a platform for mental health law, needs to be established.   
                                                 
52 Paula Braveman, ‘Health Disparities and Health Equity: Concepts and Measurement’ (2006) 27 Annual 
Review Of Public Health 167.  
53 Plato (429–347 B.C.) Theory of Forms, A discussion will usually require at some point, an explicit definition 
of one or more of the general terms on which the discussion hinges. Even if a definition is misdefined, its 
wrongness can be instructive. See William David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Clarendon Press, 1951).  
54 Fabrizio Macagno, ‘Definitions in law’ (2010) 2  Bulletin Suisse de Linguistique Appliquée 199.  
55 Ibid 215.  
56 Constantin Stefanou and Helen Xanthaki, Drafting legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate Publishing, 
2008).  
57 Australian Health Ministers, ‘Second National Mental Health Plan’ (Plan, Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Family Services, July 1998) 26 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/0284E597D0DD5B95CA257261001083A7/$F
ile/plan2.pdf>. 
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3.2 Mental health problems 
Mental health problems are situated within the hierarchical framework of mental 
health.  They are indicative of a policy category of ‘not quite a mental illness’ when 
measured against traditional medical diagnoses such as schizophrenia, bipolar and 
depression.
58
 They have developed as a consequence of medicalisation: the 
occurrence of human problems or experiences defined as medical problems, usually 
in terms of illnesses, diseases, or syndromes.
59
 Usually occurring as a result of life 
stressors, a mental health problem interferes with a person's cognitive, emotional or 
social abilities, but may not meet the criteria of an illness. A person with a mental 
health problem may also experience the disadvantages associated with a mental 
illness including prejudice and discrimination, and authoritative intervention by the 
state with its imposition of restrictions, and concurrent decrease in permitted 
decision-making. While potentially subject to the same control measures of the 
legal system, mental health problems do not attract the same protections. The law in 
Australia does not recognise discrimination against people who experience mental 
health problems because ‘mental health problems’ do not fall within the disease 
centric definitions of ‘mental illness’ or ‘disability’ which is ‘a total or partial loss 
of the person's bodily or mental functions’. 60  
‘Mental illness is still not well understood in the community. There is confusion 
about what it means and how it can be managed.’61 The addition of ‘mental health 
problems’ to the conceptual and language mix of mental health reflects a crossover 
between what have historically been regarded as separate medical and social issues, 
causing even more confusion about mental illness. Even for mental health 
professionals, the distinction between ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health problem’ 
is complex, and not well understood.
62
  Social problems such as poverty, illiteracy 
and alcoholism have been medicalised as diseases and people who were previously 
labelled as socially disadvantaged are now additionally labelled as mentally ill, a 
                                                 
58 Howard H Goldman and Gerald N Grob, ‘Defining 'Mental Illness' In Mental Health Policy’ (2006) 25 
Health Affairs 737.  
59 Conrad and Barker, above n 35.  
60 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 3.  
61 Victoria Legal Aid, Mental health and your rights <http://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/mentalhealth.htm>.  
62 Tricia Szirom, Debbie King and Kathy Desmond, ‘Barriers To Service Provision For Young People With 
Presenting Substance Misuse And Mental Health Problems’ (Report, Australian Government Department of 
Family and Community Services, October 2004).  
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label that attracts very high levels of negative stereotyping, prejudice and 
discrimination.  This is discussed more fully in Chapter Three.  
Theoretically, the person experiencing poor mental health will either have a 
biomedical mental disorder or a psychosocial mental health problem which is a 
disorder caused or influenced by life experience and includes alcoholism and 
aggression (see below at 4.4).   Either cause, however, increases the person’s 
vulnerability to stigma: civil, political, and socio-economic disadvantage, and their 
interaction with the legal system. Mental health problems are classed as significant 
indicators of poverty, and are generally conceded as both a determinant,
 
and a 
consequence of social issues including poor mental health,
63
 homelessness;
64
 
unemployment;
65
 poor education;
66
 and increased risk of contact with the criminal 
justice system.
67
  They cut across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines to affect a 
large proportion of communities worldwide.
68
   
Defining a ‘mental health problem’ has been an expanding process. Australia’s 
Third Mental Health Plan 2003-2008 defined it as a disruption in the interaction 
between the individual, the group and the environment which produced a 
diminished state of mental health.
69
 This definition was very broad.  Any situation 
or circumstance that disrupted the subjective well-being of a person, such as their 
participation in a personal disagreement, receipt of bad news, or disappointment in 
failing to realise a particular want had the potential to trigger a mental health 
problem. While acknowledging the complexity and diversity of views in defining 
mental illness and mental health disorders, the Plan, frequently used a number of 
                                                 
63 Vijaya Murali and Femi Oyebode, ‘Poverty, social inequality and mental health’ (2004) Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 216, 217.  
64 Mental Health Council of Australia, ‘Home Truths: Mental Health, Housing and Homelessness in Australia’ 
(Report, Mental Health Council of Australia, March 2009) 
<http://www.mhca.org.au/documents/MHCA%20Home%20Truths%20Layout%20%20FINAL.pdf>.  
65 Mental Health Council of Australia, ‘Let’s Get to Work: A National Mental Health Employment Strategy’ 
(Report, Mental Health Council of Australia, November 2007) <http://www.mhca.org.au/documents/MHCA-
Employment%20Report-final.pdf>. 
66 Gavin Turrell et al., ‘Health Inequalities in Australia: Morbidity, health behaviours, risk factors and health 
service use’ (Report No 2, Queensland University of Technology and the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, March 2006) 93 <http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/phe/hiamhbrfhsu/hiamhbrfhsu.pdf>. 
67 Matthew T Theriot and Steven P Segal, ‘Involvement with the Criminal Justice System Among New Clients 
at Outpatient Mental Health Agencies’ (2005) 56 Psychiatric Services 179, 179. The American study found that 
36% of new community patients had at least one criminal conviction with 19% having a felony conviction. 
“Common charges and convictions included petty theft, assault and battery, felony theft, narcotics offenses, and 
misdemeanor drug offenses. Clients who had been involved with the criminal justice system were more likely to 
be homeless, to have drug dependence, to have greater psychological disability, and to have less personal 
empowerment than other clients.”  
68 Lester Breslow (ed), Encyclopedia of Public Health Volume 3, (Gale Cengage, 2002). 
69 Szirom, King and Desmond, above n 62, 35.  
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different terms including ‘mental health disorder’, ‘mental health issue’, ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘mental health problem’, seemingly interchangeably, to describe a 
number of conditions, exacerbating the existing confusion.  
The Fourth Mental Health Plan 2009 - 2014 narrowed the definition by stating that 
for a person to have a ‘mental health problem’, they had to experience diminished 
emotional, cognitive or social abilities but not at the level that satisfied the criteria 
for diagnosing a mental illness.
70
  What this, the current definition has done is 
expand the parameters of mental health to include a lack of social ability. It has 
created the impression that a mental health problem is not ‘quite’ a mental illness. It 
also irrevocably associates social disadvantage with mental illness in the public 
mind. For example, Phelan et al. found that much of the public operates under the 
assumption that many homeless people are mentally ill and react to them 
accordingly: ‘in effect they transfer the stigma of mental illness to homeless 
people’.71  
The existing stigma associated with the poor and homeless is intensified by the 
coexistence of the ‘mentally ill’ label. Homeless people identified as having a 
mental disorder represent a substantial proportion of the people incarcerated within 
the criminal justice system, for example, although the cohort is representative of 
only a very small proportion of the total population.
72
  This group is also 
incarcerated for substantially longer periods. This suggests that the prison system is 
de facto assuming responsibility for problems traditionally belonging in the social 
welfare system, in areas such as public housing.
73
 Social problems have become 
erroneously simplified as psychiatric problems, resulting in the creation of overly 
simple interventions and policies to address a complex phenomenon.
74
 
  
                                                 
70 Ibid 84.  
71 Jo C Phelan et al., ‘The Stigma of Homelessness: The Impact of the Label "Homeless" on Attitudes Toward 
Poor’ (1997) 60 Social Psychology Quarterly 323, 327. 
72 Dale E McNiel, Renee L Binder and Jo C Robinson, ‘Incarceration Associated With Homelessness, Mental 
Disorder, and Co-occurring Substance Abuse’ (2005) 56 Psychiatric Services 840.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Jeffrey Draine et al., ‘Role of Social Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and Homelessness Among Persons 
With Serious Mental Illness’ (2002) 53 Psychiatric Services 565.  
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3.3 ‘Mental health’ as recognition of human potential 
There has been a recent trend in public health policies to link human potential with 
mental health, or perhaps more accurately, link the failure to achieve a non-
measurable standard of wellbeing and optimal development with poor mental health 
and psychological disability. WHO’s definition of health as ‘a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity’75 positions mental health as an essential dimension integral to attainment 
of the state of being healthy.  Mental health is the reference point: a relative state of 
mind in which an individual is able to psychologically cope with, and adjust to the 
recurrent stresses of everyday living in a manner that is socially acceptable.
76
   
A mentally healthy person is recognised for their possession of positive 
characteristics that include a sense of contentment, a zest for living, the ability to 
laugh and have fun, a good balance between work and leisure, self confidence and 
high self esteem, and the ability to build and maintain fulfilling relationships that 
are reflective of emotional, psychological and social well-being.
77
 However, the 
pressures of modern living have given unprecedented cause for the ordinary 
person’s inability to meet optimal standards for acceptable social functioning78 to 
the extent that their psychological inability has become both a source, and a 
measure of mental illness.   
People, who in the past would not have presented with symptoms that satisfied the 
existence of a mental illness, are now being labelled ‘mentally ill’ due to their 
inability to function at normative standards of social expectations.  What has 
historically been society’s tendency to blame social and moral problems on medical 
causes has developed into the 21st century’s medicalisation of human life 
experiences, a phenomenon which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.  
Increasingly, more and more people are coming before the legal system carrying the 
                                                 
75 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health 
Conference, New York, 19 June - 22 July 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States 
(Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948. The 
definition has not been amended since 1948. 
76 Keith Anderson et al (eds), Mosby's Medical, Nursing and Allied Health Dictionary (Mosby, 5th ed, 1998).  
77 William C Compton, Introduction to Positive Psychology (Wadsworth, 2005).  
78 See Chapter 22 ‘Stress’ in Julia Russell and Matt Jarvis, Angles on Applied Psychology (Nelson Thornes, 
2003). 
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label of ‘mentally ill’ which can have a detrimental impact on their legal 
outcomes.
79
   
Being mentally healthy is having the capacity to interact with others, inclusively 
and equitably, and with the environment, in ways that promote satisfactory levels of 
subjective wellbeing and optimal development.
80
  It entails the person having the 
use of cognitive, affective and relational abilities.
81
  Mental health, defined in this 
way, requires far more than merely establishing the absence of a mental illness, 
mental disease, or mental disorder. It requires the realisation of human potential. By 
normatively conceptualising mental health as a state of cognitive and emotional 
well-being in which the individual realises his or her own abilities; has the ability to 
cope with the normal stresses of life; works productively and fruitfully; and is able 
to make a contribution to his or her community
82
 posits the requirement to self-
examine personal attributes and self capabilities to the extent of reaching an 
understanding of the very nature of what it is to be a human being.  But this type of 
self reflection must occur in a world of changing ideals and values.  
By taking a neoliberal approach and creating a definitional anchoring of mental 
health to human potential, public policy makes the statement that the social worth 
of an individual is to be measured according to the level of material success, and 
that peace and happiness are achieved from the value of honest hard work.
83
  This 
opinion is not new.  In the past, having a good work ethic and possessing skills 
were personal characteristics likely to ensure stability and longevity in employment. 
In the current employment climate, economic trend analysis, technological 
advances, legislative regulations
84
, financial growth indicators and profit margins, 
                                                 
79 Susan Henderson, ‘Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System’ (Review, Mental Health Co-ordinating 
Council, May 2003) <http://www.mhcc.org.au/documents/PosPaper%20CrimJustice%20May03.pdf>. See also 
National Coalition for the Homeless, ‘Mental Illness and Homelessness’ (Fact Sheet No 5, National Coalition 
for the Homeless, June 2006) <http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/Mental_Illness.pdf>. See 
also Lisa Handwerker, ‘Medical risk: implicating poor pregnant women’ (1994) 38 Social Science & Medicine 
665.  
80 Australian Health Ministers, above n 50, 5.   
81 Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
‘National Health Priority Areas Report Mental health: A Report Focusing on Depression’ (Report No PHE 11, 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1998) 5.  
82 Mental Health Promotion Case Studies from Countries, A Joint Publication of the World Federation for 
Mental Health and the World Health Organization, World Federation for Mental Health (2004) World Health 
Organization <http://www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/en/case_studies_report.pdf>.  
83 A strong and continuing protestant value is that all that is good comes from a man’s hard labour. This point is 
discussed well in Cynthia Lynn Lyerly’s book Methodism and the Southern Mind, 1770-1810 (Oxford 
University Press, 1998).  
84 ‘One third of workforce sacked at NSW chicken meatworks’, ABC, 07/02/2012. ‘A third of the Inghams 
Chicken says it's had to cut around a third of its workforce (80) at the Byron Bay site, because it can't afford to 
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often factors well beyond the control of both employees and employers are much 
more likely to influence employment decisions.
85
  It is becoming increasingly 
difficult for people to realise their full potential in the modern world when there is 
little predictability to the outcomes of the decisions they make.  
The ranks of the poor and disadvantaged on every urban landscape have historically 
been stereotypically blamed for lacking the personal desire to work gainfully; the 
discipline necessary to maintain employment; and for failing to possess a proper 
sense of responsibility.
86
 Causal indicators for unemployment and poverty such as 
poor education, housing, and health care are largely ignored by the public 
perception in the stereotypical construction of the disadvantaged as ‘dole bludgers’, 
‘free loaders’ and ‘welfare cheats’.87   
The linking of mental health with the failure to reach human potential not only 
reinforces the public perception that people who are socially disadvantaged have a 
biomedical mental illness, it contributes to the creation of a distinct new group of 
‘mentally ill’ individuals that includes for example, people who are divorced, have 
never married, are shy, work a lot, or simply don’t laugh enough.  It generates a 
moralistic perspective that blames and punishes individuals who fail to demonstrate 
the capacity to cultivate a subjective level of wellbeing, labeling them, ‘mentally 
unhealthy’.  This new label has the potential of substantially increasing the numbers 
of people finding themselves subjected to the social stigmatisation and 
marginalisation associated with the personal experience of mental illness. It also 
increases the likelihood that should they come into contact with the legal system for 
which the central concern is risk minimisation, they will be discriminated against.
88
 
This is evidenced in Chapter Six which examines recent Australian family court 
                                                                                                                                        
upgrade its waste water facility to meet Environmental Protection Authority standards.’ 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rural/news/content/201202/s3424547.htm>  
85 Vicor Zarnowitz , ‘Theory and History Behind Business Cycles: Are the 1990s the Onset of a Golden Age?’ 
(1999) 13 Journal of Economic Perspectives 69.  
86 Judith Goode, ‘How Urban Ethnography Counters Myths about the Poor’ in George Gmelch, Robert V 
Kemper and Walter P Zenner (eds), Urban life: readings in the anthropology of the city (Waveland Press, 2002) 
279.  
87 Tony Eardley and George Matheson, ‘Australian Attitudes to Unemployment and Unemployed People’ 
(Discussion Paper, No 102, Social Policy Research Centre, June 1999). See also Michael J Dee, ‘Harsh times at 
the Ministry of Fear? Australia's diminished citizenship of the working poor’ (Paper presented at Social Change 
in the 21st Century, Brisbane, 21 November 2003).  
88 Steve Turner, ‘Risk assessment and management’ in Tim Riding, Caron Swant and Bob Swann (eds), The 
Handbook Of Forensic Learning Disabilities (Radcliffe Publishing, 2005).  
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decision-making in parenting matters where a parent has, or is perceived to have, a 
mental illness.  
3.4 Poor mental health 
The commitment of western societies to reason as a primary value89 sets the design 
and constraints of what is acceptable human behaviour.  Any impediment perceived 
to cause a decrease in a person’s ability to rationalise is considered to negatively 
impact on their actions and behaviour thereby causing social dysfunction.  The 
value of social performance is another element by which a person can be judged as 
socially dysfunctional and consequently, as experiencing mental health problems; a 
psychiatric disability; or diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness.  Ascribing 
poor mental health to an individual is a societal response to poor social 
functioning.
90
 
The level of personal happiness and satisfaction is usually judged against the 
measure of performance in careers and relationships
91
 and when evaluating 
happiness and self satisfaction, there is a tendency to apply disproportionate weight 
to income and health as the primary indicators of wellbeing.
92
  A recent global 
study of more than 150 countries identified the five essential elements of wellbeing 
that differentiate a thriving life from one spent suffering as - career, social, 
financial, physical, and community engagement.
 93
  The results suggested that 66% 
of the population are achieving optimal results in at least one of the essential 
element areas while only 7% thrive in all five.
94
   
The reason for this low result may be explained in part by the fact that often the 
factors leading to the emotional outcomes of wellbeing are beyond a person’s 
control.  For example, having a genetic disease will not be cured through hard work 
                                                 
89 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Vintage Books, 
1988). In this, his first book, Foucault examines the ideas, practices, institutions, art and literature relating to 
madness in Western history.  In it he argues that the gradual disappearance of leprosy left a void which was 
filled by madness. In the 17th century, a movement which Foucault called the Great Confinement redirected the 
physical and social exclusion of lepers toward the mad who were locked away and institutionalized.  By the 18th 
century, the mad were treated as animal-like. They had lost the essential element that separated humans from 
beasts: their reason.  
90 Lynne Friedli, ‘Mental health, resilience and inequalities’ (Report, World Health Organization, 2009).  
91 Sharon Jeffcoat Bartley, William Judge and Sharon Judge, ‘Antecedents of Marital Happiness and Career 
Satisfaction: An Empirical Study of Dual-Career Managers’ (2007) 1 Journal of Business and Public Affairs 
<http://www.scientificjournals.org/journals2007/articles/1059.htm>. 
92 Tom Rath and James K Harter, Wellbeing: The Five Essential Elements (Gallup Press, 2010).  
93 Ibid.   
94 Ibid.    
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and commitment, and having a strong work ethic will not alter the likelihood that 
the blue collar worker made redundant at age 56 will find it difficult to find new 
full-time employment quickly, if at all.  Feeling unhappy or discontented, or simply 
existing in apathy, and feeling neither, can be consequences of personal impotence, 
and inadequacy in completing the tasks of life necessary to achieve expected ideals. 
This combination of powerlessness and sense of inadequacy is a cause of the rising 
rates for depression,
95
 
96
  the emblematic malaise of our time,
97
  and which is 
particularly evident in the relationship matters dealt with within the family law 
system in those matters in which mental illness is a factor, a topic discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
Poor mental health has become a major public health concern because of the 
adverse effects it has on functioning, economic productivity, capacity for healthy 
relationships and families, physical health, and overall quality of life.
98
  The 
emerging discipline of mental health promotion is proactively charged with 
preventing mental health problems from occurring rather than reactively providing 
treatment related services after the event.
99
  This policy pinpoints a person’s mental 
health and wellbeing as lying within their social and economic domains.  
Consequently, mental health promotion addresses the determinants to mental health 
and wellbeing such as social inclusion, having a valued social position, physical and 
psychological security, opportunities for self determination and control over  life, 
and access to meaningful employment, education, income and housing.
100
   
Mental health problems are viewed as the antithesis of mental well-being, and 
maintaining a state of good mental health is a fundamental goal. An assessment of a 
person’s mental health as good is the measure used to judge that the person has the 
                                                 
95 1 in 5 Australians will experience depression at some point in their lifetime: around one million adults and 
100,000 young people live with depression each year; depression is currently the leading cause of non-fatal 
disability in Australia, but only 3 per cent of the population identifies it as a major health problem; over six 
million working days are lost each year in Australia as a result of depression; depression costs the Australian 
community over $600 million each year; beyondblue <http://www.beyondblue.org.au/>. 
96 Kelly G Lambert, ‘Rising rates of depression in today’s society: Consideration of the roles of effort-based 
rewards and enhanced resilience in day-to-day functioning’ (2006) 30 Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 
497.  
97 Zygmunt Bauman, The Individualized Society (Polity Press, 2001) 42.  
98 Breslow, above n 68.   
99 Helen Keleher and Rebecca Armstrong, ‘Evidence-based mental health promotion resource’ (Report, 
Victorian Government Department of Human Services, 2006) 
<http://www.health.vic.gov.au/healthpromotion/downloads/mental_health_resource.pdf>. 
100 Friedli, above n 90. See also Helen Keleher and Rebecca Armstrong, ‘Evidence-based mental health 
promotion resource’ (Report, Victorian Government Department of Human Services, 2006) 
<http://www.health.vic.gov.au/healthpromotion/downloads/mental_health_resource.pdf>. 
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psychological resilience to adapt to the full range of life’s demands and the ability 
to manage the traumas, stresses and disappointments of living.
101
  The capacity to 
cope is a valued and idealised objective of a functionalist society because it 
guarantees that normalcy is maintained. The problem is that it is becomingly 
increasingly more difficult for mentally healthy people to cope in their daily lives. 
Factors such as the mounting financial stress on families
102
 and employment 
uncertainty
103
 contribute to relationship breakdowns which increase a person’s 
potential to develop mental health problems.  This may then be exacerbated by a 
legal system that is inherently prejudiced toward people experiencing mental 
problems.  
4. THE SOCIAL MODEL APPROACH TO MENTAL 
HEALTH POLICIES 
The social model approach to mental health relates to a psychological concept to 
explain that mental health is affected by social causes such as negative attitudes and 
social exclusion and focuses on educating people and enabling them to regain 
control of their lives.  Increasingly, the social model approach is being adopted as 
the ideological and pragmatic framework for Australian mental health policies. 
However, despite the strong support given to applying this approach to mental 
health policies by addressing the interrelationship of mental distress and the 
problems of everyday life to mental health, it has not resulted in the creation of a 
single, coherent, social model.
104
 There is a lack of clarity as to what the social 
approach means in mental health practice and it has not had any significant 
influence on current biomedical thinking and practice.
105
 The model is too loosely 
defined and its language is open to different interpretations.  Its implementation is 
ad hoc and fails to adequately address the status and needs of people experiencing 
mental illness which differ from people in the disability sector.  The impairment 
ideology of the model is incongruous to mental health because ‘impairment’ cannot 
                                                 
101 Friedli, above n 90.  
102 Arthur Karabatos, Andrew Gill and Andrew Crawshaw-Fardouly, ‘Australian Mortgage Delinquencies by 
Postcode’ (Report, Moody’s Investor Service, 28 September 2011) 
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/66629751/Report-Aussie-Mortgage-Delinquencies-by-Postcode-Sep2011>. 
103 Janet Mantler et al., ‘Coping with employment uncertainty: a comparison of employed and unemployed 
workers’ (2005) 10 Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 200.  
104 Tew, above n 2, 9. 
105 Ibid 14.  
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be understood as a fixed structural or mechanical abnormality, not in the same way 
that deafness, blindness, or paralysis can.  
Historically, public health policies were founded on an acceptance of the 
biomedical perception of normalcy, and the narrow band of legitimate, scientific 
knowledge and practices that rested in the medical profession.
106
 The ‘problem’ was 
with the diseased person, and public health policies responded with a 
medical/individualistic approach of service delivery: treatment, hospital care, and 
community supports to cure, or alleviate the effects of the disease.
107
 The social 
model on the other hand, locates the ‘problem’ within society, a view that 
represented an ideological reversal of the internal to the external. It is a conceptual 
framework in which improvements in health and wellbeing are made by addressing 
the social and environmental determinants of health, in combination with biological 
and medical factors.
108
  The public policy adoption of the social model of health, 
with its departure from the biomedical model of disease, marked a changeover from 
‘old public health’ to ‘new public health’.109 
The social model emerged from the publication of The Fundamental Principles of 
Disability
110
 in 1976,
111
 quickly gaining academic credibility
112
 and widespread 
favour with the disability sector.
113
 It is currently the dominant model for 
researching disability.
114
 The social model was a reaction, and an alternative, to the 
traditional biomedical paradigm that regards the person and their symptoms as the 
sole focus of intervention.  The person-centric biomedical model sets the disease, 
disorder, and illness at the immutable heart of the social problems being 
                                                 
106 Kate Seelman, ‘Trends in rehabilitation and disability: transition from a medical model to an integrative 
model’ (2004) 22 Disablity World  <www.disabilityworld.org/01-03_04/access/rehabtrends1.shtml>. 
107 Glenn Roberts and Paul Wolfson, ‘The rediscovery of recovery: open to all’ (2004) 10 Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 37.  
108 Department of Human Services, ‘Community health counselling: Policy framework and program standards’ 
(Policy framework, Victorian Government Department, February 2009) 66.  
109 Maria Joyce, ‘From past to present; the changing focus of public health’ (MSc dissertation, University of 
Lincoln, unpublished) <http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/1839/3/Public_health_paper.pdf>. 
110 ‘Fundamental Principles of Disability’, The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and the 
Disability Alliance, A summary of the discussion held on 22nd November, 1975, < http://disability-
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/UPIAS-fundamental-principles.pdf> 
111 Colin Barnes and Mike Oliver, ‘Disability: A Sociological Phenomenon Ignored by Sociologists’ (Research 
Paper, June 1993) <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Barnes/soc%20phenomenon.pdf>. 
112 Victor Finkelstein, Attitudes and disabled people (World Rehabilitation Fund, 1980). Also Michael Oliver, 
The politics of disablement (Macmillan, 1990). Also Michael Oliver, Understanding disability: from theory to 
practice (Macmillan, 1996).  
113   Disability Council of NSW (Disability Council), A Question of Justice: Access to Participation for People 
with Disabilities in Contact with the Justice System, Disability Council, Sydney, 2003, p. 19  
114 Guy Dewsbury et al., ‘The anti-social model of disability’ (2004) 19 Disability & Society 145.  
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experienced and advocates changing the individual by curing them, or alleviating 
their pain and suffering. The social model, on the other hand, seeks to change 
society and the ways in which it responds to the person’s needs and interests.115  
The social model emphasises society’s responsibility to effect positive changes in 
the well-being and prosperity of impaired individuals and their communities. The 
‘disability’ is perceived as a function of ‘society’s failure to provide appropriate 
services and adequately ensure the needs of disabled people are fully taken into 
account in its social organisation’.116 It imposes a social obligation to ameliorate 
services and displace social and economic barriers, exclusions and discriminations, 
the historical sources of disability. In mental health, however, the sources of mental 
illness are innate or acquired genetic or biological factors that render a person 
vulnerable to psychosocial and environmental factors, and it is this vulnerability, 
working in unison with structural environmental forces that can manifest in the 
unacceptable behaviours of a person who is experiencing a mental illness.
117
  
Now well ensconced within the disability sector, the social model is perceived as a 
dynamic, conceptual framework for coherent and effective collective action.
118
 
Although the social model does not have a set of rules that define it, only loose 
definitions characterised by certain attributes such as a lack of functioning,
119
 it 
underpins a commitment to civil and human rights, self-organisation, independent 
living, social inclusion and anti-discrimination and has become the ideological 
litmus test for progressive policies and laws.
120
  The shift away from internal 
disablement based on an individual’s impairment to external disablement resulting 
from the social system’s failure to enable the person means that any fault or blame 
rests with society, and not with the individual. In this way, it is viewed as an 
apparatus for the dismantling of stigma. `The achievement of the disability 
                                                 
115 Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson, ‘The social model of disability: an outdated ideology?’ (2002) 2 
Research in Social Science and Disability 9.  
116 Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability From Theory to Practice (MacMillan Press, 1996) 32.  
117 Jonathan Kenneth Burns, ‘Mental Health and Inequity: A Human Rights Approach to Inequality, 
Discrimination, and Mental Disability’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights 19.  
118 Peter Beresford and Jan Wallcraft, ‘Psychiatric System Survivors and Emancipatory Research: Issues, 
overlaps and differences’ in Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer (eds), Doing Disability Research (The Disability 
Press, 1997) 66.   
119 International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), The ICF was officially endorsed by 
all 191 WHO Member States in the Fifty-fourth World Health Assembly on 22 May 2001(resolution WHA 
54.21) 
120 Shakespeare and Watson, above n 115.  
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movement has been to break the link between our bodies and our social situation, 
and to focus on the real cause of disability, i.e. discrimination and prejudice.’121  
4.1 Mental illness and the social model – a problematic fit 
Laws are an important tool in any attempt to reduce social exclusion and improve 
well-being because they can remove barriers.
122
 Interpreting a ‘barrier free 
environment’ however has generated a policy focus on mobility impairment and 
accessibility in areas such as transport, buildings and communication.
123
 For 
example, the Tasmanian government in 2011advised that discussions were 
underway at a national level to develop a Premises Standard under the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) to improve transparency and predictability in 
relation to legislative requirements for providing access to new buildings and/or 
existing buildings being renovated or extended, and to improve the current level of 
compliance with the Act.
124
   However, for people experiencing mental illness, ‘you 
could try to remove as many barriers as possible but pain, hearing voices and 
feeling the need to self harm may still exist’.125  Mental illness may be as equally 
disabling for each individual but the experiences may be vastly different. Mental 
illness does not sit easily within the disability social model approach taken by 
policy-makers. 
Mental illness is an impairment that is not easily seen.  It is a condition that may not 
be permanent. It is also episodic in that significant disruption to normal functioning 
will commonly occur in peaks and valleys throughout a person’s life, and the 
frequency and severity of dysfunctional episodes is different for each person.
126
 
This indicates a level of inconsistency in individual service needs that is not so 
apparent in the disability sector. Impairment generally for the ‘disabled’ person is 
                                                 
121 Tom Shakespeare, ‘A Response to Liz Crow’ (1992) Coalition 40.  
122 Roger Mackett, Kamalasudhan Achuthan and Helena Titheridge, ‘Reducing social exclusion by removing 
the barriers to everyday physical activity’ (Presentation at the 2nd  International Congress on Physical Activity 
and Public Health, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 13-16 April 2008).  
123 Ministry of Social Affairs, ‘Accessibility for the Disabled - A Design Manual for a Barrier Free 
Environment’ (Manual, United Nations, 2003) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/designm/>. 
124 Department of Premier and Cabinet, ‘Disability Action Framework for Action 2013-2017 – A Tasmanian 
Government plan for people with disability’ (Framework, Tasmania Government, December 2012) 
<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/cdd/policy/our_policies/disability_framework_for_action/4>. 
125 Greater London Action on Disability (GLAD), ‘Reclaiming the Social Model of Disability’ (Conference 
Report, GLAD, 2000) 7 <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/GLAD/Social%20Model%20of%20Disability%20Conference%20Report.pdf>. 
126 Vera A Morgan, ‘People living with psychotic illness 2010: Report on the second Australian national survey 
of psychotic illness’ (Report, Department of Health and Aging Australian Government, November 2011) 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/mental-pubs-p-psych10>. 
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often permanent, and largely unalterable. In contrast, the common expectation of 
mental impairment is that it manifests in episodes of temporary behavioural 
aberrance which are medically treatable and controlled.   
Where the social model in disability presents the ‘problem’ as external, and beyond 
individual responsibility, in mental health, responsibility is laid squarely with the 
person experiencing the mental illness. It is they who must make internal changes 
through engaging with treatment, and if they do not, they are blamed, and 
potentially liable to legal compulsion. So, for example, parents experiencing a 
mental illness who appear in parenting matters before the Family Court, are 
expected to change how they parent and how they interact in their relationships with 
their children to an appropriate standard of ‘meaningfulness’, a standard discussed 
in Chapter Six.  
The people who experience a mental illness do not necessarily consider themselves 
as being disabled because they associate disability with the medicalisation of their 
distress.
127
  They may demonstrate anxiety about being associated with the 
negatives linked to the disabled group which is true in reverse, in that people with a 
disability hold the same stereotypes and fears associated with mental illness as do 
the wider public. ‘[T]here is a lot of ‘sanism’ in the disability movement.’128 Mental 
illness as a disability is questionable when disability implies a long term 
unchangeable condition.
129
 
The differences between disability and mental health are quite hard to 
negotiate. A lot of people with mental illness don’t see themselves as disabled 
and don’t see the advantage of campaigning on joint things around 
discrimination. Disability organisations don’t always get mental health and 
don’t want to be seen as mentally defective.130 
                                                 
127 Beresford and Wallcraft, above n 118.  
128 Anglicare Tasmania and Tasmanian Mental Health Consumer Network, ‘Experts by Experience: 
Strengthening the mental health consumer voice in Tasmania’ (Research Paper, Anglicare Tasmania, 2009) 30 
<http://www.sswahs.nsw.gov.au/mhealth/content/pdf/Experts_by_Experience.pdf>.  
129 Ibid. See also Peter Beresford and Jan Wallcraft, ‘Psychiatric System Survivors and Emancipatory Research: 
Issues, overlaps and differences’ in Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer (eds), Doing Disability Research (The 
Disability Press, 1997).   
130 Anglicare Tasmania and Tasmanian Mental Health Consumer Network, above n 128.  
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The social model approach has been considered as helpful at a systemic level where 
a Marxist focus on social oppression and discrimination
131
 brought the issue of 
prejudice and discrimination to the fore of public policy. On a personal level, many 
people interpret their mental illness ‘in terms of different understanding, experience 
or perceptions, rather than as an impairment.’132 Although labelled ‘disabled’, they 
generally view themselves as ill, or experiencing distress at certain times during 
their life, that impact temporarily on their proper functioning in society.
133
 They 
may acknowledge having difficulties but not having a disability.
134
 Although the 
social model of disability does not appear to represent the needs and interests of 
people experiencing a mental illness particularly well, its focus on social 
inclusiveness has brought it many supporters.
135
 Social relationships and social 
supports are viewed as extremely important for good mental health, the promotion 
of recovery, and for decreasing the chance of relapse.
136
 But the social model does 
not seamlessly overlay the different experiences of people with a mental illness.
137
  
Interpreting a practical implementation of the model in the disability sector has 
resulted in a concentration on the issues that impact on a person’s daily life such as 
accessibility issues, housing, safety from violence, and welfare payments.
138
  While 
these essential needs and rights have equal importance for the well-being of all 
people experiencing disadvantage and vulnerability, the social model’s crossover 
from disability into mental health policy has contributed to the existing confusions 
and contradictions in the area of mental health without providing a substantive 
impact on mental health practice, or the legal system. The law still perpetuates the 
traditional view of disability as something inherent in the person rather than the 
social construct that is discussed below.   
                                                 
131 Mike Oliver, ‘Social policy and disability: some theoretical issues’ (1986) 1 Disability, Handicap and 
Society 5.  See also Paul Abberly, ‘The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of 
Disability’ (1987) 2 Disability, Handicap and Society 5. Also Deborah Marks, Disability: controversial debates 
and psychosocial perspectives (Routledge, 1999).  
132 Beresford and Wallcraft, above n 118, 66.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Australian Government, JobAccess - help and workplace solutions for the employment of people with 
disability, 
<http://jobaccess.gov.au/ServiceProviders/Assisting_job_seekers/Supporting_jobseekers_with_different_types_
of_disability/What_is_disability/Pages/Understanding_winder_deba.aspx>.  
135 Beresford and Wallcraft, above n 118, 66.  See also Debra Rickwood, ‘Pathways of Recovery: Preventing 
further episodes of mental illness (monograph)’ (Monograph, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006).  
136 David J Pevalin and David P Goldberg, ‘Social precursors to onset and recovery from episodes of common 
mental illness’ (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 299.  
137 Beresford and Wallcraft, above n 118, 66.  
138 Tew, above n 2, 9.  
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4.2 Defining disability 
Compounding the conceptual and definitional confusion in mental health is the fact 
that there is also no single definition of ‘disability’ either.139 In Australia, 
definitions and meanings can vary between Commonwealth and state policy and 
legislation, and even between agencies within jurisdictions, according to the context 
and purpose. In the policy context, the development of WHO’s International 
Classification of Functioning Disability and Health
140
 in 2001 shifted the focus of 
disability from cause to impact which is reflected in the policy definitions of 
‘disability’ that are broad, and socially inclusive. In contrast, in operational areas 
that provide services and financial benefits, definitions are generally much narrower 
and more exclusive, and are usually based on specific measures of impairment 
and/or incapacity.
141
  
The Disability Services Act 2011 provides the legislative basis for disability 
services provision in Tasmania. The Act serves to define ‘disability’ and to set 
down the eligibility criteria for services. The Act states that a person who has a 
cognitive, intellectual, psychiatric, sensory or physical impairment
142
 that is 
permanent or likely to be permanent,
143
 although it may or may not be of a chronic 
nature
144
 that results in a substantial restriction in their capacity to carry on a 
profession, business or occupation, or to participate in social or cultural life,
145
 and 
who has a need for continuing significant support services
146
 is person who has a 
disability and is eligible under the Act. However, in recent years, Tasmania has 
suffered from funding growth well below the already insufficient national average 
with 454 Tasmanians in need of continuing significant support services reported to 
be waiting for services in 2008, many of whom had been waiting for two or three 
                                                 
139 Michell E Loeb, Arne H Eide and Daniel Mont, ‘Approaching the measurement of disability prevalence: The 
case of Zambia’ (2008) 2 ALTER, Revue Européenne De Recherche Sur Le Handicap 32.  
140 World Health Organisation, ‘Towards a common language for Functioning Disability and Health ICF’ 
(Report, WHO, 2002). 
141 Literature Review For Captivate: Local Participation for All: A Project Funded By Disability Services 
Commission Department of Sport and Recreation, February 2007 < 
http://www.walga.asn.au/Documents/Walga/MemberResources/1623_CAPTIVATE%20Literature%20Review.
pdf> 
142 Disability Services Act 2011 (Tas) s 4 (a) 
143 Ibid s 4 (b). 
144 Ibid s 4 (d). 
145 Ibid s 4 (c) (i). 
146 Ibid s 4 (c) (ii). 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
53 
years.
147
 Nationally, fewer than 50 out of every 1000 people with severe disabilities 
receive funded support for the most basic of tasks such as showering, dressing and 
toileting.
148
 
The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) defines disability broadly to include 
total or partial loss to mental function; and a disorder, illness or disease that affects 
a person's thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that 
results in disturbed behaviour.
149
 The Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 
reproduces the Commonwealth’s definition but extends the application of the 
criteria to a disability that ‘presently exists, previously existed but no longer exists, 
may exist in the future, whether or not arising from an illness, disease or injury or 
from a condition subsisting at birth’.150 The Guardianship and Administration Act 
1995 (Tas) describes disability as ‘any restriction or lack (resulting from any 
absence, loss or abnormality of mental, psychological, physiological or anatomical 
structure or function) of ability to perform an activity in a normal manner’.151   
In contrast to the more expansive rights and protections legislative approach to 
disability, specific disability operational legislation, most likely as a cost 
minimising exercise, commonly restricts the definition of disability to a situation 
that is ‘permanent or likely to be permanent.’152   
Those aged over 65, those with psychiatric problems, substance abuse 
disorders, behaviour disorders (like ADHD or social and emotional problems), 
those in post acute care and those with chronic medical conditions are 
excluded unless there is a permanent disabling condition and they are unable 
to benefit from medical services.  Disability Services are not geared to 
temporary conditions. These are considered to be medical issues which should 
be dealt with by health services...the bulk of the clientele are ‘traditionally’ 
people with intellectual disability (46%).  Those with a physical disability 
                                                 
147 Advocacy Tasmania Inc., Submission to National Disability Strategy, November 2008, 5 
<http://www.advocacytasmania.org.au/publications/ATI_national_disability_strategy_submission.pdf>. 
148 Dr Ken Baker, National Disability Services, Link Disability Magazine 
<http://www.linkonline.com.au/Link/article/169>  
149 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4.  
150 Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 3. 
151 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 3. 
152 Disability Services Act 1992 (Tas) s 3; Disability Services Act 1986 (Cth). 
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form 16% of the clientele and only 7% have acquired brain injury and 8% 
neurological disabilities and progressive conditions.153  
Most mental illnesses, are not permanent, are episodic, and are treatable although 
the impact of the illness on a person’s life can be extremely severe, and their need 
for services necessary. Commonly, mental illness is seen as a low priority in the 
allocation of limited funds and services because it is largely an invisible disability 
competing against the strong advocacy of the family and friends of the people 
experiencing the more permanent and visible, physical, intellectual and cognitive 
disabilities.  The jockeying of large and influential disability groups in competition 
for funding and furthering the interests of their members has succeeded in 
emphasising the differences between disability groups rather than the 
commonalities
154
 to the extent that people with psychiatric disabilities are arguably 
doubly marginalised in that they are unwelcome in both the non-disabled and the 
disabled communities.
155
 
4.3 Psychiatric disability 
Mental illness is a medical term used to describe the psychological and behavioural 
patterns associated with the distress experienced by a person who has a diagnosed, 
or an undiagnosed, mental disorder or disorders. The impact that the mental illness 
has on a person’s functioning in different aspects of their life is defined as a 
‘psychiatric disability’.  Australia’s current definition of ‘psychiatric disability’ is 
taken from the Fourth National Mental Health Plan 2009-2014 and focuses on a 
person’s ability, or semantically more accurately, their inability to maintain societal 
norms.  
The person experiencing the mental illness is only considered to have a psychiatric 
disability when their ability to ‘live independently, maintain friendships, maintain 
employment and to participate meaningfully in the community’ is diminished.156  
                                                 
153 Teresa Hinton, ‘My Life as a Budget Item: Disability, budget priorities and poverty in Tasmania, Anglicare 
Tasmania’ (Research Report, Anglicare, October 2006) 27. <http://www.anglicare-
tas.org.au/docs/research/My_Life_as_a_Budget_Item_-
_Disability_budget_priorities_and_poverty_in_Tasmania.pdf>. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Sue E Estroff et al., ‘Pathways to Disability Income among Persons with Severe, Persistent Psychiatric 
Disorders’ (1997) 75 The Milbank Quarterly 495.  
156 Commonwealth of Australia, Fourth National Mental Health Plan: An agenda for collaborative government 
action in mental health 2009 – 2014’ (Report, Australian Government, 2009) 85.  
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This definition of ‘psychiatric disability’ does not view having a mental illness as 
equivalent to having a disability or functional impairment.  It presupposes that not 
everyone who has a mental illness will have their level of functioning decreased to 
the extent that it satisfies the criteria necessary to meet the definition of ‘psychiatric 
disability’. This suggests that even though a person may be diagnosed with a major 
depressive disorder for example, he or she will not be considered as psychiatrically 
disabled if they still live independently, maintain relationships, and have a job.  But 
at what point is a person’s ability sufficiently diminished to determine that they 
have a psychiatric disability and who decides what measure of community 
participation, for example, is necessary to satisfy ‘meaningful’?  Is walking to the 
shops to buy cigarettes once a day sufficient or will the person need to join a club, 
play a sport, or visit with neighbours? 
Over the years, the Commonwealth has developed a number of national mental 
health policies. The measure of ‘meaningful participation’ was first included in the 
National Mental Health Policy 2008,
157
 defined as the:  
capacity of a person to engage in personal, educational, employment, social, 
political and other activities within their community in such a way that they 
are able to fully realise their potential and to feel socially valued and 
personally validated.   
This definition was replicated in the Fourth National Mental Health Draft Plan 
2009-2014
158
 but was left out of the final document.   A reason for the omission 
might be recognition of the difficulties associated with developing a process that 
would consistently and fairly assess ‘meaningful participation’.  If the definition is 
presented from a systems perspective then the removal of barriers to ensure a 
person’s meaningful participation in their community is a worthwhile aim, but the 
definition is person-centric.  The person must possess the capacity to engage in 
‘such a way’ that internally, they can feel valued and validated although how this 
sense of value and validation can be measured has not been made known. Chapter 
                                                 
157 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘National Mental Health Policy 2008’ (Policy Report, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2009) 29 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/532CBE92A8323E03CA25756E001203BF/$F
ile/finpol08.pdf>. 
158 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 156, 64.  
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Six will show that this same problem exists in family law which statutorily binds 
parents to have ‘meaningful’ relationships with their children. 
Although ‘the product of twelve months of development work’159, the person-
centric Plan appears to be in contravention of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities
160
 which Australia ratified 17 July, 2008. This seems to be 
another indicator of the inconsistencies and conflicts that exist in mental health. The 
definition of ‘psychiatric disability’ included in the Plan appears to be in conflict 
with the social model definition of disability in the Convention which states ‘that 
disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and 
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others’.161 The Convention also states 
that ineffective, non-meaningful community participation is in fact a consequence 
of external factors: that psychiatric disability isn’t caused from within but by the 
barriers that are imposed without.  
4.4 Psychosocial disability 
Newly arriving into the conceptual and definitional mix is ‘psychosocial disability’ 
which is referenced, although left undefined, in the Commonwealth’s National 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020. The term, to date, is not widely used although it is 
favoured as the ‘disability’ definition of the Australian consumer and carer 
movement.
162
 The focus of ‘psychosocial disability’ is social support. Critics argue 
that it is inappropriate for the health system to provide social support for people 
with physical disabilities or intellectual disabilities, so it should be so for 
psychosocial disability.
163
 
A psychosocial disability is the result of the ‘complex interactions between 
limitations in activity (related to impairments associated with usually severe mental 
                                                 
159 Department of Health and Aging, Publications Page, 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/mental-pubs-f-plan09>  
160 Australia ratified the United Nation Convention on 17 July 2008. 
161 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Preamble (e) 
<http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml> 
162 National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, ‘Unravelling Psychosocial Disability: A Position 
Statement by the National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum on Psychosocial Disability Associated with 
Mental Health Conditions’ (Forum, National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, 2011)  
163 Mental Health Carers Arafmi Australia, Submission to Productivity Commission Disability Care and 
Support, April 2011. 
<http://www.arafmiaustralia.asn.au/uploads/7/2/8/9/7289235/mhcaa_submission_to_productivity_commission_
-_april_2011.pdf>.    
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health conditions) and the environment in which people live.’164 The World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health165 
drew from the biopsychosocial model to describe ‘psychosocial disability’ as a 
complex phenomenon that reflects the interaction between the features of a person’s 
body and the features of the society in which the person lives. The model proposes 
that the community acknowledges its responsibility to provide the resources and 
supports necessary to assist people with disabilities to participate as equal and 
valued citizens.
166
  
Adding to the definitional and conceptual confusions in mental health, this new 
understanding of ‘psychosocial’ is in conflict with the established biomedical 
definition which is:  
... the psychological and social factors that influence mental health. Social 
influences such as peer pressure, parental support, cultural and religious 
background, socioeconomic status, and interpersonal relationships all help to 
shape personality and influence psychological makeup. Individuals with 
psychosocial disorders frequently have difficulty functioning in social 
situations and may have problems effectively communicating with others.167 
A psychosocial disorder is defined as a mental illness caused or influenced by life 
experiences, as well as maladjusted cognitive and behavioural processes.
168
 Alcohol 
abuse and domestic violence are considered to be signs of psychosocial dysfunction 
in men for example.
169
  The medical model focuses on the psychosocial causes of 
the person’s ‘problem’ while the social model focuses on the present and future 
support needs of the person who has a mental condition.  ‘Psychosocial disability 
can exacerbate mental health conditions, cause social isolation and economic 
marginalisation that can spiral into crisis, homelessness, poverty and risk of harm 
through exploitation.’170  
                                                 
164 Ibid 160, 9.  
165 World Health Organisation, ‘Towards a common language for Functioning Disability and Health ICF’ 
(Report, WHO, 2002). 
166 World Health Organisation, Health topics: Disabilities <http://www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/>. 
167 Farlex, Psychosocial Disorders <http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Psychosocial+Disorders>.  
168 Ibid. 
169 Ted D Epperly, Kevin E Moore, ‘Health Issues in Men: Part II. Common Psychosocial Disorders’ (2000) 62 
American Family Physician 117.  
170 National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, above n 162, 9. 
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The Psychosocial Disability Position Statement of the Association of Relatives and 
Friends of the Mentally Ill (ARAFMI), the peak body in Australia for carers of 
people experiencing mental illness states that ‘psychosocial disability, often referred 
to as psychiatric disability, marks a significant shift in the attitudes of policy makers 
and the community.’171 This is a good example of the interchangeable use of 
concepts and language in mental health. Until there are at least clear and consistent 
messages coming from mental health policies, the confusion being generated will 
continue to help to fuel the stigma that the policies for the most part are trying to 
eradicate.  
5. CONCLUSION 
To date, mental health policy has failed to provide an effective guiding platform for 
encouraging constructive changes in how the legal system might deal with mental 
illness.  It is a policy area that, although having largely moved away from the 
biomedical platform, has yet to develop a universally accepted clear, precise and 
ideologically appropriate mental health model that can effectively guide service 
practice.  Although a significant body of mental health policies has been produced 
in recent decades, it has developed within different jurisdictional silos.  There has 
been inconsistent referencing of various conceptual models, and a vocabulary of 
vague and interchangeable terms has been created, all of which has contributed to 
an uncertain understanding of what ‘mental health’ is, as distinct to what the public 
understands mental illness to be.  
Mental illness evokes a level of fear and avoidance in the public mind that public 
policy changes have so far failed to diminish because not only are the public’s 
attitudes rooted in fear, but they are also a reflection of the social disapproval of the 
communities that mental illness disproportionately affects such as the poor, the 
homeless and prisoners. Treatment, hospitalisation and legal controls are the 
mechanisms on which society relies to palliate its ‘fear and loathing’172 of people 
who experience mental illness. To prevent or minimise the negative effects of the 
                                                 
171 ARAFMI Australia, Psychosocial Disability – Position Statement (24 November 2011) Arafmi Mental 
Health Carers Australia <http://www.arafmiaustralia.asn.au/1/post/2011/11/psychosocial-disability-position-
statement.html>. 
172 Jack K Martin, Bernice A Pescosolido and Steven A Tuch, ‘Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of 'Disturbing 
Behavior,' Labels, and Causal Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental Illness’ 
(2000) 4 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 208. 
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pathological problems of mental illness, society has as its first line of defence, the 
medical profession, a topic discussed more fully in Chapter Two.  
Although Australian public mental health policies have been quite pointed in the 
direction of a socially inclusive approach to well-being through the expression of 
clear social aspirations, the necessary funding to achieve these social objectives 
such as proper housing, employment, and improved benefits have not only been 
grossly inadequate but are continually subject to cuts to existing funding or 
services.
173
 Aspirations are commonly disregarded in both an operational and public 
preference for maintaining basic medical care and treatment services. Mental health 
is still primarily understood from a medical perspective. 
Law is an important public health tool because it plays a critical role in regulating 
and controlling behaviours because mental health is fundamentally about society’s 
reactions and responses to the abnormal and unacceptable behaviours of people who 
experience a mental illness, the topic discussed in Chapter Three. The state’s police 
powers strongly reinforce the social requirement to ‘control and treat’, perpetuating 
the very stigma and stereotypes that mental health policies aim to reduce. And 
according to Perlin, judges and lawyers are positioned as the incompetent and 
capricious agents of social control, sharing identical bias and myths with the public 
because, they are the public.
174
  The evidence for Perlin’s contentious assertion will 
be examined in Chapter Five. 
What is obvious is that the social nature of illness is particularly evident in the 
stigma associated with the disease of mental illness. When a disease is stigmatised 
in this way, public health policies can help to protect the ill from public prejudice, 
or alternatively, they can help to ‘promote environments in which stigma festers’.175 
Equally, the law is an important tool in protecting the rights of people who 
experience mental illness.  But until clear and consistent conceptual models and 
definitions are developed and universally applied, mental health policies will 
                                                 
173 The 2011/12 Federal Budget saw the Government make savage cuts of 400 million to the funding of GP 
mental health services through Medicare under the Better Access Program. The Tasmanian state government cut 
$14 million from its mental health budget in the same year. See Australian Medical Association, ‘Stop the 
Government's cuts to mental health funding’ (Petition, AMA, 8 July 2011) <http://ama.com.au/node/6870>. 
And also Aimee Volkofsky, ‘Rural, Regional mental health services struggle with funding cuts’, ABC (online), 
28 July 2011 <http://www.abc.net.au/sitearchive/rural/tas/content/2011/07/s3280194.htm>. 
174 Perlin, above n 8, 47.  
175 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatric Association 16, 18.  
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continue to be plagued by vagary, confusion and inconsistent interpretations that are 
often driven by myths, stereotypes and ‘risk minimisation’, and people who 
experience a mental illness will continue to be disadvantaged by a legal system that 
is disconnected from the diverse, though well intentioned basic goals of public 
policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MENTAL ILLNESS: SOCIAL, MEDICAL 
AND LEGAL LABELLING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two has two related purposes. First, it examines the conceptual and 
definitional problems associated with achieving a clear and unified acceptance of 
what mental illness means in law. While the law has wholly incorporated the 
biomedical notions of mental illness that was explored in Chapter One, it has not 
defined the term with any more precision. Legal definitions tend to be generalised, 
broad, vague, ambiguous, and having ‘circular definitions that contain few 
limitations’1 so as to permit, and mask ‘arbitrariness and discrimination in the 
application of the law’.2  
Secondly, it demonstrates that the clinical labelling of ‘mental illness’ is achieved 
through an observation process that arrives at value laden, unreliable and 
inconsistent, qualitative guesses by mental health professionals. The diagnostic and 
social labelling of a person as ‘mentally ill’ tags them as abnormal, different, 
disabled and dysfunctional, characteristics that  are reinforced, and perpetuated, by 
a legal system well rooted in the medical model of treatment and control, and reliant 
on psychiatric predictions of risk and future behaviour. 
In the rational world, psychiatrists have long been tasked with responsibility for 
understanding the causes and nature of irrationality, and treating and controlling the 
abnormal and socially unacceptable manifestations of mental illness. It is therefore 
understandable that psychiatry has infiltrated itself into every aspect of legal matters 
in which a party is alleged to be experiencing a mental illness, and credibility, 
culpability, competency, compensation and custody are at issue.
3
  The clinical 
                                                 
1 Bruce J Winick, ‘Ambiguities In The Legal Meaning And Significance Of Mental Illness’ (1995) 1 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 534, 554.  
2 Ibid 555.  
3 Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law, Law in Psychiatry (Routledge, 2009) xi.  
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opinion of the psychiatrist expert witness strongly influences judicial decision-
making and yet, as this chapter shows, the foundation on which the psychiatric 
expert’s evidence rests is flawed. The legal system’s willingness to accept 
pretextual pseudoscientific evidence based on intuitive, unreliable and often 
incorrect diagnoses continues to propagate the law’s discrimination of a vulnerable, 
disadvantaged and marginalised group of people who experience mental illness.  
2. ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’ IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
A medical condition that deviates from what is considered to be a socially 
acceptable, ‘normal’ non-contagious disease such as cancer or diabetes usually 
attracts a significant level of legal intervention through the enactment of control and 
compulsion legislation.  In Tasmania, the HIV/AIDS Preventive Measures Act 1993 
provides measures for the prevention and containment of HIV/AIDS, the protection 
and promotion of public health, and appropriate treatment, counselling and care of 
persons infected with HIV/AIDS, or at risk of HIV/AIDS infection. S.47 (a) of the 
Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 also makes it lawful to discriminate 
against a person with an infectious disease such as AIDS.  However, globally, there 
is no illness that has historically attracted even close to the levels of restrictive 
interaction with the legal system than mental illness.  
Over the centuries, the law has developed particular rules to deal with the problems 
caused by the socially unacceptable, abnormal behaviours associated with, if not 
actually being acted out at the time by, people experiencing a mental illness. The 
application of these special regulatory rules to a particular social group is 
considered by some commentators as discriminatory
4
 although others believe that 
‘special rules to deal with at least some people with mental disorder are justified 
because they substantially lack rational capacity, a condition that justifies disparate 
treatment.’5 While at times may behave differently, the majority of people who 
experience mental illness are usually considered sufficiently like ‘normal’ people 
                                                 
4 Stephen Rosenman, ‘Mental Health Law: An Idea whose Time has Passed’ (1994) 28 Australian New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry 560.  
5 Stephen J Morse, ‘Mental Disorder and Criminal Law’ (2011) 101 The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 885, 885.  
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that they are treated in the same way, and are held equally as responsible for their 
behaviours as people who are not experiencing a mental illness.
6
 
Although both the legal and mental health systems are concerned with 
understanding and controlling human behaviour, they approach the task differently.  
Law is a normative enterprise which views almost everyone as responsible for their 
actions, and the consequences that flow directly from those actions. The legal 
system’s approach is in terms of moral evaluation and the imposition of values, 
adhering to the principle that all people have free will and choose how it is that they 
will behave, so are morally and legally responsible for their behaviour.
7
 While the 
legal system adequately interprets, and addresses the problems associated with 
normal behaviour it is ill-equipped to do so in matters of abnormal, irrational 
behaviour.   
Biological, psychological, and sociocultural factors or pressures can affect choices 
of action which can impact on the law’s imposition of legal responsibility on a 
person. The socially held rational model of behaviour is unable to explain why a 
person would choose to behave in an abnormal way which inevitably leads to the 
intuitive conclusion that the person cannot, or has great difficulty in controlling 
their behaviour. This view comports with, and is reinforced by the biomedical 
model in which free will or personal responsibility have little meaning. Medicine 
views responsibility as a scientifically irrelevant, moral term.
8
 
2.1 The law and the biomedical notion of mental illness 
Society and the legal system have always been confused and often frightened 
by mental disorder.9 
Determining whether the person has a mental illness is the necessary yardstick in 
legal areas such as criminal law, contract law, succession, financial administration, 
civil commitment, guardianship and family law in which competency, capacity and 
culpability are at issue.  In evaluating competency, capacity and culpability, the 
legal system relies on the biomedical model which advances the claim that mental 
                                                 
6 Stephen J Morse, ‘Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law’ (1978) 51 
Southern California Law Review 527.  See also Stephen J Morse, ‘Mental Disorder and Criminal Law’ (2011) 
101 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 885.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, 530.  
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illness is the same as physical illness, and that people who experience mental illness 
require medical management. Mentally disordered behaviour is considered to be a 
symptom of a mental illness, and the person who is in a mentally disordered state 
has no, or limited, control over their behaviour.  The implication is that if the person 
is sick then they should be exempted from their responsibilities, and be given care 
and treatment rather than punishment.
10
    
In legal matters in which mental illness is a significant factor, courts often base their 
decisions on the clinical information contained within psychiatric evaluation/reports 
and/or on expert psychiatric witness testimony.  Psychiatry plays an important role 
in establishing, for the court’s benefit, whether the person has a mental illness that 
satisfies the statutory definition; whether the person experiencing a mental illness 
had a ‘guilty mind’ at the time of committing an offence, an essential element of 
criminal law; whether the person possessed the requisite capacity for a ‘meeting of 
minds’ in contract law; or whether the person was of ‘sound mind’ when writing 
their will.
11
   
By its acceptance of the biomedical notion of mental illness, the law has created a 
forum in which psychiatrists are all knowledgeable, and all powerful.  When issues 
of a person’s present or predictive abnormal behaviours are brought into the legal 
system so they may be potentially deprived of their rights and responsibilities, 
courts call on mental health professionals to help resolve the issue, and to legitimise 
the decisions made which are often, the legal ratification of a scientific judgement 
although, as shown in this chapter (see below at 3.5), there is very little science in a 
psychiatric opinion.  
The public treats a person experiencing a mental illness differently because of its 
prejudicial belief in the inferiority of the person. This is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three.  The law however, treats them differently because of its perception 
of the uncontrollable, wrongness of the person’s mental functioning, and the 
predictive assessment of their future, undesirable behaviour. This treatment 
difference is evident in practically every area of civil and criminal law on occasions 
when a person’s competency, responsibility and capability are brought into 
                                                 
10 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Tavistock, 1952).  
11 Slovenko, above n 3.   
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question, or the public’s interest in the preventative need to involuntarily detain and 
treat are deemed key factors in arriving at a desired legal outcome.  
2.2 Legally defining ‘mental illness’ 
There is a traditional acceptance that medical definitions consist of vague 
generalities with an emphasis on symptoms, disability or distress.
12
  Clinical 
definitions of mental illness suffer from the ambiguities found in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders V(DSM IV and DSM V)
13
, the system of mental disorder 
classifications of mental disorders used by psychiatrists to diagnose their patients.  
Overlapping categories and the absence of defined borders among conditions which 
affect different systems simultaneously results in definitions that satisfy clinical 
purposes but lack legal functionality.
14
  Legal definitions on the other hand, 
emphasise constructs of incapacity, incompetence and culpability, and differ 
according to whether the definition is for the purposes of civil or criminal law.  
There exists a need for linguistic clarity and consistency in law. Terminological 
clarity is a prerequisite for the clear thought and analysis
15
 that are necessary 
attributes for academic discussion, strategic planning, legislative drafting and 
interpretation, and legal decision-making.  How terms are interpreted can have 
important practical consequences, particularly to the person being classified as 
‘mentally ill’ or ‘mentally disordered’.16 A universally accepted definition can help 
settle the normative issue of, for example, when an offender is sentenced to 
psychiatric hospital care instead of prison.
17
  That there are no clear and precise 
legal definitions is not surprising considering that there are also no agreed medical 
definitions for ‘mental illness’, ‘mental disorder’ and ‘mental disease’.    
                                                 
12 Joseph M Livermore, Carl P Malmquist and Paul E Meehl, ‘On the Justifications for Civil Commitment’ 
(1968) 117 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 75.   
13 The DSM was first published in 1952. The previous version, the DSM-IV was published in 1994 by the 
American Psychiatric Association. A text revision of DSM-IV, called DSM-IV-TR was published in July 2000. 
The current version, the DSM V was publically released in May, 2013. 
14 In David N Weisstub (ed.), Research on Human Subjects:  Ethics, Law, and Social Policy (Pergamon, 1998). 
Arboleda-Flórez, J.,  Weisstub, D.N., Ethical Research with Vulnerable Populations: The Mentally Disordered, 
pp. 433-450. 
15 Pierre Beumont and Terry Carney, ‘Can psychiatric terminology be translated into legal regulation? The 
anorexia nervosa example’ (2004) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 819.  
16 Bengt Brulde, ‘On defining “mental disorder”: Purposes and conditions of adequacy’ (2010) 31 Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics 19.  
17 Ibid.  
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Recent decades have demonstrated a trend of circularity in legislatively defining 
‘mental illness’ which is perhaps best apparent in the development of the United 
Kingdom’s recent mental health legislation. Prior to 2007, ‘mental disorder’ was 
very loosely defined as ‘mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of 
mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind’.18 These 
four broad categories captured intellectual disability, autism, dementia, personality 
disorders, drug and alcohol dependence etc. under the Act. The Mental Health Act 
2007 replaced the categories with a single definition of mental disorder which 
‘means any disorder or disability of the mind’ with the new Act omitting altogether 
the term ‘mental illness’.19 Jurisdictions across the world share similar definitional 
provisions to the UK.  
This was the situation in Tasmania until very recently. The previous 1996 Act
20
  
similarly captured disabilities such as autism and dementia.  The newly enacted 
2013 Act defines mental illness as a mental condition which a person experiences, 
temporarily, repeatedly or continually, that is a serious impairment of thought and 
includes delusions, or is a serious impairment of mood, volition, perception or 
cognition. It expressly excludes a list of conditions including intellectual or physical 
disability, acquired brain injury and dementia.
21
  
The medical approach toward defining the term can be seen in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Department of Health memorandum that claims that the term’s ‘operational 
definition and usage is a matter for clinical judgment’.22  The law has historically 
agreed.  ‘Mental illness is a medical concept, and so it would seem self-evident that 
its definition should come from the medical profession and not from either 
legislators or judges.’23 Turning to the medical profession has, however, failed to 
provide the law with any clear answers
24
 and any expectation that judges might 
themselves provide a clear definition has gone unrealised as they have shown 
                                                 
18 Mental Health Act 1959 Chapter 72, Part 1 (4) (1); Mental Health Act 1983 Chapter 20, Part 1 (1)(2)  
19 Mental Health Act 2007 (UK) s 1(2) amended the 1983 Act’s definition of “mental disorder”. See also Mental 
Health Act 2007 (NSW) s 4(c). 
20 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 4(1).   
21 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s 4(1).   
22 Department of Health and Welsh Office, Memorandum on Parts of the Mental Health Act 1998: Para 10  
23 Henry Weihofen, ‘The Law and the Mentally Ill: The Definition of Mental Illness’ (1960) 21 Ohio State Law 
Journal 1.  
24 Ibid. 
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themselves none too anxious to define ‘mental illness’.25 Having accepted the 
medical framework but finding it conceptually and definitionally lacking for legal 
purposes, the law has turned to ordinary language definitions that suggest that 
mental illness is, for legal and lay purposes, a label for incomprehensible conduct.
26
   
Rather than taking the opportunity to provide a clear judicial interpretation of 
mental illness, and prior to that, ‘unsound mind’27, courts have permitted the 
tautological definitions to stand unclarified, and have shown a willingness to accept 
mental illness as whatever society says it is.  In Buxton v Jayne, Lord Devlin stated 
he ‘was not going to attempt a definition of just what is meant by unsound mind, an 
expression which the Act itself leaves undefined, nor am I going to search for 
equivalent language’.28 In 1974, Judge Lawton noted in W v L29 that:  
The facts of this case show how difficult the fitting of particular 
instances into the statutory classification can be. Lord Denning MR and 
Orr LJ have pointed out that there is no definition of “mental illness”. 
The words are ordinary words of the English language. They have no 
particular medical significance. How should the court construe them? 
The answer in my judgement is to be found in the advice which Lord 
Reid recently gave in Cozetts v Brutus [1973] AC854 p.861 namely, 
that ordinary words of the English language should be construed in the 
way that ordinary sensible people would construe them. That being, in 
my judgment, the right test, then I ask myself, what would have the 
ordinary sensible person said about the patient’s condition in this case if 
he had been informed of his behaviour to the dogs and cat and his wife? 
In my judgment such a person would have said: “Well, the fellow is 
obviously mentally ill”. 30 
Courts apply ‘the man must be mad’ or ‘what the ordinary sensible person would do 
and think’ lay discourse tests on a case by case basis. The problem is that these tests 
rely on the ordinary person’s misinformed, stereotypical and discriminatory 
attitudes toward non-conformist behaviour to establish the presence of a mental 
                                                 
25 John O’Sullivan, Mental Health and the Law (The Law Book Company, 1981).  
26 David Pilgrim and Anne Rogers, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness (Open University Press, 1999).  
27 Anselm Eldergill, Mental Health Review Tribunals: Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 1997).  
28 [1960] 2 All ER 688 at 697. 
29 W v L [1974] QB711 688. 
30 Ibid, Lawnton LJ.  
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illness.
31
 It is merely an observation about madness that says nothing about what 
constitutes a mental illness.
32
 It also   wrongly assumes that there exists a standard 
shared view among lay people as to what mental illness is,
33
 but as Morse indicates, 
society is just as confused by mental illness as the legal system is.
34
  
2.3 Australia’s mental health laws 
Australian jurisdictions have readily given statutory definition to mental illness in 
the civil commitment forum, albeit with varying degrees of uniformity, clarity and 
worth.  Here, mental health acts are purposive with dichotomous streams of 
paternalism and protectionism converging at a single point: treatment.
35
  They 
therefore tend to focus on the practical application of symptom presentation which 
can be treated or controlled rather than on theoretical values. However, 
psychopathological definitions of mental illness are considered to be notoriously 
difficult to draft.  If framed too narrowly they are said to deny services to people but 
if framed too broadly, they can result in unnecessary intervention.
36
  This concern is 
commonly used as a rationale for why statutory definitions of mental illness are 
fairly fluid.
37
 The consequence of fluidity is that mental health acts differ 
significantly across Australian jurisdictions.  
As the law is concerned with regulating, controlling and treating socially 
unacceptable, abnormal behaviours, having the ‘appearance’ of a mental illness38 is 
often the requisite for the lawful deprivation of a person’s autonomous rights and 
freedoms. The law concentrates on establishing indicia - signs, symptoms and 
behaviours – which provide the evidence the courts uses to justify its discriminatory 
treatment of people experiencing a mental illness.  
                                                 
31 Lawrence Gostin, Mental health services: law and practice (Shaw & Sons, 1986).   
32 Brenda Hale, Mental Health Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed,  2010).  
33 Michael Cavadino, ‘Mental illness and neo-Colonialism’ (1991) 2 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 295.  
34 Morse, above n 6. See also Stephen J Morse, ‘Mental Disorder and Criminal Law’ (2011) 101 The Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology 885.  
35 Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) s 4 amended the 1983 Act, replacing the ‘treatability test’ with the 
‘appropriate treatment test’. 
36  Beth Wilson, ‘Legal Straitjackets: When Reason Fails: Law and Mental Illness’ in Hugh M Selby (ed), 
Tomorrows Law (Federation Press, 1995) 312.  
37 Beaumont and Carney, above n 15.   
38 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 24(a).  
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Table 1 below demonstrates the symptoms/sign focus of Australian mental health 
legislation. 
Table 1 Australian statute definitions for mental illness 
New South Wales 
Mental Health Act 
2007 
s.4(1) 
‘a condition that seriously impairs, either temporarily or 
permanently, the mental functioning of a person and is 
characterised by the presence in the person of any one or 
more of the following symptoms:  
(a) delusions,  
(b) hallucinations,  
(c) serious disorder of thought form,  
(d) a severe disturbance of mood,  
(e) sustained or repeated irrational behaviour indicating the presence 
of any one or more of the symptoms referred to in paragraphs (a)-(d).  
Tasmania 
Mental Health Act 
2013 
s.4(1) 
(a) a person is taken to have a mental illness if he or she experiences, 
temporarily, repeatedly or continually – 
(i) a serious impairment of thought (which may include       delusions); 
or 
(ii) a serious impairment of mood, volition, perception or   cognition; 
and 
(b) nothing prevents the serious or permanent physiological, 
biochemical or psychological effects of alcohol use or drug-taking 
from being regarded as an indication that a person has a mental illness. 
Queensland  
Mental Health Act 
2000 
s.12(1) 
Mental illness is a condition characterised by a clinically significant 
disturbance of thought, mood, perception or memory. 
Victoria 
Mental Health Act 
1986 
s.8(1A) 
a person is mentally ill  if he or she has a mental illness, being a 
medical condition that is characterised by a significant  disturbance of 
thought, mood, perception or memory.’ 
South Australia 
Mental Health Act 
1993 
S.3 
"mental illness" means any illness or disorder of the mind; 
Western Australia 
Mental Health Act 
1996 
s.4(1) 
 
For the purposes of this Act a person has a mental illness if the person 
suffers from a disturbance of thought, mood, volition, perception, 
orientation or memory that impairs judgment or behaviour to a 
significant extent. Western Australia doesn’t specifically define it at all 
but identifies a person as having a mental illness if they suffer ‘from a 
disturbance of thought, mood, volition, perception, orientation or 
memory that impairs judgment or behaviour to a significant extent’. 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Mental Health 
(Treatment and Care)  
Act 1994  s.3 
mental illness means a condition that seriously impairs (either  
temporarily or permanently) the mental functioning of a person and  
is characterised by the presence in the person of any of the  
following symptoms:  
(a) delusions;  
(b) hallucinations;   
(c) serious disorder of thought form;   
(d) a severe disturbance of mood;   
(e) sustained or repeated irrational behaviour indicating the presence of 
the symptoms referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d). 
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Table 1 Australian statute definitions for mental illness 
Northern Territory 
Mental Health and 
Related Services Act  
S. 6(1) 
 
 "mental illness" means a condition that seriously impairs, either 
temporarily or permanently, the mental functioning of a person in one 
or more of the areas of thought, mood, volition, perception, orientation 
or memory and is characterised:  
(a) by the presence of at least one of the following symptoms:  
(i) delusions;  
(ii) hallucinations;  
(iii) serious disorders of the stream of thought;  
(iv) serious disorders of thought form;  
(v) serious disturbances of mood; or  
(b)  by sustained or repeated irrational behaviour that may be taken to 
indicate the presence of at least one of the symptoms referred to in 
paragraph (a). 
In contrast to the present Australian focus on biomedical symptomology, Florida 
recently enacted legislation that appears to be an attempt to align the 
implementation of the state’s mental health law with the direction of its mental 
health policies. The Act
39
  broadly defines ‘mental illness’ as ‘an impairment of the 
mental or emotional processes that exercise conscious control of one's actions or of 
the ability to perceive or understand reality, which impairment substantially 
interferes with a person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of living, regardless 
of etiology’.40 Involuntary examination is authorised for someone considered likely 
to suffer from neglect that ‘poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his 
or her well-being’.41  It was WHO that defined mental health as a state of well-
being.
42
 With the insertion of terms such as ‘ordinary demands of living’ and 
‘regardless of etiology’ into legislation, mental illness appears in some jurisdictions 
to no longer be constrained within statutory confines of biomedicine and its focus 
on treatment and control but is branching out into a much broader social paradigm 
with its new functionalist test of expected performance. 
It seems that increasingly, it is the lack of well-being - the state of being healthy, 
happy, or prosperous - that is becoming the driving indicator for state intervention 
in the social lives of citizens.
43
  How the future role of the law might be interpreted 
within this broader social/medical/legal process, and how it will be applied to 
individual cases requires serious academic and judicial discussion which, to date, 
                                                 
39 Florida Mental Health Act ss. 394.455 (18) (2009)  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 World Health Organization, ‘Mental health: a state of well-being’ (Report, World Health Organization, 
October 2011) <http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/mental_health/en/index.html>. 
43 Interestingly, Florida is ranked 49th in the U.S. for per-capita spending on mental health care and 35th in 
substance abuse care. Ralph De La Cruz, ‘Mental Health Funding at Risk’, Florida Centre for Investigative 
Reporting (online), 9 March 2011 <http://fcir.org/2011/03/09/mental-health-funding-at-risk/>. 
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has not occurred.  The process is likely to result in many more people being labelled 
as experiencing a mental illness and as a consequence, experiencing stigma, social 
marginalisation and legal discrimination.  A first step toward preventing, or 
minimalising, this occurrence is to redress the present conceptual and definitional 
inconsistencies and ambiguities that exist in the legal system. 
3. BIOMEDICINE: THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW 
Mental health is an area unlike any other, in which the medical, political and legal 
systems have aligned to deprive the members of a large, marginalised group 
consisting of approximately one fifth of the world’s population, of basic freedoms 
on the basis of intuitive, unreliable and often incorrect psychiatric diagnoses. People 
experiencing a mental illness are disempowered by systems juggling the weight of 
medical guesswork and value-laden judgments: conflicted and inconsistent mental 
health policies; non-existent, tautological, or inadequate definitions; paternalism 
and public safety issues are weighed against the, often feather light, rights of the 
individual diagnosed with a mental illness.   
Mental illness is commonly regarded as an indicator of suffering, vulnerability and 
neglect for an individual that not only justifies, but obligates the state to intervene 
by authority of its paternalistic beneficence and public safety powers. It is the 
biomedical model that has had dominance in shaping society’s understanding of 
mental illness.
44
 Reasons for this might include the model’s long history and its 
embeddedness within medical thought and practice; the prestige and authority 
associated with its scientific foundation; its strong explanatory power; the intuitive 
understanding of medical disease; and the beneficial connectivity that disease has 
with treatment.  
3.1 The pathology of disease 
During the first half of the 20
th
 century, psychiatrists took a psychoanalytic 
approach to treatment which made them unconcerned with actual diagnoses. This 
                                                 
44 Peter Beresford, Mary Nettle and Rebecca Perring, ‘Towards a social model of madness and distress? 
Exploring what service users say’ (Report, Joseph Rountree Foundation, 2010) 
<http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/social-model-madness-distress>. 
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changed in the early 1950s when clinicians began labelling psychiatric disorders as 
particular diagnostic entities and a mental disease or mental disorder became a 
pathological problem.  At this time, psychiatry adopted the medical model with its 
assumption that a disease has three components: an etiological agent, a pathological 
process, and symptoms and signs.
45
  Current medical practice is dominated by the 
biomedical model of health with its reliance on signs/symptoms.
46
   
The biomedical disease model assumes that the disease is a temporary organic 
condition experienced by a sick individual who then becomes an object of medical 
intervention, the objective of which is to cure or eradicate the disease which makes 
making the application of medicine a reactive healing process.
47
 Non-organic 
factors associated with the human mind are viewed as unimportant, or are ignored 
altogether in the search for biological causes of pathological symptoms.
48
 Treatment 
is then administered, usually in a medical environment such as a surgery or a 
hospital, in response to the symptomatic features of the illness, disease or injury in 
accordance with the treatment choices that invariably flow from the medical 
diagnosis.
49
 
To date, mental health commentators have not reached universally accepted 
meanings for ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’.  Even WHO expressly refused 
to define the terms.  The International Classification of Diseases (ICD10)
50
 ‘used 
the term “disorder” throughout the document to avoid even greater problems 
inherent in the use of terms such as “disease” and “illness”.’51  No matter what 
terminology is actually used however, words such as illness, disorder, disease, 
diagnosis, symptoms, hospitalisation and treatment all arise out of the biomedical 
model approach to mental health. The lay person tends to view ‘disease’ and 
                                                 
45 Ahmed Aboraya et al., ‘The Validity of Psychiatric Diagnosis Revisited: The Clinician's Guide to Improve 
the Validity of Psychiatric Diagnosis’ (2005) 2 Psychiatry 48.  
46 Mladen Havelka, Jasminka Despot Lucanin and Damir Lucanin, ‘Biopsychosocial model--the integrated 
approach to health and disease’ (2009) 33 Collegium Antropologicum 303. 
47 Tony Bilton et al., ‘Health, Illness and Medicine’ in Tony Bilton et al., Introductory Sociology (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 4th ed, 2002) 354.  
48 Ibid 354. 
49 Ibid. 
50 ICD-10 was endorsed by the Forty-third World Health Assembly in May 1990 and came into use in WHO 
Member States as from 1994. It is an international standard diagnostic classification for all general 
epidemiological, many health management purposes and clinical use. 
51 World Health Organisation, ‘ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders’ (Clinical 
descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, World Health Organisation (2010) 5 
<http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf>. 
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‘illness’ as synonymous52 which may be a contributor to the conceptual and 
definitional problems that exist across the totality of mental health understanding. 
3.2 The separate concept of mental disease 
Psychiatry has an altogether separate status to general medicine. The reason for this 
is probably rooted in the claim that physical and mental disorders ‘are two separate 
concepts that can be definitively recognised and differentiated’.53  Physical illness is 
much more likely than mental illness to have an agreed diagnosis, a clear course of 
treatment and an expected recovery time.
54
  Psychiatrists are more concerned with 
the classification and treatment of mental disorders than in attempting to formulate 
a definitive statement as to what mental illness is. Psychiatry reduces mental illness 
to an intuitive judgment of the causative presence of a mental disorder and it is 
preoccupied with the identification of mental disorders and the narrow technical 
solutions that flow from the medical model.
55
   
The goal of psychiatric practice is to alleviate the symptoms of the diagnosed 
disorder,
56
  expressed in unacceptable behavioural manifestations. Treatment is 
commonly the dispensement of psychotropic drugs
57
 which for most mental 
disorders is aimed solely at providing the person with relief.
58
  However, the 
effectiveness of these drug treatments has been called into question particularly 
when considered alongside their known side effects. In a 2011 Canadian judgment, 
for example, the court found that the antidepressant Prozac was the cause of a 
murder. It had affected the defendant’s behaviour and judgement, thereby reducing 
his moral culpability for the crime.
59
 Manufacturer warnings regarding the possible 
serious behavioural and emotional changes, and suicidality associated with 
                                                 
52 Beumont and Carney, above n 15.  
53 Genevra Richardson, ‘Balancing autonomy and risk: A failure of nerve in England and Wales’ (2007) 30 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 71, 73.  
54 Karin A Guiduli, ‘Challenges for the mentally ill: the “threat to safety” defence standard and the use of 
psychotropic medication under title one of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1980’ (1996) 144 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1149.   
55 Joanna Moncrieff, ‘Is Psychiatry for Sale: An examination of the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on 
academic and practical psychiatry’ (Maudsley Discussion Paper, Institute of Psychiatry, 2003) 
<http://www.critpsynet.freeuk.com/pharmaceuticalindustry.htm>. 
56 Rachael Anderson-Watts, ‘Recognizing Our Dangerous Gifts: Applying the Social Model to Individuals with 
Mental Illness’ (2008) 12 Michigan State University Journal of Medicine and Law 141, 147.  
57 Helen Lester and Jonathan Q Tritter, ‘‘Listen to my madness’: understanding the experiences of people with 
serious mental illness’ (2005) 27 Sociology of Health & Illness 649, 658.  
58 Saxby Pridmore, Psychiatry, Chapter 1, University of Tasmania EPrint, p. 8. 
<http://eprints.utas.edu.au/287/2/Chapter_1_Introduction_to_psychiatry%5B1%5D.pdf>  
59 Her Majesty the Queen and C.J.P.  (Citation #2011 MBPC 62) September 16, 2011, per Heinrichs, R, P.J., at 
n.50  
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antidepressants are extensive.
60
 Yet mental health practitioners continue to prescribe 
them widely for depression: to correct the chemical imbalance brought on by low 
serotonin although research has shown that low serotonin does not cause 
depression.
61
 Other research suggests that antidepressants are little more effective 
than placebos with dangerous side effects.
62
  It appears that people labelled as 
‘mentally ill’ are treated with, sometimes ineffective although always dangerous, 
drugs, often involuntarily, as a means to control and alleviate behaviours that 
frequently have unknown causes.  
3.3 Diagnosing mental illness 
Diagnoses of mental illness are based on symptomology rather than etiology 
because the causes of serious mental illnesses are unknown. The mental health 
diagnosis is essentially a label applied to a set of signs/symptoms commonly 
occurring together that have actually been observed, or have been extracted from 
the patient’s medical history. This diagnostic label cannot be scientifically tested 
and proven, yet it, and the predictive conclusions that it engenders are the evidence 
that guides legal decision-makers in matters in which mental illness is a factor. 
Mental illness suggests the presence of a clinically diagnosable disorder that 
significantly interferes with an individual’s cognitive, emotional or social abilities.63 
Yet ‘mental illness’ is not an exact term and nor does it have a single definition.  To 
understand its meaning depends on the social, cultural, economic and legal context 
in which it is being used.  Its contemporary use among mental health professionals 
and commentators is as an umbrella term encompassing the many differently 
categorised mental disorders.   
Describing a person as experiencing a ‘severe mental illness’ or ‘serious mental 
illness’, is an indication of their mental disorder which typically, involves 
                                                 
60 Subject: Stronger WARNING for SSRIs and other newer anti-depressants regarding the potential for 
behavioural and emotional changes, including risk of self-harm, Eli Lilly Canada Inc, May 18, 2004, Health 
Canada, <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/medeff/advisories-avis/prof/_2004/prozac_hpc-cps-eng.php> See 
also Lexapro warning at <http://www.frx.com/pi/Lexapro_pi.pdf>; Paxil warning at 
<http://us.gsk.com/products/assets/us_paxil.pdf>.  
61 ‘When it comes to Depression, Serotonin Isn’t the Whole Story’, shots Health News from npr, transcript of 
radio discussion, 23 January 2012, 2010 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=145525853>. 
62 Irving Kirsch et al., ‘Initial Severity and Antidepressant Benefits: A Meta-Analysis of Data Submitted to the 
Food and Drug Administration’ (2008) 5 Public Library of Science Medicine 0260.   
63 Australian Health Ministers, ‘National Mental Health Plan 2003-2008’ (Plan, Australian Government, July 
2003) 5.  
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psychosis, high levels of care, and hospitalisation. The two most common of these 
are schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. A mental disorder exists when 
psychological systems of perception, thinking, cognition, emotion, motivation, 
language or memory do not function appropriately.
64
 Standards of appropriateness 
are not universal properties but are culturally specific norms that regulate individual 
behaviour to ensure it meets social expectations of what is socially acceptable.  If a 
person has a mental disorder it implies that they have a clinically recognisable set of 
symptoms or behaviours which, in most cases, are associated with distress and 
dysfunction existing within them.
65
   
Diagnosing mental illness has a far greater evaluative component than diagnosing a 
somatic illness which can be scientifically substantiated. A mental disorder 
diagnosis rests predominantly on ‘a judgment made on a particular desirability or 
undesirability of an experience.’ 66 Psychiatrists attempt to define mental disorders 
that are unobservable, hypothetical constructs in terms of observable behaviours, 
and through the self reporting of their patients.  They do not directly observe the 
disorder, only the behaviour and subjective mental state of the person that are typed 
as indicators of the presence of the disorder. This has been allegorised as being akin 
to diagnosing a broken leg based on certain patient symptoms without taking an x-
ray of the limb.
67
 There may be some factual components evident, as in certain 
abnormalities, biochemical levels and neuro-physiological disturbances present in 
the brain of a person with depression but they do not have the same robustness as 
the facts of other medical conditions.  
3.4 Classifying mental disorders 
The diagnosis of a mental disorder is primarily reliant on the system of 
classifications listed in two professional publications, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and, the International Classification of 
                                                 
64 Allan V Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness (The University of Chicago Press, 2002) 22.  
65 World Health Organisation, ‘ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders’ (Clinical 
descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, World Health Organisation, 2010, 5 
<http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf>. 
66 Dr Michael Robertson, Senior Consultant Psychiatrist, Centre for Values, Ethics & Law in Medicine, 
University of Sydney, ABC Radio National interview with Natasha Mitchell, 18 April, 2009 
<https://whyweprotest.net/community/threads/abc-oz-interviews-cchrs-thomas-szasz.38097/> See also Elijah 
Millgram, ‘Practical Induction’ (Harvard University Press, 1997).  
67 Brad Johnson, ‘Prophecy with Numbers: Prospective Punishment for Predictable Human Behaviour?’ (2005) 
7 University of Technology Sydney Law Review 117.  
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Diseases (ICD -10).
68
  Critiques of the new DSM V refer to the manual as a 
primarily commercial compendium of expert opinions presented as scientific 
truths.
69
 Critics suggest that the American Psychiatric Association has arbitrarily, 
and unwisely, encouraged doctors to diagnose bogus mental illnesses such as binge 
eating disorder in their patients, and to treat them with too much medication.
70
 The 
DSM V’s diagnostic inflation turns normal people, particularly children, into 
mental health patients.
71
 
According to the DSM-V, a ‘mental disorder;’ must comprise a manifestation of a 
behavioural, psychological or biological dysfunction in the person.  It is: 
a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that 
occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress … or 
disability … or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, 
disability, or an important loss of freedom …  
Criticisms of the classification systems are that that they do not define disorders in 
terms of their causes but only of their symptoms and that mental disorders are 
defined as discrete categories rather than as continuous dimensions.
72
 The 
classification system fundamentally changed the relationship between mental illness 
and normality. Where previously, psychotic behaviours had been easily 
distinguishable from normal behaviours, the categorisation of the new neurotic 
behaviours such as sexual perversions, obsessions, compulsions, phobias and 
anxiety weren’t considered as forms of an illness but as exaggerations of normal 
behavioural functions.
73
   Co-morbidity, the presence of more than one disorder also 
became the norm rather than the exception but attempts to study its impact have 
been complicated by the lack of consensus about how to define and measure the 
concept.
74
   
                                                 
68 ICD-10 was endorsed by the Forty-third World Health Assembly in May 1990 and came into use in WHO 
Member States as from 1994.  
69 Gary Greenberg, The Book Of Woe: The DSV And The Unmaking Of Psychiatry (Scribe Publishers, 2013).  
70 Allen Frances, Saving Normal: An Insider’s Revolt Against Out-Of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, 
Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life (William Morrow 2013)  
71 Ibid. See also Gary Greenberg, The Book Of Woe: The DSV And The Unmaking Of Psychiatry (Scribe 
Publishers, 2013).  
72 Nick Haslam, ‘Categorical versus dimensional models of mental disorder: the taxometric evidence’ (2003) 37 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 696, 696.  
73 Horwitz, above n 63.  
74 Jose M Valderas et al., ‘Defining Comorbidity: Implications for Understanding Health and Health Services’ 
(2009) 7 Annals of Family Medicine 357.   
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It has also been widely accepted that the addition of many ‘new’ diagnostic 
guidelines to the DSM-III in 1980 ‘unintentionally positioned psychopharmacology 
on a growth trajectory’75 which has not slowed.   
The D.S.M. is the offspring of odd bedfellows: the medical industry, with its 
focus on germs and other biochemical causes of disease, and psychoanalysis, 
the now-largely-discredited discipline that attributes our psychological 
suffering to our individual and collective history.76 
Despite these criticisms, both systems have been adopted by key Australian 
agencies. The Australian Bureau of Statistics used an adapted version of the ICD-10 
for its surveys including the 2001 National Health Survey.
77
 The classification 
systems were also referenced in the Third National Mental Health Plan 2003–08 
although they were omitted from mention in the Fourth National Mental Health 
Plan 2009–14.  This omission suggests a change in policy focus reflected in a 
number of recent national mental health policies that has seen a distancing from the 
once favoured biomedical paradigm of previous plans toward the placement of 
more emphasis on the psychosocial model which is discussed below. 
3.5 Diagnosis or misdiagnosis? 
There is much more scope for interpretation and dissent in psychiatry than in most 
other medical fields due to the more rudimentary knowledge base, and the greater 
distance from clinical realities.
78
 It is axiomatic that psychiatrists often disagree on 
a diagnosis, and if not the diagnosis, on the treatment needed for the management of 
the symptoms.
79
 An example of this type of polar disagreement between mental 
health professionals became apparent when five men who were experiencing mental 
illness died in Tasmania’s 260 bed prison within a five month period in 1999/2000. 
The deaths prompted a public outcry that resulted in two separate inquiries: a Death 
                                                 
75 Rick Mayes and Allan V Horwitz, ‘DSM-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness’ 
(2005) 41 Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 249, 266.  
76 Gary Greenberg, ‘Not Diseases, but Categories of Suffering’, The New York Times (online), 29 January 2012 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/opinion/the-dsms-troubled-revision.html?_r=2&ref=opinion>. 
77 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), National Health Survey: Summary of Results, (Report, No 4364.0, 
Canberra, 2001).  
78 Michele T Pathé and Paul E Mullen, ‘The Dangerousness of the DSM-III-R’ (1993) 1 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 47.   
79 The New York Times published an article by Benedict Carey on 11 November, 2006 titled What’s Wrong 
With a Child? Psychiatrists Often Disagree in which he referred to a 13 year old boy who had had 13 different 
the diagnoses. His first diagnosis was depression. He was aged 7. ‘Each diagnosis was accompanied by a 
different regimen of drug treatments.’ 
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in Custody inquest conducted by the state coroner and another inquiry initiated by 
the Tasmanian Ombudsman.
80
  
The issue of medical diagnosis and misdiagnosis was a prominent factor in the 
subsequent findings of the mens’ deaths and led to the coroner’s recommendation 
that a system of peer review of psychiatric decisions be implemented.
81
  
...the diagnosis by Dr. Pargiter on the 18/8/99 of a major depressive disorder 
which Dr. Jager disagreed with 3 days later without allowing for any period of 
observation by him82... Dr Jager agreed he read Fabian’s forensic file which 
included the reports of the psychiatrists and psychiatric registrar all of whom 
had previously diagnosed Fabian as suffering from schizophrenia. His view 
however was that Fabian was a severely personality disordered individual with 
an anti-social and narcissistic profile.  His condition was likely to be a 
psychopathic personality disorder and unlikely to be schizophrenia.83...While 
Dr. Sale disagreed with Dr. Jager’s diagnosis...he said that the treatment 
Dr.Jager was giving Fabian....the anti-psychotic drugs, would have been what 
he would have done anyway.84 
Psychiatrists use the diagnostic classification lists to aggregate symptoms, 
manifestations and behaviours deemed abnormal or dysfunctional then subjectively 
afford different value weights and rankings to, too often, arrive at inconsistent, 
uncertain, unprovable, unreliable and inaccurate diagnoses.
85
  The strategy of 
constructing standardised definitions of designated behavioural indicators to aid 
psychiatrists to make appropriate and consistent diagnoses has not been as 
successful as hoped.
86
  Suggested causes for this include the view that severe 
                                                 
80 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Report on an Inquiry Into Risdon Prison: Risdon Prison Hospital & Forensic Mental 
Health Services’, volume 1, June 2001. 
81 Recommendation 26, Magistrates Court Tasmania, ‘Findings Deaths in Custody Inquest’ (Inquest Report, 
Magistrates Court Tasmania, 26 March 2001) 
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/18050/Findings__Deaths_in_Custody_inquest.pdf>.  
82 Ibid, 140. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid, 141. 
85 Marlene Busko, Adults Admitted to a Mood-Disorder Clinic Are Often Misdiagnosed. 
<http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/582125>.   
86 Aleen Frances, ‘The Forensic Risks of DSM-V and How to Avoid Them’ (2010) 38 Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 11. See also Allen Frances, ‘PTSD, DSM-5, and Forensic Misuse’, 
Psychiatric Times (online), 30 September 2011 
<http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/blog/couchincrisis/content/article/10168/1959645>.  ‘In preparing DSM-IV, 
we worked hard to avoid causing confusion in forensic settings. Realizing that lawyers read documents in their 
own special way, we had a panel of forensic psychiatrists go over every word to reduce the risks that DSM IV 
could be misused in the courts. They did an excellent job, but all of us missed one seemingly small mistake—
the substitution of an “or” for an “and” in the paraphilia section that lead to serious misunderstandings and the 
questionably constitutional preventive psychiatric detention of sexual offenders.’  
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mental disorders may exist on a continuum rather than as discrete binary 
possibilities and clinical entities,
87
 and the differences in the ways that clinicians 
account for the social context of behavioural symptoms.
88
   
Psychiatrists can also differ on what symptoms are necessary to trigger a particular 
diagnosis.  For example, some psychiatrists will diagnose every person 
experiencing a mood disorder as ‘Bipolar’. A requisite symptom of Bipolar is a 
manic episode which involves a distinct period of abnormal, irritable moods, 
characterised by inflated self-esteem, sleeplessness and other traits. When ‘mania’ 
is not present, some psychiatrists will assume that it has occurred, but the person 
was unaware, or that it will occur at some point in the future, so make the Bipolar 
diagnosis. On the other hand, many patients who do have Bipolar but who have not 
experienced a manic episode are initially diagnosed and treated for major 
depression.   
Many patients carry each of the diagnoses of Schizophrenia, Major 
Depression, Bipolar illness, and Schizoaffective Disorder at some points in 
their lives ... A recent review of the case of a woman who had committed 
suicide found that her psychiatrist had diagnosed her with all of these disorders 
within the past year. It's a rare patient who carries the same psychiatric 
diagnosis throughout their lifetime...Our field's inability to agree on what 
disorder an individual actually suffers from is held up by some as confirmation 
of their belief that psychiatry is just a bunch of pseudoscience at best or, at 
worst, a profit-driven business.89 
The results of a 2000 Bi Polar study by the American Psychiatric Association that 
followed up an earlier 1992 study reported that: 
Over one third of respondents sought professional help within 1 year of the 
onset of symptoms. Unfortunately, 69% were misdiagnosed, with the most 
frequent misdiagnosis being unipolar depression. Those who were 
misdiagnosed consulted a mean of 4 physicians prior to receiving the correct 
                                                 
87 John Cloud, ‘The DSM: How Psychiatrists Redefine 'Disordered'’, Time (online), 13 February 2010 
<http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1964196,00>. 
88 Stuart A Kirk and Derek K Hsieh, ‘Diagnostic Consistency in Assessing Conduct Disorder: An Experiment 
on the Effect of Social Context’ (2004) 74 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 43, 53.  
89 Kevin Turnquist, Problems with Psychiatric Diagnosis, Readings in Humanistic Psychiatry 
<http://kevinturnquist.org/problemsindiagnosis.php>. 
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diagnosis. Over one third waited 10 years or more before receiving an accurate 
diagnosis.90 
The researchers expressed their concern that in 2000, psychiatrists were still 
misdiagnosing at the same high rates that had been occurring in 1992 while the 
numbers of family physicians misdiagnosing had significantly increased during the 
intervening period.   
The high levels of misdiagnosis in psychiatry may be a function of symptom 
overlap. For example, Bipolar disorder was often misdiagnosed as schizophrenia 
because psychosis was more commonly associated with schizophrenia. A study of 
100 patients with a primary diagnosis of major depression or Bipolar disorder found 
that 26% actually had an anxiety disorder, a thought disorder (schizoaffective 
disorder), or a personality disorder.
91
 Another study that examined psychiatric 
misdiagnoses in patients with chronic fatigue syndrome found that doctors often 
mentioned symptoms consistent with a depressive or anxiety disorder but failed to 
make a formal diagnosis.  This failure may have been due to a general reluctance to 
‘label’ a patient with a stigmatised diagnosis.92   
3.6 A diagnostician’s tool box – a manual, guesses and Google93  
It is estimated that doctors carry 2 million facts in their head in order to fulfil their 
diagnostic role although with the rapid expansion in medical knowledge, even this 
may not be enough.
94
 A recent Australian study suggested that in difficult 
diagnostic cases, it is often useful to ‘google for a diagnosis.’95  The media wrongly 
reported that general practitioners were being urged to try diagnosis by Google 
because it offered a greater chance of diagnostic accuracy.
96
 This misreporting may 
                                                 
90 Robert M Hirschfeld, Lydia Lewis and Lana A Vornik, ‘Perceptions and impact of bipolar disorder: how far 
have we really come? Results of the national depressive and manic-depressive association 2000 survey of 
individuals with bipolar disorder’ (2003) 64 Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 161, 161.  
91 Busko, above n 84.  
92 Tara Lawn et al., ‘Psychiatric misdiagnoses in patients with chronic fatigue syndrome’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
the Royal Society of Medicine Short Reports 28.  
93 Google is an internet search engine. 
94 Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Hwee Kwoon Ng, ‘Googling for a diagnosis—use of Google as a diagnostic aid: 
internet based study’ (2006) 333 British Medical Journal 1143, 1144.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Hawkes, N., Health Editor, The Sunday Times, November 10, 2006 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8122-2446250,00.html> 
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be an indicator of the general attitude toward psychiatrists as witch doctors
97
 and 
shrinks.
98
  The incomprehensibility that is the mind is attractive to the mystique of 
tribal sorcery and shamanism, and ritualistic tools such as wands and runes, even 
Google, for arriving at accurate diagnoses of mental illness. David. L. Rosenhan 
famously asked in 1973, ‘If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them?’99  
To answer his question, he, and eight other pseudo patients (a psychology graduate 
student, three psychologists, a paediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, and a 
housewife) were admitted to 12 psychiatric hospitals across the United States of 
America.  After their admission, the pseudo patients behaved on the wards as they 
would normally behave.  They were paragons of cooperation and compliance, and 
‘spoke to patients and staff as they might ordinarily’.100 The length of 
hospitalisation for the pseudo patients ranged from 7 days to 52 days, with an 
average stay of 19 days.
101
  Every pseudo patient was discharged with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia in remission.  It seemed that the circumstances of the environment 
had made the sane insane and ordinary behaviour deviant. Rosenhan concluded, ‘we 
have known for a long time that diagnoses are often not useful or reliable, but we 
have nevertheless continued to use them.’102 
The question was raised in 2008 by the BBC’s science and philosophy program 
Horizon
103
  as to whether the reliability of mental disorder diagnoses has improved 
since Rosenhan’s provocative experiment forty years earlier.  The program set out 
to answer this question in a two part documentary, How Mad Are You?
104
 Ten 
volunteers, five of whom had a diagnosed mental illness, were brought together for 
                                                 
97 E Fuller Torrey, Witchdoctors and Psychiatrists: The Common Roots of Psychotherapy and Its Future 
(Harper & Row, 1986).  The author examines the similar techniques used by witch doctors and psychiatrists 
which he considers far outweigh any differences that exist.  
98 ‘Shrink’ likely originated from a commingling of the two words "head shrink" and the single word 
"headshrinker," indicating that it likely originated as a disparaging reference comparing the process of 
psychotherapy to primitive tribal practices of shrinking the heads of enemies. Reportedly, "shrink" was first 
used in literature by Thomas Pynchon in his book The Crying of Lot 49 published in 1966.’ Retrieved from Dr 
Ron Sterling’s website DearShrink.com. <http://www.dearshrink.com/shrink.htm> 
99 David L Rosenhan, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’ (1973) 179 Science 250, 250.  
100 Ibid 252.  
101 Rosenhan, above n 98, ‘252. 
102 Ibid 257. 
103 Horizon's original mission statement, broadcast on its first ever programme, reads: "The aim of Horizon is to 
provide a platform from which some of the world's greatest scientists and philosophers can communicate their 
curiosity, observations and reflections and infuse into our common knowledge their changing views of the 
universe. We shall do this by presenting science not as a series of isolated discoveries but as a continuing 
growth of thought, a philosophy which is an essential part of twentieth century culture." BBC Press Office, BBC 
TWO’s Horizon (19 August 2004) BBC 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2004/08_august/19/horizon_facts.shtml>. 
104 The program was first shown in the UK on 11 and 18 November, 2008. SBS ran the show in Australia on 16 
and 23 November, 2010 
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a week of intense observation by a panel of clinical experts who were to decide 
which of the five had one of six common mental disorders - Bipolar, schizophrenia, 
depression, social anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and 
anorexia.   
The participants underwent a series of physical and mental challenges, psychiatric 
tests and interviews that were intended to expose the traits of a disorder.  The 
psychological tests proved inconclusive and even created ‘greater confusion’105 for 
the experts.  The panel correctly diagnosed the two participants with OCD and 
anorexia but incorrectly diagnosed three participants, two of whom had no history 
of mental illness.  The panel were also required to choose one of the 10 who was 
definitely not a psychiatric service user. The experts again made an incorrect 
choice.   Such a low diagnostic success rate appears to support Rosenhan’s 
conclusions, although the results must be tempered by the fact that Horizon 
achieved its results within the limitations and gimmickry of popular factual 
television programming – reality genre.  
Popular factual programs encourage public engagement with social and political 
issues through the experience of being entertained.
106
  In engaging the audience in 
this way, too many restrictions were placed on the program’s experts required to 
diagnose participants who were either experiencing a period of wellness or whose 
behaviours were being successfully managed by treatment.  ‘My worst fear was 
that... people would notice immediately that I have some sort of disorder. But the 
point...was to show people ... it is not easy for people to see that I have had mental 
health problems.’107  Perhaps the producers used the Rosenhan experiment as the 
inspiration to explore the hypothesis that a mentally healthy person can be 
diagnosed as having a serious mental illness.   
Possibly, the clearer intent was the portrayal of the guise of normalcy.  In an 
endeavour to reduce stigma, and change attitudes, the program set out to 
demonstrate that people with significant mental health problems can live normal 
and undistinguished lives.  Misdiagnosis was simply presented as a contributing 
                                                 
105 Lesley Henderson, ‘How mad are we?’ (2008) 337 British Medical Journal a2641.  
106 Annette Hill, Reality TV: Audiences and popular factual television (Routledge, 2005) 171.  
107 Participant, How Mad Are You? (21 June 2010) Spotlight <http://www.spotlightradio.net/listen/how-mad-
are-you/>. 
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factor in the blurred demarcation between normal and abnormal lifestyles.  
Ancillary to this but certainly more concerning is whether the public will now be 
more worried that mental health experts are failing to diagnose individuals with 
serious mental disorders than interested in the possibility that a mentally healthy 
person might be incorrectly labelled with a serious mental disorder. Will this 
display of diagnostic guesswork played out in the medium of public entertainment 
contribute to an increase in the public’s fear of people experiencing mental illness, 
and reinforce the stereotypes of them as being deceptive, secretive and 
manipulative?  
Arriving at a correct mental health diagnosis is always a challenging exercise.  A 
psychiatrist will usually offer up their ‘best guess’ based on their observation of a 
group of presenting symptoms. This diagnosis may be replaced by a later doctor’s 
‘best guess’ made from observing a different group of presenting symptoms in the 
person.  In this way, it is not unusual for individuals to receive many different 
diagnoses over a lifetime, informed by psychiatrists observing only components of 
the overall pattern of behaviours categorised in the diagnostic manuals. Professor 
Sandifer’s research on diagnosing schizophrenia found that more than a fifth of 
cases studied were not sufficiently clear to warrant a diagnosis but he suggested that 
professional pride and the pressure for statistical neatness emboldened psychiatrists 
to a diagnostic certainty that often the facts of a particular case did not support.
108
   
We have all learned our lessons rather well, and know the textbook definitions, 
but all might not agree that a particular patient has certain characteristics (and 
in a particular order of importance). The primary origin of our diagnostic 
differences lies, in my opinion, in the way different observers view the same 
patient.109 
The diagnostic manuals have become vital tools in psychiatric medicine. They 
provide the framework from which clinicians hang their intuitive and subjective 
psychiatric disorder
 
attributions.  Accurately diagnosing specific disorders causative 
to the person’s state of mental illness is difficult, perhaps, even rarely possible, and 
from a medical perspective, may be unnecessary. As indicated by Dr Sales in his 
evidence to the Risdon Prison Inquiry, drugs are grouped together so that the 
                                                 
108 Myron G Sandifer, ‘Psychiatric Diagnosis: Cross-National Research Findings’ (1972) 65 Proceeding of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 497, 500.  
109 Ibid 499. 
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benefits of a particular medication may span a number of different disorders while 
psychiatric treatment is generally a matter of trial and adjustment.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that a ‘mental illness’ is a medical label to be found 
somewhere within the medical rhetoric of constructs contained within the DSM-IV 
Manual, and that psychiatry is largely a discipline of classification, observation and 
guesswork.  There are no scientific tests such as x-rays or blood tests to prove the 
existence, or non-existence of a mental illness.
110
   The ‘only possible verification 
of the presence of mental disorder is by a consensus of those who have observed the 
actor's behaviour’111 because, unlike measles, diabetes or hepatitis, mental illness is 
not really a ‘real disease’.112  Yet once the label of ‘mentally ill’ is attached to an 
individual, the legal system is alerted that this person is, or may become at some 
point in an indeterminate future,
113
 irrational, unpredictable and dangerous.  It is a 
social indicator of the person’s inferiority, vulnerability, and impaired decision-
making capability and functioning capacity, which in turn justifies the imposition of 
restrictive and discriminatory laws, and biased decision-making that can impact 
harshly, and unfairly, on people experiencing a mental illness.  
The psychiatrist is generally classed as the expert interpreter of a person’s life 
experiences and properly placed to intervene in the life of a person existing within 
the context of social abnormality – mentally diseased and ill –to help enable the 
person to overcome their pathology.  The person’s perceived ‘suffering’, and their 
alleged inability to relieve themself of their suffering without the intervention of the 
psychiatrist, and potentially, the coercive authority of the state, fixes the patient in 
the role of an inferior, helpless being, a role that is both a product and cause of the 
stigma associated with mental illness, a proposition fully discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
                                                 
110 Morse, above n 6.  
111 Ibid 607. 
112 Thomas Stephen Szaz, The Myth of Mental illness (Harper Collins, 2010). First published in 1974, this 
edition includes the Preface: Fifty Years After the Myth of Mental Illness. 
113 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 24. This section states that a person maybe involuntarily hospitalized in they 
have the appearance of a mental illness, and as a consequence there is a significant risk of harm to self or others 
but it fails to use time limiting terms such as imminent or immediate so that the harm can potentially occur at 
anytime in the future.  There is also no definition for ‘harm’ although whatever it might mean, it includes 
‘serious mental or physical deterioration’.  
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While all medical diagnoses are value laden, psychiatric diagnoses are 
quantitatively more so.
114
  Even though psychiatric opinions are commonly based 
on value-laden interpretations of classified sets of behaviours, unprovable 
diagnoses, and predictive assessments regarding future inappropriate behaviours, 
psychiatric evaluations are still regarded by the legal system as integral to decision-
making when mental illness is a fact at issue.
115
  This is because there exists in the 
role of the psychiatrist, a superiority built upon their pseudoscientific knowledge of 
the socially unacceptable, abnormal behaviours of people experiencing a mental 
illness.  
The health and legal institutions have joined together in a single, treatment control 
system which has thus far focused on regulating and managing abnormal social 
behaviours rather than on developing clear, consistent concepts and definitions that 
span the social sciences, medicine and the law.  Until a concerted start is made on 
addressing the jurisdictional, conceptual and language inconsistencies across the 
various disciplines, people experiencing a mental illness will continue to be 
subjected to the biased, arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law:
116
  
  
                                                 
114 Nigel Eastman and Bella Starling, ‘Mental disorder ethics: theory and empirical investigation’ (2006) 32 
Journal of Medical Ethics 94. See also K W M Fulford, ‘Ten principles of values-based medicine’ in Jennifer 
Radden (ed), The Philosophy of Psychiatry (Oxform University Press, 2004) 205.  
115 Bernadette Dallaire, ‘Civil commitment due to mental illness and dangerousness: the union of law and 
psychiatry within a treatment-control system’ (2000) 22 Sociology of Health & Illness 679. See also David L 
Shapiro, Forensic Psychological Assessment: An Integrative Approach (Simon & Schuster, 1991).  
116 Winick, above n 1, 555.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUALISING STIGMA: STEREOTYPES, 
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A major premise of this thesis is that negative attitudes of law students regarding 
mental illness may be positively altered through their participation in therapeutic 
jurisprudence based clinical legal programs such as the Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme which is detailed in Chapter Seven. This premise rests on 
the Michael Perlin’s proposition that the legal system stigmatises and discriminates 
against people who experience mental illness. It explores the prospect that if a 
positive system change is to occur, it may be propelled by the interest and 
commitment of law graduates disabused of myths and stereotypes.  New lawyers 
who understand the barriers that people with a mental illness face in the community 
and particularly, when they confront the legal system.  Lawyers who have acquired 
the attributes and skills to work both professionally and empathetically with this 
large group of vulnerable citizens and share the common goal of exposing, and 
eradicating the social acceptance of stigma and discrimination associated with 
mental illness in the law. 
Chapter One examined the failure of the public health paradigms and policies to 
provide the law with clear and consistent guidance in decision-making matters in 
which mental illness is a factor. Chapter Two discussed the reliance of the law on 
the biomedical model and the diagnostic and social labelling of a person who 
experiences a mental illness as someone who is abnormal, different, disabled, and 
dysfunctional, and someone who carries with them the potential to commit harm to 
others. This risk factor is often the determinant factor for decision-makers when 
mental illness is an issue. This can unfairly disadvantage the individual, a situation 
that is evident in the family law parenting order matters discussed in Chapter Six 
but is as equally apparent upon examination of other aspects of law in which mental 
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illness is a factor such as criminal law, sentencing, child protection, guardianship 
and administration and legislative drafting. 
This chapter is important to the thesis because it examines the phenomenon that is 
stigma. Stigma is a multi-faceted societal construct that involves attitudes, feelings 
and behaviours
1
 and is best understood by examining the terms of its components; 
stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination, and the interconnectedness between the 
three.
2
  Stigma associated with mental illness is a crucial phenomenon because 
while tolerance for other stigmatised groups has grown, for the people who 
experience mental illness, it persists to the extent that their castigation is socially 
acceptable.
3
 Stigma exists against even the mildest forms of mental illness.
4
 It is 
pervasive, pernicious and resistant to change.
5
 A valuable, if not indeed, a necessary 
first step to designing effective social and legal interventions to reduce stigma and 
decrease discrimination, particularly in the legal system which is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters, is to identify and appreciate the theories that 
explain the processes that drive stigma.
6
   
For this reason, this chapter presents a predominantly social science style 
discussion. It explores the theories of devaluating human characteristics through 
labelling, stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination which exist within the context 
of social power, and perpetuate within an environment of social inequality. The 
stigmatisation process distinguishes human differences which are linked to 
undesirable characteristics.  These perceived differences are then exaggerated 
through the use of stereotypes that identify and label individuals and whole groups 
as inferior and dysfunctional, which in turn justify society’s prejudicial and 
discriminatory responses to the exaggerated differences. Stereotypes provide the 
structure for predetermined negative attitudes; the cognitive and affective responses 
                                                 
1 David L Penn and James Martin, ‘The Stigma of Severe Mental Illness: Some Potential solutions for a 
Recalcitrant Problem’ (1998) 69 Psychiatric Quarterly 235.    
2 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16, 16.  
3 Andrea Stier and Stephen P Hinshaw, ‘Explicit and Implicit Stigma Against Individuals With Mental Illness’ 
(2007) 42 Australian Psychologist 106.  
4 Stephen P Hinshaw and Andrea Stier, ‘Stigma as Related to Mental Disorders’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of 
Clinical Psychology 367.   
5 Heather Stuart, ‘Fighting Stigma caused by mental disorders: past perspective, present activities, and future 
directions’ (2008) 7 World Psychiatry 185.  
6 Corrigan and Watson, above n 2, 16.  
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that occur when negative attitudes are endorsed; and the behavioural actions 
prompted by prejudiced attitudes. 
This chapter discusses the social theories that underlie, and offer explanation for 
these prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices although a complicating 
factor in the discussion is the sheer number and diversity of stigma theories and 
classifications. Accordingly, the chapter reviews only the seminal and most 
influential literature, commencing with Erving Goffman’s classic devaluation and 
dehumanisation theory.
7
  It examines later theories that built on Goffman’s 
theoretical foundation, in particular, Corrigan’s theory of structural discrimination8 
which is generally considered to be the most egregious form of indirect 
discrimination because of the pervasive impact that society's basic institutions have 
on people’s lives.9 Common within all the theories, however, is reference to the 
implicit tension that exists between the individually focused psychomedical model 
and the sociological stigma as a mechanism of social control model.
10
  
Chapter Three discusses the factors that led to deinstitutionalisation that in turn 
generated a social need to measure the public stigma associated with mental illness.  
The concept of stigma is not a recent creation but its traditional, historical 
theological and moral cause beliefs have been almost entirely supplanted by the 
post-industrial, post-enlightenment, ‘medical model’ which approaches mental 
illness as a disease, or a disease-like condition that produces abnormal behaviours 
that can, and should be, treated by medical professionals through somatic means.
11
 
This belief is a product of western medicine’s idealisation that the body can be 
objectified and controlled, and its associated conviction that the failure to control 
abnormal behaviours must be ascribed to the diseased individual.
12
  By applying the 
medical model to mental illness, the person is defined by the diagnostic label that 
                                                 
7 Erving Goffman was a sociologist prominent for his analyses of human interaction. He relied less on formal 
scientific method than on observation to explain contemporary life.  
8 Corrigan and Watson, above n 2, 16. 
9 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).  
10 Kristine Harris, ‘Pride and Prejudice – Identity and stigma in leprosy work’ (2011) 82 Leprosy Review 135.  
11 David Zigmond, ‘The Medical Model—its Limitations and Alternatives’ (2011) L1 Physical Culture and 
Sport Studies and Research 6 <http://www.marco-learningsystems.com/pages/david-zigmond/medical-
model.htm>.  
12 Jayne Clapton and Jennifer Fitzgerald, ‘The History of Disability: A History of 'Otherness'’ New Renaissance 
News (online), 1997 <http://www.ru.org/human-rights/the-history-of-disability-a-history-of-otherness.html>. 
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medically and socially signposts their past, present, and increasingly for the benefit 
of the legal system, predicted behaviours.
13
   
Stigma is entrenched within society’s institutions, including the legal system which 
despite its foundational principles of fairness and equality, is far from immune from 
the stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination associated with mental illness.
14
 
According to Perlin, the legal system is largely blind to the hidden prejudices that 
sustain and perpetuate biased legal decision-making, and discriminatory practices 
that often deny dignity, respect and fairness to parties experiencing a mental 
illness.
15
 The law’s stigmatic response emanates from a variety of  misconceived 
and erroneous beliefs regarding mental illness such as psychiatric experts can 
accurately identify and measure dangerousness; the predictions of experts have a 
scientific foundation;  the person with a mental illness is dangerous, lacks 
credibility, is unpredictable and should be feared; they are also childlike so must be 
protected; they need to be controlled because they are weak, irresponsible, and 
sometimes even blameworthy for their condition; they lack the capacity to show 
love or affection and so do not make good parents; they are presumptively 
incompetent; and they are unable to make autonomous life decisions particularly, 
when it involves their own medical care and treatment.
16
   
The institutional embeddedness of stigma ensures that the inferior ‘them’ can be 
identified as people who should be intimidated, humiliated, coerced, restricted, 
avoided and segregated by the powerful ‘us’, a role traditionally performed by the 
law and its actors.  Chapter Four will discuss the usefulness of the tool of law in 
challenging social stigma, particularly through anti-discrimination legislation but 
the law can also create and perpetuate stigma and discriminatory legal system 
practices.
17
  If a positive cultural shift is to occur in the legal system that results in 
reduced stigma and decreased discrimination, it will first require an understanding 
                                                 
13 Thomas H Richardson, ‘Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in Examining the Relationship between 
Mental Illness and Violent Behaviour and Crime’ (2009) Internet Journal of Criminology 1. See also Heather 
Stuart, ‘Violence and mental illness: an overview’ (2003) 2 World Psychiatry 121. See also Barbara D 
Underwood, ‘Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized 
Judgment’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 1408.  
14 Michael Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000).  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid 43.  
17 Scott Burris, ‘Stigma and the law’ (2006) 367 The Lancet 529.  
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and appreciation of the power and pervasiveness of stigma. This chapter is a 
contextual vehicle for getting to ‘know the enemy’.  
2. DEINSTITUTIONALISATION – A CAUSE FOR 
MEASURING STIGMA 
Stigma is the consequence of prejudice and prejudice is detriment or damage, 
caused to a person by judgement or action in which his/her rights and dignity 
are disregarded. Prejudice leads to action, and this action is to stigmatise.18 
Stigma is a major contributor to the burden of illness on societies as it influences 
case finding and treatment delivery, major factors in effective disease control.
19
  
Stigma has a substantial impact on the experience of illness, help seeking, and 
treatment adherence. Identified with other stigma targets such as poverty, 
homelessness and sexual preferences, marginalised groups are more vulnerable to 
health issues, and health-related stigma, which contribute further to social 
disadvantage or discrimination.
20
 The past sixty years has seen the study of stigma 
become an area of major research applied to a wide array of health related 
circumstances including leprosy,
21
 HIV/AIDS,
22
 cancer,
23
 tuberculosis,
24
 urinary 
incontinence,
25
 cystic fibrosis,
26
obesity,
27
 and mental illness.
28
 
The academic literature is replete with studies examining the psychological, 
sociological, structural, and interpersonal forces that create, support and maintain 
                                                 
18 Juan J Lopez-Ibor, ‘The power of stigma’ (2002) 1 World Psychiatry 23.  
19 Mitchell Weiss, Jayashree Ramakrishna and Daryl Somma, ‘Health-related stigma: Rethinking concepts and 
interventions’ (2006) 11 Psychology, Health & Medicine 277.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Opala, J.,  Boillot, F., (1996) Leprosy among the Iimba: Illness and healing in the context of world view, 42 
Social Science and Medicine 3. See also Kristine Harris, ‘Pride and Prejudice – Identity and stigma in leprosy 
work’ (2011) 82 Leprosy Review 135.  
22 Lynne Duffy, ‘Suffering, shame, and silence: The stigma of HIV/AIDS’ (2005) 16 Journal of the Association 
of Nurses in AIDS care 13.   
23 Sophie Lebel and Gerald M Devins, ‘Stigma in cancer patients whose behavior may have contributed to their 
disease’ (2008) 4 Future Oncology 717.  
24 Jean Macq et al., (2006) Assessing the stigma of tuberculosis, 11 Psychology, Health and Medicine 3, 
pp.346-352  
25 Kathleen Sheldon and Linda Caldwell, ‘Urinary incontinence in women: Implications for therapeutic 
recreation’ (1994) 28 Therapeutic Recreation Journal 203.  
26 Kendea Nicole Oliver, Perceived Stigma and Self-disclosure in Adolescents and Adults Living with Cystic 
Fibrosis: Measuring the Impact on Psychological and Physical Health, Degree for Master of Arts in Psychology 
Thesis, Ohio  State University, 2011. 
<https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap:0:0:APPLICATION_PROCESS=DOWNLOAD_ETD_SUB_DOC_ACCNUM:::F1
501_ID:osu1307639721,inline> 
27 Lynne MacLean et al., ‘Obesity, stigma and public health planning’ 24 Health Promotion International 88.  
28 Corrigan and Watson, above n 2. See also Jo C Phelan and Bruce Link, ‘Conceptualizing Stigma’ (2001) 27 
Annual Review of Sociology 363.  
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stigma and define, describe, and measure the negative impact that stigma has on the 
social, vocational, and economic functioning of people who experience mental 
illness.
29
 A few researchers have taken the extreme position that there is no stigma 
attached to mental illness at all
30
 but for others,  it is the term ‘stigma’ that is itself 
viewed as the problem as stigma is considered a conflation of cause and effect. 
‘There’s stigma around the word stigma’.31 Most researchers consider 
stigmatisation to be a consequence of the dichotomy of the normalcy of ‘wellness’ 
and the abnormality of ‘illness’32 which is discussed in detail at Section 3.0. 
Prior to the 1950s, historians and social scientists demonstrated little interest in the 
housing of ‘mental patients’.33  Historically, mental illness had been regarded as a 
private matter that gave cause for shame and embarrassment, and as a topic of 
conversation, was inappropriate for public discussion.
34
 For the public opinion 
analyst, the investigation of stigma associated with mental illness offered finite 
interest because of its limited public and political significance.
35
 It would take the 
combination of the social impact of deinstitutionalisation (the process of replacing 
long stay psychiatric hospitals with community mental health services) policies; the 
appearance of the anti-psychiatry movement in the 1960s; and the igniting of public 
interest by Michel Foucault’s polemic, Madness and Civilization in 196436 to begin 
the demise of the scientific apathy for mental illness stigma research.
37
   
The concept of stigma as a component of the social impact of mental illness quickly 
gained popular attention amongst policy developers, social scientists and mental 
health professionals.
38
 The standard albeit archaic dictionary definition of stigma as 
a mark or token of infamy, disgrace or reproach was supplanted in the vocabulary 
                                                 
29 Neasa Martin, ‘From Discrimination to Social Inclusion, A review of the literature on antistigma initiatives in 
mental health’ (Literature Review, Queensland Alliance, 2009) < http://www.mhcc.org.au/documents/From-
discrimination-to-social-inclusion-Lit-review.pdf>.  
30 Guido M Crocetti, Herzl R Spiro and Iradj Siassi, Contemporary Attitudes towards Mental Illness (University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1974).  
31 Meaghan Wray, ‘'There's stigma around the word stigma'’ (2012) 139 The Journal Queens University 
<http://queensjournal.ca/story/2012-04-05/news/theres-stigma-around-word-stigma/>. 
32 Steven James Bartlett, Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards 
of Good Psychological Health (Praeger, 2011).  
33 Bill Forsythe and Joseph Melling (eds), Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800-1914: A social history of 
madness in comparative history (Routledge, 1999).   
34 Andrew B Borinstein, ‘Public attitudes toward persons with mental illness’ (1992) 11 Health Affairs 186.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (Jean Khalfa (ed)) (Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa trans) 
(Routledge, 2006). 
37 Hinshaw and Stier, above n 4.  
38 Weiss, Ramakrishna and Somma, above n 19.  
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of public health culture, so that stigma became widely understood as a reference for 
adverse and exclusionary social processes experienced by members of marginalised 
and vulnerable groups.  Greater emphasis was placed on achieving outcomes of 
community integration and social inclusion, and on the development of strategies 
that focused primarily on housing and employment.  Although sociological interest 
appears to have plateaued in the 1990s, this was matched by a marked increase in 
the practical psychological and health studies of stigma.
39
 Understanding and 
measuring stigma remains a priority interest for public opinion analysts.
40
 Stigma 
research continues to be regarded as an important tool for indentifying and 
ameliorating the social harms experienced by marginalised individuals who are 
brought into contact with the legal system.
41
    
2.1 Community care to public vagrancy 
Prior to the advent of the ‘enlightened’ asylum system in the 19th century,42 
responsibility for the care and control of all but the dangerous and acutely disturbed 
rested primarily with families,
43
 local parishes
44
 and municipalities.
45
 Family 
administered care typically meant cruel restraints,
46
 incarceration in upstairs attics 
and downstairs cellars,
47
 caging in pigpens, or being placed under the control of 
abusive servants.
48
  If the family had financial means, the insane relative could be 
delivered into the care of untrained staff in private madhouses.
49
 One such 
                                                 
39 Ibid.  
40 Weiss, Ramakrishna and Somma, above n 19.   
41 Juliana van Luoma et al., ‘An investigation of stigma in individuals receiving treatment for substance abuse’ 
(2007) 32 Addictive Behaviour 1331.  
42 Roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford University Press, 2002).  
43 Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions (Yale University Press, 1993).  
44 In London prior to 1834, there were more than 90 separate parishes, many of them tiny with only a few 
hundred residents. Commencing in 1714 with the enactment of the first of various Acts of Parliament that 
governed the disposal and care of the mentally ill, parishes discharged their legal obligation by sending them to 
“pauper farms” situated on the outskirts of the city.  
45 Gerald N Grob, ‘Mental Health Policy in America: Myths and Realities’ (1992) 11 Health Affairs 7, 9. The 
US had a system of municipal almshouses. 
46 Edward Shorter, History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (Wiley, 1997) 3.  
47 The incarceration of the mentally ill in private homes has been romantically conveyed through classic fiction. 
In the novel Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bronte, Rochester keeps his uncontrollably ‘mad’ wife Bertha secretly 
locked in the “attic”, or more correctly, a room on the third story of Thornfield House.  
48 Porter, above n 42.  
49 Grob, above n 45, 9. See also Elaine Murphy, ‘The Mad-house Keepers of East London’ (2001) 51 History 
Today 29.  
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madhouse was Bethlehem which was more commonly known as Bedlam.
50
 All 
madhouses were generally places of neglect, restraint and mistreatment.
51
  
Lunatic indigents were confined in gaols and work houses,
52
 and houses of 
correction and bridewells
53
 although Shorter suggests that in 1826, the number of 
people that were actually detained in England was in fact minimal: 5,000 people in 
a country with a population of 10 million.
54
 Myers suggests that in England and 
Wales during the 19
th
 century, the number of insane workhouse inmates never fell 
much below 20 per cent of all known pauper lunatics.
55
  While the cruel and 
inhumane treatment meted out to the lunatics detained in madhouses was 
newsworthy, it was particularly scandalous when the mistreated individual was a 
member of the aristocracy.
56
  Legislative reform commonly followed when ‘law 
was invoked as a sponge to mop up scandal wherever it should arise’.57 Protective 
legislation including the Workhouse Test Act 1723 and the Lunacy Act 1845 were 
enacted to combat these flourishing abuses in private institutions, and by the late 
nineteenth century, private institutions had withered, to be replaced by public 
lunatic asylums.
58
  
2.2 The rise and fall of the asylum  
The decline of the feudal age in the 16
th
 century had caused the creation of a large, 
newly mobile underclass of poor which was lacking the traditional supports and 
protections of feudalism.
59
  With the concurrence of the post reformation decline of 
the Church as an instrument of social welfare,
60
 families increasingly abandoned 
                                                 
50 Shorter, above n 46, 5.  
51 Elizabeth M Varcarolis, Foundations of Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing (W.B. Saunders Company, 2005). 
See also Thomas S Szasz (ed), The Age of Madness (Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1975).  
52 Allison Foerschner, ‘The History of Mental Illness: From "Skull Drills" to "Happy Pills"’ (2010) 2 Student 
Pulse 1.  
53 E D Myers, ‘Workhouse or asylum: the nineteenth century battle for the care of the pauper insane’ (1998) 22 
Psychiatric Bulletin 575.  
54 Shorter, above n 46, 5. 
55 Myers, above n 53.  
56 Scull, above n 43.  
57 Clive Unsworth, ‘Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s ‘Golden Age’’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
479, 500. See also Elaine Murphy, ‘A mad house transformed: the lives and work of Charles James Beverly 
FRS (1788 - 1868) and John Warburton MD FRS (1795-1847)’ (2004) 58 Notes and Records of the Royal 
Society of London 267.  
58 Elaine Murphy, ‘A mad house transformed: the lives and work of Charles James Beverly FRS (1788 - 1868) 
and John Warburton MD FRS (1795-1847)’ (2004) 58 Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 267. 
59 Marvin Ventrell, ‘Evolution Of The Dependency Component Of  The Juvenile Court, 1899-1999’ (1998) 49 
Juvenile and Family Court Journal 1, 8.  
60 There are a number of excellent histories such as Clive Unsworth, ‘Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s ‘Golden 
Age’’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 479. See also Henry R Rollin, ‘Psychiatry at 2000, A bird’s 
eye view’ (2000) 24 Psychiatric Bulletin 11. 
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relatives to a life of begging and vagrancy.
61
  The ‘mentally ill swelled the streams 
of beggars that wandered the roads’.62  The immediate social impact of this new, 
impoverished class was a substantial increase in vagrancy, criminality and other 
types of behaviour contrary to peace and good order.
63
 There was a growing public 
interest in social engineering.  Lunatics were now classed as deviants, far removed 
from the attributes that were fundamental to the newly evolving industrial world: 
rational individualist qualities of self-control, predictability and responsibility. 
Society required that they be contained to a level that had previously been reserved 
for criminals.
64
  
This endemic social problem of lunatic vagrancy with its nuisance and violence 
committed on others generated strong public demand for state intervention in 
matters of mental illness. The County Asylums Act of 1808 authorised the 
establishment of refuge asylums for pauper criminally insane lunatics.
65
  In 1842, 
Poor Law Commission, speaking in promotion of the asylum and against the 
workhouses stated that: 
It must ... be remembered that with lunatics, the first object ought to be their 
cure, by means of proper medical treatment. This can only be obtained in a 
well-regulated Asylum: and therefore the detention of any curable lunatic in a 
workhouse is highly objectionable, on the score both of humanity and 
economy.66 
During the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, these revolutionary ideas about asylum treatment 
with its benevolent concept of curing or alleviating the symptoms of mental illness 
through medical treatments and psychological interventions
67
 were shifting the 
focus of mental health care from containment to treatment.
68
  In 1796, the York 
Retreat was opened by the Quaker, William Tukes.  This revolutionary institution 
followed a moral treatment/moral therapy model in which the use of physical 
                                                 
61 Foerschner, above 52.  
62 Shorter, above n 46, 2.  
63 Ventrell, above n 59, 8.  
64 Leonard D Smith, ‘The County Asylum in the Mixed Economy of Care’ in Bill Forsythe and Joseph Melling 
(eds), Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800-1914 (Routledge, 2006) 33.  
65 Unsworth, above n 57.  
66 Poor Law Commission. Printed Directions on Lunatics in Workhouses 5.2.1842, quoted 1844 Report 
Metropolitan Commissioners, 95-96. 
67 Louis C Charland, ‘Benevolent theory: moral treatment at the York Retreat’ (2007) 18 History of Psychiatry 
61.  
68 Shorter, above n 46.  
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restraints was minimised and improvements in the patients behaviour was sought 
through appeal to their ‘moral capacities’.69  
The American reformer Dorothea Dix, having forged links with the English 
Quakers, was thoroughly influenced by moral therapy and ‘what could be 
accomplished by using it to effect a relief of symptoms, even if not a complete cure, 
for people with mental illness.’70 Returning to the United States, Dix lobbied for 
moral therapy institutions to be made available for the care of the insane poor 
throughout the country.
71
  At a time when most people experiencing a mental illness 
were consigned to extremely overcrowded and unpleasant county-run almshouses, 
Dix proved extremely successful in getting state-based mental institutions built and 
funded.
72
  
Back in the United Kingdom, the enactment of the Medical Registration Act 1858 
had brought with it the formal recognition of medicine as a credible profession. The 
developing discipline of psychiatry’s theories of mind function as a convincing 
basis for the treatment of mental illness also shared in this new medical practice 
credibility.
73
  By the mid 19
th
 century, the asylum model had become widely 
regarded as a symbol of enlightened and progressive mental health care that offered, 
for the first time, professional treatment and humane custodial care for chronic 
cases of mental illness.
74
 Further, in 1867 the enactment of the Metropolitan Poor 
Act resulted in a physical and philosophical transitioning of individuals classified as 
‘pauper lunatics’ across from workhouses into places of medical care.75   
In the Australian colonies, the asylum system was forced upon the administration 
early. Not having an established British workhouse system of pauper relief for 
‘destitute lunatics’, colonists experiencing mental illness were sent to infirmaries, 
make-shift hospitals, or gaol.
76
  The unrestrained growth in the convict and settler 
                                                 
69 Cirostan Smark, ‘Dorothea Dix: A social researcher and reformer’ (Working Paper No 06/15, University of 
Wollongong Faculty of Business - Accounting & Finance, 2006) 7.  
70 Ibid 4.  
71 Smark, above n 69, 4.  
72 Ibid 9.  
73 It wasn’t until 1971 that the College of Psychiatrists came into being. 
74 By the 1930s nearly 80 percent the mental hospital beds in the US were occupied by chronic patients. Gerald 
N Grob, ‘Mental Health Policy in America: Myths And Realities’ (1992) 11 Health Affairs 7.  
75 Alistair E Sutherland Ritch, ‘Sick, Aged and Infirm’ Adults in The New Birmingham Workhouse, 1852 – 1912 
(Thesis for Masters of Philosophy Degree, University of Birmingham, 2009) 
<http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/846/1/Ritch10MPhil_A1a.pdf>. 
76 Penelope Hetherington, Paupers, poor relief and poor houses in Western Australia, 1829 to 1910 (University 
of Western Australia Publishing, 2009).  
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population, however, quickly brought with it serious sociological problems. 
Prisoners who had completed their sentences or who had been pardoned, or who 
were emancipated were often unable, or incapable, of supporting themselves due to 
the limited opportunities available in the new colonies.
77
  The colonies’ loose 
systems of supervision and minimum restraints soon proved inadequate, prompting 
the establishment of secure institutions.
78
 
While the Lunacy Commissioners in the United Kingdom were highly critical of the 
workhouse system for pauper lunatics, they were also concerned about the lack of 
space in the asylums
79
 and the diminishing confidence in the results of asylum 
treatment. They reconciled themselves to the fact that only the acute pauper insane 
should be admitted to the asylums and that all other lunatics were to be sent to the 
workhouses.
80
  By the mid 19
th
 century, asylum critics were claiming that the 
asylums were becoming human warehouses in which mental illness had become 
irreversible.
81
 They were ‘places of detention for confined lunatics rather than 
hospitals for the cure of the insane’.82  The earlier optimism that insanity could be 
curatively treated in asylums had all but disappeared by the late 19
th
 century.
83
 
By the 20
th
 century, the asylum was ‘perceived as the vestigial remnant of a bygone 
age’.84  Asylums had become grim environments where people were shut away, out 
of sight and out of mind, and the lack of public interest and political neglect became 
the norm.
85
  Decades of financial neglect exacerbated by the combined impact of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II caused the post war asylum to 
be associated with squalor and brutality. The pejoratively titled ‘snake pits’ of the 
1950s were generally regarded as having limited therapeutic benefit.
86
  Asylums 
had lost their social and medical legitimacy and had become little more than 
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containment facilities providing often life-long, custodial care to the chronically 
mentally ill.
87
   
2.3 From containment to treatment  
The arrival of the neuroleptic/antipsychotic drugs in the 1950s radically altered the 
way mental illness was treated.  In 1949, the Australian psychiatrist John F. J. Cade 
recognised the beneficial effects of lithium as a mood stabiliser on manic-
depressive disorder (Bipolar) patients.
88
   When Chlorpromazine
89 
was released in 
1954, it led a pharmacotherapy revolution that had a similar impact in psychiatry as 
the discovery of penicillin had had in mainstream health care.
90
  At the time, the 
prevailing treatments for schizophrenia were psychosurgery, electroconvulsive 
therapy, and insulin shock therapy.
91
  While the new psychotropic drugs could not 
cure serious mental illnesses in the same way that antibiotics proved effective 
against acute infectious diseases, importantly, the new psychotropic drugs could 
alleviate aberrant behaviours.  
Warner suggests the European social psychiatry revolution was another significant 
factor occurring at the time that contributed toward deinstitutionalisation although 
he contends that the impact of social psychiatry is largely overlooked by American 
commentators who accord central importance to the role of drug therapy.
 92
 He 
suggests that antipsychotic drugs were more effective for patients who were in 
inadequate care and treatment settings but was of less value when administered in 
settings designed for the patient’s well-being.93 However, the combination of the 
pharmaceutical and social psychiatry revolutions did result in millions of previously 
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untreatable and clinically hopeless psychiatrically institutionalised patients being 
able to have their socially unacceptable behaviours effectively managed.   
This ability to effectively manage socially inappropriate behaviours enabled many 
patients, often to their disadvantage, to be transferred across to the administratively 
less expensive, care homes system.
94
 This system functioned with poorly paid and 
untrained staff in facilities where wards were locked, overcrowded and shabby; 
amenities, programs and services were deficient or absent; and the only treatment 
available was drugs.
95
  In 2009, a Federal Court in the United States found that New 
York State had discriminated against thousands of people experiencing a mental 
illness by housing them within a system of privately run adult homes which had 
effectively replaced the state-run psychiatric hospitals but were themselves little 
more than institutions.
96
  But as un-therapeutic and forlorn as the homes system 
was, many commentators at the time believed that the situation was far worse for 
ex-patients discharged into the community to live in isolation and fear, without 
adequate treatment and employment and shelter opportunities.
97
  By the mid 1970s, 
however, the majority of western governments were committed to the policy of 
deinstitutionalisation and were preparing for the wholesale movement of patients 
into the general community in line with the principles of normalisation, a process 
essentially completed by the late 1990s.
98
  
2.4 Policy development 
We as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill . . . .99 
The earliest deinstitutionalisation policies and objectives focused on moving the 
newly functioning patients out of state public psychiatric hospitals,
100
 prompting 
criticism that ‘there was no planning before or during deinstitutionalization’101 and 
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warnings that nothing was being provided on the outside for the former mental 
hospital patients.
102
 These initial critics were dismissed as ‘impeding the triumph of 
the new social psychiatry’.103  The focus of later policies did shift toward improving 
and expanding the range of available community services and supports as lessons 
had been learned from the experiences of the first wave of patients.  Being able to 
effectively medicate former patients alone did not ensure their community 
acceptance and tenure.
104
   
The widespread closure of the large psychiatric institutions in the 1990s brought 
with it another shift in deinstitutionalisation policies.
105
 This newest wave of 
discharged patients encountered the same conditions of poverty, homelessness, 
unemployment and social rejection as the patients in the previous rounds. This time 
governments responded by developing and implementing inclusionary public 
policies and programs and enacting anti-discrimination legislation to protect the 
rights of people experiencing mental illness to accommodation, employment and 
lifestyle. The United States enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990.  
Australia enacted the Disability Discrimination Act in 1992 and the United 
Kingdom enacted the Disability Discrimination Act in 1995.  
2.5 The growth of stigma research 
Critics of deinstitutionalisation have argued that it was a ‘most stunning public 
policy failure’106 and ‘[i]t is now an axiom that deinstitutionalization caused the 
contemporary epidemic of homelessness for the mentally ill’.107 Rothman suggests 
that while it was hardly debateable that deinstitutionalisation ‘failed to deliver 
appropriate services to ex-mental patients or other persons in need of them’, it is 
inappropriate to suggest that a process that reached its peak in the 1970s is the root 
cause of current homelessness.  As has been shown in 2.1 and 2.2, people 
experiencing mental illness have historically been highly representative within the 
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homeless population.
108
 Newly created problems such as the ‘revolving door’ 
phenomenon where patients are discharged from psychiatric hospitals only to be 
readmitted again within a short period are also blamed on deinstitutionalisation 
instead of insufficient community resources.
109
  
However, the social issues associated with deinstitutionalisation and the 
implementation of community-based mental health care has succeeded in propelling 
the issue of mental illness into public view.  What had once been a private, ‘out of 
sight, out of mind’ topic became a visible community problem confronting an 
unprepared and concerned public that was reminiscent of the social movement of 
the pauper lunatics in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.  The newly deinstitutionalised had 
become the newly homeless, the newly unemployed and the newly poor on urban 
landscapes world-wide.
110
  They also became the newly criminalised. ‘This 
resulted, in part, from the after-effects of deinstitutionalization, but more 
importantly from stigma, fear, anger and the misuse of the dangerousness concept’. 
111
  This unexpected, swift and largely unplanned process of deinstitutionalisation 
triggered an explosion of quantitative and qualitative research beginning in the early 
1950s.
112
   
Initially, mental health professionals wanted to measure the level of public 
acceptance toward recently discharged patients in need of accommodation, 
employment and community health care but for many other commentators, 
deinstitutionalisation represented a revolution of rights in mental health law that 
began with the exercise of the fundamental right to liberty.
113
  For others, the 
unplanned and reactionary process of deinstitutionalisation was seen as the first step 
down a pathway of unfairness, intolerance and ignorance.
114
 The media’s 
stigmatised reporting of the association of violence in the community with mental 
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illness made the public increasingly fearful.
115
 The wealth of data collected over the 
past six decades has identified, measured, confirmed, and reconfirmed the fact that 
the public has held fast to negative attitudes and opinions regarding people who 
experience mental illness and that it is largely unwilling to accept any deviation 
away from established standards of normalcy. What deinstitutionalisation did 
succeed in doing was reveal the ‘elephant in the room’.  Stigma was a phenomenon 
that had to be studied if effective strategies were to be developed to reduce its 
negative impact on the lives of people experiencing a mental illness. 
3. STIGMA:  BEING DIFFERENT BY BEING ‘ILL’ 
The origin of stigma is rooted deeply in the control mechanism of the law and 
punitive processes of ancient cultures wanting to indelibly identify miscreants as 
deviant participants in normal society.
116
   The concept of stigma arose from the 
Greco-Roman practice of tattooing delinquent slaves
117
 and criminals,
118
  usually on 
the face, with missives indicating status and offence.  Herodas Bion described his 
freed slave father as having ‘not a face, but a narrative on his face, the mark of his 
master's harshness’.119  Plato ordained that 'if anyone is caught committing 
sacrilege, if he be a slave or a stranger, let his offence be written on his face and his 
hands'.
120
  The Romans adopted both the Greek practice and the Greek term used to 
describe the markings. This word has passed into present English language use as 
‘stigma’. Its meaning, and the message it conveys are as widely understood today as 
they were in antiquity, although the stigmatising process has grown beyond the 
simplicity of imposing an identifying mark on a person’s body.  
The stigmatised contemporary does not even need be aware of their discredited 
position in society, although research suggests that children within a stigmatised 
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group become aware at a very early age that they are discriminated against.
121
  The 
stigmatiser needs only to hold the erroneous belief that the stigmatised person is 
less worthy, less credible and less able than normal members of society. 
Stigmatisers do, however, share common attributes such as feelings of antipathy, 
distrust and even pity toward the stigmatised person but importantly, they share the 
desire to subdue and control individuals who are different.
122
  For the stigmatised 
mental illness group, this is achieved primarily through legal interventions such as 
civil commitment, involuntary treatment, guardianship processes and in family law, 
the making of parenting orders, a subject discussed in Chapter Six. 
3.1 Illness – a condition of difference 
The socio-cultural concept of mental illness draws its meaning from the 
philosophical realm of metaphysical ontology
123
 in which health, disease, wellness 
and illness exist in dialectical relationship, and although distinct, are neither 
mutually exclusive nor are they polar opposites.
124
  The ontological wellness/illness 
model follows a process of identifying entities and grouping them together into 
categories based on their relationship similarities and differences.  In this way, ‘ill’ 
and ‘healthy’ are grouped as a pair of contrasting, and in theory, mutually exclusive 
core concepts that are also inseparable because they are defined through each 
other’s existence.125   They are human experiences of ‘actual or perceived function-
dysfunction through the interaction of cognitive-affective dimensions arising out of 
intrapersonal, interpersonal, health-disease-related and extra-personal factors’126 
situated in a set of overlapping circles in which either illness or wellness takes 
precedence at varying times in an individual’s life.   
As the reality of the illness experience, and its personal and social context changes, 
the degree to which the illness is in the foreground or background of a person’s 
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world shifts.
127
 The ill person undergoes an in principle, temporary change to their 
ontological and existential experiences.  This change is negatively valued by society 
because being ill is categorised as an extraordinary, aberrant occurrence contrary to 
the normality that is identified as being healthy.
128
   The negative impact of illness 
is not confined to the aberrant individual and the people around him or her but is 
also measured in terms of human suffering and economic loss that is experienced by 
the whole of society.
129
  
3.2 Illness – a social role 
Pol
130
 categorised illness as a trio of perspectives: phenomenological, behavioral, 
and biological.
131
  The first - phenomenological - is a discontinuation in a person’s 
life founded in experiential change where being ill imposes feelings of passivity, 
powerlessness, loss of autonomy, dependency and loss of freedom,  giving rise to 
feelings including fear, worry, resentment, anger, anxiety, suspicion and guilt.
132
  
For the person experiencing a mental illness, the experiential change of being ill 
does not necessarily occur as a result of feeling physically unwell but may arise as a 
consequence of performing socially unacceptable behaviours, being assessed at 
being at risk of performing socially unacceptable behaviours, and psychiatric 
labelling. The prognosis is powerlessness, loss of autonomy, dependency, a loss of 
freedoms, state intervention, and the traumatic events associated with deprivation of 
liberty and forcible treatment.  Experiential changes and negative value judgments 
result in all facets of suffering that is a necessary condition for being ill although 
suffering of itself is not a sufficient condition for being ill.
133
 
The second category - behavioral - is a discontinuity in the behaviour and 
functioning of the person who is being ill.  The person will typically remain in bed, 
stay home from work, hand over their responsibilities such as the parenting of 
children to others; withdraw from social contact and generally, perform their normal 
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behaviors and functions less well, as a certain degree of dysfunction is a necessary 
condition for being ill. Dysfunction alone, however, is not sufficient for being ill.
134
   
Taken from the biological angle, being ill is a discontinuity in living. In this 
context, illness is an ‘abnormality of form, structure, and/or function of some part, 
process or system of the individual.’135  How is the person behaving differently 
when they are ill to the way they behaved when they were healthy, or to how 
healthy people behave in general?  In this respect, abnormality is identified via a 
comparative measure against matters that are typified as either static-normal or 
ideal-normal. Abnormality of form, structure or function is a necessary condition 
for labeling a person as ill but abnormality alone is not a sufficient condition for 
being ill. Suffering, dysfunction and abnormality although independent of each 
other must all be present if a person is ill, and to qualify as an illness, the three 
factors must all be present at a certain level of severity.
136
 
If a person has an illness, then their social role as an ill person is typified by their 
right to be free from normal responsibilities and obligations at a measure that is 
dependent on the severity of their illness. It is a normal expectation that a person 
who is ill with a head cold might take a day off work but taking a month off work 
for the same severity of head cold is entirely unacceptable unless the severity of the 
illness increases in tandem with the right to be free from the responsibility to go to 
work i.e. head cold develops into bronchitis which in turn develops into pneumonia.  
It seems that the reverse is true with regard to a mental illness.   
The stereotypical expectation is that a person experiencing a mental illness will be 
hospitalised, often for long periods of time, and often against their will. They may 
be forcibly required to undergo extreme regimes of psychotropic medication. They 
will be incapable, or deemed incapable of holding down jobs, maintaining 
relationships and sustaining stable accommodation. The state will statutorily free 
them, most often forcibly, from their responsibility to manage their financial affairs 
and their right to make autonomous decisions. It is the condition of their illness 
which marks them as socially different which excludes them from the normal 
society of the well. Stereotypically, they are expected to think, feel and act in 
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certain ways. An example of this is the belief that parents who experience a mental 
illness are unable to have a ‘meaningful’ relationship with their children (see 
Chapter Six with regard to Family Law Act 1975 parenting orders). 
4. CONCEPTUALISING STIGMA 
The French sociologist, Émile Durkheim was the first to examine stigma as a social 
phenomenon in 1895.
137
 Since that time, social scientists have attempted to 
conceptualise the phenomenon with particular attention given to its study during the 
past few decades.
138
  Despite the attention, the concept remains vaguely defined and 
an examination of the recent literature also exposes the expanse of definitional 
variability. Link and Phelan
139
 suggest that there are two predominant reasons for 
this. First, the stigma concept has been applied to a vast range of unique 
circumstances which has resulted in researchers conceptualising stigma differently 
and secondly, that the investigation has been multidisciplinary with psychologists, 
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and social geographers 
contributing to the research.   
There is an overlap in interests across the disciplines and the approaches researchers 
have taken toward establishing a stigma concept appear to have come from different 
frames of reference and the placement of different emphases.  Even researchers 
from the same discipline have different theoretical orientations.  Some researchers 
have refrained altogether from providing an explicit definition and have turned 
instead to the dictionary for ordinary language definitions of stigma as a mark of 
shame, disgrace, infamy and reproach, or have turned toward related aspects of 
stigma such as rejection or stereotyping.
140
 ‘Stigma’ has the same conceptual and 
definitional vagaries and inconsistencies as ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ 
which relegates many studies of ‘mental health stigma’ to its consequences rather 
than to its causes. 
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4.1 Devaluation theory 
The classic starting point for defining the current notion of stigma is the work of 
Erving Goffman.
141
 Goffman’s revisionist concept is based primarily on dyadic 
social interaction which holds as its central feature the tenet that social stigma is 
devaluation and dehumanisation.  His defining account of what stigma means, 
which still underpins much of the current theoretical discussion and empirical 
research on stigma and stereotyping, entered social science prominence in 1963 
with the publication of his seminal book, Stigma: notes on the management of 
spoiled identity.
142
   
Goffman focused his observations on attitudes toward individuals possessing 
attributes or characteristics that fall short of societal expectations.  He glosses the 
term stigma as the situation in which an individual is disqualified from full social 
acceptance’,143 describing it as ‘deeply discrediting within a particular social 
interaction’,144 and having the effect of reducing the stigmatised person in the 
stigmatiser’s mind ‘from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’.145 
He saw the stigmatised as victims of negative stereotypes that commonly elicit 
emotional reactions such as pity, anger, anxiety, or disgust.
146
  They are people 
devalued solely based on their social identity and membership in a social group, to 
the extent that their full humanity is called into question.
147
   
In Goffman’s view, mental illness is one of the most deeply discrediting and 
socially damaging of all stigmas.
148
 He was highly critical of psychiatric hospitals.  
He considered them to be anti-therapeutic and believed that mental illness stigma 
was rooted in the very nature of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.
149
  Once the 
                                                 
141 Erving Goffman was a sociologist prominent for his analyses of human interaction. He relied less on formal 
scientific method than on observation to explain contemporary life.  
142 Erving Goffman, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity (Prentice-Hall, 1963). Goffman’s 
book can be credited with conceptualizing stigma and creating a framework for the wealth of academic study 
during the past 47 years. 
143 Ibid 9.  
144 Ibid 3.  
145 Ibid. 
146 Bernard Werner, Raymond P Perry and Jamie Magnusson, ‘An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas’ 
(1988) 55 Journal of personality and social psychology 738.  
147 Goffman, above n 142, 3.  
148 Stephan P Spitzer and Norman K Denzin (eds), The mental patient  (McGraw-Hill 1968) Goffman, E., The 
moral career of the mental patient, pp. 226–234. 
149 Erving Goffman (ed), Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and other in-mates (Anchor 
Books, 1961).  
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
120 
pre-patient
150
 was convinced by their families or doctors that they that needed 
hospitalisation, as a hospital patient they would lose nearly all the relationships and 
rights that they had prior to their admission. 
151
  
Goffman’s work succeeded in capturing widespread attention in what was a rapidly 
changing world trying to manage the legal, social and emotional consequences of 
civil libertarianism and human rights advocacy, and to fully understand and 
appreciate the increasing number of scientific developments such as the 
technological mapping of mental diagnoses. Faced with the exclusionary practices 
of a public unwilling to accept the new proximity of mental illness within its 
communities, policymakers and service providers embraced Goffman’s innovative 
concept which seemed to give scientific and theoretical substantiation to that which 
was observed to be a practical truth.   
4.2 Social structural aspects of stigma 
For policymakers, and the researchers that guided them, unpacking stigma was the 
necessary first step in the development of processes and structures designed to 
change the public’s negative attitudes. Optimistically, it was thought that by 
understanding the causes and effects of stigma, processes could be developed and 
laws enacted that would ultimately result in its eradication. The failure in 
significantly altering the public’s negative attitudes toward mental illness suggests 
the naiveté of this simple linear approach to tackling the insidiousness that is 
stigma.
152
  
While Goffman’s concept continues to influence public opinion analysis and public 
policy approaches toward countering stigma within population attitudes, his use of 
language and classification has become dated according to its critics.
153
   The 
conceptual framework is inadequate and inappropriate for cross-cultural research 
and policymaking because his ‘implications of a dominant normal run counter to 
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recognition and appreciation of multicultural societies and multiculturalism’.154  
Although his concept successfully shifted the formulation of stigma from symbols 
to social processes, it focused primarily on dyadic social interactions
155
 and failed to 
give sufficient attention to the social structural aspects that form society as a whole.  
The structure of society is defined by the organisation of its population according to 
established patterns of social interaction and it is these patterned social 
arrangements that determine in varying degrees, the actions of the individuals 
within the social structure.
156
  On a macro level, social structures include social 
institutions which include the legal system. On a micro level, social structures are 
the standardised beliefs, values or norms that shape the behaviours of the 
relationship participants: lawyers, judges and legal system consumers.  
Criticism of Goffman’s concept of stigma resulted in significant paradigm 
elaborations and refinements. Jones built on Goffman’s three categorisations with 
the proposition of six dimensions of stigma – concealability, course, disruptiveness, 
aesthetics, origin and peril.
157
  The peril dimension is particularly important with 
regard to mental illness stigma because it marks a degree of difference that 
significantly engenders feelings of threat or danger in others.  Elliot emphasised 
social interaction, defining stigma as a form of deviance where others judge a 
person as dangerous and unpredictable and lacking in the skills or attributes 
necessary to carry out legitimate social interaction.
158
 It was this ‘illegitimacy’ that 
gave cause for the non-stigmatised group to ignore and exclude the stigmatised.  
The most productive area of stigma research in the past ten years has been in the 
area of internalised stigma with consumer/survivors
159
 being surveyed for their 
personal experiences of mental illness stigma, prejudice and discrimination.
160
  
                                                 
154 Ibid, 279.  
155 Ibid.  
156 Douglas V Porpora, ‘Four Concepts of Social Structure’ (1989) 19 Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour 195.   
157 Edward E Jones et al., Social Stigma: the Psychology of Marked to Relationships (W.H. Freeman & Co., 
1984).  
158 Gregory C Elliott, ‘Understanding stigma: dimensions of deviance and coping’ (1982) 3 Deviant Behavior 
275.  
159 Nancy Tomes, ‘The patient as a policy factor: a historical case study of the consumer/survivor movement in 
mental health’ (2006) 25 Health Affairs 720.  
160 Elaine Brohan et al., ‘Experiences of mental illness stigma, prejudice and discrimination: a review of 
measures’ (2010) BMC Health Services Research <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/80>. See also 
Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘The effect of personal experience with mental illness on the 
attitude toward individuals suffering from mental disorders’ (1996) 31 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology 321. Also Beate Schulze and Matthias C Angermeyer, ‘Subjective experiences of stigma: A focus 
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Corrigan
161
 proposed a dual model in which the category of self stigma or 
internalised stigma
162
 is set al.ongside the category of public stigma. This is then 
broken down into three further elements: stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination.  
Thornicroft
163
 revised Corrigan’s definition by including problems of knowledge 
(ignorance or misinformation), problems of attitudes (prejudice) and problems of 
behaviour (discrimination) claiming that the ‘combination of these three elements 
has a powerful force for social exclusion’.164  Link and Phelan defined stigma as the 
convergence of four interrelated components within a power situation - (1) 
identification and labelling of human difference; (2) the association of those 
differences with undesirable characteristics; (3) a separation of the ‘them’ from 
‘us’; and (4) the experience of loss of status and discrimination by the ‘them’.165   
Stigma as a whole consists of a number of interrelated components that include 
elements such as labelling, status loss, exclusion, discrimination, stereotyping and 
separation and each component is named ‘stigma’. Stigma is also dependent on 
social, economic, and political power with power being essential to the social 
production of stigma. Power differences within the legal system are 
institutionalised, which is seen as unproblematic, but within this forum of 
established and acceptable power imbalances, mental illness stigma simply remains, 
unseen. 
5. STEREOTYPES - EXAGGERATING DIFFERENCE  
The major barriers for people experiencing a mental illness are attitudinal barriers, 
labelling, stereotypical thinking and ill-informed and inaccurate assumptions
166
 that 
prevent individuals from participating fully in a society in which autonomy resides 
                                                                                                                                        
group study of schizophrenic patients, their relatives and mental health professionals’ (2003) 56 Social Science 
& Medicine 299.  Also Otto F Wahl, ‘Mental Health Consumers' Experience of Stigma’ (1999) 25 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 467.  
161 Patrick W Corrigan, On the Stigma of Mental Illness (American Psychological Association, 2005). Also 
Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘The paradox of self-stigma and mental illness’ (2002) 9 Clinical 
Psychology, Science and Practice 35.  
162 Jennifer Boyd Ritsher, Poorni G Otolingam and Monica Grajales, ‘Internalized stigma of mental illness: 
psychometric properties of a new measure’ (2003) 121 Psychiatry Research 1.  
163 Graham Thornicroft et al., ‘Stigma: ignorance, prejudice or discrimination?’ (2007) 190 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 192.  
164 Graham Thornicroft, ‘Stigma and discrimination limit access to mental health care’ (2008) 17 Epidemiologia 
e Psichiatria Sociale 14, 14.  
165 Link and Phelan, above n 138.  
166 Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Mental health stigma as social attribution: Implications for research methods and 
attitude change’ (2000) 7 Clinical Psychology Science and Practice 48.  
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with the individual who is able to discipline their emotions by rationality.  Fuelled 
by ignorance, misinformation, fears and assumptions,
167
 the stigmatised perception 
of the person experiencing a mental illness is that they are unable to structure their 
life within a framework of consistent normalcy, control their disordered, impulsive 
and maladaptive thoughts, or restrain their emotional disturbances. It is these 
stereotypical assumptions that form the core of the public’s stigmatising attitudes.168   
Stereotypes are ubiquitous. They are not intrinsically bad and nor are they 
intrinsically good.  They are components of communication that are present in a 
person’s cognitive repertoire, providing an efficient structure for organising 
knowledge.
169
  Stereotypes are used to ‘simplify and organise social 
information’.170 The suggestion of this theory is that stereotyping, or labelling 
occurs because it is too difficult to take in all of the complexities of other people as 
individuals.  Categorisation affords an efficient means to mentally organise large 
blocks of information enabling a simple, organised and predictable management of 
the human experience.
171
   
Stereotyping is not always detrimental for example, as the economic advantages 
associated with stereotyping Australia as a place of sun, beaches and kangaroos.  
The real problem arises when rigid, negative stereotypes are acted upon in 
discriminatory ways.
172
  Stereotyping is about selective perceptions of who should 
be categorised on the basis of exaggerated differences between the stigmatiser and 
the stigmatised.  The exaggeration of difference is conveyed via the perpetuation of 
stereotypical misconceptions intended to maintain the schism of social distance that 
exists between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Therefore, the identification of difference, and 
sameness, is central to social selection.  By exaggerating the differences in one 
group, the differences in the other group will be obscured.
173
   
                                                 
167 Merton and Bateman, above n 109.   
168 Nicolas Rüsch, Matthias C Angermeyer and Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Mental illness stigma: Concepts, 
consequences, and initiatives to reduce stigma’ (2005) 20 European Psychiatry 529.  
169 Allison J Gray, ‘Stigma in psychiatry’ (2002) 95 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 72, 72.  
170 Ana I Balsa and Thomas G McGuire, ‘Prejudice, Clinical Uncertainty and Stereotyping as Sources of Health 
Disparities’ (2003) 22 Journal of Health Economics 89, 103.  
171 Todd D Nelson (ed), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Psychology Press, 2009).  
172 Gray, above n 169, 72.   
173 Peter Byrne, ‘Stigma of mental illness and ways of diminishing it’ (2000) 6 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 65, 66.  
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Attitudes based on the difference of people who are experiencing a mental illness, 
or their ‘Otherness’,174 succeed in forging the image of someone who is incapable, 
dangerous and unpredictable and standing outside acceptable standards of normal 
behaviour. Classification as an ‘Other’ facilitates the person’s stigmatisation as a 
member of a marginalised, subordinated and ostracised group.  The powerfully 
normal develop an institution of rules that perpetuate the inferiority of the 
powerless group so as to ensure that the separation between the two groups is 
maintained.  
Irrationality, indelibly associated with mental illness, lays the foundation for the 
deep seated stereotypical assumption that the person is unable to exercise their full 
citizenship responsibilities because they are unable to contribute, deliberate, 
negotiate, and compromise in the process of working with others to achieve the 
common good.
175
   Irrationality is the justification for negating, or severely 
compromising the person’s capacity to fully participate in society although mental 
illness and mental incapacity are not synonymous.  As a consequence of 
irrationality, the ‘mentally ill’ group has been consigned to an inferiority position of 
‘half citizenship’, a status that both justifies, and necessitates, their continued 
subjugation to the authority of the rational powerful. 
176
  
5.1 Stereotypical misconceptions  
There are three commonly held stereotypical misconceptions that provide the three 
elements that underpin the public’s stigmatised attitudes toward the mentally ill: 
authoritarianism, benevolence and fear.
177
 Authoritarianism is responsible for 
generating the greatest number of misconceptions such as the belief that only weak 
or feeble people who lack direction in life become mentally ill; they are lazy; only 
the elderly suffer from depression; the person themself is responsible for becoming 
                                                 
174 A number of contemporary identity theorists using a Self/Other dichotomy, distinguish the Other from the 
Self as a way of distinguishing one person from another. 
175 Allison C Carey, On the Margins of Citizenship (Temple University Press, 2009).  
176 Pauline Prior, ‘Citizenship and Mental Health Policy in Europe’ (2007) 5 Social Work and Society 115, 117. 
‘The overwhelming message from people with mental illnesses is that they are not functioning as full citizens’.   
177 Corrigan and Watson, above n 2. See also Patrick W Corrigan, Amy Kerr and Lissa Knudsen, ‘The stigma of 
mental illness: Explanatory models and methods for change’ (2005) 11 Applied and Preventive Psychology, 
179. Also Paul E Holmes et al., ‘Changing attitudes about schizophrenia’ (1999) 25 Schizophrenia Bulletin 447.  
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mentally ill;
178
 and the application of sufficient willpower can cure 
psychopathological problems.
179
  
The second element is benevolence in which people with a mental illness are 
deemed helpless. They are naïve and inexperienced and possess a child-like 
perception of the world.
180
 Their non-conforming free spirit is simply indicative of 
their irresponsibility which necessitates the state’s intervention to ensure that 
acceptable and appropriate life decisions are made on their behalf.  State 
intervention is commonly confined to two aspects of the free spirit’s life: control of 
their finances
181
 and their forcible treatment
182
 although it can extend to other 
decision-making areas such as deciding where the person lives,
183
 who they are 
allowed to associate with,
184
 and whether they can work and where.
185
  Having a 
childlike mentality enables the state’s intervention in its authorisation of the 
statutory appointment of a benevolent guardian (often a state employee)
186
 whose 
function is to ensure the proper provision of care and protection for the person.
187
 In 
practice, guardians often usurp most, if not all of the significant decision-making 
rights previously exercised by the person.  Viewed from a benevolent approach, 
people experiencing mental illness are non-conformists, living by their own life 
plan, unconstrained by society's conventions and lacking in worth as a contributor 
to the common good.  
The final stereotypical misconception is fear. The qualities of dangerousness and 
unpredictability attributed to people experiencing a mental illness dictate 
apprehensiveness and avoidance in the stigmatiser. To minimise public risk, 
                                                 
178 Attitudes to Mental Illness - 2011 survey report, published by The Health and Social Care Information 
Centre, NHS, United Kingdom, June 2011. In this survey, 16 per cent of respondents believe that one of the 
main causes of mental illness is lack of self-discipline and will-power.  Mental Health America Attitudinal 
Survey in 2007 found that 22% of Americans believed that depression is a personal weakness. 
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go//go/news/10-year-retrospective-study-shows-progress-in-american-
attitudes-about-depression-and-other-mental-health-issues. 
179 Adrian Furnham and Susan Henley, ‘Lay Beliefs about Overcoming Psychological Problems’ (1988) 6 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 423. See also Chris R Brewin and Adrian Furnham, ‘Attributional 
pre-attributional variables in self-esteem and depression: comparison and test of learned helplessness theory’ 
(1986) 50 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1013.    
180 Nicolas Rüsch, Matthias C Angermeyer and Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Mental illness stigma: Concepts, 
consequences, and initiatives to reduce stigma’ (2005) 20 European Psychiatry 529, 530.  
181 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 51.  
182 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 32(2).  
183 Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 25(2)(a).  
184 Ibid s 25(2)(d).  
185 Ibid s 25(2)(c). 
186 Ibid s 14.  
187 Ibid s 15.  
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
126 
jurisdictions have enacted extraordinary civil commitment laws which give power 
to police to enter premises without warrant
188
 so as to take health clients into 
custody and forcibly transport them to hospitals and health centres for involuntary 
psychiatric assessment and treatment;
189
 admit the ill, non-criminal to secure 
forensic mental health units;
190
 and deprive individuals of their liberty indefinitely, 
without trial.
191
 Benevolence legislation spreads its authoritative umbrella over the 
mentally impaired but because society does not fear or loathe the demented elderly, 
intellectually disabled, or people with an acquired brain injury, the state does not 
impose the same level of restrictive and controlling power over these groups that it 
does over the ‘mentally ill’ group. 
All three misconceptions result in the authority of the state meted through its 
instrument, the law, to forcefully deprive individuals of their fundamental rights to 
liberty, bodily integrity and autonomous decision-making via involuntary and 
coerced treatment regimes, and civil commitment and guardianship legal processes.  
Authoritarianism supports the expectation that the individual should willingly 
engage in their treatment and they are sufficiently blamed to justify their legal 
compulsion. Benevolence and fear support the framework of laws that reduce the 
status of the adult person experiencing a mental illness to that of a vulnerable, 
erratic and threatening child requiring special management by the parent - the state 
– which both mirrors and reinforces the public stereotypical views that normal 
people need to distance themselves from the abnormality of mental illness.  
5.2 Social Distance 
Stigma represents a kind of death – a social death.  Nonstigmatised people, 
through avoidance and social rejection, often treat stigmatised people as if they 
were invisible, nonexistent, or dead.192 
                                                 
188 Mental Health Act 1996 s 15(2). 
189 Ibid s 16(1)(a).  
190 Ibid s 72B(1).  
191 Jurisdictions differ in the precise statutory processes regarding review procedures, length of time between 
reviews, etc. In Tasmania, the Mental Health Tribunal reviews involuntary hospitalizations 6 monthly (s 29 (1)); 
as an informal process (s.56(2)), without regard to technicalities or legal forms (s.56 (1)(a)); is not bound by 
Rules of Evidence (s.58(1)); does not guarantee representation for patients; is not compelled to produce hearing 
transcripts or Statement of Reasons; and the Act is silent on the right of appeal. One tribunal member can hear 
the proceedings (s.49 (2)) and there is no requirement that that person is a lawyer. 
192 Lerita Coleman Brown, ‘Stigma: An enigma demystified’ in Lennard J Davis (ed), The Disability Studies 
Reader (Routledge, 1997) 216, 226.  
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The consequence of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination is the imposition of 
interactional/social distance with the amount of distance imposed measured by the 
level of intimacy required.
193
 The concept of social distance is conceptualised in a 
number of different ways including affective social distance which determines the 
levels of social distance through feelings such as sympathy, fear, loathing, anger 
and pity which one group expresses toward another group.
194
 Normative social 
distance refers to the distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and is expressed through 
the norms of social acceptability. The primary question in this concept is who is 
different and therefore, outside the normal majority.
195
  
Researchers use the construct of social distance to assess expected discriminatory 
behaviour toward adults with mental illness based on the opinion that it can provide 
valuable insight into factors that influence mental illness stigma. In 2006, 
Angermeyer et al. undertook a literature review of 33 national and 29 local and 
regional population studies of public beliefs about, and attitudes toward, people 
experiencing mental illness.
196
  Angermeyer found that while the public majority 
considered that they were in need of help, a substantial proportion perceived them 
with unease, uncertainty and fear. There is a tendency to increase social distance 
when 54-85% of respondents thought that people with schizophrenia were 
unpredictable while 18-71% thought them to be dangerous.
197
 Pescosolido reported 
that 71.8% of their study’s respondents indicated that they would socially distance 
themselves from people who were drug dependent; 55.7% reported wanting to 
avoid interactions with people who were alcohol dependent (Angermeyer reported 
65-71%); 48.4% said they would shun a person diagnosed with schizophrenia; and 
37.4% said they would be unwilling to associate with a person diagnosed with a 
major depression.
198
  
These results were in line with results of other studies that found that the most 
socially isolated individuals were identified as those experiencing schizophrenia, 
                                                 
193 Jack K Martin, Bernice A Pescosolido and Steven A Tuch, ‘Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of 'Disturbing 
Behavior,' Labels, and Causal Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental Illness’ 
(2000) 4 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 208.   
194 Jo C Phelan, ‘Geneticization of Deviant Behavior and Consequences for Stigma: The Case of Mental Illness’ 
(2005) 46 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 307.  
195 Nedim Karakayali, ‘Social Distance and Affective Orientations’ (2009) 24 Sociological Forum 538.  
196 Matthias C Angermeyer and S Deitrich, ‘Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental 
illness: a review of population studies’ (2006) 113 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 163.  
197 Ibid, 170.   
198 Martin, Pescosolido and Tuch, above 193.  
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alcoholism, or who were drug abusers, and that there was greater public tolerance 
for people who have a serious mental illness than people who have alcohol or drug 
dependencies.  In light of the recent trend worldwide in mental health services 
infrastructures, policies and programs towards creating a more homogenous service 
approach to mental illness/alcohol/drug dependency via the concepts of co-
morbidity, co-occurrence and dual diagnosis,
199
  people experiencing a mental 
illness may become even more stigmatised, and rejected, in future.  
5.2.1 Comorbidity  
Recent national public health rationalisation processes have included support and 
implementation of comorbidity policies
200
 and service delivery
201
 that has resulted 
in alcoholism and drug abuse/dependency becoming extrinsically linked to mental 
illness. Recent Australian research shows that the comorbid population is far from a 
homogenous group and that the co-occurrence of mental health issues and alcohol 
and other drugs (AOD) dependencies has failed to produce consistency in 
ideologies, frameworks, terminology, treatment approaches and professional 
knowledge. Consequently, a person may have their mental illness go undetected or 
untreated in the AOD setting; be labelled as difficult to treat; be denied services 
because of the complexity of their presentation; be ineligible for cross-referral; or 
be denied service altogether because they do not meet the treatment criteria because 
of their co-occurring disorders and complex needs.
202
  
Co-morbidity has little advantage to the person experiencing a mental illness but it 
does afford them great disadvantage through further stigmatisation.  When 
                                                 
199 Queensland Health, ‘Service delivery for people with dual diagnosis (co-occurring mental health and alcohol 
and other drug problems)’ (Policy Paper, Queensland Government, 2008) 
<http://www.comorbidity.org.au/sites/default/files/Qld%20DD%20policy%20Oct%2008_0.pdf>.Maree 
Teesson and Lucy Burns (eds), ‘National Comorbidity Project’ (Research Paper,  National Drug and Alcohol 
Research Centre, 2001) <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-pubhlth-
publicat-document-metadata-comorbidity.htm>. 
200 Mental health policy implementation guide: dual diagnosis good practice guide; 2002. Department of Health 
(U.K.) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistic
s/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4009058>. See also National comorbidity initiative: a 
review of data collections relating to people with coexisting substance use and mental health disorders. Cat. No. 
PHE 60. (Drug Statistics Series No. 14). Canberra: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare; 2005, 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442459660>.  
201 Gavin Andrews, Scott Henderson and Wayne Hall, ‘Prevalence, co-morbidity, disability and service 
utilisation, Overview of the Australian National Mental Health Survey’ (2001) 178 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 145, 153. 
202 Rachel Canaway and Monika Merkes, ‘Barriers to comorbidity service delivery: the complexities of dual 
diagnosis and the need to agree on terminology and conceptual frameworks’ (2010) 34 Australian Health 
Review 262.   
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addressing a conference on mental health and homelessness in 2010, Michael 
Kirby, the then Chair of the Canadian Mental Health Commission, and former 
Australian High Court Justice stated that there is: 
... a huge lack of compassion on the part of Canadians toward individuals who 
suffer from mental illness, who are homeless, or who suffer as a result of 
substance abuse … If you have all three, the discrimination is colossal.203  
Stigma is compounding and comorbidity attracts its own stigma because of the 
impact it has on the person’s ability or capacity to deal effectively with their 
conditions
204
 and yet, despite the fact that the limited available evidence does not 
support co-morbid psychotherapeutic treatment,
 205
 mental health agencies have 
adopted an integrated services approach.  Clinical care and treatment services are 
delivered to people experiencing mental health problems such as substance abuse 
together with behavioural syndromes associated with permanent physiological 
disturbances and physical factors.
206
  Inappropriate behaviours arising from cerebral 
vascular accidents
207
 or a neurological disorder caused by alcoholism 
208
 are being 
inextricably associated with mental illness and the label, ‘mentally ill’.  
5.2.2 Hierarchy of acceptance 
The term hierarchy of acceptance refers to a structure of public preference toward 
marginalised groups with the level of acceptance of each group’s distinct difference 
determining the group’s ranking. In 1970, John Tringo modified the Bogardus 
scale
209
 to measure social distance between respondents and 21 disability groups. 
The study established that a hierarchy existed in which mental illness placed at the 
bottom of rankings indicating the greatest amount of social distance.  Tringo’s 
results were mirrored by later studies that also rank mental illness at the bottom, or 
                                                 
203 Monte Paulsen, ‘Canada short changes mental health care: Kirby’, The Tyee (online), 22 June 2010 
<http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Health/2010/06/22/Canada-short-changes-mental-health/>. 
204 Netzach Goren and Jane Mallick ‘Prevention and early intervention of coexisting mental health and 
substance use issues, Drug Info Clearing House, Issues Paper 3, November 2007 < 
http://www.druginfo.adf.org.au/attachments/347_PRQ03Nov07_final.pdf>. 
205 Laurie Barclay, ‘Integrated Treatment of Substance Use Disorders and Comorbid Conditions - A Literature 
Review’, Medscape (online), 27 April 2009 <http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/701725>. 
206 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2005. Mental health services in Australia 2003–04. 
AIHW cat no. HSE 40. Canberra: AIHW (Mental Health Series no. 8). (Up to 4% of all mental health services 
provided by government services and agencies; 3% of private hospital services; 16% by General Practitioners) 
207 Stroke 
208 Korsakoff's syndrome 
209 The sociologist E. S. Bogardus developed the ‘Bogardus social distance scale’ in 1925. The scale was used 
to measure the social-psychological distance between different ethnic and racial groups.   
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close to bottom in varying order with alcoholism and drug addiction.
210
 Motivated 
by the liberalisation of public opinion, and the legislative rights changes that had 
occurred in the three decades since Tringo’s study, Thomas211 tested whether the 
hierarchy still existed, and if so, how stable it was in what had generally become, 
more informed and more tolerant communities. He found that the ‘hierarchy of 
preference of disabilities proposed by Tringo over 30 years ago remains firmly 
entrenched’.212  
6. DISCRIMINATION 
Discrimination is a multifaceted phenomenon that exists explicitly in norms, values 
and institutions.  It is not necessarily the deliberate, prejudicial treatment of a 
person, or a group of people who, on the basis of having a negatively valued 
difference, are considered to have less social worth.   Discriminated people are 
subject to exclusions and restrictions that deny them the same opportunities of the 
social majority to participate fully in economic, social and political life.
213
  
Individual discrimination is the behaviour of individual members belonging to one 
group that is intended to have a differential and/or harmful effect on the members of 
another group.
214
   
Structural discrimination, sometimes called institutional or systemic discrimination, 
is entrenched in the structure and institutional patterns of behaviour and actions of 
organisational culture. It relates primarily to the ways in which norms, behaviour 
and rules intentionally, or unintentionally affect, and obscure, discriminatory and/or 
harmful effects on a stigmatised group, either because of prejudice, or because of a 
failure to take into account the particular needs of different social identities.
215
   
However, the idea of structural discrimination is that it represents an attempt to 
                                                 
210 Stefan J Harasymiw, ‘A longitudinal study of disability group acceptance’ (1976) 37 Rehabilitation 
Literature 98.  See also Gary L Albrecht, Vivian G Walker and Judith A Levy, ‘Social distance from the 
stigmatised’ (1982) 16 Social Science and Medicine 1319. Also David R Austin, ‘Attitudes toward old age: a 
hierarchical study’ (1985) 25 The Gerontologist 431.  
211 Adrian Thomas, ‘Stability of Tringo's Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups: 30 Years Later’ 
(2000) 86 Psychological Report 1155.  
212 Ibid.  
213 Craig Morgan et al., ‘Social exclusion and mental health: Conceptual and methodological review’ (2007) 
191 The British Journal of Psychiatry 477.  
214 Fred L Pincus, ‘Discrimination comes in many forms: Individual, institutional, and structural’ (1996) 40 The 
American Behavioral Scientist 186.  
215 Patrick W Corrigan, Fred E. Markowitz and Amy C. Watson, ‘Structural levels of mental illness stigma and 
discrimination’ (2004) 30 Schizophrenia Bulletin 481, 481. 
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capture a social wrong distinct from a direct discrimination.  Pincus observed that 
‘[t]he key element in structural discrimination is not the intent but the effect of 
keeping minority groups in a subordinate position’.216  
6.1 Structural discrimination 
Structural discrimination refers to the policies and behaviours of the powerful group 
in the implementation of policies which are neutral in intent but have a 
discriminatory and or/harmful effect on the stigmatised group, leaving them 
vulnerable to a number of untoward circumstances.
217
  It affects people in ways that 
cannot be explained by the direct psychological effects of an individual’s prejudiced 
attitudes and behaviours
218
 and occurs ‘when an entire network of rules and 
practices disadvantage less empowered groups while serving at the same time to 
advantage the dominant group’.219  
Structural discrimination is the accumulated institutional practices and policies that 
work to the social disadvantage and political isolation of marginalised groups even 
when the prejudice or discrimination is not apparent.
220
   Informal habitual practices 
– ‘this is just the way things are done here’ – are covertly built into systems, making 
it much more difficult to identify structural discrimination than to identify personal 
bias or individual discrimination.
221
  Examining an institution’s rules and practices 
through the ‘lens’ of structural discrimination, existing prejudices can be indentified 
and appropriately addressed. With regard to mental illness, structural discrimination 
is tightly woven into social policies and organisational structures, service delivery, 
legislation, legal administration and practices to such an extent that not only is the 
prejudice largely unnoticed, but when it is noticed it is generally considered 
acceptable.  
                                                 
216 Fred L Pincus and Howard J Ehrlich (eds), Race and Ethnic Conflict: contending views on prejudice, 
discrimination, and ethnoviolence (Westview Press 1994). Fred L Pincus, From Individual to Structural 
Discrimination, 84. 
217 Link and Phelan, above n 164, 373. 
218 Corrigan, Markowitz and Watson, above n 215. 
219 This definition was taken from the Equal Employment Opportunity Policy to 2010: Future Directions of 
EEO in the New Zealand Public Service, Appendix 1, Definitions and Key Concepts 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/node/5282. 
220 The Aspen Institute, ‘Structural Racism and Community Building’ (Forum Paper, The Aspen Institute 
Roundtable on Community Change, June 2004) <http://www.kintera.com/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-
8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/aspen_structural_racism2.pdf>. 
221 Human Rights Commission, ‘A fair go for all? Rite tahi tätou katoa? Addressing Structural Discrimination in 
Public Services’ (Discussion Paper, New Zealand Human Rights Commission, July 2012) 
<http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/IndigenousPeoples/DocumentsPage/Addressing%20Structural%20Discrimin
ation%20%20HRC%20New%20Zealand%20Structural%20%282012%29.pdf>. 
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6.1.1  Intentional structural discrimination – insurance policies 
Intentional structural discrimination against people experiencing a mental illness 
lies in the policies, rules and procedures of private and public entities in positions of 
power that consciously and purposefully restrict a person’s rights, and limits their 
opportunities.
222
 One area that serves as an example of the endemic of 
discrimination is insurance, which alongside financial services companies, routinely 
discriminates against people with mental illness in Australia.
223
  In Tasmania, s.30 
of the insurance and superannuation section of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 
provides insurers with an exemption that makes it lawful to discriminate against an 
individual based on the person having ‘certain attributes’.  This exemption is a 
replication of the Commonwealth’s Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (DDA) 
which ‘does not render it unlawful for a person to discriminate against another 
person, on the ground of the other person's disability when asked to sell insurance 
coverage for life or accident, ‘or any other policy of insurance’, or asked to grant 
membership to a superannuation or provident fund or scheme.’224 For the 
discrimination to be lawful it must be based upon actuarial or statistical data on 
which it is reasonable for the discriminating party to rely;
225
 or is reasonable having 
regard to the matter of the data and other relevant factors;
226
 or ‘in the case where 
no such actuarial or statistical data is available and cannot reasonably be obtained - 
the discrimination is reasonable having regard to any other relevant factors.’227  
In the 2004 review of the Australian DDA, the claim was made that ‘unjustified, 
stereotyped ‘relevant factors’ are used to deny insurance to people with psychiatric 
disabilities’.228 In the circumstances where an insurance policy is issued, insurance 
industry standards allow increased rates by a percentage or a flat dollar amount 
(known as ‘premium loading’), shorter periods for the insurance contracts and/or 
                                                 
222 Corrigan, Markowitz and Watson, above n 215, 481.  
223 Mental Health, Discrimination & Insurance (A Survey of Consumer Experiences 2011, Mental Health 
Council of Australia) <http://www.beyondblue.org.au/docs/default-source/default-document-library/bw0129-
report-mental-health-discrimination-and-insurance.pdf?sfvrsn=2> 
224 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 s 46(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e). 
225 Ibid s 46(2)(f)(i). 
226 Ibid s 46(2)(f)(ii). 
227 Ibid s 46(2)(g).  
228 Report of the Review of the Disability Discrimination Act (Cth) 1992, Productivity Commission, Australian 
Government, 14 July 2004, 336. <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-discrimination/report>. 
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exclusions for one or more medical conditions or risky activities in situations.
229
  
While these insurance discrimination exemptions have been consistently used to 
deny insurance coverage to, or heavily penalise people experiencing, or having at 
some point in their lives experienced mental illness, there has been a recent trend 
away from the acceptability of having disability discriminatory exemptions in anti-
discrimination legislation. This is generated largely by state compliance with the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
230
   
The United Kingdom enacted the Equality Act 2010 which set new standards of fair 
treatment for people with a disability. The Act made it illegal for insurers to 
discriminate by refusing to provide a service, or to provide a service on worse terms 
than for non-disabled people which included increased premiums, on the basis of a 
the person having disclosed a present or past mental illness.
231
 Historically, most 
United States’ health insurers have categorically excluded mental health benefits 
from mainstream health coverage.
232
 In an attempt to try to end this discrimination, 
and to place mental health benefits on an equal footing with medical and surgical 
benefits, the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act was passed as part of 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Under this new law, insurance 
companies were no longer arbitrarily able to limit the number of hospital days or 
outpatient treatment sessions, or assign higher co-payments or deductibles for those 
in need of psychological services.
233
  
In Australia, it had been the first National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People 
living with Mental Illness (The Burdekin Report) in the early 1990s that first 
revealed the systemic nature of the discrimination that Australians who experienced 
mental illness face when applying for, or making claims against, insurance 
policies.
234
 This situation has not changed according to the Discrimination & 
                                                 
229 ‘Mental illness and life insurance: What you need to know – a detailed guide’ (Information Sheet, Beyond 
Blue, Mental Health Council of Australia, Lifewise and the Financial Planning Association, 2010) 
<http://www.psychology.org.au/assets/files/mental-illness-and-life-insurance-detailed-guide.pdf>. 
230 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 61/106 (17 July 2008).   
231 Part 3 - s.29 
232 Richard A Garcia, ‘Equity for All? Potential Impact of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Act of 2008’ 
(2010) 31 Journal of Legal Medicine 137.  
233 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 2008 (U.S.) 
234 HREOC (1993) Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People with Mental Illness,  
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/mental_illness/national_inquiry.html. 
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Insurance: A Survey of Consumer Experiences 2011
 235
 paper which reported that 
Australians with a history of mental illness continue to experience significant 
discrimination and difficulty obtaining insurance products that are otherwise readily 
available to people without a history of mental illness, and when trying to make a 
claim against their existing policies.   
Consumers reported that insurance companies make broad and stigmatised 
assumptions about their ability to maintain their employment, and their general 
level of function to the extent that they are subjected to higher premiums, have 
exclusions placed on their policies, or are refused coverage outright. Interestingly, 
rather than calling for legislation similar to the UK’s Equality Act and America’s 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act to be enacted in Australia, the report 
blandly concluded that: 
... much needs to be done to break down misinformation and the lack of 
knowledge that exists within the insurance and financial sectors in relation to 
mental illness ... it will be interesting to see what changes are made and 
whether consumer and carer experiences improve over time. The results from 
this survey will be used to advocate attitudinal changes through improved 
knowledge and awareness about mental illness within the insurance and 
financial sectors.236  
6.1.2 Unintentional structural discrimination - health parity 
When unintentional structural discrimination occurs, it results in fewer 
opportunities for people experiencing a mental illness even when there is a 
principle, policy or legislative commitment to neutrality.
237
  In 1997, the Mental 
Health Parity Act 1996 was signed into law in the United States.
238
 The Act 
required that lifetime and annual health care limits were to be set at a similar level 
for mental health benefits as for medical and surgical benefits.  At the time, typical 
health care coverage included $50,000 lifetime/$5,000 annual caps on mental illness 
                                                 
235 Mental Health Council of Australia, ‘Mental Health, Discrimination & Insurance: A Survey of Consumer 
Experiences 2011’ (Report, Mental Health Council of Australia and Beyondblue, 2011) 
<http://www.beyondblue.org.au/index.aspx?link_id=4.62&tmp=File Download&fid=2444>. 
236 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D Proctor and Jessica C Smith, ‘Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2010’ (Report No P60-239, United States Census Bureau, September 2011) 56 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf>. 
237 Corrigan, Markowitz and Watson, above n 215, 481.  
238 Mental Health Parity Act, S. 2031, 104th Cong. (1996). 
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benefits in contrast to the $1 million lifetime/no annual caps for somatic illnesses.
239
 
Even after it was enacted into law, insurers were still able to impose significant 
restrictions on mental health benefits.
240
 
The Act did not make it compulsory for employers to provide mental health 
coverage, although according to the United States Census Bureau 55% of 
Americans obtained their insurance through an employer.
241
 The Act exempted 
altogether companies with 50 or fewer employees.  The Act did not ‘require health 
plans to provide mental health services, but merely regulated those health care plans 
that already offered mental health coverage’242 and moreover, most employers that 
had health plans with mental health coverage were already compliant with the 
provisions of the Act.
243
 Although the idea of equal health care for mental illness 
had wide political and public support, the business and financial issues and 
particularly, the public concern regarding the necessity for higher premiums for all, 
and concern regarding the redistribution of funds from medical/surgical services 
necessary to achieve the desired goal meant that there was a lack of practical 
support for the provisions of the Act.
244
  
The 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act was intended to close 
many of the loopholes in the 1996 Act although it continues to maintain employer 
exemptions that had been at the financial root of problems in the 1996 Act.
245
 To 
date, the promise of the 2008 Act has not been realised as a final rule has not been 
issued on key provisions necessary to make the Act fully operational.  Critics 
suggest that in practice, the Act ‘will do little to ensure equality of mental health 
benefits under the current health care landscape.’246  Insurance companies continue 
to impose stringent limits on addiction/mental health benefits that prevent patients 
from fully accessing the benefits they were promised under their health plan, and 
                                                 
239 National Alliance on Mental Illness, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 
<http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/E-News/1996/The_Mental_Health_Parity_Act_of_1996.htm> 
240 Garcia, above n 232.  
241 DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith, above n 236.  
242 Garcia, above n 230, 141.  
243 Kevin D Hennessy and Howard H Goldman, ‘Full Parity: Steps Toward Treatment Equity for Mental and 
Addictive Disorders’ (2001) 20 Health Affairs 58.  
244 Corrigan, Markowitz and Watson, above n 215, 481.  
245 Ibid.  
246 Garcia, above n 232, 154. 
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insurers refuse to disclose the criteria used to make denials on comparable medical 
benefits.
 247
   
The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s report issued on May 31, 2012 
showed that the percentage rise of treatment exclusions in health plans from 2008 to 
2011 included behavioural disorders 30.8% from 11.1%, attention deficit disorder 
5.1% from 0.0% and residential treatment facility 15.4% from 11.1%.
248
 ‘As a 
result of the lack of guidance regarding final regulations from the administration, 
many individuals seeking care for mental health and addiction disorders are unable 
to access the services they need’.249  When funding is insufficient, and there are 
fewer resources available for mental illness in contrast to medical illness, the 
opportunities for people experiencing mental illness are diminished.
250
   
6.2 Structural discrimination in Australia 
The mental health sector in Australia is seriously underfunded and under-resourced 
and yet mental illness is the country’s leading cause of disability, accounting for 
13% of the total burden of disease while only 6% of the entire health budget is 
spent on mental health care.
251
 Mental health research receives a lower proportion 
of health funding than other National Health Priority Areas
252
 such as cancer, 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease, with a significant proportion of the mental 
health research funding directed toward ageing.
253
 Studies show that the public 
                                                 
247 Letter written jointly by Republican Congressmen John Sullivan and Democrat Congressman Tim Ryan, 
‘Mental Health Parity: Where’s the final rule?’ October 5, 2012 requesting fellow Congressman to ‘Please join 
the Addiction, Treatment, & Recovery Caucus in signing onto the letter below urging the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Treasury to issue the final rule so that MHPAEA may be fully 
implemented.’ 
<http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Advocacy%20and%20Newsroom/APA%20on%20the%20Issues/0
9-25-2012-MHPAEA-2012-Letter---DC---FINAL.pdf.> 
248 Letter from John E Dicken, Director Health Care to George Miller, Ranking Member Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, 31 May 2012 (United States Government Accountability Office, Washington) 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591261.pdf>. 
249 Sullivan and Ryan letter, above n 247. 
250 Carolyn Levinson and Benjamin G Druss, ‘The evolution of mental health parity in American politics’ 
(2000) 28 Administration and Policy in Mental Health 139.  
251 Louise Newman, Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Inquiry into 
the Council of Australian Governments reforms relating to health and hospitals, 26 May 2010 < 
http://www.ranzcp.org/Files/ranzcp-attachments/Resources/Submissions/sub39-pdf.aspx>.  
252 The NHPA initiative, established in 1996, is a program emphasising collaborative action between Australia’s 
Commonwealth and State and Territory governments, non-government organisations, health experts, clinicians 
and consumers, for specific diseases and conditions including mental health. 
253 Helen Christensen et al., ‘Funding for mental health research: the gap remains’ (2011) 195 The Medical 
Journal of Australia 681.  
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clearly favours prioritising the limited health funding toward somatic illness over 
mental illness, placing mental health care funding at a distinct disadvantage.
254
  
That the sector is insufficiently resourced has historically ‘bedevilled community 
based-care’.255 This has been particularly so in regional and remote areas because 
81% of Australian psychiatrists practice in the capital cities.
256
  WHO reported that 
in the South East Asia region between 2001 and 2004, there had been a 40% 
decrease in the number of practising psychiatrists and a 60% decrease in the number 
of psychiatric nurses.
257
  Doctors and nurses are no longer choosing psychiatric 
specialisation in what is now a global problem of  underfunded and under resourced 
mental health systems, turning instead to the financial rewards, prestige and 
minimised risks of working in other areas of health care.   
Psychiatric hospitals, treatment centres and supported accommodation facilities are 
commonly established in isolated areas or in disadvantaged urban settings where the 
already stigmatised community members themselves lack the social power to 
exclude another marginalised and stigmatised group.  Care and treatment is 
generally provided by less accomplished professionals in under resourced public 
hospital settings because the more successful and accomplished mental health 
professionals gain more status and financial benefits from treating patients with less 
serious mental illnesses in private practices situated in affluent areas.
258
 Psychiatric 
patients are excluded from life sustaining and improved quality of life medical 
procedure waiting lists on the basis of their diagnosis even though there has been 
little research done to establish that there is a link between psychosocial variables 
and poor medical outcomes.
259
 Also, the ability to access mental health resources 
                                                 
254 Georg Schomerus, Herbert Matschinger and Matthias C Angermeyer, ‘Preferences of the public regarding 
cutbacks in expenditure for patient care: Are there indications of discrimination against those with mental 
disorders?’ (2006) 41 Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology 369.  
255 ‘Human Rights and Mental Illness. Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People with 
Mental Illness’ (Report, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1993) 137. 
256 The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, ‘Environmental Scan Component of the 
Mental Health Professionals’ Association Multidisciplinary Training Resource Program’ (Final Report, The 
Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, January 2008).   
257 World Health Organization, ‘Mental Health Atlas 2005: Evidence and Research Department of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse World Health Organisation’ (Report, World Health Organization, 2005) 45.  
258 Bruce G Link and Jo C Phelan, ‘On Stigma and Its Public Health Implications’ (Paper presented at On 
Stigma and Its Public Health Implications, Bethesda Maryland USA, 5 – 7 September 2001) 
<http://www.stigmaconference.nih.gov/FinalLinkPaper.html>. 
259 Leon Phipps, ‘Psychiatric evaluation and outcomes in candidates for heart transplantation’ (1997) 20 
Clinical and Investigative Medicine 388.  
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can be severely diminished by the inadequacies of social systems such as transport, 
health and social services.
260
  
For some commentators, the very existence of distinct mental health legislation is in 
itself evidence of structural discrimination because it unfavourably distinguishes 
one particular group, one particular condition, and one particular disability.
261
 
Mental health acts make it lawful to deprive a person of their liberty and their right 
to bodily integrity based on the suspicion of a mental illness.
262
  People living in the 
community can be compelled to undergo treatment as a preventative measure, so as 
to minimise the likelihood of them becoming unwell in the future, even though they 
may not be unwell at the time that they are under compulsion.
263
 These types of 
unique structural discriminations both contribute to, and reinforce the stereotypical 
view of people who experience mental illness as being different, helpless and 
dangerous, and someone who is in need of social control by the legal system.  
7. CONCLUSION 
A significant component of stigmatisation is the implicit association of mental 
illness with the moral concepts of ‘helpless’, ‘bad’ and ‘blameworthy’ which has 
helped to strongly link mental illness to misconceptions of dangerousness, 
vulnerable incapability and irresponsibility.  Myths and fears provide fertile ground 
for stigma to flourish and the public’s feelings of pity, fear and loathing flow from, 
and contribute to its deep seated prejudicial attitudes regarding mental illness.  The 
‘mentally ill’ are categorised as different, dysfunctional and inferior which in turn 
justifies the legal system’s necessary intervention in the control and management of 
their behaviour, and the restrictions placed on their rights and interests. Stigma 
provides the foundation for the legal system’s discrimination against people who 
experience mental illness.  
                                                 
260 Graham Currie, Janet Stanley and John Stanley (eds), No Way To Go: Transport And Social Disadvantage In 
Australian Communities (Monash University ePress, 2007).  
261 George Szmukler and Frank Holloway, ‘Mental health legislation is now a harmful anachronism’ (1998) 22 
Psychiatric Bulletin 662.  
262 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) requires the appearance of a mental illness for involuntary hospitalization to 
occur.  
263 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 44 authorizes the making of, and indefinite renewal of a community 
treatment orders lasting 12 months at a time if the person is of significant risk of harm if not treated, with 
‘harm’ defined as a deterioration of their illness. Clinicians argue that if the treatment is stopped their mental 
health will deteriorate which is the justification for forcibly treating them when they are well, possibly for the 
rest of their life.   
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Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma as disqualification from full social 
acceptance has guided a wide range of social research studies, many of which this 
thesis has relied on in its argument that stigma propagates in power situations when 
there is a co-occurrence of labelling, negative stereotyping, exclusion, 
discrimination, and low status.
264
  Although these terms are commonly used 
interchangeably with stigma, ‘stigma is a broader and more inclusive concept than 
any one of these processes’.265 There is a social responsibility to appreciate stigma 
if the legal and health systems are to cease being influenced by stereotypes, 
prejudices, and unfounded speculation that magnify risk, or by misguided 
expectations about the benefits of restrictive policies. It is important that public 
understanding and social policies regarding stigma are informed by the research, 
including the influential studies presented in this chapter.  
Stigma is a destructive social phenomenon and people who live with mental illness 
are amongst the most stigmatised groups in society.
266
 According to Perlin, its 
destructiveness pervades the legal system. Instead of providing the person with a 
mental illness with a neutral and even ‘playing field’, the legal system 
stereotypically and unfairly stigmatises and discriminates against them as was 
shown in the example of insurance coverage. So far, the stigma associated with 
mental illness has largely been resistant to the policy, legal and cultural efforts to 
reduce its negative impact which is the topic explored in the following, Chapter 
Four.   
  
                                                 
264 Phelan and Link, above n 138.   
265 Major and O’Brien, above n 120, 395.  
266 Stuart, above n 5.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHALLENGING STIGMA: THE INTERMIX OF 
POLICY, LAW AND CULTURAL INTERVENTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Stigma is a complex social process associated with competition for power, 
integrated into the existing social processes of dominance and exclusion.
1
 It is an 
expression of society’s intolerance of difference and its rejection of abnormality.  
Stigma and discrimination are reflections of the complex relationship between the 
prejudiced attitudes and wrong behaviours, which were discussed in Chapter Three, 
and both are firmly embedded within the legal system as this chapter shows.  
Although it may not be immediately apparent as to why much of Chapter Four sits 
within a thesis concerned with mental illness stigma when it discusses such topics 
as the law and racism and immigration law, this chapter is crucial to the thesis 
because it demonstrates how law and governments politicalise language; 
manipulating its use to achieve, or counter, particular social and political agendas.  
The chapter is important because it demonstrates how political correctness has, in 
many areas of social concern, been an effective tool in reducing discrimination, 
although, not necessarily, prejudice. It shows that the use of ‘politically correct’ 
language’ is a topical discussion in both the public and legal forums when it relates 
to issues other than the language associated with mental illness. The chapter is also 
important because it is contextual to Chapter Five which examines ‘sanism’ - the 
specific prejudice, stigma and discrimination associated with mental illness that, 
according to Perlin, is largely invisible and socially acceptable.
2
  
                                                 
1 Bruce G Link and Jo C Phelan, ‘Conceptualizing Stigma’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociolog 363. See also 
Jo Stein, ‘HIV/AIDS Stigma:  The Latest Dirty Secret’ (Working Paper No 46, Centre for Social Science 
Research University of Cape Town, 2003) <http://www.heart-
intl.net/HEART/010105/HIVAIDSStigmaTh.pdf>. 
2 Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000).   
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The academic literature is replete with studies that define, describe, and measure the 
harmful impact of stigma and discrimination on people’s lives.3 The impetus 
driving this ever enlarging repository of social scientific research is the public 
health view that diminishing prejudice in the community will cause a concurrent 
decrease in stigma and discrimination, thereby resulting in an improved quality of 
life for people who are subjected to stigma and discrimination.
4
 Although there is 
considerable literature defining and describing stigma, and examining the impact 
that stigma has on society, there has been little study given
5
 to the complicated 
process of determining how best to combat stigma.
6
 As shown in the first three 
chapters, there is little agreement regarding how ‘mental illness’ is described or 
understood so that, perhaps expectedly, there are similar vagaries and different, and 
conflicting ideologies apparent in ascertaining what is the best approach for 
reducing stigma associated with mental illness.
7
   
While the ‘best approach’ may remain an unknown8, the commonly agreed view 
amongst anti-stigma campaigners is that if a successful, long lasting reduction in 
stigma is to be achieved, it will require both a top-down approach of change in laws 
and policies, and a bottom-up approach of improving public empathy and 
acceptance.
9
  This widely subscribed view emanates from the general confidence 
that positive attitudes are manifested in well-adjusted behaviours and changing 
negative behaviours produces positive attitudes, reduces stigma and decreases 
discrimination.  It is this ideal that informs the favoured strategic, three tiered anti-
stigma approach that provides the content of this chapter’s discussion: (1) the public 
health approach of raising awareness of stigma and discrimination particularly 
through educating the public to the belief that mental illness is an ‘illness like any 
                                                 
3 Neasa Martin, From Discrimination to Social Inclusion: A Review of the literature on anti stigma initiatives in 
mental health, A Report to the Queensland Alliance, 2009 <http://www.mhcc.org.au/documents/From-
discrimination-to-social-inclusion-Lit-review.pdf>. 
4 Patrick W Corrigan and David L Penn, ‘Lessons from social psychology on discrediting psychiatric stigma’ 
(1999) 54 American Psychologist 765.  
5 Barbara Everett, ‘Stigma: The Hidden Killer’ (Background Paper and Literature Review, Mood Disorders 
Society of Canada, May 2006) 
<http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Publications/Stigma%20the%20hidden%20killer.pdf>. 
6 Patrick W Corrigan (ed), On the stigma of mental illness: Practical strategies for research and social change 
(American Psychological Association, 2005).    
7 Neasa Martin, From Discrimination to Social Inclusion: A Review of the literature on anti stigma initiatives in 
mental health, A Report to the Queensland Alliance, 2009 <http://www.mhcc.org.au/documents/From-
discrimination-to-social-inclusion-Lit-review.pdf> 
8 Melissa D Pinto-Foltz and M Cynthia Logsdon, ‘Reducing Stigma Related to Mental Disorders: Initiatives, 
Interventions, and Recommendations for Nursing’ (2009) 23 Archives of Psychiatric Nursing 32.  
9 Stephen P Hinshaw and Andrea Stier, ‘Stigma as Related to Mental Disorders’ (2008) 4 Annual Review of 
Clinical Psychology 367.  
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other; (2) attacking stigma and discrimination through cultural intervention such as 
political correctness and the enactment of associated sanctioning legislation; (3) and 
specific performance to remedy discriminatory acts.
10
  
Chapter Three examined stigma theories, identifying the sociological, psychological 
and structural forces that create, support and maintain stigma: a phenomenon that 
consists of a group of three related problems - lack of knowledge/ignorance; 
negative attitudes/prejudice; and excluding or avoiding behaviours/discrimination.
11
 
Chapter Four demonstrates that these theories are largely theoretical and have 
limited utilitarian application in achieving a real reduction of stigma.
12
  This is 
shown through the discussion of the three anti-stigma strategies of protest, 
education and contact that have received the most significant attention in the 
literature.
13
 Although these strategies were first used in other areas of marginalised 
difference such as race, gender and sexual orientation, for the most part, they have 
been unsuccessful. While there has been a decrease in overt, blatant expressions of 
prejudicial attitudes, a subtle and covert form of negative expression termed 
‘modern prejudice’ has become prevalent.14 Rather than eliminating prejudice, these 
anti-stigma strategies appear to have merely suppressed the public’s negative 
attitudes.   
Chapter Four analyses first, the limited impact that the public health disease 
approach, built on its three main anti-stigma strategies; protest, education and 
contact, has had on stigma reduction.  These strategies aim to (1) ‘name and shame’ 
unacceptable behaviours in an effort to decrease the likelihood that the behaviour 
will be repeated; (2) educate the public to facts, disabuse it of myths, and make it 
aware of the social and economic harms that stigma and discrimination causes, not 
only to the individual but also to their carers and their communities as a whole; and 
(3) promote a more inclusive society.  It suggests that policy makers wrongly 
                                                 
10 Fiona Myers et al., ‘Evaluation Of ‘See Me’ - The National Scottish Campaign Against Stigma and 
Discrimination Associated with Mental Ill-Health’  (Scottish Government Social Research, 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/mental_health/eu_compass/reports_studies/seeme_report.pdf>. 
11 Everett, above n 5. See also Diana Rose et al., ‘250 labels used to stigmatise people with mental illness’ 
(Research Paper, British Medical Council Health Services. 2007) 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6963-7-97.pdf>. 
12 Heather Stuart, ‘Fighting Stigma caused by mental disorders: past perspective, present activities, and future 
directions’ (2008) 7 World Psychiatry 185.  
13 Miriam Heijnders and Suzanne Van Der Meij, ‘The fight against stigma: an overview of stigma reduction 
strategies and interventions’ (2006) 11 Psychology Health and Medicine, 353.  
14 Anne Pedersen et al., ‘Attitudes toward Aboriginal Australians in city and country settings’ (2000) 35 
Australian Psychologist109.  
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assumed that once the public was armed with its newly acquired scientific 
knowledge and social awareness, prejudice would naturally dissipate.  
The public health ‘disease like any other’ educational concept has not been effective 
in changing the cultural context of stigma. By shifting the moral blame for 
abnormal behaviour from the person to their families (the nature/nurture debate 
continues to strongly influence current public health policies, research and law) or 
to science through the disease model, researchers, policymakers, lawyers and 
mental health professionals believed that the uncontrollable causality of ‘disease’ 
would generate more compassionate and tolerant public responses. Recent research 
indicates that the biological emphasis has, in fact, impeded anti-stigma efforts and 
undermined efforts to change the unsupportive social and physical environments 
that adversely affect mental health. Although much of the public now accepts the 
biological aetiology of mental illness, stigma has not diminished and certain forms 
of stigma and discrimination have actually increased.  
This chapter also examines the ideology of ‘political correctness’: an avoidance of 
forms of expression or actions perceived as excluding, marginalising, or insulting 
certain social groups.  It is a cultural intervention accompanied by regulating and 
sanctioning anti-discrimination laws. It shows that political correctness is a tool that 
is selectively used by governments, courts, media and the public to alter society’s 
informal and formal rules, and manipulate sentiment and opinion to effect change in 
public thought, language and behaviour. In particular, it examines the role of 
political correctness in the context of immigration public policy and law which ‘is 
now the most controversial, and the single largest, area of public law adjudication 
by courts and tribunals in Australia’.15  
Further, Chapter Four discusses the use of politically correct language in the area of 
mental health which, as is mostly the case in all aspects of mental health, suffers 
from the same ambiguities and misinterpretations. While there are problems 
associated with political correctness in the historical, first wave areas of social 
concerns such as racism and sexism, Chapter Four shows that unlike mental illness, 
those problems do not include invisibility and widespread social acceptance. This 
                                                 
15 McMillan, John, ‘Immigration and the Law Chapter 5 Upholding the Australian Constitution’ (Paper 
presented at Proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society Sydney, 14 – 16 June, 
2002).  
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chapter shows that on the rare occasion that a matter of offensive language related 
to mental illness is brought before the courts, the courts are willing to authorise the 
disrespectful and derogatory language which is a cause, product and validation of 
stigma.  
There is evidence, however, that suggests that certain types of education in 
combination with contact can have a positive impact on changing prejudicial 
attitudes, most particularly in young people. This evidence is important to this 
thesis as it is relevant to the research questions of whether (1) law students are 
sanist and whether (2) law students who participate in mental health clinical 
programs founded on therapeutic jurisprudence are less sanist in their attitudes than 
students that do not participate.  Chapter Eight quantitatively examines whether the 
particular form of education delivered by the Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme in conjunction with the direct personal contact students 
have clients who have a mental illness helps to disabuse them of the myths and 
stereotypes that were discussed in Chapter Three?  It also examines whether the 
combination of the education, direct personal contact, and the practical skills and 
personal attributes gained from working with clients who have a mental illness 
suggests that alumni might contribute to the deconstruction of the legal system’s 
cultural framework of mental illness stigma and discrimination.  
The role of Chapter Four is to analyse the ways in which public policy, cultural 
intervention and law are used to challenge stigma to show that alongside the limited 
success achieved by the public education strategy, the most employed strategy is the 
flexible use of ‘political correctness’ and its accompanying regulating and 
sanctioning mechanism, anti-discrimination legislation.  It will show that while 
stigma is resistant to change, society is still able to identify offensive and socially 
unacceptable language and behaviours except, according to Perlin, when it is 
associated with mental illness.  
Perlin’s claim raises the question of how society can change its stigmatising and 
discriminatory language and behaviours when it is unable to recognise them, or has 
deemed them socially acceptable.  Applying this question narrowly to the legal 
system, the thesis examines one change option in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
Although the research did not generate sufficient consistent data to enable a 
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concrete answer to be reached, it did provide valuable information for future 
research as to whether participation in a therapeutic jurisprudence clinical program 
can effect positive measurable changes in the attitudes of law students capable of 
producing stigma and discrimination reductions in the legal system.  
2. LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH  
With the clear aim of challenging the complex, multilayered phenomenon that is 
stigma, changing the public’s attitudes towards mental illness and eliminating 
discriminatory behaviours, policy makers have largely been influenced by the 
industry of stigma change research
16
 that favours implementing large scale, broad 
based programs, founded on a multi-pronged approach of the three tier stigma 
reducing strategies. These are protest, education and contact.
17
  The presumption 
underlying this approach is that the expression of negative attitudes leads to 
discriminatory behaviours and so the solution is to ensure that people will not do 
negative things by creating positive attitudes.
 
 ‘The lack of evidence for this 
proposition deters no one’.18 Most recently, Pescosolido found the individuals were 
more willing to express stigma than to act on it.
19
 Some researchers have suggested 
that while attitudes are important, attitudinal change is unnecessary for behavioural 
change and that if prejudice and discrimination are to be reduced then the most 
attention should be paid to effecting behavioural changes.
20
  
                                                 
16 Jo C Phelan et al., ‘Public conceptions of mental illness in 1950 and 1996: what is mental illness and is it to 
be feared?’ (2000) 41 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 188.   
See also Anthony F Jorm et al., ‘Mental health literacy: A survey of the publics’ ability to recognise mental 
disorders and their beliefs about the effectiveness of treatment’ (1997) 166 Medical Journal of Australia 182.  
See also Anthony F Jorm, Helen Christensen and Kathleen M Griffiths, ‘The impact of beyondblue: the national 
depression initiative on the Australian public’s recognition of depression and beliefs about treatments’ (2005) 
39 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 248. Also Catherine Francis et al., ‘Improving Mental 
Health Literacy: A Review of the Literature’ (Literature Review, Centre for Health Program and Evaluation 
Evidence, June 2002) 
<http://quitnow.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/6A5554955150A9B9CA2571FF0005184D/$File/li
teracy.pdf>. 
17 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16, 16.  
18 Harris Chaiklin, ‘Attitudes, Behaviour, and Social Practice’ (2011) 38 Journal of Sociology and Social 
Welfare 31, 46.  
19 Bernice A Pescosolido et al., ‘The “Backbone” of Stigma: Identifying the Global Core of Public Prejudice 
Associated With Mental Illness’ (2013) 103 American Journal of Public Health 853.  
20 Chaiklin, above n 18, 48.  
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2.1 Protest strategy 
Protest is a punishing strategy whereby injustices are highlighted and offenders 
chastised for their stereotyping and discriminations in the hope that their behaviour 
will not be repeated.
21
 It is meant to change behaviour, not attitudes
22
 although 
some commentators argue that behaviour is a direct attitude manifestation.
23
  While 
there is some evidence to suggest that protest positively influences harmful 
behaviours, it has largely been anecdotal,
24
  with the weight of empirical evidence 
suggesting that protest campaigns are ineffective in changing attitudes,
25
 and may in 
fact, make attitudes worse.
26
  Trying to coerce attitudinal change can also reinforce 
discriminatory behaviour.
27
 Penn found that ‘stereotype suppression may have 
modest, although limited effects, on psychiatric stigma’28 but it had no impact on 
the behaviours directed toward people experiencing a severe mental illness.
29
 
Telling people to stop believing in their negative beliefs about mental illness, or to 
ignore or suppress their negative thoughts or attitudes could have a paradoxical 
rebound effect with stigmatisation being augmented rather than reduced.
30
  The 
cognitive process of avoiding unwanted thoughts may, through concentration, allow 
the thought to achieve a level of accessibility that exceeds normal levels of 
accessibility to the extent that the unwanted thoughts may exert a measure of 
influence on a person’s thoughts, and possibly behaviour, greater than if there had 
been no attempt at suppression.
31
 
                                                 
21 Patrick W Corrigan and Jenessa R Shapiro, ‘Measuring the Impact of Programs that Challenge the Public 
Stigma of Mental Illness’ (2010) 30 Clinical Psychology Review 907.   
22 Patrick W Corrigan, David Roe and Hector W H Tsang, Challenging the Stigma of Mental Illness: Lessons 
for Therapists and Advocates (John Wiley and Sons, 2011).  
23 Terry M Dockery and Arthur G Bedesian, ‘Attitude versus actions: LaPiere’s (1934) classic study revisited’ 
(1989) 17 Social Behavior and Personality 9.  
24 Otto E Wahl, Media Madness: Public images of mental illness (Rutgers University Press, 1995).  
25 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Three strategies for changing attributions about severe mental illness’ (2001) 27 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 187.  
26 David L Penn and Patrick W Corrigan, ‘The effects of stereotype suppression on psychiatric stigma’ (2002) 
55 Schizophrenia Research 269.  
27 Chaiklin, above n 18. 
28 David L Penn and Shannon M Couture, ‘Strategies for reducing stigma toward persons with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 20, 20.  
29 Ibid 21.  
30 Margo J Monteith, Jeffrey W Sherman and Patricia G Devine, ‘Suppression as a stereotype control strategy’ 
(1998) 2 Personality and Social Psychology Review 63.  
31 Ibid, 65. 
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Protest campaigns have long been used as weapons by weak social groups for 
influencing policy and legislative changes
32
 but these changes do not automatically 
translate into changing attitudes and social practices
33
 and although behaviours 
might change, values and norms are likely to remain unchanged.
34
  A prominent 
Australian protest campaign is Stigma Watch, a Sane Australia
35
 initiative that 
offers an online forum for mental health consumers and supporters to report 
‘inappropriate news stories, commentary, advertisements or products’.36  It claims 
that it is ‘helping to change community attitudes’37 by ‘making it known that stigma 
won’t be tolerated’38 but a critical aspect of rights-based protest campaigns is that 
they do not require attitudinal change.
39
 The aim of protest campaigns is to change 
behaviours but the education strategy discussed below aims to change attitudes. 
2.2 Education strategy 
Stigma was expected to abate with increased knowledge of mental illness, but 
just the opposite occurred: stigma in some ways intensified over the past 40 
years even though understanding improved.40  
The wealth of scientifically supportable evidence detailing the harmful effects of 
stigma prompted the propagation of public health campaigns with the specific intent 
of altering the public’s negative attitudes by improving its mental health literacy.41 
A prominent finding in the 1990s suggested that negative attitudes were fuelled by a 
lack of knowledge, and that ignorance was the predicator of prejudice.
42
  The 
general presumption behind this strategy is that if the public’s negative attitudes are 
                                                 
32 Richard Roberts, ‘Shaming, State Power, and Enforcement in the History of Anti-Trafficking Efforts: African 
Perspectives’ (Working Paper No 006, Program on Human Rights Centre on Democracy, Development, and the 
Rule of Law, June 2012) <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23749/Roberts_Shaming__Final_06_13_13.pdf>. 
33 David J Hunter and Amanda Killoran, ‘Tackling health inequalities: turning policy into practice?’ (Health 
Development Agency, 2004). <http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/documents/tacklinghealthinequalities.pdf>. 
34 Roger Giner-Sorolla et al., ‘Shame expressions reduce the recipient’s insult from outgroup reparations’ 
(2008) 44 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 519.   
35 SANE Australia was founded in 1986 and is a national charity working for a better life for people affected by 
mental illness – through campaigning, education and research, <http://www.sane.org/information/about-sane>. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Michael Smith, ‘Stigma’ (2002) 8 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 317.  
40 Mental Health, Report of the Surgeon General, 1999 
<http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/NNBBHS> 
41 The term was introduced by Anthony F Jorm et al., ‘Mental health literacy’: a survey of the public's ability to 
recognise mental disorders and their beliefs about the effectiveness of treatment’ (1997) 167 Medical Journal of 
Australia 182. 
42 Geoffrey Wolff et al., ‘Community Knowledge of Mental Illness and Reaction to Mentally Ill People’ (1996) 
168 The British Journal of Psychiatry 191.  
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positively changed, stigma will reduce and discrimination will decrease.
43
  The 
ideal that positive attitudes manifest in well-adjusted actions has dominated public 
health policy but despite the unprecedented volume of factual biomedical 
information that has been delivered into the public arena,
44
 the level of accurate 
knowledge about mental illnesses continues to remain meagre
45
 and the widespread 
reduction in stigma has not occurred.
46
 This may be because as some commentators 
suggest, stigma emanates from social inequality not social ignorance.
47
  
Yet public health systems continue to wholeheartedly accept the premise that 
ignorance is the key factor in the perpetuation of stigma
48
 and that ‘If there is a 
causal relationship between lack of knowledge or experience of the mentally ill and 
negative attitudes, it may well be that an educational intervention will improve 
attitudes ...’49  Education challenges inaccurate stereotypes and replaces them with 
factual scientific information.  People who possess more factual information about 
mental illness are believed to be less likely to stigmatise than people who are 
misinformed,
50
 however, it appears that the delivery of factual information has been 
more effective in reducing the stigma associated with a serious mental illness in 
general than reducing stigma directed toward individuals who experience a severe 
mental illness.
51
  
A number of potential problems have been identified with the education strategy. 
First, it contributes to the minimisation of the impact that social and environmental 
factors have on mental health. If three out of four people can deal with divorce, 
bereavement, debt, unemployment, homelessness without becoming ‘mentally ill’, 
                                                 
43 Ian F Brockington, Peter Hall, Jenny Levings and Christopher Murphy, ‘The community's tolerance of the 
mentally ill’ (1993) 162 British Journal of Psychiatry 93. 
44 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Mental illness stigma: problem of public health or social justice?’ (2005) 50 Social 
Work 363. 
45 Graham Thornicroft et al., ‘Stigma: ignorance, prejudice or discrimination?’ (2007) 190 The British Journal 
of Psychiatry 192.  See Arthur Crisp et al., ‘Stigmatization of people with mental illnesses: a follow-up study 
within the Changing Minds campaign of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ (2005) 4 World Psychiatry 106.  
46 Robert A Hayes and Christopher Vaughan, ‘Stigma directed toward chronic illness is resistant to change 
through education and exposure’ (2002) 90 Psychology Reporter 1161.  
47 Link and Phelan, above n 1. See also Jo Stein, ‘HIV/AIDS Stigma:  The Latest Dirty Secret’ (Working Paper 
No 46, Centre for Social Science Research University of Cape Town, 2003) <http://www.heart-
intl.net/HEART/010105/HIVAIDSStigmaTh.pdf>. 
48 Smith, above n 39.  
49 Wolff et al., above n 42, 196.  
50 Corrigan and Penn, above n 4.   
51 David L Penn and Bruce Link, ‘Dispelling the stigma of schizophrenia, III: The role of target gender, 
laboratory-induced contact, and factual information’ (2002) 6 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills 255. 
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the three will question why the fourth can’t do the same.52  Society asks why they 
don’t just ‘pull their socks up’, ‘get on with it’ and ‘stop putting it on’ like everyone 
else does.  This commonly shared viewpoint is promoted by the media, which 
reports, for example, that depression is the ‘latest must-have accessory’ for middle-
class women.
53
  
Secondly, it confuses the frequency of common mental illnesses with the fair 
treatment of people experiencing the uncommon, severe mental illnesses. 
Acceptance rather than equality underlies most education campaigns including 
Australia’s ‘Beyond Blue’, the United Kingdom’s ‘Changing Minds’ and New 
Zealand’s ‘Like Minds, Like Mine’ all of which promote people experiencing 
mental illness as being ‘just like us’ except that they have a genetic or medical 
difference.
54
  The rationale behind these anti-stigma campaigns that say little or 
nothing about the severity and difficulties associated with serious mental illnesses, 
especially anything associated with psychosis or news headline incidents of 
violence, is to create a general acceptance of mental illness and a much more 
positive outlook surrounding recovery.
55
  The indirect consequence of this strategy 
is that it further marginalises serious mental illness because as a topic, it is made 
publically unpalatable yet it is people who experience serious mental illness and are 
characterised as ‘ definitely not like us’ who most often come to the attention of the 
legal system.  
Thirdly, recent research has found that the framing of mental illness in biological 
terms has led to the paradoxical effect
56
 of increasing the public’s negative attitudes 
about mental illness.
57
 The disease model amplifies the distinction between ‘them 
and us’, making ‘them’ an ‘almost a different species.’58  Families are equally 
subjected to mental illness stigma because of their shared genetic, biological 
                                                 
52 ‘Cosmetic anti-stigma campaigns miss the point’ (2012) 4 NSSS Advocacy Bulletin 
<http://www.northshoreschizophrenia.org/images/2012%20Feb%20Advocacy%20Bulletin.pdf>.  
53 Janet Street Porter, ‘Depression? It's just the new trendy illness!’, Daily Mail Online (online), 5 August 2010 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1278510/Depression-Its-just-new-trendy-illness.html>. 
54 Carolyn Shimmin, ‘Understanding stigma through a gender lens’ (2009) 11 Canadian Women’s Health 
Network 14.   
55 ‘Cosmetic anti-stigma campaigns miss the point’ above n 52. 
56 Jo C Phelan, Rosangely Cruz-rojas and Marian Reiff, ‘Genes and Stigma: The Connection Between Perceived 
Genetic Etiology and Attitudes and Beliefs About Mental Illness’ (2002) 6 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills 
159.  
57 Sheila Mehta and Farina Amerigo, ‘Is Being “Sick” Really Better? Effect of the Disease View of Mental 
Disorder on Stigma’ (1997) 16 Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 405.  
58 Ibid 416.  
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attributions.
59
  Once labelled ‘mentally ill’, it is extremely difficult to detach from 
the label, no matter how many years the individual may have been symptom/sign 
free.
60
  The permanency of the label is likely due to the perception that mental 
illness is a stabile problem
61
 which contributes to the public pessimism that a person 
can never truly recover from mental illness. This belief is perpetuated by the legal 
system in which evidence of past mental illness is usually a key factor in a variety 
of present legal circumstances where mental illness is an issue such as family law 
children’s matters, obtaining insurance coverage, determining the validity of a will 
or contract, providing a defence to criminal charges or holding a position on a 
Board of Directors.  
Fourthly, the stigma associated with mental illness is exacerbated by the disease 
model’s associations of instability, unpredictability and uncontrollability that fuel 
the public’s fear of violence and genetic contamination.62  People experiencing a 
mental illness are perceived as having no control over the unacceptable and 
potentially dangerous behaviours that manifest, just as they had no control about the 
onset of their illness. Research shows that people who endorse biological causal 
beliefs appear to be more likely to agree with negative perceptions of people 
experiencing mental illness as being dangerous, antisocial, and unpredictable,
63
 
64
 
65
  
and as a rule, people who stigmatise are the least likely to want to undertake 
education to change their negative attitudes.
66
  Being confronted with factual 
‘truths’ and being told that their long held and deeply felt beliefs are groundless is 
not likely to result in their prejudicial ideas vanishing. Social intelligence and social 
tolerance are not adjuncts to information delivery.   
Contrary to the general appeal of education as a cure all for the most varied of 
social problems, ‘public education does not destroy prejudice and discrimination in 
                                                 
59 Jo C Phelan, ‘Genetic bases of mental illness – a cure for stigma?’ (2002) 25 Trends in Neurosciences 430.  
60 Ibid 431.  
61 Edward E Jones et al., Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships (W.H. Freeman, 1984).  
62 Ibid. 
63 John Read and Alan Law, ‘The relationship between causal beliefs and contact with users of mental health 
services to attitudes to the ‘mentally ill’’ (1999) 45 International Journal of Social Psychiatry 216.  
64 John Read and Niki Harre, ‘The role of biological and genetic causal beliefs in the stigmatisation of ‘mental 
patients’’ (2001) 10 Journal of Mental Health 223.  
65 Jason Schnittker, ‘An uncertain revolution: Why the rise of a genetic model of mental illness has not 
increased tolerance’ (2008) 67 Social Science and Medicine 1370.  
66 Peter Byrne, ‘Stigma of mental illness and ways of diminishing it’ (2000) 6 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 65.  
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the community’67 and generally, the ‘[y]ears of research into public attitudes and 
stigma have not led to the development of effective models of change’.68 A recent 
comparative study suggests that despite the anticipated advances in public 
knowledge, stigma has remained surprisingly fixed.
69
  The single large-scale, broad-
based mass campaigns that policy-makers tend to develop have done little to reduce 
the stigma associated with mental disorders
70
 although some campaigns have 
succeeded in reducing stigma associated with depression.71 These campaigns have 
proved much less successful than campaigns that tailor the content of the message 
to target specific groups.
72
  There is also more potential for achieving positive 
mental attitudinal change from short term campaigns.
73
 Continuing with the current 
global approach to disseminating a disease model barrage of information rather than 
designing small, localised programs to tackle particular attitudes of specific groups 
toward mental illness
74
 will not result in a decrease in stigma but will, as the 
evidence suggests, continue its pervasiveness and increase its incidence.
75
   
Although ‘the impact of education may be limited’76 there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that participation in brief courses on mental illness
77
 can improve attitudes
78
 
                                                 
67 Robert K Merton, ‘The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy’ (1948) 8 The Antioch Review 193.  
68 ‘Discrimination against people with experiences of mental illness’ (Discussion Paper, Mental Health 
Commission, July 1997) 16 
<http://www.hdc.org.nz/media/200685/discrimination%20against%20people%20with%20experiences%20of%2
0mental%20illness%20july%2097.pdf>.  
69 Bernice A Pescosolido et al., ‘“A disease like any other’’? A decade of change in public reactions to 
schizophrenia, depression, and alcohol dependence’ (2010) 167 American Journal of Psychiatry 1321, 1325. 
See also Georg Schomerus et al., ‘Evolution of Public Attitudes about Mental Illness: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis’ (2012) 125 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavia  440. See also Andrew R Payton and Peggy A 
Thoits, ‘Medicalization, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, and Mental Illness Stigma’ (2011)1Society and 
Mental Health 55. 
70 Beate Schulze and Matthias C Angermeyer, ‘Subjective experiences of stigma. A focus group study of 
schizophrenic patients, their relatives and mental health professionals’ (2003) 56 Social Science & Medicine 
299.   
71 Ulrich Hegerl and Lisa Wittenburg, ‘Focus on mental health care reforms in Europe: the European alliance 
against depression: a multilevel approach to the prevention of suicidal behaviour’ (2009) 60 Psychiatric 
Services 596. 
72 Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Where Is the Evidence Supporting Public Service Announcements to Eliminate Mental 
Illness Stigma?’ (2012) 63 Psychiatric Services 79. See Also Claire M Kelly, Anthony F Jorm and Annemarie 
Wright, ‘Improving mental health literacy as a strategy to facilitate early intervention for mental disorders’ 
(2007) 187 Medical Journal of Australia S26. Also Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Target-specific stigma change: A 
strategy for impacting mental illness stigma’ (2004) 28 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal 113.  
73 Sara Evans-Lacko et al., ‘Evaluation of a brief anti-stigma campaign in Cambridge: do short-term campaigns 
work?’ (2010) 10 Biomed Central Public Health 1.  
74 Corrigan, above n 72. See also Petrus Ng and Kai-Fong Chan, ‘Attitudes towards people with mental illness, 
Effects of a training program for secondary school students’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Adolescent 
Medical Health 215, 222 – 223.  
75 E Fuller Torrey, ‘Stigma and Violence: Isn’t It Time to Connect the Dots?’ (2011) 37 Schizophrenia Bulletin 
892.  
76 Paul E Holmes et al., ‘Changing attitudes about schizophrenia’ (1999) 25 Schizophrenia Bulletin 447, 454.  
77 Ibid 456. See also J K Morrison, J J Cocozza,  and D Vanderwyst, ‘An attempt to change the negative, 
stigmatizing image of mental patients through brief re-education’ (1980) 47 Psychological Reports 1, 334.  
78 Patrick Corrigan, ‘How Stigma Interferes With Mental Health Care’ (2004) 59 American Psychologist 614.  
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particularly the attitudes of young people.
79
 This finding is important to this thesis 
and the discussion on changing the attitudes of law students undertaken in later 
chapters. Studies evaluating the impact of these types of short programs have been 
consistent in the result that ‘educational workshops with young people can have a 
small but positive impact on students' views of people with mental health 
problems’80 although there is evidence to suggest that the positive impact may not 
be long lasting.
81
 There is a need for future research to determine how these 
minimal, positive changes can be maintained over time.
82
  The research undertaken 
in this thesis suggests that reducing stigma amongst law students and ultimately 
decreasing discrimination in the legal system requires that the short course mental 
health education is founded on a therapeutic jurisprudence model, and is delivered 
in unison with a program of personal contact with people who experience mental 
illness.  
2.3 Contact 
The third strategy with an expected outcome of decreasing prejudicial attitudes and 
behaviours is contact. Contact promotes increased interpersonal interaction between 
the general population and people experiencing mental illness.
83
 Chaiklin suggests 
that creating interaction situations is the way to deal with negative stereotypes but it 
should not be used to try to change attitudes.
84
   When directly compared against 
educational and protest programs, contact, when used in carefully controlled trials, 
has been shown to effect improvement in attitudes.
85
  Yamaguchi’s review found 
that when comparing the three types of interventions, direct contact appeared key to 
stigma reduction.
86
  One of the problems identified with the research, however, is 
                                                 
79 Amy C Watson, ‘Changing Middle Schoolers' Attitudes About Mental Illness Through Education’ (2004) 30 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 563. See also Petrus Ng and Kai-Fong Chan, ‘Attitudes towards people with mental 
illness. Effects of a training program for secondary school students’ (2002) 14 International Journal of 
Adolescent Medical Health 215.  
80 Vanessa Pinfold et al., ‘Reducing psychiatric stigma and discrimination: evaluation of educational 
interventions in UK secondary schools’ (2003) 182 The British Journal of Psychiatry 342, 344.  
81 Mary Keane, ‘Acceptance vs. rejection: nursing students' attitudes about mental illness’ (1991) 27 
Perspectives in Psychiatric Care 13.  See also Vanessa Pinfold et al., ‘Reducing psychiatric stigma and 
discrimination: evaluation of educational interventions in UK secondary schools’ (2003) 182 The British 
Journal of Psychiatry 342, 344.  
82 Holmes et al., n 76.    
83 Corrigan and Shapiro, above n 21.  
84 Chaiklin, above n 18, 45.  
85 Corrigan and Shapiro, above n 21, 910.  
86 Sosei Yamaguchi, Yoshio Mino and Shahir Uddin, ‘Strategies and future attempts to reduce stigmatization 
and increase awareness of mental health problems among young people: a narrative review of educational 
interventions’, (2011) 65 Psychiatry and clinical neurosciences 405. 
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that there has been little study given to understanding how contact changes stigma 
prospectively.
87
  
Chapter Eight examines the contact strategy in more detail. It compares the attitudes 
of law students who have undertaken mental health awareness training, and 
represented clients appearing before the Mental Health Tribunal, with the attitudes 
of law students who have not.  Overall, the results of the study provide some 
valuable empirical insight in understanding the stigmatising attitudes of law 
students. It is hoped that the findings will contribute to future research into the 
development of strategies aimed at reducing stigma and discrimination associated 
with mental illness in the legal system to the advantage of a very vulnerable group 
of legal service users. 
3. THE LAW AND THE DISEASE MODEL  
We must make it clear, once and for all: mental illness is no different from 
physical illness. 
President Clinton 
White House Conference on Mental Health 
June 7, 199988 
As shown in the previous chapters, mental illness is viewed from a number of 
different theoretical perspectives including biological, psychological, environmental 
and social.  There are two perspectives that presently dominate mental health 
discussion. The first, the biological, characterises mental disorders as malfunctions 
of the body such as abnormal brain structure, genetics and neurotransmitter 
dysregulation. The second is the psychosocial, which although it does not discount 
biological causation, focuses on identity, characterising mental disorders as being 
caused or influenced by life experiences as well as maladjusted cognitive and 
behaviour processes such as trauma, bad parenting and life stresses.
 89
   
This section examines how anti-stigma campaigns have attempted to re-educate the 
public by replacing stigmatising perceptions of moral causation and personal 
                                                 
87 Monika E Kolodziej and Blair T Johnson, ‘Interpersonal contact and acceptance of persons with psychiatric 
disorders: a research synthesis’ (1996) 64 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 387.  
88 The White House at Work, The Clinton-Gore Administration: Addressing Mental Health, Monday, June 7, 
1999 <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/Work/060799.html>  
89 Lauren B Alloy, John H Riskind, Margaret J Manos, ‘Abnormal psychology: current perspectives’ (9th ed, 
McGraw-Hill, 2005). 
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responsibility for a ‘weak will’ and ‘bad character’ with an acceptance of scientific 
and environmental causes that place mental illness outside the person’s control.  It 
examines the nature/nurture debate which continues to have a pervasive influence 
on research in areas such as biology, neuroscience, child development and 
criminology despite, as some critics argue, modern biology having made the 
distinction between nature and nurture obsolete as any given set of genes has 
different effects in different environments.
90
  The nature argument recently gained 
support from the advancements made in neuroscience technology which make it 
possible to identify structural anomalies in the brain. This evidence is increasingly 
being used by courts, and particularly the criminal courts to guide their 
determinations,
91
 a trend more fully discussed in 3.8 below.   
While the legal system broadly accepts the disease model’s manifesto that mental 
illness is outside an individual’s control and therefore should not be blamed, the 
family courts continue to hand down decisions that are reflective of moral 
blame/weakness of character in matters involving children and parents with a 
mental illness. This is made evident in Chapter Six’s examination of recent 
Australian family law parenting order decisions. However, the legal system is 
selective in its support of the disease model. It is prepared to discount medical 
evidence when if it did not, the court believes that the outcome would be morally 
unpalatable.  This selectivity is an indicator of deeply entrenched stereotypes such 
as the belief that ‘mentally ill’ parents are ‘bad parents’.  
3.1 Shifting the blame 
Researchers, policymakers and mental health professionals assumed that knowledge 
of uncontrollable causality and the absence of responsibility would elicit emotional 
responses of sympathy, pity and compassion.
92
 If mental illness could be made 
comparable in the public mind to Alzheimer’s disease for example, blame, anger 
and social avoidance would decrease.
93
  It simply requires an acceptance of socially 
                                                 
90 Steven Pinker, ‘Why nature & nurture won't go away’ (2004) 133 Daedalus 5, 7.  
91 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., ‘Brain Images as Legal Evidence’ (2008) 5 Episteme 359.   
92 Bernard Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of Social Conduct (Guilford Press, 
1995) 20.  
93 Mental illnesses are ‘illnesses just like any other: heart disease, diabetes, asthma. Yet the traditions of 
flowers, sympathy and support provided to people with a physical illness are often denied to those with a mental 
illness’. ‘What is mental illness?’, Department of Health and Ageing, Australian Government website, 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/publications/publishing.nsf/Content/mental-pubs-w-whatmen-toc~mental-
pubs-w-whatmen-myth>  
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unacceptable behaviours as manifestations of an illness that is a ‘disease like any 
other’.94  The moral ‘blame’ for the abnormal behaviour would shift from the 
individual to the science of mental illness: ‘brain blame’.95  
The U.S. Congress declared the decade beginning January 1, 1990 as the Decade of 
the Brain.
96
 Thus began a global campaign to enhance public awareness as to the 
benefits to be derived from brain research.  In conjunction with the resolution, the 
U.S. Surgeon General issued a landmark report on mental health in 1999 which 
explained that if the conditions of the mind could be better explained by a scientific 
‘cause-and-effect’ relationship, then the stigma associated with mental illness 
would wane.
97
  The normal emotional response toward any person judged 
responsible for a negative life situation is to attribute blame.
98
 It is a habitual 
response
99
 that leads to anger and social avoidance.
100
 The assumption was that if 
the person was perceived as a victim of a biological disorder beyond their control, 
they would not be blamed for their condition, or its symptoms.
101
  However, studies 
show that the like-minded belief that mental illness is about weak people making 
bad choices still persists, and that the people who believe that mental illness is 
caused by ‘weak wills’ and ‘bad character’ are more inclined to stigmatise.102  
In deciding legal issues of competency or capacity, courts rely on the opinions of 
mental health experts who are given broad leeway to express their opinions about 
the ultimate issue before the court.
103
  The psychiatric way has been, and continues 
to be regarded by the moral authorities as the only way because it is viewed as the 
                                                 
94 Dale L Johnson, ‘Schizophrenia as a brain disease: implications for psychologists and families’ (1989) 44 
American Psychologist 553.  
See also Patrick W Corrigan, Fred E Markowitz and Amy C Watson, ‘Structural levels of mental illness stigma 
and discrimination’ (2004) Schizophrenia Bulletin 481.   
95 David H Barlow and Vincent M Durand, Abnormal Psychology: An Integrative Approach (Wadsworth 
Cengage Learning, 2011) 569.  
96 House Joint Resolution 174. 
97 Mental Health, Report of the Surgeon General, 1999 
<http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter1/sec1.html>  
98 Weiner, above n 92, 16.  
99 Daniel N Robinson, Praise and Blame (Princeton University Press, 2002) 7.  
100 Weiner, above n 92, 16.  
101 Reuven Bar-Levav, ‘The stigma of seeing a psychiatrist’ (1976) 30 American Journal of Psychotherapy 473. 
See also Richard A Schwartz and Ilze K Schwartz, ‘Reducing the stigma of mental illness’ (1977) 38 Diseases 
of the Nervous System 101.  
102 Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Causal beliefs and attitudes to people with schizophrenia: 
Trend analysis based on data from two population surveys in Germany’ (2005) 186 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 331.  
103 Matthew Large, Olav Nielssen and Gordon Elliott, ‘Reliability of psychiatric evidence in serious criminal 
matters: fitness to stand trial and the defence of mental illness’ (2009) 43 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Psychiatry 446.  
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way of scientific truth. Despite it being shown in Chapter Two that there is very 
little science and very little ‘truth’ in psychiatry,104 it is psychiatric opinion that 
informs the legal system.  After more than a century of psychiatry and psychology’s 
acceptance of theoretical models that have had poor family socialisation and 
individual character weakness as central to the genesis of mental illness, 
stigmatisation became embedded in the core of the helping disciplines.
105
 Mental 
illness has long been considered the domain of the weak willed and morally 
defective,
106
 a perception that appears to have been little altered by the ‘brain 
blame’ paradigm.  
3.2 Nurture  
In the first half of the 20
th
 century, psychiatry embraced the ideas and teachings of 
Sigmund Freud, founder of the psychoanalytic school of psychiatry.
107
 Prior to 
Freud’s revolutionary theories on the nature and functioning of the unconscious 
mind, a form of positivism had existed in which it was believed that a person only 
needed to make the choice to act in the right way and live a moral life informed by 
religion, or a rational life informed by science. This positivist approach never 
entirely lost its appeal to psychiatry as is evidenced in the classification of 
homosexuality as a mental disorder up until the 1970s.
108
 
Freud’s theory that pathogenic parental care was responsible for the development of 
certain mental illnesses
109shifted the ‘control’, and therefore the ‘blame’ away from 
the individual. It began the psycho/social era of ‘there are no bad children, only bad 
parents’.  Health professionals and social workers were trained to view children as 
mere products of their environment: intrinsically good children were influenced to 
be otherwise through pathogenic parenting.
110
  Ostensibly, this era has passed 
                                                 
104 Thomas S Szasz, ‘The Lying Truths of Psychiatry’ (1979) 3 The Journal Of Libertarian Studies 121. See 
also Els van Dongen and Sylvie Fainzang (eds), Lying and Illness: Power and Performance (Het Spinhuis, 
2005).  
105 Hinshaw and Stier above n 9.  
106 Angela K Thachuk, ‘Stigma and the politics of biomedical models of mental illness’ (2011) 4 International 
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 140.  
107 Volker Hess and Benoît Majerus, ‘Writing the history of psychiatry in the 20th century’ (2011) 22 History of 
Psychiatry 139. 
108 Robert L Spitzer, ‘The diagnostic status of homosexuality in DSM-III: a reformulation of the issues’ (1981) 
138 American Journal of Psychiatry 210.  
109 Robert B. Ewen, An Introduction to Theories of Personality, (Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2003)  
110 Michael Rutter, ‘Maternal Deprivation Reconsidered’ (1972) 16 Journal of Psychosomatic Research 241, 
241.  
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although the belief in nurture blame can still be found in current social campaigns 
such as ‘Violence is a Learned Behaviour’.111 
Cohen discounted parental responsibility for mental illness and emotional problems 
in children, arguing that genetic influences were more powerful than the influence 
of either good parenting or bad parenting.
112
 Understandably, the genetic/disease 
model found strong support amongst the ‘blamed’ families who have, in recent 
decades, evolved into politically powerful advocacy organisations, advising and 
influencing governments on mental health policies.
113
  
3.3 Nature 
The campaign to change the public’s causal perceptions from moralistic ‘poor 
choices’ and ‘weak wills’ to mental illness being ‘an illness like any other’ resulted 
in a flood of evidence based research supporting biochemical, neurological and 
genetic causations. This evidence, strongly suggesting that genetic predispositions 
underlie many of the major mental disorders, is said to have been responsible for 
the reascension of the medical model of mental illness.
114
 Although there has been 
keen academic debate arguing that the terms ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ do not 
necessarily imply a biological cause exclusively, the impetus for the promotion of  
‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ is based precisely on such an 
implication.’115  
3.4 Normalisation 
There has been growing agreement amongst mental health professionals that the 
experience of mental illness is a common part of the human experience and so it 
                                                 
111 ‘Domestic Violence is about power and control over another person. It is not a problem with anger. Rarely 
do you see an abuser act violently with friends, coworkers or a boss. It is a Jeckyl and Hyde personality that 
confuses others who learn of a person’s violence with their partners. Abusers can act charming, loving and 
attentive…when they want to. Drinking, drugs, genetics, the victim’s behavior or stress does not cause domestic 
violence. It is learned behavior. It is learned in the home by observation and reinforcement before the age of 
10.’ <http://www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/family/domestic_violence_issues.php> 
112 David B Cohen, Stranger in the Nest: Do Parents Really Shape Their Child's Personality, Intelligence, or 
Character (John Wiley and Sons, 1999).  
113 Michelle Funk et al., ‘Advocacy for mental health: roles for consumer and family organizations and 
governments’ (2006) 21 Health Promotion International 70. See also Robert Sommer, ‘Family advocacy and 
the mental health system: The recent rise of the alliance for the mentally ill’ (1990) 61 Psychiatric Quarterly 
205.  
114 Theodore P Beauchaine and Stephen P Hinshaw (eds), Child and Adolescent Psychopathology (Wiley, 
2008).  
115 John Read, ‘Why promoting biological ideology increases prejudice against people labelled “schizophrenic”’ 
(2007) 42 Australian Psychologist 118, 118.  
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should be normalised.
116
 Anti-stigma campaigners have attempted to ‘normalise’ 
mental illness by promoting the statistic that 1 in 4 people
117
 or 1 in 5
118
 people will 
experience a mental illness, a statistical consequence of the ‘medicalisation of life’ 
discussed in Chapter Two.  Anti-stigma campaigns have tended to focus on socially 
relatable mental health problems such as sadness, irritability, loss of energy or 
motivation, anxiety and the depressed feelings when a loved one dies or a marriage 
breaks up.
119
 Normalising mental illness in this way may help to explain why, in 
2010, 44% of the Australian public believed that people with schizophrenia can 
self-manage their illness.
120
 A concern associated with normalising campaigns is 
that they succeed in further marginalising people who experience a severe mental 
illness that manifests in less socially tolerable behaviours.
 121
 Instead of combating 
stigma these styles of campaigns appear to reinforce it. 
3.5 Harsher treatment 
Mehta and Amerigo’s study122 of the effects of the disease model found that the 
public felt that it must be kind to people whose mental illness is conspicuous but 
that it actually treats the person more harshly if their illness is described in disease 
terms.
123
 This contradiction between what is felt and what is done is not apparent if 
the illness is described in psychosocial terms. This mirrors the findings in the 
Rothaus employment interview study 35 years earlier.
124
 The disease view tends to 
                                                 
116 Ending Stigma and Achieving Parity in Mental Health: A Physician Perspective, Summary of Presentations 
and Key Emerging Themes, Toronto, Canada, September 2010, 
<http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Advocacy/Stigma%20Workshop%20Report.pdf> 
117 David Goldberg and Peter Huxley, Common mental disorders a bio-social model' (Routledge, 1992). This 
statistic initially was taken from a large scale study published first in 1980, then updated again 1992. Also see 
United Kingdom Office for National Statistics, ‘Psychiatric Morbidity Report’ (Report, 2000) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psychiatric-morbidity/psychiatric-morbidity-among-adults-living-in-private-
households/2000/index.html>. 
118 United States Department Of Health And Human Services, ‘Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health: Mental Health Findings’ (Report, 2010) 
<http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10MH_Findings/2k10MHResults.htm>. See also Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, ‘National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing: Summary of Results’ (Report, ABS, 2007) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4326.0Media%20Release12007?opendocument&tab
name=Summary&prodno=4326.0&issue=2007&num=&view=>. 
119 Defined by the Victorian government as ‘mental health problems’ Victorian Government, 
<http://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/bhcv2/bhcarticles.nsf/pages/Mental_health_problems_early_care_helps>. 
120 Stollznow Pfizer Health Report Wave 2 - Views and Understanding of Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder 
in Australia, October 2010, 
(<http://www.pfizer.com.au/sites/au/news_and_media/media_releases/Pages/Stigmaofseverementalillnessescon
tinuestoriseinAustralia.aspx> 
121 ‘Cosmetic anti-stigma campaigns miss the point’ (2012) 4 NSSS Advocacy Bulletin 
<http://www.northshoreschizophrenia.org/images/2012%20Feb%20Advocacy%20Bulletin.pdf>. 
122 Mehta and Amerigo, above n 57. 
123 Ibid, 415.  
124 Paul Rothaus, ‘Describing psychiatric hospitalization: A dilemma’ (1963) 18 The American Psychologist 85. 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
170 
engender awareness that there should be generosity of thought directed toward the 
person but produces the concurrent awareness that the person is ‘set apart from the 
rest of humanity.’125  They are perceived to be different from ‘us’ and this sense of 
difference, or ‘Otherness’, is central to the description of mental illness.126 Attitudes 
based on difference create an image of an inferior person standing outside normal 
standards of human interaction.   
Promoting a disease view of mental illness reminds the public of its susceptibility to 
a chance in which one in five healthy people will become ‘mentally ill’ at 
anytime.
127
 Feeling under constant threat can prompt the harsh treatment of those 
who have already succumbed to mental illness as they are seen as perpetual 
reminders of the public’s vulnerability.128 Mehta and Amerigo’s study found little 
support for the position that regarding mental illness as a sickness would ‘promote 
greater acceptance and more favourable treatment’.129  In fact, it may cause the 
adoption of a patronising attitude where the person is not blamed for their socially 
unacceptable behaviours but is simply thought to require firm, disciplined, thereby 
harsher, treatment to control the output of unacceptable behaviours.  By viewing the 
person as diseased, they are identified as different which can engender 
callousness
130
 within thought and lead to harsh actions.
131
  These negative attitudes 
and unfair behaviours are apparent in the parenting decisions that are discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
3.6 Violence 
Phelan established that the public of the 1950s had an unscientific understanding of 
mental illness; was unable to identify individuals as having a mental illness unless 
their behaviour was extreme, namely psychotic; was unskilled in distinguishing 
mental illness from ordinary unhappiness and anxiousness; and feared the mentally 
                                                 
125 Mehta and Amerigo, above n 57, 416.  
126 Juliet Foster, ‘Unification and differentiation: A study of social representations of mental illness’ (2001) 10 
Papers on Social Representations 1.  
127 One in five Americans, or 45 million adults, experienced some form of mental illness in 2009. Source: 2009 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Volume I. Summary of National Findings released in November, 
2010, <http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k9NSDUH/2k9Results.htm> 
128 Mehta and Amerigo, above n 57, 416.  
129 Ibid 417.  
130 Ibid 416. 
131 Nicholas G Procter, ‘‘They first killed his heart (then) he took his own life': Reaching out, connecting and 
responding as key enablers for mental health service provision to multicultural Australia’ (2006) 5 Advances in 
Mental Health 81.  
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ill as dangerous and unpredictable.
132
 By the latter part of the 1990s, the public 
largely attributed mental illness to a combination of biological abnormalities and 
vulnerabilities and social and psychological stresses; was able to define mental 
illness; and could separate mental illness from life’s ordinary, albeit, distressing 
experiences.
133
 However, only 13% of people surveyed in the 1950s
134
 linked 
violence to mental illness. The percentage had increased to 31% by 1996.
135
  
The ‘British Attitudes to Mental Illness 2007’ survey found that there had been an 
increase in prejudice across a wide variety of indicators including the belief that 
people with mental health problems are 'prone to violence' and that younger people 
are more likely to hold negative attitudes.
 136
  The 2010 follow up survey found that 
agreement with the statement that ‘We need to adopt a more tolerant attitude 
towards people with mental illness’ had fallen from 92% in 1994 to 87%.137  Also 
in 2010, Pescosolido et al. published the results of their 10-year comparison of 
public endorsement of treatment, and prejudice.
 138
 They found that the majority of 
respondents reported that a person with schizophrenia was likely to be violent 
towards others, and that significantly more respondents in the 2006 survey than the 
1996 survey reported an unwillingness to have someone with schizophrenia as a 
neighbour.   
A major finding of the study was that ‘… holding a neurobiological conception of 
mental illness either was unrelated to stigma or increased the odds of a stigmatizing 
reaction…. In no instance was a neurobiological conception associated with 
significantly lower odds of stigma.’139 In his study assessing the efforts to reduce 
stigmatisation by providing specific information regarding the relationship between 
mental illness and violence, Penn concluded that some information such as the role 
                                                 
132 Phelan et al., above n 16.  
133 Mental Health, Report of the Surgeon General, 1999, Chapter 1,  
<http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter1/sec1.html>  
134 Phelan et al., above n 16. 
135 Ibid 
136 Attitudes to Mental Illness 2007 Research Report, June 2007.  The report presents the findings of a survey of 
attitudes towards mental illness among adults in England. The survey was commenced in 1994 and were 
initially carried out annually, then every three years from 1997-2003, and again annually since 2007.  The aim 
of the surveys is to monitor public attitudes towards mental illness, and to track changes over time < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120406161400/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_076516> 
137 Attitudes to Mental Illness, 2010 Research Report, March 2010 .p.4. < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120502171823/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_114795>  
138 Pescosolido et al., above n 69.  
139 Ibid, 1324.  
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that acute symptoms has in initiating violent behaviour can have a deleterious effect 
on the public’s perceptions of dangerousness, and increase the fear of people with 
schizophrenia.
140
 In 2010, an Australian survey of more than two and a half 
thousand Australians found that 47% of respondents believed that schizophrenia 
meant ‘having violent tendencies’ which was a dramatic rise from the reported 32% 
in 2006.
141
  The perceived danger associated with people experiencing mental 
illness has not decreased significantly, although a neurobiological conception was 
found to increase the likelihood of support for treatment but this was generally 
unrelated to stigma.
142
 
The evidence suggests that while the public demonstrates a greater scientific 
understanding of mental illness than in the past, this newly found knowledge has 
not defused social stigma, which remains at high levels
143
, and with some variables 
such as the apprehension of violence having increased appreciably.
144
 Where there 
was an association, ‘the effect was to increase, not decrease, community 
rejection’.145 Generally, the perception of mental illness has become more negative, 
statistically increasing four-fold, due primarily to the association of mental illness 
with violence.
146
 It is unlikely that the politicians, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, 
child protection and probation and parole officers and clerks that are the mainstay 
of the legal system are immune from the increases in the public’s perceptions of 
violence associated with mental illness.  
The legal system reports large increases in violence with one Victoria Legal Aid 
branch indicating an overall funding assistance increase of 20% for family violence 
matters in 2011-12 compared to the previous financial year.
147
  ‘There is a well-
established relationship between the experience of intimate partner violence and 
                                                 
140 Penn et al., above n 51.  
141 Stollznow Pfizer, above n 120. 
142 Pescosolido et al., above n 69, 1321.  
143 Pescosolido et al., above n 19. See also Bernice A Pescosolido et al., ‘“A Disease Like Any Other”? A 
Decade of Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence’ (2010) 167 
American Journal of Psychiatry 1321, 1325. See also George Schomerus, ‘Evolution of Public Attitudes about 
Mental Illness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis’ (2012) 125 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavia 440. See 
also Andrew R Payton and Peggy A Thoits, ‘Medicalization, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, and Mental 
Illness Stigma’ (2011) 1 Society and Mental Health 55.  
144 Phelan, above n 16.  
145 Pescosolido et al., above n 69, 1321.  
146 Ibid 1325.  
147 Clark Quirk, ‘Family violence court cases rise 20 per cent’, The Standard (online), 12 November 2012 
<http://www.standard.net.au/story/967113/family-violence-court-cases-rise-20-per-cent/>. 
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mental health problems’.148 There is also evidence that the fear/risk of violence 
associated with parents with a mental illness is a key factor in the parenting order 
decisions (see Chapter Six) and in regard to preventative detention (discussed 
below), but there needs to be much more research undertaken regarding the extent 
to which the legal system disadvantages parties with a mental illness because the 
association mental illness has with violence.  
3.7 Preventative action  
Although much of the literature focuses on the criminal law aspects of preventative 
detention, such as serious sexual offender’s legislation149, preventative action has 
long been a medically, legally and publically acceptable process for interacting with 
people experiencing a mental illness. According to Szasz, ‘mental illness’ is a term 
that implies dangerousness, which in turn justifies psychiatric coercion.
150
 Research 
shows that society is much more inclined to endorse legal coercion such as forced 
medication and, if necessary, involuntary admission to psychiatric hospitals than it 
was more than a decade ago.
151
 
152
   
Genetic and chemical imbalance arguments are positively associated with 
recommending medical treatment, but not with the perceived likelihood of 
improvement. Genetic arguments make a person appear more threatening than they 
were when they were thought to be more responsible for their behaviour.
153
 The 
only other causative belief that appears to have a significant positive association 
with support of coerced treatment is ‘bad character’ which, particularly in regard to 
schizophrenia, is indistinguishable from genetics. ‘In their effects, if hardly their 
content, “bad genes” resemble “bad character”’.154  
                                                 
148 Leah Bromfield, Alister Lamont, Robyn Parker and Briony Horsfall, ‘Issues for the safety and wellbeing of 
children in families with multiple and complex problems: The co-occurrence of domestic violence, parental 
substance misuse, and mental health problems’ (National Child Protection Clearinghouse, Issue 33, 2010) 5. 
149 Corey Rayburn Yung, ‘Symposium: Preventative Detention: Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive 
Detention’ (2011) 101 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 969.  See also Patrick Keyzer, ‘The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee's views about the legitimate parameters of the preventive detention of serious 
sex offenders’ (2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 283. See also Bernadette McSherry and Patrick Keyzer, Sex 
Offenders and Preventitive Detention: Politics, Policy and Practice (Federation Press, 2009) 
150 Thomas Szasz, ‘Psychiatry and the control of dangerousness: on the apotropaic function of the term “mental 
illness”’ (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 227.   
151 Schnittker, above n 65.   
152 Pescosolido et al., above n 69.  
153 Schnittker, above n 65.  
154 Ibid 1376.  
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Stigma exaggerates violence, both justifying and affirming the social need for a 
coercive response to mental illness. The law then demands that the psychiatrist 
makes a prediction in response to the ill-conceived, stereotypically obvious question 
‘Is this person dangerous?’, as if dangerousness is an inherent, chronic, life-long 
and unchanging quality instead of an ascribed, unobjective quality that cannot be 
identified or measured.
155
 Dangerousness is not a diagnosis but a legal status 
although determining its presence requires a normative judgment.
156
  Even though 
the law expects and accepts the psychiatrist’s opinion as legal evidence, it 
acknowledges that ‘psychiatrists notoriously overpredict’157  and that risk of harm 
predictions are not very accurate.
158
 
159
 The consequence of these inaccuracies is 
that large numbers of people who would not go on to cause, or experience harm, are 
classified as representing a high risk of harm.160 Individuals are unfairly, and 
incorrectly, institutionally labelled.  The exaggerated classification also fuels the 
public’s fears that people experiencing a mental illness are dangerous, and 
reinforces the belief that the law must implement harsh preventative actions to 
restrict and detain.   
Greely has raised the issue of the intertwined complexities of accuracy, fairness and 
prediction.  If, he asks, there was an accurate neuroscience test which could predict 
that a person would be a paedophile; would it be fair, or ethical, to take preventative 
action such as detaining them; informing their neighbours, or warning potential 
employers, before they had actually committed any wrong?
161
 Fairness and ethics 
have little resonance when a prediction of harm or dangerousness often results in a 
person being involuntarily detained and/or forcibly treated under mental health 
legislation, and/or subjected to guardianship and administrative regulations 
restricting their autonomous freedoms in personal matters of finance, treatment and 
lifestyle choices.  
                                                 
155 Morris Vinestock, ‘Risk assessment: A word to the wise?’ (1996) 2 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 3.  
156 Robert I Simon, ‘The Myth of “Imminent” Violence In Psychiatry and the Law’ (2006) 75 University Of 
Cincinnati Law Review 631.  
157 Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 2002-2003’ (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 325, 338. See also Fardon v 
Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 124 (Kirby J).  
158 Charles W Lidz, Edward P Mulvey and William Gardner,  ‘The accuracy of predictions of violence to 
others’ (1993) 269 Journal of American Medical Association1007.  
159 Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 125 (Kirby J). 
160 Matthew M Large et al., ‘The Predictive Value of Risk Categorization in Schizophrenia’ (2011) 19 Harvard 
Review of Psychiatry 25.  
161 Henry T Greely, ‘The Social Consequences of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal 
Perspectives’ in Judy Illes (ed), Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy (Oxford 
University Press, 2005).  
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3.8 Neuroimaging and the law 
Mental states are fundamental to law and ‘blame shift’ is most apparent in matters 
of criminal responsibility and mitigation/sentencing. Criminal law presupposes the 
‘folk psychological’162 view of the person and their behaviour, focusing largely on 
the portion that guides the prediction and explanation of actions.
163
  If a person 
lacks the relevant mental capacity at the time of an offence, then a legal excuse such 
as insanity is warranted. Recently, courts have been increasingly confronted by 
scientific findings in behavioural genetics, neuroscience, and other rapidly 
advancing disciplines.  This has raised concerns regarding the judges need for 
guidance from the medical profession to decide the proper use of the neuroimage, 
and the need to assess the qualifications and calibre of the expert testimony that 
accompanies the image into court.
164
 With behavioural genetics likely to be the next 
frontier in criminal justice, making sense of the new data will require courts to place 
even greater reliance on the mental health professional.
165
 
The past several decades have seen a large amount of literature produced on the 
intersection of neuroimaging and law by commentators from the fields of medicine, 
law and the social sciences,
166
 many of whom believe that the introduction of 
neuroimaging into the court process to establish proof in all matters regarding a 
party’s mental state or capabilities is inevitable.167 Structural neuroimages presently 
provide an often compelling visual blueprint of the workings of the brain within the 
courtroom but its critics claim that the evidence is more seductive than scientific 
because the image and its interpretation are subject to manipulation and 
distortion.
168
 Many commentators have also raised concerns surrounding the risk of 
misuse of brain imaging in the courtroom, questioning whether the adversarial 
                                                 
162 Folk psychology is the term given to the information that lay people have about the mind.   
163 Lynn Nadel (ed), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Nature Publishing, 2002) Shaun Nichols, ‘Folk 
Psychology’.  
164 Laura Stephens Khoshbin and Shahram Khoshbin, ‘Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An Historical 
Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law’ (2007) 33 American Journal of Law and Medicine 171, 191.   
165 Paul S Appelbaum, ‘Law & Psychiatry: Behavioral Genetics and the Punishment of Crime’ (2005) 56 
Psychiatric Services 25.  
166 John H Blume and Emily C Paavola, ‘Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages  and Disadvantages  
of the Defense's  Use  of Neuroimages in Capital Cases – Lessons from the Front’ (Research Paper Series No 
11-18, Cornell Law School, 23 May 2011) 1 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856188>. 
167 Neal Feigenson, ‘Brain imaging and courtroom evidence: on the admissibility and persuasiveness of fMRI’ 
(2006) 2 International Journal of Law in Context 233, 233.  
168 Donald Reeves et al., ‘Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry’ (2003) 31 Journal of American  
Academy of Psychiatry and Law 89.  
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system is an improper forum for determining the evidentiary validity of 
neuroimaging evidence.
169
  
Neuroimaging is seen as particularly vulnerable to misuse and misunderstanding in 
what it is that the image is actually showing, and what it actually means.
170
 It does 
not have an automatic, self-evident significance and no matter how well designed, 
executed and analysed, it still requires its import, in context, to be interpreted.
171
  
There is no standard followed in the production and presentation of this type of 
evidence, which can easily be manipulated by someone with knowledge of 
technology.
172
 Perlin suggests that while jurors might respond positively to the 
science of neuroimaging evidence in insanity defence cases, they could also respond 
negatively according to their prejudices: fear and loathing of insanity pleaders.
173
  
What is certain is that this type of scientific evidence is likely to be increasingly 
used to guide future courts in decisions about, for example, culpability, sentencing 
and preventative detention.   
3.8.1 Structural Neuroimaging Evidence 
The United States has a surprisingly high admissibility rate for structural type 
neuroimaging evidence such as the Computerised Tomography (CT) scans and 
diagnostic Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans which use magnetic fields 
and radio waves to take detailed ‘pictures’ of the brain.174 This may be a 
consequence of the large proportion of bench proceedings in which a judge 
typically hears the evidence and then makes a determination as to the weight to be 
applied to it. It is less likely to be admitted into testimony in hearings in which a 
jury has been empanelled because the evidence is likely to be deemed not 
sufficiently reliable.
175
 American courts have been more circumspect about 
admitting into evidence functional neuroimaging such Positron Emission 
                                                 
169 Khoshbin and Khoshbin, above n 164, 191. 
170 Ibid.  
171 Owen D Jones et al., ‘Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed’ (2003) 5 Stanford 
Technology Law Review <http://stlr.stanford.edu.ezproxy.utas.edu.au/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf>.  
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Academy of Psychiatry and Law 89.  
173 Michael L Perlin, ‘“Good and Bad, I Defined These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt Somehow”: 
Neuroimaging and Competency to be Executed after Panetti’ (2010) 28 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 671, 
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174 Martha Shenton, Thomas J Whitford and Marek Kubicki, ‘Structural neuroimaging in schizophrenia from 
methods to insights to treatments’ (2010) 12 Dialogues in clinical neuroscience 317. 
175 Feigenson, above n 167, 237.  
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Tomography (PET) scans and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography 
(SPECT) scans to prove either insanity or incompetency, but have been relatively 
lenient regarding their admissibility in death penalty hearings.
176
 
Structural neuroimages are also ‘routinely admitted into evidence in civil and 
criminal trials in Australia’.177 Courts have accepted them as a scientific tool for 
determining the presence of a brain injury due to trauma
178
, diagnosing a brain 
injury
179
, ruling in or out the cause of the brain injury
180
, declaring brain death
181
, 
assessing whether a brain is juvenile or adult
182
, establishing testamentary capacity 
and dementia
183
 and establishing a mental illness.
184
 However, it will be rare, if 
indeed even possible, to establish a direct and unequivocal chain of causation 
between the identified abnormal condition of the brain of a person and the person’s 
unacceptable, inappropriate and deviant behaviour.
185
 In criminal cases, this raises 
the concern that neuroimaging evidence may lead jurors to believe that the 
structural brain abnormality was the proximate cause for the functional bad conduct. 
186
  
3.8.2 Functional Neuroimaging Evidence 
Despite the high profile that academic attention, media and public interest has given 
to functional neuroimagery, they have rarely been used internationally, and to date, 
have not been successfully introduced into evidence in either a criminal or civil trial 
in Australia.
187
 Functional neuroimaging measures aspects of brain function usually 
with the view of understanding the relationship between activity in certain areas of 
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Treatment from Patients in Vegetative State’ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 245.  
182 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.03–633). The U.S. Supreme Court in Roper banned the death 
penalty for offenders under the age of 18 years due to brain imagery evidence that indicated that the regions of 
the brain responsible for decision making and impulse control are not as well developed in adolescents as in 
adults, and therefore adolescents are less culpable for the crimes they commit. 
183 Burgess v Leech [2007] NSWSC 700. 
184 R v Coleman [2010] 9NSWSC 177. 
185 Kirsten Nugent, ‘Neuroimaging in Criminal Trials:  Evidentiary and Constitutional Concerns’ (Research 
Paper, SeletedWorks, January 2009) <http://works.bepress.com/kristen_nugent/4>.    
186 Ibid.  
187 Leanne Houston and Amy Vierboom, ‘Neuroscience and Law: Australia’ in Tade Mathias Spranger (ed), 
International Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis (Springer, 2012).  
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the brain and specific mental functions.
188
 Their value in the legal context has 
largely been speculative, with suggested uses being the detection of deception or the 
compelling of truth;
 189
 determining racial or other bias on the part of jurors or 
witnesses, determining mental capacity for the purposes of criminal responsibility 
and fitness to plead;
190
 deciding civil competency in the execution of contracts and 
wills, and the giving of informed consent; proving the presence of intractable pain, 
proving addiction or susceptibility to addiction; showing a disposition to sexual 
deviance or predatory impulses; and predicting future dangerousness.
191
   
The law-influenced discussions surrounding the possible uses of functional 
neuroimaging have raised far more questions than provided any real answers, 
although the questions themselves are viewed as beneficial in maximising the 
benefits and minimising the harms associated with the new neuroscience 
technologies.
192
 How much accuracy, and of what kind, would there need to be to 
the prediction before the law intervened?   Whether a structural neuroimage 
supports a psychiatric diagnosis such as schizophrenia or not is an entirely different 
question to whether for example, the defendant knew the nature or wrongfulness of 
their behaviour at the time of the crime.
193
 Establishing the presence of a brain 
abnormality by a structural neuroimage may raise a reasonable doubt in the juror’s 
mind as to the defendant’s ability to form the necessary mens rea.194 However, the 
psychiatrist would need to assess criminal intent from a functional neuroimage by 
identifying not only what a thought looks like, but also recognising what in 
particular, a bad or antisocial thought looked like long after the criminal intent had 
passed.
195
 Neuroimaging has the potential to advantage people experiencing mental 
illness but it also has the potential to disadvantage them.
196
   
                                                 
188 Tor D Wager, Luis Hernandez, and Martin A Lindquist, ‘Essentials of functional neuroimaging’, Handbook 
of Neuroscience for the Behavioral Sciences, 2009, 
<http://tauruspet.med.yale.edu/staff/edm42/courses/ENAS_880_2012/papers/chapters/Wager_fMRIChap_2008
_text_tables_r1.pdf> 
189 Feigenson, above n 167.  
190 Joseph R Simpson (ed), Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry: From Clinic to the Courtroom (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012).  
191 Greely, above n 161.   
192 Ibid.  
193 Donald Reeves et al., ‘Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry’ (2003) 31 Journal of American 
Academy of Psychiatry and Law 89.  
194 Joseph R Simpson (ed), Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry: From Clinic to the Courtroom (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012). 
195 Ibid. 
196 Sinnott-Armstrong et al., above n 91. See also John H Blume and Emily C Paavola, ‘Life, Death, and 
Neuroimaging: The Advantages  and Disadvantages  of the Defense's  Use  of Neuroimages in Capital Cases – 
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4. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE REGULATION OF 
LANGUAGE  
The 1950s commenced a watershed of social changes in which issues of diversity, 
inclusion, social equity and multiculturalism found expression in policy 
interventions and laws that were intended to govern human behaviour, solve social 
problems, and make the lives of disadvantaged people better.  A range of tools 
including legislation, regulations and legal sanctions and the provision of public 
services, and information and guidance materials were used to influence community 
behaviour and confer economic, social and community benefits.
197
  Marginalised 
populations possessing immutable qualities of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality and 
youth began accumulating a swag of newly recognised rights and protections via 
this mix of social justice/human rights policies and materials, affirmative 
action/anti-discrimination legislation such as the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth) and Racial Discrimination Act 1995 (Cth);
198
 and social change decisions 
handed down by liberal courts with landmark rulings such as Hickie v Hunt and 
Hunt
199
, Maguire v SOCOG
200
, McBain v Victoria
201
 and Mabo (1).
202
 
203
   
One of the most important tools in the armoury of the social justice advocates 
wanting to overcome the disadvantages and barriers experienced by various 
oppressed or marginalised social groups is political correctness: the careful use of 
language so as not to disrespect, or exclude disadvantaged groups from full political 
and civic participation.
204
  Once social/legal change has acquired a particular degree 
of significance, the socio-cultural process of political correctness attempts to 
                                                                                                                                        
Lessons from the Front’ (Research Paper Series No 11-18, Cornell Law School, 23 May 2011) 1 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856188>. 
197 Australian Public Service Commission, ‘Changing Behaviour: A Public Policy Perspective’ (Research Paper, 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2007) 
<http://www.apsc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/6821/changingbehaviour.pdf>. 
198 Some examples of Australian legislation are the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Australian Human 
Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).  
199 Hickie v Hunt and Hunt [1998] HREOCA 8. 
200 Bruce Lindsay Maguire v. Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (Respondent) H 99/115 
(2000). 
201 McBain v Victoria (2000) 99 FCR 116. 
202 Mabo v Queensland (No. 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (‘Mabo case’) [1992] HCA 
23. 
203 Similar international landmark decisions included Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), R v R [1992] 1 A.C. 599, 
House of Lords, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), Gillick v 
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL). 
204 Robert Sparrow, ‘Talking sense about political correctness’ (2002) 26 Journal of Australian Studies 119.  
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stabilise the new order
205
 although its critics argue that this presents the danger of 
government censoring of free speech.
206
 However, manipulating or censoring 
language use is unlikely to cure the deeply held prejudices and entrenched social 
disadvantages that drive offensive language.   
This section explores how political correctness when associated with a social issue 
such as racism is connected to laws that are then used to regulate and sanction 
language that is deemed racially offensive.  It shows through the lens of 
immigration policy and law how the language of ‘political correctness’ is 
manipulated to support different political agendas, and justify legal decision-
making. Racism and immigration law are discussed because no similar processes 
have occurred regarding the use of offensive and disrespectful language associated 
with mental illness. Racist language is considered legally offensive language while 
sanist language is socially, and therefore, legally acceptable language. The section 
leads into Perlin’s argument in Chapter Five that sanism is a socially acceptable 
phenomenon.  
4.1 A politically correct society 
A civilised society is a ‘politically correct’ society.207 Political correctness is an 
ideology that seeks to alter the rules, formal and informal, that govern relations 
amongst people and institutions and in Australia; its primary meaning is as a 
reference to the criticism and regulation of speech.
208
 It arises out of idealistic 
motives and moral values, and is an attempt to change the way that a group is 
perceived by taking control of language, and steering its use in a particular 
direction.
209
 Concepts and terminology are the cognitive apparatus used to establish 
groups, and group identities, and ‘political correctness’ is the tool used to change 
negative behaviour, thought and language about the group thereby eliminating 
prejudice and discrimination.
210
   
                                                 
205 Peter Klotz, ‘Politeness and Political Correctness: Ideological Implications’ (1999) 9 Pragmatics 155.  
206 Sparrow, above n 204.  
207 Polly Toynbee, ‘This bold equality push is just what we needed. In 1997’, The Guardian (online) 28 April 
2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/28/toynbee-equality-bill-welfare>. 
208 Sparrow, above n 204. 
209 Klotz, above n 205.  
210 William S Lind, ‘“Political Correctness:” A Short History of an Ideology’ (Research Paper, Free Congress 
Foundation, November 2004) <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2674655/Political-Correctness-A-Short-History>. 
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Its most recognisable feature is the regulation of speech by banning the use of 
‘offensive’ words and verbal expressions and replacing them with euphemisms and 
circumlocutions.
211
  Its proposition is that language not only represents thought but 
can also be used to control thought.
212
  This assumes that if linguistic behaviour is 
changed, social inequality will be reduced
213
 and a more inclusive society will be 
created because it will be equipped with a homogeneous and consensual set of 
moral norms and behavioural standards. This assumption of a more equitable 
society is foundational to  the use of less pejorative, more ‘politically correct’ 
language intended to counteract negative descriptors, and ultimately, negative 
attitudes.   
Leading up to the enactment of the United Kingdom’s Equality Act 2010, the 
populist view expressed at the time was that ‘[t]he phrase "political correctness" 
was born as a coded cover for all who still want to say Paki, spastic or queer, all 
those who still want to pick on anyone not like them, playground bullies who never 
grew up’.214  Yet in the present, more equal Britain, Lord Rodger in his judgment in 
HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
215
  still felt 
comfortable resorting to trivial stereotypes when he found that foreign homosexuals 
claiming asylum were entitled to the same freedoms as British gays, which was ‘to 
enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails 
and talking about boys with their straight female mates’.216 Perhaps presumptively, 
the use of politically correct language is claimed as a key factor in the success of 
campaigns opposing discrimination based on gender, age, religion, race and 
physical disability.
217
   
                                                 
211 Hans Geser, ‘Political Correctness: mental disorder, childish fad or advance of human civilization? In: 
Sociology in Switzerland, Online Publication, Zurich, Jan. 2008, 
<http://www.forschungsnetzwerk.at/downloadpub/Political_Correctness_pc_geser2008.pdf>  
212 For many critics, enforcing politically correctness is equivalent to ‘thought policing’. See Suzan Poyraz, 
‘The Charge of Thought-Policing in Universities’ (2006) 36 The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 65. See 
also Joan Wallach Scott, ‘The Campaign Against Political Correctness: What’s Really at Stake’ (1992) 54 
Radical History Review 59. 
213 Edna Andrews, ‘Cultural Sensitivity and Political Correctness: The Linguistic Problem of Naming’ (1996) 
71 American Speech 389.  
214 Toynbee, above n 207.  
215 [2010] UKSC 31 
216 HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 at para 78. On appeal from: 
[2009] EWCA Civ 172 
217 Byrne, above n 66, 67.  See also IRS Reddy, ‘Making psychiatry a household word’ (2007) 49 Indian 
Journal of Psychiatry 10.  
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4.2 Tyranny of manners 
‘Political correctness’ or what pundits refer to as ‘a tyranny of manners’218, is a 
concept that has become as disagreeable to its critics as the prejudices perpetrated 
against people who have a mental illness are to mental health advocates.  The 
exponents of political correctness are increasingly viewed as self-righteous; a sort 
of vanguard of enlightenment that does not accept the judgment of dissenters, and is 
prepared to impose reforms against the public will.
219
 Social and political causes 
ranging from medical practitioner resistance to the establishment of a pregnancy 
and drugs database on the ground of privacy
220
 to the implementation of civil 
partnership legislation
221
 are touted by their opponents as ‘political-correctness-
gone-mad’: unpredictable, uncontrolled and dangerous.   
Its opponents argue that the imposition of ‘a new orthodoxy is not the way to tackle 
prejudice’222, claiming that it is itself the most pernicious form of intolerance 
because it comes disguised as tolerance.
223
 Whereas the intent of political 
correctness was to change behaviour, thought and language, and eliminate prejudice 
and discrimination, behaviour, thought and language appear to have combined to 
further stigmatise mental illness through their forced association with an 
increasingly unpopular ideology.  Professor Hans Geser’s sanist criticism reinforces 
the unhealthy association of political correctness and mental illness: 
[p]olitical correctness is certainly a very ianus-faced224 thing: an advance in 
human civilisation as well as a childish fad - and that some considerable 
efforts of self-clarification and self-criticism may be necessary to make sure 
                                                 
218 Charlton Heston, “If Americans believed in political correctness, we'd still be King George's boys -- subjects 
bound to the British crown.” An excerpt from a speech by Charlton Heston entitled ‘Winning the Cultural War’, 
delivered at Harvard Law School, 16 February 1999. Heston called those law students who validated, and 
abided by political correctness, cowards. He would later coin the popular phrase, “Political correctness is simply 
tyranny with manners”. Richard Corliss, ‘Appreciation: Charlton Heston’, Time (online), 6 April 2008 
<http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1728272-3,00.html>. 
219 Peter Coleman, ‘What is Political Correctness? The Pros and Cons’, Quadrant (online), 1 March 2000 
<http://www.liberalsindia.com/relevence/PoliticalCorrectness.php>.  
220 E J Begg, ‘Prescribing in pregnancy and lactation’ (2008) 65 British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 627.  
221 Elizabeth Peel, ‘Editorial Introduction: Recognizing and Celebrating Same-Sex Relationships: Beyond the 
Normative Debate’ (2008) 11 Sexualities 659.  
222 Jeff Johnson, ‘Literature, Political Correctness and Cultural Equity’ (1992) 8 English Today: The 
International Review of the English Language 44, 45.  
223 Ibid.   
224 Ianus or Janus, the Roman god having two faces--one looking to the future and one to the past; having or 
concerned with polarities or contrasts; marked by deliberate deceptiveness especially by pretending one set of 
feelings and acting under the influence of another; hypocritical. 
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that it does not become an almost incurable (because almost unnoticed) kind of 
collective mental disorder.225  
‘Political correctness’ may be a solution for some but for others it is representative 
of a problem considered to be just as unpredictable, uncontrolled, dangerous and 
insidious as the negative labels applied to ‘mentally ill’ individuals: a concept gone 
mad.  While stigma may be viewed as topical and trendy, it is definitely more than a 
passing fashion.
226
  The real question is whether ‘political correctness’, having 
taken on its own set of stigmatising properties and pejorative connotations, has run 
its course or whether its influence on the law has ensured its longevity.  
5. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE LAW 
There is no unfairness in the court following rules. But there is an unfairness 
in courts following trends. 
Former Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Michel Bastarache227 
 
Judges do not make letter of the law decisions according to recently retired 
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Bastarache.  Instead, they follow popular global 
trends in arriving at decisions which are seen to be right and fair.  Bastarache claims 
that judges do not wish to be seen as out of step with ‘progress’ although he 
suggests that ‘progress can also be seen as political correctness’.228 Society 
embraces its commitment to the equity that underlies political correctness and sets 
great value in the shifts in norms achieved by its commitment.
229
 A growing 
concern for communities that are regulated by political correctness is that its 
populations ‘feel judged and fear being blamed’.230 As Bastarche implies, judges 
worrying about how they are viewed as representatives of their social group can 
                                                 
225 Geser, above n 211, 38. 
226 Peter Byrne, ‘Psychiatric stigma’ (2001) 178 The British Journal of Psychiatry 281.   
227 Jason Hewlett, ‘Legal system needs to stick to law, retired Supreme Court judge says’, The Daily News 
(online), 18 January 2013 <http://www.kamloopsnews.ca/article/20130118/KAMLOOPS0101/130119821/-
1/kamloops/legal-system-needs-to-stick-to-law-retired-supreme-court-judge-says>. 
228 Hewlett, above n 227.  
229 Robin J Ely, Martin N Davidson and Debra Meyerson, ‘Rethinking Political Correctness’ (2006) 84 Harvard 
Business Review 78.  
230 Ibid 80.  
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arrive at decisions that are based on untested, private conclusions that may become 
immutable.
231
  
This section discusses political correctness and the role it has in the law in the areas 
of racism and immigration. It will show that political correctness as a regulator of 
speech and behaviour suffers from the same conceptual and definitional weaknesses 
as terms such as ‘mental illness’ and ‘stigma’ that were discussed in previous 
chapters. But as a tool, political correctness has become ensconced in legal 
discussion and statutory interpretation in areas of social concern except in the area 
of mental health is which offensive, derogatory and disrespectful language is 
sanctioned by the law on the basis of its social acceptability (See Section 6.0, 
below).     
5.1 Racism and political correctness 
Few labels are as aversive in a society where motivations to avoid appearing 
prejudiced are as increasingly pervasive as that of appearing ‘racist’.232 And there 
are few more offensive racist terms than ‘nigger’. The need to be perceived as 
‘politically correct’ is considerable, however, the confusion surrounding what 
phraseology is, and is not ‘politically correct’ is evident.233 An example of this is 
found in the Australian case of Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground 
Trust 
234
 in which the applicant complained that the sign, ‘The ES `Nigger' Brown 
Stand’ positioned above the local football oval grandstand was a contravention of 
the provisions of the Discrimination Act
235
 because the word ‘nigger’ was racially 
offensive.  
Arriving at its decision to dismiss the application, the court turned to the dictionary 
for the meaning of Negro which informed that, ‘[e]xcept in Black English 
vernacular, where it remains common, it is now virtually restricted to contexts of 
deliberate and contemptuous ethnic abuse’.236 While the term ‘black’ has undergone 
semantic amelioration and once acceptable racial designations such as ‘coloured’ 
                                                 
231 Hewlett, above n 227 
232 Michael I Norton et al., ‘Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game’ 
(2006) 17 Psychological Science 949.  
233 Jennifer Grafton and Joanne M Lye, ‘Political correctness, surface tension & passive racism’ (2000) 19 
Youth Studies Australia 44.  
234 [2000] FCA 1615 (10 November 2000) 
235 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9, 18C.  
236 Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615 (10 November 2000). 
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and ‘Negro’ have undergone semantic pejoration and fallen into desuetude among 
some groups,
237
 it is inaccurate to claim that their use is restricted to contemptuous 
abuse.  Although the term ‘Negro’ may be considered obsolete by many238, it was 
included on the 2010 United States census form. Question 9 asked respondents to 
indicate whether their race was ‘Black, African Am., or Negro’.239  The Census 
Bureau claimed that the term offered older African Americans
240
 a new identifier 
and that the term was in fact, one of inclusion
241
 as ‘[m]any older African-
Americans identified themselves that way, and many still do...Those who identify 
themselves as Negroes need to be included.’242  For Americans, the status of 
‘Negro’ is age related with more than half of both the black and white older 
populations believing that ‘Negro’ is a respectful term.243  
A 1980s study measuring the preferences that black Americans had for the race 
names, ‘Black’, ‘Negro’ and ‘Afro-American’244 found that it related to the 
individual’s underlying sense of identity and consciousness although ‘currently, 
“Black” is in’.245 The researchers concluded that ‘black Americans remain 
somewhat schizophrenic (italics added) when it comes to using own- race 
descriptors and labels’.246 Setting aside the fact that the inaccurate misuse of the 
term ‘schizophrenic’ to describe the normal variations in the preference of race 
descriptors by the members of a particular racial group is demonstratively sanist, 
                                                 
237 Anita Henderson, ‘What’s in a Slur?’ (2003) 78 American Speech 52, 55.  
238 Jack Martin, ‘Census Bureau defends 'negro' addition’, The New York Daily News (online), 6 January 2010 
<http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/01/06/Census-Bureau-defends-negro-addition/UPI-
70241262798663/>. 
239 United States Census, 2010, U.S. Department Of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. 
Census Bureau < http://www.census.gov/2010census/> 
240 Census respondents indicated whether they were white, black, or mulatto until 1950 when black and mulatto 
were replaced with the more ‘politically correct’ term ‘Negro’.  Black reappeared in 1970 with a capital B, and 
Negro remained. African American first appeared in 2000 as one of three choices. NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
Political Participation Practice Group, <http://www.thedefendersonline.com/2010/01/11/the-word-negro-and-
the-2010-census-form/> 
241 Census officials stated that the term was added to the form after some respondents, primarily older blacks, 
wrote ‘negro’ on the form in 2000. "Negro" on Census Form Called Offensive, CBS News, 7/1/2010, 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/07/national/main6067168.shtml> 
242 Martin, above n 238.   
243 Henderson, above n 237, 56.  
244 ‘In 1988 Jesse Jackson encouraged people to adopt this term over the then-used “black.” As he saw it, the 
words acknowledged black America’s ties to Africa. “African American,” says Hill, is now “used more by non-
African-American people, who cling to it because they are unsure what word to use.” Sen says, “African 
American” is favored by “highly educated people who are not black. Whether one uses ‘black’ or ‘African 
American’ indicates how strong your social relations are with those communities.” And Chris Raab, founder of 
Afro-Netizen, says, “People who are politically correct chose to use African American, but I don’t recall any 
mass of black folks demanding the use of African American.’ Excerpt from Joel Bleifuss, ‘A Politically Correct 
Lexicon’, In These Times (online), 21 February 2007 
<http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3027/a_politically_correct_lexicon/>. 
245 Halford H Fairchild , ‘Black, Negro, or Afro-American?: The Differences Are Crucial!’ (1985) 16 Journal of 
Black Studies 47.  
246 Ibid 53.  
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the researchers suggest that ‘politically correct’ language is language favoured by 
the powerful at any given time.
247
 This raises the question as to whether it is the 
words themselves that are detrimental, or whether the detriment is found in the 
attitudes behind the speaking and hearing of the words.    
The court in Hagan found that even if Mr Brown's nickname had had its genesis in 
bigotry, it had long ago lost its racial connotation. It was helped to this view by the 
evidence of well known Indigenous community representatives who expressed their 
acceptance of the public expression of the word ‘Nigger’ used in the context of 
honouring Mr Brown, a white Australian. The court seemed to believe that a legally 
offensive word may lose its offensiveness if it can be shown that the term had its 
inception in the bigotry of the past, has been absorbed into cultural acceptance and 
practice, and is not presently used with an offensive intent. The court’s view in 
Hagan reflects the concept of a socially acceptable offensiveness, a topic discussed 
in regard to mental illness in Section 6.0.   
5.1.1 Politically correct speech is not free speech 
In the Salford Youth Court in the United Kingdom in 2012, a 10 year old boy was 
prosecuted for racist school name-calling. The case prompted the judge to ask 
‘[h]ave we really got to the stage where we are prosecuting 10-year-old boys 
because of political correctness?’ and ‘Nobody is more against racist abuse than me 
but these are boys in a playground, this is nonsense.’248 Adjourning the matter, he 
asked prosecutors to reconsider whether the case was in the public interest stating 
that in his day, the boys would have gotten a ‘good clouting’.   
It appears that this judge may adhere to the popular culture myth that children are 
colour blind and don’t develop racial prejudices until, and unless, they are explicitly 
taught although current psychological research shows that children develop racial 
biases that do not necessarily reflect the racial attitudes of the adults in their lives by 
the age of three to five.
249
   
                                                 
247 Historically, black was an offensive term. It was replaced by the ‘politically correct’ terms ‘Negro’ and 
‘Colored’ which were in turn replaced by ‘Afro-American’. Coming full cycle, Black with a capital b is now 
‘politically correct’.  
248 ‘Judge labels case 'PC gone mad'’, BBC News (online), 6 April 2006 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/4883398.stm>.  
249 Stephen M Quintana and Clark McKown (eds.), Handbook of race, racism, and the developing child (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008 
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The judge’s comments raise the question as to whether racist abuse in adults is 
socially unacceptable and should be sanctioned but in children it should be tolerated 
and kept free from sanction.   
In Australia, political correctness is treated with a great deal of flexibility by both 
the right and left sides of government.  Recently, the former Australian Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard stated that she would not allow political correctness to get in 
her way when addressing immigration issues
250
 while the Opposition Leader, Tony 
Abbott recommitted to his potential future coalition government removing section 
18C from the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
251
  He implied that this section, 
that makes it illegal to make statements that offend based on race or ethnicity, is 
simply a ‘hurt feelings’ test.252  He argued that ‘[e]xpression or advocacy should 
never be unlawful merely because it is offensive’253 and ‘[s]peech that has to be 
inoffensive is not free, just unerringly politically correct’.254 The clear message of 
Mr Abbott, the newly elected Australian Prime Minister is that while racial abuse is 
not socially acceptable, it should be socially tolerated.  The problem is that when a 
society tolerates offensiveness, in due course offensiveness becomes acceptable and 
eventually, customary, a situation exemplified in regard to mental illness (see 
Section 6.0 below).  
5.2 Immigration and political correctness 
The earliest judicial use of the term ‘politically correct’ appears to be by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson in 1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia when he used 
the expression ‘not politically correct’ in order to reveal and criticise what he 
perceived as an inappropriate use of language.
255
  In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court 
would again turn its attention to the inappropriate use of language when Justice 
Sotomayor chose to use alternative, ‘politically correct’ language in contrast to the 
language used by her fellow judges in Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
                                                 
250 ‘PM vows no ‘political correctness’ on immigration’, SBS World News Australia (online), 4 July 2010 
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1293687/pm-vows-no-political-correctness-on-immigration>. 
251 James Massola ‘Abbott slams ‘political correctness enforcement agency’’, Financial Review (online), 6 
August 2012 <http://afr.com/p/national/abbott_slams_political_correctness _rApUF2bnf8Wwpdr2m56elN>. 
252 Mariam Veiszadeh, ‘Opinion: Abbott's pandering betrayal: Why the Racial Discrimination Act is worth 
defending’, ABC Religion and Ethics (online), 13 August 2012 < 
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/08/13/3566446.htm>. Mariam Veiszadeh is a lawyer, writer and 
community rights advocate 
253 Massola, above n 251.  
254 Ibid.  
255 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).  
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v. Whiting.
256
 Previously, in what many perceived to be a historic moment, Justice 
Sotomayor had introduced the term ‘undocumented immigrant’257 258, which was a 
label that was endorsed by the National Association of Hispanic Journalists 
(NAHJ), an organisation opposed to terminology that criminalises the person rather 
than the actual act of illegally entering or residing in the United States.
 259
  
NAHJ has always denounced the use of the degrading terms such as “alien” 
and “illegal alien” to describe undocumented immigrants because it casts them 
as adverse, strange beings, inhuman outsiders who come to the U.S. with 
questionable motivations. ‘Aliens’ is a bureaucratic term that should be 
avoided unless used in a quote.260 
There has long been general acceptance by the courts, government agencies and 
public of the terms ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘illegal aliens’ to identify people who 
entered, or reside in the United States without lawful authority.  The presence of 
these individuals is classified as a violation of immigration law.
261
  A growing 
number of scholarly and liberal voices
262
 argue that the terms are ‘racially loaded, 
ambiguous, imprecise and pejorative’263 and claim that by ascribing illegality to a 
person’s alleged violation, for which the yet as unproved burden of proof rests with 
the government, is comparative to the criminal law labelling a suspect who has not 
                                                 
256 (December 8, 2010) (No. 09-115) 
257 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter (12/08/2009) ( 08–678) 
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American Bar Association Journal 
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Investigation Yields Hundreds of Arrests (Oct.23, 2003). 
<http://search.dhs.gov/search?query=Immigration+and+Customs+Enforcement+%28ICE%29+Employment+In
vestigation+Yields+Hundreds+of+Arrests&op=Search&affiliate=dhs> 
262 Victor C Romero, ‘Racial Profiling: Driving While Mexican and Affirmative Action’ (2003) 6 Michigan 
Journal of Race & Law 195. n.11. See also Kevin R Johnson, ‘“Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The 
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons’ (1996– 97) 28 The University of Miami Inter-American Law 
Review 263.   
263 Beth Lyon, ‘When More "Security" Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S.  Laws That 
Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers’ (2004) 6 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment 
Law 571, 576.  
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been tried in court, a ‘convicted criminal’.264 Using the term ‘unauthorised’ is said 
to avoid the overbroad and criminal connotations associated with ‘illegal’.265 
But is seems that ‘political correctness’ is a vacillating road to travel. In Whiting266, 
Sotomayor inexplicably altered her terminology to that of ‘undocumented aliens’ 
after having first corrected her initial use of the more pejorative ‘illegal aliens’.267 
The relevant state and federal statutes refer to ‘unauthorized aliens’268 although the 
term ‘illegal alien’ is used in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 but 
with regard to the incarceration and deportation of convicted offenders.   The 
Supreme Court absque Sotomayor chose to use the term ‘illegal aliens’.  Sotomayor 
took the backward step into political incorrectness with her use of the term ‘alien’.  
The negative perception of aliens as strange, inhuman outsiders requiring harsh and 
punitive measures can unquestionably influence courts. Reno v Flores
269
 
demonstrates how members of the U.S. Supreme Court manipulated their use of 
terminology to reflect their favourable decision or to justify the harsh treatment of a 
vulnerable group of children. In rejecting the constitutional challenges, Justice 
Scalia referred to the children as ‘alien juveniles’ while Justice Stevens in his 
contra judgment simply called them ‘children’.270 The word ‘children’ is evocative 
of the natural desire to provide care and protection to a young, dependant person 
while juvenile is an exclusionary term suggestive of ‘juvenile delinquents’ and 
‘juvenile courts’, and children or adolescents who demonstrate antisocial or illegal 
behaviours. This same language manipulation has been used in Australian cases. 
5.3 Australian immigration and political correctness 
In the years leading up to 2004, there had been a steady and striking rise in the 
immigration caseload
 
of the Australian Federal Court.  The number of cases filed 
had risen from 84 in 1987/8 to 1340 in 2000/01 and by 2002, 54 per cent of all 
                                                 
264 Ibid.  
265 Ibid 578.    
266 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (December 8, 2010) (No. 09-115). 
267 ‘Ibid 14, ‘but you don't disagree that Congress at least intended that if someone violated the Federal law and 
hired illegal aliens and was -- undocumented aliens and was found to have violated it, that the State can revoke 
their license, correct?’. 
268 Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-211 and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986". (8 USC 110). 
269 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 294 (1993). 
270 Kevin R Johnson, ‘“Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons’ (1996– 97) 28 The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 263, 280.   
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decisions of the Court at trial and full bench levels were immigration matters.
271
  
The High Court’s caseload had also risen dramatically so that by August 2002, it 
was receiving new applications at an average rate of 17 per week.
272
  The issue of 
immigration began to strain the relationship between the Australian government and 
the courts so that by 1998, the Minister for Immigration was accusing the judges of 
embarking 'on a frolic of their own'.
273
  
In 2002, Prime Minister Howard, in response to the release of two High Court 
judgements,
274
 stated on national television that ‘tribunals and courts often operate 
unfairly.’275 In what was quickly becoming a match of political lob and return, 
ministers accused judges of undermining the will of Parliament
 
while the High 
Court rebuked Parliament for imposing on the Court, a ‘great inconvenience’.276  
The tension came to a head in 2004 in the matter of Singh v Commonwealth.
277
  The 
High Court had to decide if a six year old girl, notwithstanding her Indian 
citizenship and lack of Australian citizenship was, by virtue of the fact that she was 
born in Australia (albeit to non-citizens), not an alien and therefore, whether it was 
beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament to deport her.  Similarly to 
Reno v Flores, language use reflected the judicial positions taken. The majority held 
that the child who they referred to as the ‘plaintiff’ was an alien within the meaning 
of s 51(xix) of the Constitution and subject to deportation.  Justice McHugh in his 
dissenting decision referred to the child throughout as ‘Ms Singh’.  
During the same year, the issue of the detention of five children in Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B
278
 further strained the 
relationship between the officers of three Australian courts and a federal 
government minister, and inflamed public opinion.  The Family Court had ruled 
                                                 
271 John McMillan, ‘Judicial Restraint and Activism in Administrative Law’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 
335, 337–8.  
272 Ibid 338.   
273 Philip Ruddock, 'Immigration Reform: The Unfinished Agenda' (Speech to National Press Club), reported in 
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274 The High Court decisions of Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; (2002) 190 ALR 601; (2002) 
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275 Gerard Henderson, ‘Ruddock and Howard: tough cop and nice cop’, The Age (online), 13 August 2002 
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/12/1029113893737.html>. 
276 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala, (2000) 204 CLR 82 at para. 133; see also Re Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham, (2000) 168 ALR 407 at para. 13; and 
Abebe v. Commonwealth, (1999) 197 CLR 510 
277 HCA 43; (2004) 222 CLR 322; (2004) 209 ALR 355; (2004) 78 ALJR 1383 (9 September 2004)  
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that the children should be released from the Baxter Detention Centre while their 
father argued his claim for asylum.
279
 After their release, Federal Court Justice 
Lander rebuked the Immigration Minister’s extraordinary decision to declare the 
house the children were staying in, and the school that they attended as places of 
detention. Neither the carers nor the school staff had consented to being declared 
detention officers.
280
  The activist Family Court then received a stern judicial rebuff 
from the High Court which unanimously overruled its decision, reasoning that the 
Family Court did not have the jurisdiction to order the release of the children, or to 
make orders about their welfare.
281
 
5.3.1. The media complaint 
The media covered the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs v B
282
 case extensively with the Sydney Morning Herald reporting the story 
beneath the headline, Illegal immigrant children may not be sent home.  A 
complaint was brought before the Australian Press Council concerning the 
newspaper’s use of the term ‘illegal immigrants’ to describe people who arrived in 
Australia without the necessary migration documents or authority.  The 
complainants argued that the term was factually incorrect and that the correct term 
is ‘asylum seekers’.   
‘Illegal' means 'contrary to or forbidden by law'. It necessarily implies 
commission of an offence. It is inappropriate, and misleading, to characterise 
an act as illegal simply because it is not specifically authorised. It is all the 
more inappropriate where the relevant conduct is positively permitted under 
international conventions, and where it is used as a device to make it appear 
respectable to imprison the supposed illegals.283 
The Council upheld the complaint and stated that the newspaper had acknowledged 
its use of an incorrect descriptor and that it should have used the ‘preferred term’ of 
                                                 
279 HR & DR & Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FamCA 616 (14 
August 2003). 
280 ‘Vanstone child detention move 'extraordinary'’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 30 April 2004 
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281 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B [2004] HCA 20; 219 CLR 365; 206 
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282 HCA 20; 219 CLR 365; 206 ALR 130; 78 ALJR 737 (29 April 2004)  
283 Extract from a letter written by Julian Burnside to Refugee Advocate, Ross Copeland and included in his 
correspondence with Jack Herman, Exec Secretary Australian Press Council dated May 28, 2004. 
<http://www.safecom.org.au/illegals2.htm>. 
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‘asylum seekers’.284 The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs countered the Council’s decision with the argument that ‘illegal 
immigrant’ was in fact correct terminology.285   
The sensitivity in some quarters to the use of the words 'illegal' or 'unlawful' or 
'unauthorised' to describe asylum seekers arriving without Australia's 
permission seems to have at its root vigorous attempts by some in the 
community to mislead the public into believing a myth that all unauthorised 
arrivals are asylum seekers and that all asylum seekers have a right to enter a 
country of choice without authority and therefore 'can never be illegal'. This is 
just not true. The reality is clear in international law and has been made crystal 
clear by the High Court of Australia. 286 
The use of the word 'illegal' or 'unlawful' to describe asylum seekers entering a 
country without authority is standard international practice, not least by signatory 
states to the Refugees Convention
287
 because the Convention (Article 31) explicitly 
refers to the ‘illegal entry or presence’ of refugees who arrive in the territory of a 
country ‘without authorisation’.288 As their asylum claims had been reviewed and 
refused, they had ceased to become ‘asylum seekers’.  By May 2011, The 
Australian newspaper was referring to asylum seekers who had been unsuccessful 
in their asylum claims as ‘failed refugees’.289   
The media both informs and reflects public attitudes. People react differently when 
exposed to intensive media discussions of a social issue or event than if they are 
simply aware of the issue.
290
 An event portrayed through the media, especially 
television, is experienced by the viewer as being more real and more credible than 
the same event in real life.  ‘“Reality” at a distance has become authentic reality and 
                                                 
284 Australian Press Council, Adjudication No. 1242, (June 2004)  
< http://www.immi.gov.au/media/letters/letters04/Press_Council_28_June.htm>  
285 Ibid. 
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“real” reality has lost its value until it is authenticated through the media’.291 The 
mediatisation of the immigration issue has succeeded in polarising the views of 
Australians but it has also given public dialogue to what is an important social 
conundrum.   
5.3.2 The political agenda 
In 2010, the former Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. Julia Gillard, vowed not to 
let political correctness interfere in tackling immigration ‘[s]o any sort of political 
correctness, or niceties that get in the way, I think, need to be swept out of the 
way.’292 During a radio interview in August 2012, the Hon. Tony Abbot, then the 
former Leader of the Opposition and now current Prime Minister of Australia, 
referred to the numbers of ‘illegal arrivals’, to which the interviewer responded by 
saying ‘They're not illegal. Tony Abbott, do I need to remind you that the use of 
words in this is critical?’293 Most recently, in October 2013, the newly appointed 
Minster for Immigration, Hon. Scott Morrison instructed his departmental staff to 
publicly refer to asylum seekers as ‘illegal’ arrivals rather than as clients. Critics 
claim the new terminology is designed to dehumanise and demonise refugees.294  
The courts accept that the use of ‘unlawful non-citizen’ in the Migration Act 1958 is 
a labelling term and that ‘unlawful’ in the Australian sense has the rather 
meaningless definition of ‘without lawful permission’. 295   
Judicial decision-makers, government agents, and the media recognise the 
significance of language in manipulating public sentiments and attitudes on 
immigration matters.  The language that is chosen in any given circumstance is 
dependent on the commentator’s values and biases which are often reflected in their 
political agenda.  It is a useful tool for impressing attitudinal and behavioural 
population change favoured by governments and incorporated into law to combat 
prejudices including race and sexism.   Equally, it is an ideology easily dismissed 
by governments when it is deemed inconvenient. But what the ‘asylum seeker’ 
                                                 
291 Ibid. 
292 ‘PM vows no ‘political correctness’ on immigration’, SBS World News Australia (online), 4 July 2010 
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issue has shown is that ‘political correctness’ can be a powerful stimulator of public 
and legal debate.   
In mental health, sanism is not only hidden but it is also silent. There is no public 
debate regarding the offensiveness of sanist language but simply polite 
conversations amongst mental health stakeholders about whether terms such as 
‘people experiencing mental illness’ is preferable to other terms such as ‘the 
mentally ill’. Rather than political and judicial strategic action to eradicate 
contemptuous and offensive language associated with mental illness from the public 
voice, governments have largely ignored its existence while the courts have largely 
accepted sanist language as socially acceptable. 
6. SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE OFFENSIVENESS 
But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.296 
Derogatory language is a medium that is used to reflect the contempt of the normal 
majority for the inferior minority. Only in recent decades have societies, mostly, 
discontinued their legal and social exclusionist policies.  These policies prevented 
people experiencing a mental illness from interacting with the ‘normal’ majority by 
authorising their detention in public institutions, or through the stigmatic ‘blame’ 
responses of families confining them within the family home and out of public 
view.  As a consequence of the historical social distance between the groups, 
attitudinal and linguistic expressions of difference have flourished in the larger 
society unchecked.  Pejorative terms including ‘crazy’, ‘bonkers’, ‘loony’, ‘nuts’ 
and ‘wacko’ entered into the vocabulary of ordinary language as did the more 
scientific, though no less pejorative terms such as ‘abnormal’, ‘insane’, ‘maniac’, 
‘deviant’, ‘schizo’ and ‘psycho’.   
That these terms are now embedded in common parlance is too often given as an 
excuse as to why there has been no real political or legal attempt to make their use 
unacceptable in ordinary language similar to the present legally and socially non 
gratis racially offensive words such as ‘nigger’ and ‘paki.’297  Once well established 
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within general parlance, these strongly discredited terms are now classed as 
derogatory and highly offensive and their use is an actionable insult as a term of 
contempt.
298
  Social activists are focused on removing them from cultural and 
historical prominence.   
‘Nigger is arguably the most known of the contemptuous terms, prompting 
editors recently, as a ‘political correct’ exercise, to expunge from Mark 
Twain’s classic anti-racist novel Huckleberry Finn, all occasions of the word 
and replacing it with ‘slave’.299  
Dehumanizing language, when used in regard to people experiencing mental illness, 
is both ubiquitous and socially acceptable.
 300
 One recent English study surveyed 
400 14 year old schoolchildren, who provided the researchers with 250 different 
labels used to stigmatise people with a mental illness.
 301
  The labels were grouped 
into five themes of which the first and largest group consisted of 116 (almost half 
the total) labels termed ‘popular derogatory terms’: slang. They found that the 
labels appeared ‘to have no referent but were a set of negative associations and 
judgements in and of themselves.’302 The primary sources identified for the 
derogatory references were the media
303
 and family and peers.
304
 Professor Patrick 
McGorry, leading international researcher, clinician, advocate for reform in mental 
health and 2010 Australian of the Year made the claim that ‘common gibes such as 
''nutter'' and ''psycho'' reflected an inherent prejudice towards the mentally ill’305 and 
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that society’s broad acceptance of discriminatory language suggests the obvious, 
that mental illness prejudice and stigma still operates at all levels.
306
 
6.1 Political correctness in mental health 
Proclaimed as a key factor in the ‘successful’ campaigns opposing discrimination 
based on race, gender, age, disability and religion, ‘politically correct’ language was 
promoted as being equally applicable to mental health, with the attached 
implication that similar successful results would be achieved.
307
  There is a concern 
that ‘political correctness’ in mental health has come with a cost.308  An example is 
the use of the label ‘mental health consumer’ in preference to the pejorative label 
‘schizophrenic’. Critics suggest that this can have a negative impact by suggesting 
that the person’s symptoms are under their control, raising the expectation that the 
person should, and can, effect personal change.
309
 If a change does not occur, then 
individual and public frustration will.
310
   
Euphemistic labels such as ‘person with a mental illness’ or ‘mental health 
consumer’ are claimed to carry an insufficiency of information that results in the 
public filling in the gaps with the undesirable effect of increasing stigma
 
through 
stereotypical associations with concepts of dangerousness, unpredictability and 
uncontrollability.
311
  The use of the term ‘person with schizophrenia’ is said to be 
preferred by the cohort of individuals who actually experience this particular 
illness.
312
 But when a person is continually paired with a particular mental illness, 
‘politically correct’ terms can take on stigmatising properties to the extent that the 
‘politically correct’ term, ‘person with a severe mental illness’ becomes no less 
pejorative than ‘person with schizophrenia’ or even ‘schizophrenic.’313 This raises 
the question of how relevant is a descriptor when mental illness and schizophrenia 
are inextricably entwined in the public mind. 
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The entrenchment of the disease model has meant the embrace of scientific terms 
such as ‘mental disorder’ and ‘brain disorder’, and mental illness described as a 
medical condition.
314
  Science rejects the use of vague and value laden terms in 
favour of precisely-definable, morally neutral terms.  This use of physiological or 
biological terminology was wrongly thought to decrease stigmatisation because of 
the perception of mental illness as a ‘real’ medical problem.315  As discussed in 
Chapter Three, many commentators consider the medical model to be oppressive, 
and that the ‘sick role’ patient is made dependent and incapable, and that their 
obligation to take care of their own affairs is cancelled. They are dehumanised 
within the disease paradigm.
316
 
6.2 Political correctness and sanism 
Language is a common communication method that enables the transmission of 
intended and unintended meanings.  Language which is unclear in its message or 
has unintended stigmatising meanings is particularly insidious and 
dangerous because those messages and meanings become so common place as to 
be invisible.
317
 This invisibility is woven into the social acceptability of the 
prejudice associated with mental illness so strongly argued by Michael Perlin in his 
theory of sanism, discussed at length in Chapter Five.   
In the recent psycho/legal response
318
 to the Australian Capital Territory’s 2010 
Options Paper: Review of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994
319
, the 
authors advised readers that their decision to adopt the: 
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rather clumsy term “people living with a mental illness” rather than use more 
euphonious signifiers like “the mentally ill”’ was due to their belief that much 
of the debate originates from the entrenched and largely invisible prejudice 
against people who suffer mental illness which Michael Perlin has dubbed 
‘sanism’.320   
The authors stated that an intrinsic part of sanism is that people who ‘happen to 
suffer a mental illness’321 are perceived to be essentially different from the rest of 
society. They are effectively defined by their illness to their detriment, akin to the 
use of the term ‘the Negro’.322  The main problem with broad-brush terms like ‘the 
mentally ill’ is that they lump all kinds of people with all kinds of mental health 
conditions into one impersonal mass,
323
 however, referring to people as ‘living with 
mental illness’ rather than being ‘mentally ill’ is unlikely to purge from the public 
mind the entrenched belief that they are still people who are essentially different.  
The person continues to be labelled and defined by their mental illness.  And the 
preferred label, ‘living with’, in fact, suggests a degree of choice, much like living 
with an unsuitable flat mate or a badly behaved pet: fix it and if you can’t fix it, 
move out or move on.  
Sanism is ‘based predominately on ... deindividualization’324 which raises the 
argument as to whether using the term ‘people’ may contribute to a person’s loss of 
individual self-awareness.  Also, the authors’ use of the term ‘suffer’ which means 
to feel pain or distress; sustain loss, injury, harm, or punishment, tolerate or endure 
evil, injury, pain, or death or appear disadvantaged
325
 may be a reflection of the 
authors’ own ‘entrenched and largely invisible prejudice’326 which may be a counter 
weight their good intentions.  Mental health advocates argue that clichés such as 
‘suffering from’ or ‘afflicted with’ perpetuate misunderstanding and fears about 
being diagnosed with a mental illness, and that with treatment and support, ‘most 
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people with mental illness diagnoses are managing their symptoms and leading 
ordinary, productive lives.’327 
It appears that the authors have confused ‘political correctness’ with sanism, 
perhaps believing, as many others do, that if the text contains ‘politically correct’ 
language, it is evidence of the writer’s lack of prejudice.  Unfortunately, 
substituting the term ‘people living with a mental illness’ for ‘mentally ill’, only to 
then reduce the epithet to the acronym ‘PLWMI’ throughout the remainder of the 
document, does not succeed as a linguistic demonstration of value and respect being 
shown to people who have a mental illness. This type of acronymic use is offensive 
when referring to marginalised groups.   
This is made particularly evident in, for example, an indigenous discussion where 
‘[t]he term ‘Aboriginal’ should never be abbreviated, as to do so is offensive’.328 
Also ‘[t]he abbreviation to ‘ATSI’ when used to describe people is offensive’329 and 
‘[t]he term ‘Torres Strait Islander’ should never be abbreviated, as to do so is 
offensive’.330  It would not be acceptable to refer to the First Nations Peoples as 
FNPs or to African-Americans as AAs in any public document of note and yet the 
use of PLWMI was considered in this instance to be an acceptable, non-prejudicial 
use of language.   
The authors’ suggestion that it ‘may be sensible to adopt such terminology to 
protect their rights’ was also not convincing.  Their numerous references to 
sufferance
331
 are reflective of a patronising use of language.
332
 The attribution of 
‘sanism’ as justification for the authors’ use of ‘politically correct language’ may 
well be demonstrable of sanism at work, with these authors, and perhaps many 
others, failing to recognise their own acceptance of that which should be 
unacceptable in a confused homage to political correctness rather than sanism.  
                                                 
327 Lockett John, above n 114.  
328 ‘Guidelines for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Terminology’ (Guidelines, Queensland Health, October 
2011) 2 <http://www.health.qld.gov.au/atsihealth/documents/terminology.pdf>. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid 3.  
331 Genelle Sharrock, ‘The Media, Mental Health Issues and The CALD Community’ (Slides, Mindframe), 
<http://www.ceh.org.au/downloads/Diversity_in_Health/Presentations/Day1_A063_Sharrock.pdf >.‘Say “being 
treated for” or “currently experiencing” a mental illness rather than “suffering from” or “afflicted with” a 
mental illness’   
332 ‘Patronising language - Don’t describe people as brave, special or suffering just because they have a 
disability.’ Also, ‘Sufferer - Avoid using to indiscriminately describe a person with a disability – individuals 
don’t suffer just because they have a disability.’ Above n 313. 
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Simply using people-first language will not change underlying negative attitudes 
often hidden or unrecognised behind a sanist curtain of acceptability. Using 
‘politically correct’ language may give the impression that discrimination and 
prejudice are being tackled head on but often it is a case of applying a sanist veneer 
that is sufficient to settle most interested minds but which effects very little actual, 
positive change for people experiencing mental illness. 
6.3 Mental illness and the law’s acceptance of socially offensive language 
In 1998, David Hay, Auckland’s Deputy Mayor, lodged a complaint with the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority in which he claimed that Television 
New Zealand had breached Standard G13 of the Television Code of Broadcasting 
Practice
333
 when a presenter called him a ‘moron’, a term he found offensive.334  In 
reaching its decision, the Authority referenced two dictionary definitions for the 
word
335
: 
1   colloq a very stupid or foolish person 
2   an adult with a mental age of about 8 – 12 
In declining to uphold the complaint, the Authority reasoned that ‘the colloquial use 
of the word moron is not uncommon in general parlance in New Zealand’336 and 
was only ‘marginally derogatory’.337 This raises the question as to how the 
Authority decided that calling a city official a very stupid or foolish person would 
not detract significantly from their good character, and particularly from their civic 
standing as the continuation of their role is reliant on the election support of the 
public.  The court found that ‘although it involved the use of a marginally 
derogatory colloquial expression, it was an ‘expression of a genuinely-held opinion 
in a news or current affairs programme’338 and therefore exempt.339  Elucidating the 
issue in a later, different complaint, the Authority, stated that it: 
                                                 
333 Broadcasting Act 1989 (NZ), The Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, Standard 7(a) 
334 David Hay Deputy Mayor of Auckland, Complaint against  Broadcaster Television New Zealand Limited – 
Broadcasting Standards Authority - 1998-043 [1998] NZBSA 38 (30 April 1998) < 
http://bsa.govt.nz/decisions/716-decision-number-1998-043>. 
335 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, Eighth Edition, 1990). 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 G13(ii) 
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reiterates the conclusion it reached in its earlier decision which was that it is 
not unfair to describe someone as a ‘moron’ in view of the accepted, relatively 
light-hearted colloquial meaning given to the term in New Zealand.340   
‘Moron’ is a eugenic term first used in psychology ‘to denote a particular measure 
of feeblemindedness and low intelligence.
341
 It sat within a list of other, newly 
scientific terms such as imbecile
342
 and idiot.
343
  A broad application of the Binet – 
Simon Scale
344
 revealed that the intelligence level of almost half the population of 
America sat within the moronic category.
345
  This empirical fact did not sit well 
with the population, which led to the various terms of classification subsequently 
being disuses as scientific terms and helped in all of them being used as common 
insults in general language.
346
   
The Authority’s decision suggests that even though a word is offensive in its 
genesis and meaning, and the speaker might use the word with the intention of 
offending, and the person against whom the word is used may feel deeply offended, 
both personally and professionally, because the offensive term is in use in ordinary 
language, the aggrieved person has little remedy in the courts.  Following this 
reasoning, the past acceptable colloquial use of subjectively measured derogatory 
terms such as ‘nigger’ and ‘piccaninny’ might not legitimate their present use but if 
it were not for the public’s acceptance of the offensiveness of the words and the 
                                                 
340 Jenny Hale of Auckland Broadcaster Television New Zealand Limited - 1998-079 [1998] NZBSA 76 (23 July 
1998)  
341 The word ‘moron’ was widely introduced by Henry Herbert Goddard as scientific terminology to describe 
people with a mental age between 8 and 12. Goddard was a eugenicist who was focused on preventing the 
breeding of feebleminded people. In 1908, he had found utility in mental testing as a way to evidence the 
superiority of the white race. After studying abroad, he brought the Binet-Simon Scale to the United States and 
had it translated it into English. Goddard believed that compulsory sterilization would solve the problem of 
feeblemindedness, a proposition he understood that many would find offensive, so as an alternative, he 
suggested that mentally deficient individuals should be kept, humanely, in institutions. His best known work is 
The Kallikak Family: A study in the heredity of feeble-mindedness. (Macmillan, 1912). In 1914, he became the 
first American psychologist to testify in court that subnormal intelligence should limit the criminal 
responsibility of defendants. 
342 A person whose intelligence has been tested at a level between the ages of three to seven on the Binet scale. 
343 A person whose intelligence has been tested at a level below the age of three on the Binet scale. 
344 Alfred Binet, ‘New Methods for the Diagnosis of the Intellectual Level of Subnormals’ (1905) 12 L'Année 
Psychologique 191 <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Binet/binet1.htm>. The following translation by Elizabeth S. 
Kite first appeared in The development of intelligence in children, Vineland, NJ: Publications of the Training 
School at Vineland, in 1916.  ‘Understanding the normal progress of intellectual development among normals, 
we shall be able to determine how many years such an individual is advanced or retarded. In a word we shall be 
able to determine to what degrees of the scale idiocy, imbecility, and moronity correspond’.  
345 Jean-Claude Croizet, The Racism of Intelligence: How Mental Testing Practices Have Constituted an 
Institutionalized Form of Group Domination. In Henry Lewis Gates et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
African American Citizenship, 1865-Present (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
346 Trent W James, Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation in the United States (University 
of California Press, 1995).  
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presence of racial discrimination legislation
347
 regulating and sanctioning their use, 
the racially person would be without legal redress.  The vast majority of 
stigmatising and offensive language associated with marginalised groups was at 
times in history acceptable in their use amongst the more powerful groups. Today, 
this type of judicial justification would likely only be considered to be adequate 
when the alleged offensive word/s pertained to mental illness.   
The consequence for people who have a mental illness who live in a society in 
which people who do not have a mental illness are referred to by words and terms 
associated with mental illness is that they are hurt by the disregard of their feelings 
by the use of disparaging references.
348
 It is acceptable to laughingly call a friend 
crazy, nuts or psycho; lovingly call a child ‘a little lunatic’ or a ‘mad monster’; 
affectionately tell an elderly mother she’s ‘daft’ or call a father a ‘madman’ because 
he thinks a certain football team will win; or use the same words in anger when 
wanting to insult another person. Insensitive or offensive racial language is not 
socially acceptable.  Insensitive or offensive sanist language has meshed into every 
aspect of our social fabric.   
7. CONCLUSION 
Sixty years of stigma studies have persistently arrived at the singular conclusion 
that the public’s attitudes toward people experiencing a mental illness are negative 
and rejecting, and formed out of fear and loathing.
349
 Contemporary assessments of 
popular sentiments indicate that the past injurious evaluations have not diminished, 
remaining prevalent within public attitudes,
350
 with certain types of negative beliefs 
having, in fact, increased.
351
 Typically, society’s reaction to mental illness has been 
                                                 
347 Racial Discrimination Act 1975. 
348 Otto F Wahl, ‘Confronting Stigma, Health Care and Rehabilitation Services’ (Committee Paper, Health Care 
and Rehabilitation Services, 2007) 
<http://www.hcrs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=198&Itemid=229>. 
349 Jum C Nunnally, Popular conceptions of mental health: Their development and change (Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1961).  
350 Arthur H Crisp et al., ‘Stigmatisation of people with mental illnesses’ (2000) 177 The British Journal of 
Psychiatry 4. This study found that the stigmatising opinions about people with psychiatric disorders are still 
widely held in the population and concluded that if stigma is to be reduced, more needs to be done than 
providing information about mental disorders.  There must also be an attempt to reduce discrimination. See also 
Graham Thornicroft, Shunned: Discrimination against people with mental Illness (Oxford University Press, 
2006).  
351 Jim Read and Sue Baker, ‘Not Just Sticks and Stones: A survey of the stigma, taboos and discrimination 
experienced by people with mental health problems’ (Report, The Mental Health Charity, November 1996) 2 
<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disabilitystudies/archiveuk/MIND/MIND.pdf>. 
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one of denial, isolation, and insulation
352
 so that stereotypes, prejudice, 
discrimination, social barriers, and social rejection continue to be confronted by 
people who experience mental illness.
353
   
Chapter Four examined the approaches of  science, protest, education, anti-
discrimination laws, inclusive public policies and cultural interventions; all the tools 
intended to decrease, if not eradicate entirely, society’s differential treatment of 
people experiencing a mental illness. However, it is clear that these interventions 
have had limited success and in some instances, increases rather than decreases in 
negative attitudes have been reported.
354
  Public attitudes have proven themselves to 
be extraordinarily resistant to change.  
The health policy strategy of educating the public to the view that mental illness is 
an ‘illness like any other’ has been successful, although the public’s greater 
understanding and appreciation of the aetiology and symptoms/signs of mental 
illness has not resulted in the anticipated stigma diffusion.  Instead, the ‘disease’ 
model had the unintended result of increasing mental illness stigma in regard to its 
association with violence, a fundamental element at the core of public fear.   
In addition, this chapter has examined the position that the ‘nature’ of mental illness 
is largely a social phenomenon that is defined by the person’s social behaviour and 
also the social impact that their behaviour has on people’s lives because, unlike 
somatic illnesses, there are no physiological signs or symptoms for most mental 
illnesses.
355
 The chapter addressed this social/environmental aspect of mental 
illness in its examination of the shifting blame debate of nature and nurture which 
continues to strongly influence mental health policies, research and law.  The 
nurture effect is particularly noteworthy in the area of family law parenting matters 
which will be discussed in Chapter Six. In this area of law, the instrument of fear is 
risk, a barrier that a parent with a mental illness is often unable to overcome. The 
nature effect can be found in the rapid technological advances that are increasingly 
being used to shift responsibility away from the person across to a pin pointed brain 
image. While this new technology may have advantages in sentencing for example, 
                                                 
352 Barry Trute and Anne Loewen, ‘Public Attitude Toward the Mentally Ill as a Function of Prior Experience’ 
(1978) 13 Social Psychiatry 79.  
353 Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Social distance towards the mentally ill: results of 
representative surveys in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (1997) 27 Psychological Medicine 131.  
354 Phelan et al., above n 16.  
355 Len Bowers, The Social Nature of Mental Illness (Routledge, 1998) 2.  
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it may equally have disadvantages in its use in preventive sentencing.  The nature 
effect also reinforces the view that a person with mental illness lacks control over 
their behaviour, a significant contributing factor to the public’s fear and desire for 
social distance. 
Finally, this chapter examined the cultural intervention of ‘political correctness’, an 
ideology that promotes language that is not disrespectful or used to exclude 
disadvantaged groups from fully participating in all aspects of society. The ideology 
is founded on a set of democratic values and a principle - fairness, justice and 
equality – that are expected to coexist congruently alongside another, conflicting set 
of deeply felt, socially entrenched negative attitudes about mental illness. The 
incongruence of the situation is exemplified by state authorities’ willingness to 
publically discard the ideology when it is incompatible with a political agenda as 
evidenced by the immigration discussion, or judicial validation of the use of 
derogatory and offensive language that is associated with mental illness because of 
its embeddedness in common parlance. But what is absolutely clear is the public’s 
knowledge that should it publically use language such as ‘nigger’ or ‘Paki’, there 
will be social condemnation and legal punishment. This is not the case when a 
person experiencing mental illness is called a ‘lunatic’, ‘moron’ and ‘loony’. 
Chapter Four has shown that there is a wealth of research that defines, describes, 
and measures the impact of social stigma on people’s lives. It has also shown that 
there is an equally plentiful amount of research reporting that anti-stigma strategies, 
in particular anti-discrimination legislation, which regulates and sanctions language 
and behaviour, have succeeded in altering how the public acts although not 
necessarily how it thinks and feels when discussing social issues such as racism. 
Unfortunately, even these limited successes have not been repeated in the area of 
mental health.  The prejudice associated with mental illness is institutionalised, 
ingrained into Australian culture, and according to Perlin, it is often unseen, or 
unrecognised by those that should know better: the policymakers, legislators and 
judicial decision-makers. Perlin considers that the legal system’s blindness to the 
stigmatisation and discrimination that it attaches to mental illness is a reflection of 
sanism, the insidious force discussed in Chapter Five. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to challenge and change that which is largely invisible, and socially 
acceptable.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPTS OF SANISM AND 
PRETEXTUALITY 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths. 1 
Chapters One and Two discussed the problems that underlie the way the legal 
system operates in situations in which mental illness is a key factor. Nebulous or 
contradictory mental health concepts, ambiguous and inconsistent terminology, and 
an overreliance on one particular paradigm - the biomedical model - have succeeded 
in creating an unhelpful policy environment and a poor statutory basis for legal 
actors to operate. Chapter Three examined the phenomenon of stigma; the social 
construct of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination that is both the source, and 
the product, of the problems that were discussed in the first two chapters.  Stigma 
exemplifies the fact that law is not just words on paper but is transformed by its 
implementation into public attitudes and social practices.
2
  
Chapter Four showed that stigma associated with mental illness is pervasive, and 
despite policy, legal and cultural interventions, remains resistant to change. This 
was particularly evidenced by the law’s acceptance of insulting words and terms 
that would likely be held to be statutorily offensive if not for the fact that the 
disparaging and disrespectful language was not linked to race, gender or sexual 
orientation but was descriptive of mental illness and the people who experience it.  
However, if it happened that the problems identified in the earlier chapters were 
rectified, there is a further compounding problem.  This problem may explain what 
appears to be the specious and biased reasoning of courts in support and defence of 
what are, at times, seen to be indefensible decisions: sanism.  
                                                 
1 Karl Popper, ‘Science : Conjectures and Refutations’, Ch. 1, Section VII, 
<http://worthylab.tamu.edu/courses_files/popper_conjecturesandrefutations.pdf> 26 
2 Scott Burris, ‘Stigma and the Law’ (2006) 367 The Lancet 529.    
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Chapter Five examines Michael Perlin’s dualistic theories of sanism and 
pretextuality which, he claims, riddle social policy, are written into law, and 
influence judicial decision-making.
3
 The normal operating framework of the legal 
system is widely regarded as a system that provides legal parties with a level 
playing field: a neutral environment in which impartial decision-makers with good 
statutory interpretation techniques arrive at fair and just outcomes. Perlin argues 
that this environment is not neutral when a party has a mental illness because the 
system is inherently biased against mental illness.   A person who carries a medical 
label of ‘mentally ill’ will acquire the prejudicial legal label of erratic, 
unpredictable, disorganised, without credibility and potentially, and quite probably, 
dangerous
 4
 immediately they enter the legal system.
5
  Dangerousness is a 
component of stigma and central to prejudice.
6
  These ascribed attributes of 
unacceptable difference, Perlin argues, fuel the law’s adverse presumptary beliefs 
and pretextual practices which he describes as ‘harmful, irrational prejudice, 
founded in myths, stereotypes, superstitions, and de-individualization’,7 and the 
corruption of the court’s processes - pretextuality.8  
Sanism’s interlinked theory, pretextuality, which is the court’s practice of 
employing artifices to help ensure that the morally right, if not in fact, the legally 
correct decision is reached according to Perlin.  In uncomfortable areas of law, 
courts commonly seek refuge in expressing common sense morality to utilise 
heuristic devices,
9
 and they are willing to rely on suspect evidence to justify 
decision-making that ignores rights.  Perlin argues that pretextuality is poisonous 
because ‘it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and 
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé 
judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying’.10 Rather than applying 
the law to ensure parties experiencing mental illness achieve fair and equitable legal 
                                                 
3 Michael L Perlin and Deborah A Dorfman, ‘Sanism, social science, and the development of mental disability 
law jurisprudence’ (2006) 11 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 47.  
4 Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000).   
5 Ibid. 
6 Matthew Large and Christopher J Ryan, ‘Sanism, stigma and the belief in dangerousness’ (2012) 46 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 1099.  
7 Michael L Perlin, ‘"Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental 
Disability Law Developed as it Did’ (1999) 10 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 3, 5. 
8 Michael L Perlin, ‘“And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and 
Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases’ (2005) 42 San Diego Law Review 735.  
9 Perlin, above n 4, 136. 
10 Michael L Perlin, ‘“Through the Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy’ 
(2008) 13 Texas Journal On Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 413, 417.  
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outcomes, courts implicitly, or explicitly, will accept false or misleading testimony 
and engage in biased, superficial or dishonest decision-making to achieve the 
desired social results that have value to the decision-maker.
11
 This claim is 
specifically discussed in Chapter Six with regard to conflicted family law parenting 
matters.  
The theories of sanism and pretextuality are yet to be generally accepted by 
mainstream lawyers and, as was shown in Chapter Four, when lawyers do 
acknowledge the concept, they can misunderstand it and/or confuse it with the 
ideology of political correctness.  A suggested reason for why sanism and 
pretextuality have not been more broadly accepted is that the theories are 
confrontationalist, portraying the majority of legal actors in a negative light by 
labelling them as prejudicial and dishonest.  It is difficult enough for a lay person to 
accept that they might be prejudiced and dishonest when told, because everyone has 
the illusion of their own objectivity.
12
  But while legal actors have a tendency to see 
bias in others, it is often difficult for them to identify their own biases.
13
  This 
appears to be particularly so for judges who work under community and personal 
expectations that they are free from preconceptions and bias, and that they will give 
function to ethical principles of neutrality, fairness, equality, justice and objectivity.   
While there is some academic scepticism surrounding the ‘false claims’ of the 
court’s objectivity and neutrality,14 that discussion is a long way distant from 
Perlin’s heretical claims of prejudice and dishonesty.   
A careful consideration of the weight of the literature bringing the powerful 
concepts of sanism and pretextuality to academic attention shows that it has been 
published mainly by Perlin himself, although over the past three decades a small but 
keen commentary support base has grown.  Sanism has largely been uncritically 
accepted, with its minimal testing focused on the attitudes of jurors in death penalty 
                                                 
11 Perlin, above n, xix.  
12 Tom Pyszczynski and Geoff Greenberg, ‘Toward an integration of cognitive and motivational 
perspectives on social inference: A biased hypothesis-testing model’, 297. In Leonard Berkowitz, (ed), 
Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 20, (Academic Press, 1987)  
13 Mary R Rose, Christopher Ellison and Shari Seidman Diamond, ‘Preferences for Juries Over Judges Across 
Racial and Ethnic Groups’ (2008) 89 Social Science Quarterly 372.  
See also Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich and Lee Ross, ‘Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent 
Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others’ (2004) 3 Psychological Review 781.  
14 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World’ 
(1996) 38 William and Mary Law Review 5.  
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cases.
15
  Chapter Eight endeavour to test sanism by surveying the attitudes of law 
students upon their entry into law school and compare them with their attitudes 
upon exiting law school. It will also assess the influence that participating in the 
clinical training and representation program founded on principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence that is discussed in Chapter Seven had on improving students’ 
attitudes.  
While stigma stems from intolerance and the lack of compassion for difference, 
prejudice is ‘an unfavourable opinion or feeling formed beforehand without 
knowledge, thought, or reason’.16  This distinction is an important one but despite 
the different theoretical health, science and legal perspectives and definitions of 
stigma and prejudice, colloquially, ‘stigma’ is commonly used to refer to the 
public’s negative and prejudicial attitudes.17  Unlike stigmatising attitudes, 
prejudicial attitudes are not necessarily the products of small, foolish minds.
18
  This 
chapter will show that legislators, judges, lawyers and psychiatric expert witnesses 
are just as susceptible to the cognitive errors of prejudice as is everyone else.  It will 
examine the law’s reliance on the medical model, and the importance that it gives to 
the psychiatric expert. Courts readily turn to psychiatric opinion to both guide and 
justify their decision-making.  However, the reality of the relationship is not the 
media generated perception of a performance of two competing institutions meeting 
at the junction where the person’s rights are at judicial issue, but an interdependent 
interplay between law and psychiatry within a ‘treatment and control’ legal system 
that has as its intention and function, the taking ‘care of' those residual cases that 
society views as problematic.’19  
                                                 
15 The prejudice of jurors in death penalty cases has been the subject of extensive research and discussion. 
Perlin raised the issue in ‘The sanist lives of jurors in death penalty cases: The puzzling role of “Migrating” 
mental disability’ (1994) 8 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 239. Twenty years later, he 
again deals with the issue in his newest book; Michael L Perlin, Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The 
Shame of the States (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013). See also Bruce J Winick, ‘The Supreme Court's 
Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier’ (2009) 50 Boston College 
Law Review 785. See also Kevin M O’Neil, Marc W Patry and Steven D Penrod, ‘Exploring the Effects of 
AttitudesToward the Death Penalty on Capital Sentencing Verdicts’ (2004) 10 Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law 443. See also Christopher Slobogin, ‘Mental Illness and the Death Penalty’ (2000) 24 Mental & Physical 
Disability Law Report 667. See also Stephen P Garvey, ‘The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing’ (2000) 
75 New York University Law Review 26.  
16 Macquarie Dictionary, (Macquarie University Press, 5th edition, 2009).  
17 Heather Stuart, Julio Arboleda-Florez and Norman Sartorius, Paradigms Lost (Oxford University Press, 
2012).  
18 Large and Ryan, above n 6.  
19 Bernadette Dallaire et al., ‘Civil commitment due to mental illness and dangerousness: the union of law and 
psychiatry within a treatment-control system’ (2000) 22 Sociology of Health & Illness 679, 679.  
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Chapter Five is important to this thesis because first, it brings Perlin’s ‘hidden 
prejudice’ into public discussion.  Sanism is different from other prejudices 
because, according to Perlin, it is a self perpetuating, socially acceptable prejudice, 
inherently bound up in the public’s thoughts, fears, language, and humour. It is 
largely invisible, and unrecognised by those who would otherwise be expected to 
champion its eradication: the courts.  The court’s use of stereotypical presumptions, 
its balancing of moral values and principles and its use of heuristics result in biased, 
paternalistically beneficent, more restrictive, and less just outcomes for people 
experiencing mental illness. If sanism is to be eradicated from the legal landscape 
so that people who experience a mental illness can be integrated with equal standing 
into a more equitable, just and fair society, the first step must be to recognise and 
acknowledge sanism and its perniciousness.  
Secondly, Perlin’s theories help to explain the findings in regard to decisions made 
in the recent Australian family law parenting order cases examined in Chapter Six. 
The results also help provide empirical support for Perlin’s sanist theory.   Thirdly, 
the empirical study in Chapter Eight rests on the proposition that sanism exists. The 
research questions try to answer to what extent, and which variables including 
maturity, legal education, clinical legal training and contact can improve the 
attitudes of law students toward mental illness and people who experience mental 
illness. 
2. DEFINING ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’ PREJUDICE 
The ubiquity of stigma and the lack of language to describe its discourse have 
served to delay its passing...there is no word for prejudice against mental 
illness.20  
The first attempts to create a definitive word to describe the prejudice toward 
people experiencing mental illness arose out of the beginnings of the of the ex-
patient movement in 1970 when the spread of the newly forming mental health 
community organisations realised the existence of an array of negative assumptions 
                                                 
20 Peter Byrne, ‘Challenging healthcare discrimination’ (2010) 16 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 60, 67. Dr 
Byrne is the current Director of Public Education for the Royal College of Psychiatrists, United Kingdom. 
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attached to mental health patients.
21
  Judi Chamberlain found that they were 
assumed to be incompetent, incapable, in constant need of supervision and 
assistance, unpredictable, irrational, and likely to be violent by people who did not 
have a mental illness experience.
22
  Surprisingly, these same assumptions were also 
found to be held by people who had experience of mental illness
23
 and who, over 
time, had internalised the public’s negative attitudes.24  
Chamberlin, one of the early leaders of the American ex-patient movement, coined 
the term ‘mentalism’ to describe these assumptatory prejudices directed toward 
people who had received psychiatric treatment.
25
 She considered mentalism to be 
‘endemic, pervasive and institutionalised’26 and just as with any other ‘ism’ such as 
racism, sexism and ageism, it was characterised by the complex social inequities of 
power that resulted in the ubiquitous mistreatment of people labelled ‘mentally 
ill’.27  Mentalism separated people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups.  The members of 
the power-up group were assumed to be ‘normal’, i.e. healthy, reliable and capable 
while the ‘abnormal’ members of the power-down group were assumed to be crazy, 
erratic, sick, disabled and violent.
28
 Mentalism was typically about being a 
powerless sick person who is expected to be compliant with the treatment orders 
mandated by the powerful healthy group.
29
 The search for a single descriptive label 
for the particular prejudice associated with mental illness resulted in other terms 
being tendered such as ‘sane chauvinism’30 and ‘pychophobia’31 with 
                                                 
21 Among the earliest ex-patient groups were the Insane Liberation Front in founded in 1970 and the Mental 
Patients' Liberation project and the Mental Patient's Liberation Front which were both founded in1971.  
22 Judi Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System (McGraw-Hill, 
1978).  
23 Ibid.  
24 Betty Blaska, ‘First Person Account: What It Is Like to Be Treated Like a CMI’ (1991) 17 Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 173.  
25 Chamberlin, above n 22.   
26 Denise Tanner, ‘Crossing bridges over troubled waters?: Working with children of parents experiencing 
mental distress (2000) 19 Social Work Education: The International Journal 287, 295. 
27 Coni Kalinowski and Pat Risser, ‘Identifying and Overcoming Mentalism’ (Research Paper, InforMed Health 
Publishing & Training, July 2000) 
<http://counterpsych.com/uploads/23542/uploadedDocuments/Mentalism_07_00.pdf>. 
See also Marit Borg, Bengt Karlsson and Hesook S Kim, ‘User involvement in community mental health 
services – principles and practices’ (2009) 16 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 285.  
28 Kalinowski and Risser, above n 27.  
29 Marit Borg, Bengt Karlsson and Hesook S Kim, ‘User involvement in community mental health services – 
principles and practices’ (2009) 16 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 285, 289.  
30 Judi Chamberlin, ‘The Ex-Patients' Movement: Where We've Been and Where We're Going’ (1990) 11 The 
Journal of Mind and Behavior 323.  
31 Peter Byrne, ‘Stigma of mental illness and ways of diminishing it’ (2000) 6 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 65, 67.  
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‘psychophobic’ suggested as the descriptive label for a person who held prejudicial 
attitudes and incorrect exaggeration. 
32
  
Pizzuro stated Perlin ‘has coined two terms that are quickly becoming universally 
accepted within the world of Mental Disability Law’.33 Perlin himself credits the 
American lawyer, Morton Birnbaum, as the person who, in his article The Right to 
Treatment,
34
 first coined the term ‘sanism’.35 Birnbaum’s concept of sanism is 
discussed in 7.0.  Although acceptance of the term ‘sanism’ may still be some 
distance from being universal, there is a burgeoning preference, particularly 
amongst mental health consumers, for the term to be used to describe the prejudice 
associated with mental illness.
36
   
3. SANISM OR STIGMA? 
Prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behaviours are components of both stigma 
and sanism, which, although conceptually different,
37
 are seemingly bound together 
in symbiotic perpetuance ‘[b]ecause sanism produces stigma and stigma leads to 
sanism’.38 Stigma is the overarching, prevalent and generally ignored oppression 
that is built on a framework of sanist beliefs, attitudes and practices.
39
 Although 
there are many definitions of stigma, the classic formulation is Goffman’s ‘deeply 
discrediting attribute’ intimately linked to the reproduction of social difference40 
which was discussed at length in Chapter Three.  Goffman’s theory is based on a 
person differing in some characteristic from the cultural or social norms and it is 
this unique characteristic of difference which distinguishes the stigmatised person 
as someone deserving of disapproval. The association of negative qualities such as 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Salvatore Pizzuro, ‘The implications of the Atkins Concept on the Lives of People with Disabilities in 
Criminal and Civil Courts’ (Research Paper, 2009) 3 
<http://s395229360.onlinehome.us/Research/Legal/PizzuroOnAtkins%282009%29.pdf>. 
34 Morton Birnbaum, ‘The Right to Treatment’ (1960) 46 American Bar Association Journal 499.  
35 Perlin, above n 4, 22.  
36 Robert Menzies, Brenda A LeFrançois and Geoffrey Reaume (eds), Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in 
Canadian Mad Studies (Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2013).  
37 Jennifer Piel, ‘Mental Disability Law, Evidence, and Testimony: A Comprehensive Reference Manual for 
Lawyers, Judges, and Mental Disability Professionals’ (2010) 38 Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry 
and the Law 619.  
38 John W Parry, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A Comprehensive 
Reference Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Criminal Justice Professionals (American Bar Association, 2009) 
48.  
39 Jennifer M Poole et al., ‘Sanism, ‘Mental Health’, and Social Work/Education: A Review and Call to Action’ 
(2012) 1 Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, Research, Polity, and Practice 20.  
40 Erving Goffman, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity (Prentice-Hall, 1963).  
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dangerousness, unpredictability, moral weakness and helplessness with having a 
mental illness creates the stigma that feeds upon, strengthens and reproduces 
existing social inequalities.   
Thornicroft presents stigma as an overarching term containing three elements: 
problems of knowledge (ignorance), problems of attitudes (prejudice), and 
problems of behaviour (discrimination).
41
  He suggests that the term binds together 
stereotypes, ignorance and negative attitudes and behaviours to the disadvantage of 
a stigmatised group.  Although the   term ‘prejudice’ is commonly used in reference 
to marginalised groups experiencing disadvantage, for example ethnic minorities, it 
is rarely used in regard to people with mental illness.
42
  Rejection, he argues, 
usually requires a combination of negative thoughts and negative emotions such as 
anxiety, anger, resentment, hostility, distaste or disgust. He notes that, interestingly, 
apart from describing a fear of violence, there is little published about emotional 
reactions to people who experience mental illness.
43
 Angermeyer also suggests that 
the public's emotional reactions are relatively under-researched and that more 
research could help better understand the complexities of mental illness stigma.
44
  
Phelan examined the intersection of the conceptual models of stigma and prejudice 
and determined that the models had much in common and that it was simply a 
matter of emphasis and focus that accounted for most of the differences between the 
two models.
45
  He suggested that stigma and prejudice have three functions: 
exploitation and domination (keeping people down), disease avoidance (keeping 
people away) and norm enforcement (keeping people in).
46
  Corrigan separated the 
concept into two categories, public stigma and self stigma which were then broken 
down into three social cognitive components; stereotypes (efficient social belief or 
knowledge structure), prejudice (emotion-based endorsement or evaluation of 
stereotype) and discrimination (behavioural result of prejudice).
47
   
                                                 
41 Graham Thornicroft et al., ‘Stigma: ignorance, prejudice or discrimination?’ (2007) 190 British Journal of 
Psychiatry 192.   
42 Ibid.    
43 Ibid.    
44 Matthias C Angermeyer, Andreas Holzinger and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Emotional reactions to people with 
mental illness’ (2010) 19 Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale 26.  
45 Jo C Phelan, Bruce G Link and John F Dovidio, ‘Stigma and prejudice: one animal or two?’ (2008) 67 Social 
Science and Medicine 358.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1World Psychiatry 16.  
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Stigma is about society’s intolerance and lack of acceptance and compassion for 
people who are different.
48
  Prejudice is an unfavourable opinion or feeling about a 
person that is formed beforehand without knowledge, thought or reason.
49
 The 
general belief that the holding of irrational, preconceived ideas and adverse 
judgments regarding normality and difference by the culturally and socially normal 
members of society is a predictor for the performance of prejudicial actions is not 
supported by empirical evidence.  Prejudice is considered only rarel, as a valid 
predictor of discriminatory behaviour.
50
  
Sanism is ‘a disease of attitudes.’51  It is: 
an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational 
prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, 
sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry that permeates all aspects of mental 
disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law system: 
litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.52  
Perlin’s focus on the legal system might suggest a narrow interpretation of sanism 
as relevant to the administration of law and the delivery of legal services, but taking 
this narrow view would be ill advised as Perlin’s concept is applicable to all aspects 
of structural stigma, prejudice and discrimination and should not be confined to 
only discussions of the unfairness and inadequacies of the legal system. 
The concept of sanism is preferable to that of stigma because the elements of 
sanism include intolerance, lack of acceptance and compassion, prejudice, use of 
stereotypes and myths, ignorance and the unfair and inequitable treatment of people 
experiencing a mental illness. While sanism shares the dominant and overarching 
principle shared by all other ‘isms’ - an ideological rationalization or justification 
for stigmatizing and marginalizing the other -  it is set apart from other ‘ism’ 
                                                 
48 Large and Ryan, above n 6.   
49 Macquarie Dictionary, (Macquarie University Press, 5th edition, 2009). 
50 Heidi Shutz and Bernd Six, ‘How Strong is the Relationship Between Prejudice and Discrimination? A Meta-
Analytic Answer’ (1996) 20 International Journey of Intercultural Relations 441.  
51 Michael L Perlin, 'They’re An Illusion to Me Now': Forensic Ethics, Sanism and Pretextuality’ (Research 
Paper Series No 07/08-27, New York Law School Legal Studies, 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1130923>. 
52 Michael L Perlin, ‘“His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to 
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?’ (2009) 42 Akron Law Review 885.   
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discussions because sanist theory brings with it unique, additional critical elements: 
sanism is largely invisible, socially acceptable, and frequently practised.
53
   
4. LITERATURE ON SANISM 
I have begun to write regularly, relentlessly, I might even  say about sanism 
and pretextuality,  so as  to seek to expose their pernicious power, the ways in 
which  two factors  infect judicial decisions, legislative enactments,  
administrative  directives, jury behavior, and  public attitudes.54 
The body of literature on sanism is built mainly on Perlin’s own prolific writings 
over the past 30 years, and his collaborations with other authors. Academic 
discussion and expressions of support have come mainly from Perlin’s circle of 
colleagues at the New York School of Law, and the promoters of a therapeutic 
jurisprudential approach to mental health law.  In 2002/3 there was a small flurry of 
articles written by the New York Law School academic cohort which included 
Champine’s article, A Sanist Will.55 Champine suggested that sanism and 
pretextuality provided a novel framework for analysing the problem of 
discrimination that she claimed ran rampant through the law of wills.
56
  On a 
parallel path, Ellis, also writing on testamentary law, narrowed her discussion of 
sanism and pretextuality to the civil probate hearing
57
 while Claire B. Steinberger 
produced Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The “Sanist” Factor – An Interdisciplinary 
Approach, that offered a detailed, though short, positive analysis of Perlin and 
Champine’s theories.58   
Champine again undertook collaboration with Perlin in their joint 2008 publication, 
Competence in the Law.
59
 Another co-author of the book was clinical psychologist, 
Mary Connell, who wrote as her dedication in the book, ‘[f]or all the people whose 
                                                 
53 Richard Ingram, Sanism in Theory and Practice (Conference paper, 2nd Annual Critical Inquiries Workshop, 
2011) <http://www.socialinequities.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Ingram.Sanism-in-Theory-and-
Practice.CI_.2011.pdf>.  
54 Perlin, above n 7, 26.  
55 Pamela R Champine, ‘A Sanist Will’ (2002) 46 New York School of Law Review 547.  
56 Ibid 547. 
57 Heather S Ellis, ‘Dealing With Mental Disability in Trust & Estate Law Practice: "Strengthen the Things that 
Remain:" The Sanist Will’ (2003) 46 New York Law School Journal of International & Comparative Law 565.  
58 Claire B Steinberger, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Sanist Factor-An Interdisciplinary Approach’ (2002) 
46 New York Law School Law Review 573. Claire was a J.D. candidate at the New York Law School in 2003. 
59 Michael L Perlin et al., Competence in the Law: From Legal Theory to Clinical Application (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2008).  
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lives have been affected by Professor Perlin’s contributions’.60 Perlin is an inspiring 
influence in mental health commentary.  However, there has been scant scientific 
critique of sanism and pretextuality although the experiential realities of legal 
practice and un-blinkered academic observation have ensured that support continues 
to grow. Winick, when writing about the ‘paternalistic’ or ‘best interest’ advocacy 
approach that some lawyers within the adversarial system adopt when representing 
clients experiencing a mental illness commented that, ‘[t]o some extent, this 
paternalistic role represents what Perlin has called sanism and pretextuality’.61   
In the preface to Involuntary Detention and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Perlin 
states that it was personally heartening ‘to see how many of the chapters – again 
mostly without a specific mention … confirmed my own theoretical perspective on 
all of mental disability law: that it is sanist and pretextual’.62  With reference to the 
editors’ short discussion of sanism and pretextuality in their introductory chapter, 
he stated that they had concluded that the principles ‘place at risk the legitimacy of 
the [entire mental disability law] decision-making process’.63 Perhaps a more 
accurate representation is that the editors discussed what ‘Perlin has asserted’64 by 
the inclusion of lengthy quotes drawn from Perlin’s many books and articles, 
paraphrasing Perlin’s own conclusions.   
The editors did remark on Perlin’s conviction that sanism and pretextuality were the 
‘corrosive prejudice’ at the root of mental health law, and that pretextuality was a 
poisonous, infectious, disrespecting, and demeaning reinforcement of disinterested 
judging, bad lawyering and at times, corrupt and perjurious testimony.  Similarly to 
Winick, their comment was that ‘[u]ltimately, it is the reassertion of paternalism.’65 
They suggest that deconstruction of concepts both familiar and prevalent in mental 
health law such as dangerousness, lack of insight, lack of capacity, non-compliance, 
need for treatment and best interests can be confronting because it can reveal the 
‘existence of unacceptable ideologies such as paternalism under covert guise’.66 
                                                 
60 Ibid v.  
61 Bruce Winick, ‘TJ and the Civil commitment Hearing’ (1999) 10 The Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 
37, 41.  
62 Kate Diesfeld and Ian R Freckleton (eds), Involuntary Detention and Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003) xxxvi. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 7. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 14-15. 
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This raises the question as to whether sanism may be a transposing term for 
paternalism in the minds of some commentators or whether it is a separate concept 
that either precurses paternalism, or runs parallel to it.  
Although ‘paternalism’ lacks a precise definition, it is regarded as the restriction of 
a person’s self-regarding conduct primarily for their own good.67 At the core of all 
paternalism definitions is the notion that for A’s action to be paternalistic with 
respect to B, it must promote a utilitarian benefit, or prevent a moral harm to B.
68
  
Though widely employed by writers of academic legal literature, judicial opinions, 
and legislative reports, paternalism as a jurisprudential concept is controversial
69
 
because, while its ends are benevolent, its means are usually coercive.
70
  ‘Wise and 
benevolent paternalism’71 is sanist behaviour.72 
Mention of sanist theory can come with a disclaimer such as sanism is ‘not as 
professionally acknowledged, researched, or commented upon’73 as other isms such 
as racism and ageism. The exception is the ‘many thoughtful and well reasoned 
articles by Professor Michael Perlin’.74  Perlin himself acknowledges that much of 
what he believes and writes is anecdotal and observational, and lacking a scientific 
basis
75
 and yet, despite the lack of theoretical discourse or benefit of scientific 
research, sanism has begun to gain acceptance amongst some commentators.  As 
recently as 2012, Large concluded that ‘Perlin believes that our prejudicial attitudes 
about the mentally ill have seen sanist provisions riddle our law and social 
policy’.76 Large argued that just as people have within themselves a propensity to 
                                                 
67 Thaddeus Mason Pope, ‘Counting The Dragon's Teeth And Claws: The Definition Of Hard Paternalism’ 
(2004) 20 Georgia State University Law Review 659.  
68 David L Shapiro, ‘Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism’ (1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 519.   
69 Gregory Mitchel, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is An Oxymoron’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 
1245.  
70 Peter Suber, ‘Paternalism’ in Christopher B Gray (ed), Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (Garland 
Publishing, 1999) 632. See also Donald Vandeveer, Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on 
Benevolence (Princeton University Press, 1986).  Michael Weiss and Cathy Young, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: 
Equal Rights or Neo-Paternalism?’ (Policy Analysis No 256, Cato Institute, 19 June 1996) 
<http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/feminist-jurisprudence-equal-rights-or-neopaternalism>. 
71 Chodoff, Paul, ‘Involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill as a moral issue’ (1984) 141 The American 
Journal of Psychiatry 384.  
72 Perlin, above n 51.  
73 Keri K Gould, ‘“Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of Sanism’ (1992) 9 New York Law School Journal 
of Human Rights 567, 569.  
74 Ibid, n 8. 
75 Michael L Perlin, ‘“You Have Discussed Lepers And Crooks": Sanism In Clinical Teaching’ (2003) 9 
Clinical Law Review 683.  
76 Large and Ryan, above n 6, 1101. 
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sexism, ageism and racism, prejudices which they must constantly tackle, they now 
must, just as fiercely, ‘guard against and combat sanism’.77 
5. AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY: SANISM IN SOCIETY78 
Perlin credits the person who coined the term ‘sanism’79 as the American physician 
and lawyer Morton Birnbaum, a person who ‘fancied himself a Don Quixote tilting 
at windmills’.80 In what was one of the earliest issues in the newly emerging field of 
bioethics, Birnbaum, in his 1960 seminal journal article, The Right to Treatment
 
,
81
 
presented the novel proposition that institutionalised ‘mentally ill’ patients had a 
right to receive adequate medical treatment. This claim of a ‘right to treatment’ 
provided the impetus for the monumental changes that occurred in mental health 
care over the next five decades. It continues to influence legal and legislative 
thinking about the appropriate standard of care to be applied to people experiencing 
a mental illness, no matter what environment the care is provided in: hospital, 
prison or in the community. Birnbaum’s revolutionary concept laid the foundation 
for the rich discourse of legal commentators and libertarian advocates who would 
go on to argue the existence of other rights such as the right to informed consent, 
the least restrictive option, and the right to refuse treatment.   
During the 1960s, the American courts and concerned commentators began 
focusing their attention on the adequacy of the treatment provided to people 
incarcerated for the purposes of treatment or rehabilitation, arguing that it was the 
right of prisoners, alcoholics
82
, drug addicts
83
, juveniles
84
 and homosexuals
85
 to 
receive adequate care and treatment. It was a duty of the government to provide 
proper mental health care and treatment to incarcerated patients and compelled 
                                                 
77 Ibid 1103.  
78 This is the heading Birnbaum uses when discussing his concept of sanism. Morton Birnbaum, ‘The Right to 
Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development,’ in Frank J. Ayd Jr. (ed), Medical, Moral, and Legal Issues in 
Mental Health Care (Williams & Wilkins, 1974).  
79 Perlin, above n 4, 22. 
80 Rebecca Birnbaum, ‘My Father’s Advocacy for a Right to Treatment’ (2010) 38 Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and Law 115, 116.  
81 Birnbaum, above n 34.    
82 Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A Merrill, ‘Criminal Responsibility and the Right to Treatment for 
Intoxication and Alcoholism’ (1969) 57 Georgetown Law Journal 835.  
83 Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup.Ct) 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 
1968). See also Paul Gewirtz, ‘Notes and Comments, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts’ 1969) 78 
The Yale Law Journal 1175.  
84 In re Harris, 2 Crim. L. Rep. 2412 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Juv. Div. 1967); Kent v. United States, 401 
F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
85 Ceschini v. Warden, 30 App. Div. 2d 649 291 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1968) (per curiam). 
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community patients
86
 in line with the principle of reciprocity and the ideologies of 
entitlement. Birnbaum argued that the provision of adequate treatment was more 
than government largesse sympathetically extended to disadvantaged indigents but 
it was a moral and legal obligation constitutionally imposed on the state.
87
 It was 
quid pro quo for the deprivation of liberty that accompanies civil commitment. This 
treatment-in-exchange-for-liberty argument underpinned the dismantling of the 
warehousing public mental hospital system.
88
  
Twenty years later, Gostin would refer to the ‘ideology of entitlement’ as the 
premise that access to health and social services should not be based upon 
charitable or professional discretion, but upon enforceable rights.
89
 Eastman 
suggested that the principle of reciprocity balances the state's right to deprive a 
psychiatric patient
 
of his or her rights against the state's duty to allocate the
 
resources required for treatment.
90
  In 1999, the United Kingdom government’s 
Expert Committee for the Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 stated that:  
the provision of mental health care, unlike virtually all other forms of health 
care, may have to be delivered by the use of compulsory powers. In these 
circumstances we are persuaded that the principle of reciprocity imposes 
special obligations: when society compels an individual to accept mental 
health care services those services must be available and of an appropriate 
quality.91  
5.1 Stephens and Donaldson 
In May of 1960, two involuntarily detained patients contacted Birnbaum separately 
after reading an article published in the New York Times supporting his ‘right to 
treatment’ proposition.92  The first, Edward Stephens, had been involuntarily 
committed for 30 years without adequate medical treatment in appalling, dangerous 
                                                 
86 Honora A Kaplan, ‘Institutions and Community Mental Health: The Paradox in Wyatt v. Stickney’ (1973) 9 
Community Mental Health Journal 34.  
87 Morton Birnbaum, ‘The Right to Treatment’ (1960) 46 American Bar Association Journal 499, 499. 
88 Ralph Slovenko, ‘The past and present of the right to treatment: a slogan gone astray’ (1981) 9 Journal of 
Psychiatry and Law 264.  
89 Larry O Gostin, ‘Contemporary, Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health Reform’ (1983) 10 Journal 
of Law and Society 47.  
90 Nigel Eastman, ‘Mental health law: civil liberties and the principle of reciprocity’ (1994) 308 British Medical 
Journal 43.   
91 Report of the Expert Committee, 1999. iii. 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/d
h_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4062614.pdf/>. 
92 George M Grant, ‘Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to Treatment’ (1976) 3 Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly 599.  
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conditions.
93
 
94
 Birnbaum would submit 12 separate ‘inadequate treatment’ claims 
before state and federal courts, and on three occasions, before the Supreme Court,
95
 
but no court would consent to hear Stephen’s case. He was eventually discharged 
because of a change in administrative policy rather than as a result of legal 
intervention.
96
  The second patient was Kenneth Donaldson.  His case resulted in 14 
years of protracted litigation for Birnbaum, culminating in a landmark decision that 
gave judicial recognition to the right that non-dangerous, institutionally detained 
patients had a right to adequate treatment.
97
   
Birnbaum would become co-counsel in a class action brought by more than 5,000 
patients of an Alabama mental hospital in 1971. Lawyers for the plaintiffs in Wyatt 
v Stickney
98
 investigated the facility’s history of incidents which included the case 
of a boy with profound intellectual disabilities who had a garden hose inserted into 
his rectum and filled with water which ruptured his spleen and killed him. Another 
incident concerned a patient restrained in a strait jacket for nine years to prevent 
him from sucking his hand and fingers.
99
 Birnbaum came to appreciate the true 
scope of human rejection, rooted deep in the system charged with the care and 
protection of people experiencing mental illness. It would take 14 years of 
confronting the prejudices of both the legal and medical systems before Birnbaum 
eventually coined the term ‘sanism’.100  According to Birnbaum, sanists are bigots 
who perpetrate sanism deliberately although he acknowledged that sometimes 
sanism is unintentional, even though the consequences are the same.  He believed 
that it is the lack of sociological and psychological insight into one’s own 
prejudicial thinking, feelings and behaviours
101
 that generates the irrational fear of 
                                                 
93 Donaldson was held with dangerous criminals in Florida State Hospital even though he was not dangerous to 
himself or others. His ward was understaffed, with only one doctor (who happened to be an obstetrician) for 
over 1,000 male patients. There were no psychiatrists or counsellors, and the only nurse on site worked in the 
infirmary. 
94 An elderly bedridden male patient was sexually assaulted and strangled to death by the lone night attendant in 
charge of the Stephen’s ward. Sexually assaulting helpless bedridden patients was a long time, regular practice 
of the attendant. 
95 Birnbaum, above n 189.     
96 Grant, above n 201.  
97 O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
98 Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. I34I, I343 (M.D. Ala. I97I). 
99 Lauren Wilson Carr, ‘Wyatt v. Stickney: A Landmark Decision’, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program 
Newsletter (online), July 2004 <http://www.adap.net/Wyatt/landmark.pdf accessed 14/1/2011>.  
100 Morton Birnbaum, ‘The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development,’ in Frank J. Ayd Jr. (ed), 
Medical, Moral, and Legal Issues in Mental Health Care (Williams & Wilkins, 1974). 
101 Ibid 109.  
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mental illness
102
 which permits courts to ignore, or determine prejudicially, the 
rights of people who experience a mental illness.  
Birnbaum offered as a counteracting solution - the realistic recognition of the right 
to treatment - a concept that, in his opinion, would help deter, and offset society’s 
irrational oppression.
103
  The early critics of the resulting new wave of libertarian 
laws argued that because it was more difficult to forcibly treat people experiencing 
serious mental illness, vulnerable people were left ‘to die with their rights on’ from 
incidents that included accidents, suicides, neglect and starvation.
104
  Forty years 
later, the catch phrase continues to dominate mental health discussions with Ruth 
Forrest, Member of the Legislative Council recently warning the Tasmanian 
Legislative Council Select Committee on Mental Health Legislative Measures that 
‘It is necessary to ensure that the rights argument does not swing too far to the point 
where we see people “dying with their rights on”’.105   
But, as is typically the case in the confused commentary of mental health, the 
negative concept of ‘dying with their rights on’ can also be presented in a positive 
context as the successful outcome of the changed laws. In a journal article assessing 
the impact of recently enacted mental health legislation in Tasmania, the author 
suggested that the new laws had resulted in people being more accepted, more 
informed and wiser, and having more control over their care and treatment. The 
final sentence of the article read ‘So mothball those strait jackets because in 
Tasmania our involuntarily detained mentally ill can now ‘die with their rights 
on’.106 
                                                 
102 Birnbaum, above n 209. 
103 Ibid 140.  
104 The expression ‘dying with their rights on’ was coined in 1973 by Treffert to describe the consequences of 
doctors no longer being able to commit certain mentally ill people as though their legal rights are antithetical to 
life or health rather than supportive of them. Darold A Treffert, ‘Dying with Their Rights On’ (1973) 130 
American Journal of Psychiatry 1041.  
105 Ruth Forrest, MLC, Speech to Mental Health Legislative Measures Select Committee - 27 October 2009 
<http://www.ruthforrest.com.au/index.php/parliament/speeches/2009/70-2009-speeches-on-motions/450-
mental-health-legislative-measures-select-committee-27-october-2009>. 
106 Lorette Langford, ‘The New Mental Health Act in Tasmania (1996): A Comparative Review with the 
Former Act (1963): “Can they Now Die with their Rights On?”’ (2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 
140, 143.  
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6. SOME THINGS LAST LONGER THAN YOU THINK THEY 
WILL.107 
Perlin informs his readers that it was in the seventies, when as a young public 
defender reading Birnbaum’s article on sanism,108 he found the theoretical 
explanation for his witness of the legal system’s unfair dealings with people with a 
mental illness.
109
  Sanism offered sense to the charades and subterfuges that he saw 
perpetrated by judges, lawyers, police and officials in New Jersey’s courtrooms.  It 
was this newly gained awareness of the sanist attitudes and pretextual complicities 
in mental health law that helped set Perlin the practitioner, activist, theorist and 
academic on the long road of championing the rights of people experiencing mental 
illness. 
Morris alludes to Perlin’s own, Birnbaumesque Don Quixote essence when he 
concludes that: 
The windmills that Michael contests are not mere figments of his imagination. 
They are real and continuing problems. Michael is an irresistible force.  But 
our attitude-our prejudice-toward the mentally disabled may well be an 
immovable object.  How long will Michael continue to speak in a forest, while 
we hear only “sounds of silence”?110 
Perlin argues that sanism is rooted in myth, stereotypes, superstition and de-
individualisation, and is sustained and perpetuated through ordinary common sense 
and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to everyday life events, and the 
legal process.
111
 It is not constrained within the parameters of ignorance and 
intolerance attributed to lower socioeconomic status
112
 but travels unnoticed and 
unrestricted through the corridors of our courts of justice and our schools of legal 
                                                 
107 Bob Dylan, Cold Irons Bound, Colombia Records. Michael Perlin is a lover of all things Dylan and often 
titles his academic writings with Dylan lyrics.  
108 Birnbaum, above n 209.  
109 Perlin, above n 4, xi.  
110 Grant H Morris, ‘Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled’ (Research Paper, University of San Diego 
School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 31 (2005) p.1-32 
111 Perlin, above n 4, xviii-xix.  
112 “There is a strong negative association between measures of intellectual development, such as education and 
academic achievement, and ethnocentrism and other forms of social intolerance… It is at least conceivable that 
more educated people are better equipped than others to express socially desirable opinions and that their self-
reported levels of tolerance are therefore somewhat inflated. Nevertheless, the relationship between education 
and tolerance is strong and observed across a number of different methodological paradigms” Jaime L Napier 
and John T Jost, ‘The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-
Class Authoritarianism (2008) 64 Journal of Social Issues 595, 599-600. 
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learning.  This is because sanism pervades public attitudes
113
 and the legal system is 
not immune from its insidious suffusion.
114
   
Judges, lawyers, politicians and legal educators are embedded in the cultural 
presumptions of mental illness which engulf the societal ‘all’. They possess the 
same negative attitudes and cultural presumptions, and demonstrate the same biased 
behaviours borne out of fear, anxiety, and paternalistic beneficence. Sanism is 
harmful and yet, according to Perlin, it is frequently practised either consciously or 
unconsciously by individuals who would normally take more open-minded, liberal 
stances, particularly in their professional lives: people who would decry similar 
biases or prejudices involving race, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation.
115
  One 
such example occurred during Lawfest 2003,
116
 an annual Tasmanian event for high 
school students considering undertaking a university law degree.  From an ‘elevated 
vantage of expertise’,117 community leaders address the students on topical legal 
issues.  During a sentencing workshop, Supreme Court Justice Underwood
118
 spoke 
about Tasmania’s only prison; decrying it as awful, humiliating, inhumane, and soul 
destroying.
119
  The judge had formed this opinion when visiting the prison regularly 
as a practising lawyer. He told his impressionable young audience of potential 
lawyers that, ‘Not only are you locked up, you have to mix with people you 
wouldn’t spend five minutes with in your ordinary life, psychopaths, 
schizophrenics, thugs and murderers’.120   
The newspaper story, with the headline ‘Judge Slams Risdon Prison’ only reported 
the judge’s condemnation of past prison practices and his optimism that the 
proposed new correctional facility would be more humane in its service delivery.  
What went unreported by the media and largely unnoticed by the community in 
general was the sanist expression of judicial bias in what was an unabashed 
                                                 
113 Ann K Adler and Otto F Wahl, ‘Children’s Belief about People Labelled Mentally Ill’ (1998) 68 American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 321. A considerable body of literature has established that adults hold unfavourable 
views about people labelled mentally ill and associate negative characteristics with that label.  
114 Perlin, above n 4.  
115 Michael L Perlin, ‘On “Sanism”’ (1992-1993) 46 Southern Methodist University Law Review 373.  
116 This is an annual conference organized by the University of Tasmania’s Law Faculty and School of 
Government. It is attended by approximately 450 high school legal studies students and their teachers 
117 Don Chalmers, ‘University of Tasmania’s Dean of Law, Professor Don Chalmers made the statement in a 
media release dated 31 August, 2009, 
<http://www.media.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/12256/Lawfest-FOR-WEB.pdf>.  
118 Justice Underwood was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in 2004 and on 27th 
April, 2008 he was sworn in as the State of Tasmania’s 27th Governor.  
119 The Saturday Mercury Newspaper, August 23, 2003, p.5. 
120 Ibid. 
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perpetuation of the discrimination of the mind.
121
 By voicing the socially exclusive 
assumption that people would not choose to spend five minutes of their ordinary 
lives mixing with ‘schizophrenics’, he not only reaffirmed the stigma attached to 
more than 1%
122
 of the population, and their families; he gave it credibility.  He 
publically labelled as criminal, the medical diagnoses of schizophrenia and 
psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder
123
 while using language that was 
‘politically incorrect’, stigmatizing, and fear causing.  It is these sanist attitudes that 
Perlin argues drives the pretextual processes in the legal system.  
7. PRETEXTUALITY 
Perlin argues that mental health policies and laws are developed and implemented 
in response to sanist attitudes and myths, and that legal cases are conducted and 
decided in accordance with his second theory, pretextuality, which he claims 
poisonously infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and 
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé 
judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.
124
  It is judicial 
engagement in a course of decision-making that is intended to achieve the decision-
makers preferred outcome
125
 and judges, jurors and fact finder decision-makers 
often, consciously, or unconsciously rely on reductionist, prejudice driven 
stereotypes in their decision-making thereby subordinating the legitimate interests 
of the person experiencing the mental illness.
126
   
For Perlin, pretextuality is the court’s acceptance of the testimonial dishonesty of 
expert, often conflicted, witnesses who demonstrate a high propensity to purposely 
distort their evidence in order to achieve their preferred ends.
127
  Pretextuality 
festers largely unseen in the courtroom where experts openly subvert statutory and 
case law criteria by frequently giving evidence that is a heuristically biased 
                                                 
121 People who presently have, or have a past history of mental illness are often denied insurance or have 
inequitable limits placed on the amount of benefits receivable. Anti-discrimination laws blatantly permit 
insurers to discriminate against the mentally ill. Anti-discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 44. 
122 1% represents number of people having a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The statistic would be 5% if it included 
people with antisocial disorder. 
123 James R P Ogloff, ‘Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder conundrum’ (2006) 40 Australian New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 519, 519. 
124 Perlin, above n 7.  
125 Ibid, xix. 
126 Michael L Perlin, ‘Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in 
Determining Who Dies’ (1997) 41 New York Law School Law Review 201. 
127 Perlin, above n 7.  
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simplification of thinking
128, relying on strategies such as the ‘vividness effect’129 
or attribution theory
130
, or evidence that accords with their own self-referential 
concepts of morality.
131
 ‘Judges' predispositions to employ the same sorts of 
heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the process.’132 The following 
sections examine the court’s use of pretexts. 
7.1 Pretextuality in the criminal court 
Police perjure
133
 and criminal courts are aware that police evidence is probably 
untruthful, and intended to mislead the court.
134  In the O.J. Simpson case135 Judge 
Ito accepted the police claim that police entered Simpson’s residence without 
probable cause or warrant because they were concerned for his welfare and not 
because they considered him to be a suspect. The court then ruled that bloodstains 
and other physical evidence linking Simpson to the crime scene was to be admitted 
into evidence.
136
  Prior to entry however, police knew that Simpson had beaten his 
wife on previous occasions, had found what appeared to be blood on his car, and 
were unable to find him after the murders making him a major suspect.  
A major study that examined the behaviour of narcotic officers in response to the 
exclusionary evidence rule found that nearly all of the officers admitted that police 
do perjure,
137
 reasoning that the officers ‘know’ that judges are likely to give the 
‘wink’ to police perjury in order to admit incriminating evidence.138  Police perjury 
has been called the dirty little secret of the criminal justice system
139
 albeit, a badly 
kept secret. If the public is unaware of the fact, certainly ‘[j]udges, prosecutors, 
                                                 
128 Perlin, above n 7.  
129 Rosanna E Guadagno, Kelton V Rhoades and Brad J Sagarin, ‘Figural vividness and persuasion: capturing 
the "elusive" vividness effect’ (2011) 37 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 626.  See also Marybeth 
Zientek, ‘Riggins v. Nevada: Medicated Defendants and Courtroom Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective’ 
(1993) 30 American Criminal Law Review 215. See also Jolita Kisielius and Brian Sternthal, ‘Detecting and 
Explaining Vividness Effects in Attitudinal Judgments’ (1984) 21 Journal of Marketing Research 54.  
130 Daniel J Luchins et al., ‘Lawyers' Attitudes Toward Involuntary Treatment’ (2006) 34 Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 492. See also Liza H Gold, Sexual Harassment: Psychiatric 
Assessment In Employment Litigation (American Psychiatric Publishing Inc., 2004).  
131 Perlin, above n 7.  
132 Ibid 18.  
133 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Testilying: Police Perjury And What To Do About It’ (1996) 67 University of 
Colorado Law Review 1037. 
134 R. v. S. (R.D.) [1997] 3 S.C.R 484, n.4    
135 People Of The State Of California Plaintiffs, vs. Orenthal James Simpson, CASE NO. BA 09721, 1995. 
136 Kenneth B. Noble, Ruling Aids Prosecution of Simpson, NewYork. Times, Sept. 20, 1994. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/20/us/ruling-aids-prosecution-of-simpson.html> 
137 Myron W Orfield, ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics 
Officers’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1016.  
138 Morgan Cloud, ‘The Dirty Little Secret’ (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 1311. 
139 Ibid.  
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defense lawyers, and repeat offenders all know that police officers lie under 
oath’.140 In a study of 30 major British cases in which the convictions had been 
quashed on appeal from 1989 to 2005, it was revealed that evidence of serious 
police impropriety including perjury or other professional malpractice occurred in a 
third of the cases investigated.
141
  
A rare examination of judicial insouciance toward police misconduct is Orfield's 
1992 study of the Chicago criminal court system
142
 that found that with regard to 
judicial behaviour associated with the exclusion of evidence, 77% of the judges 
surveyed believed that police will, at times, fabricate case reports and affidavits to 
obtain a search warrant, and 91% believed that police do commit perjury, which as 
a practice is tolerated, even encouraged, by prosecutors and police superiors.
143
 On 
the other hand, judges were widely thought to purposefully ignore the law to 
prevent evidence from being suppressed, and knowingly accept police perjury as 
truthful, particularly if the judge believed it would lead to an unjust outcome if they 
did otherwise.
144
  Eighty six percent of police officers surveyed believed while it 
was unusual for judges to disbelieve police testimony, it was not rare.
145
 Cloud 
suggests that one reason may be that judges do not like to call police liars. Even so, 
the court’s complicity in the police’s impropriety and professional misconduct 
constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
146
  
The expertise of the psychiatrist within the criminal justice system is still generally 
undisputed, which can allow their judgement to go unquestioned
147
 even though the 
reliability of psychiatric evidence has been the subject of significant academic 
discussion in recent decades.
148
 While contemporary psychiatric evidence is likely 
                                                 
140 Ibid 1312.  
141 Gisli Gudjonsson, ‘Disputed Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice in Britain: Expert Psychological and 
Psychiatric Evidence in the Court of Appeal’ (2006) 31 Manitoba Law Journal 489.  
142 Myron W Orfield, ‘Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago 
Criminal Courts’ (1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 100.  
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid.  
146 Gudjonsson, above n 93.  
147 Gregory Dolin, ‘A healer or an executioner? The proper role of a psychiatrist in a criminal justice system’ 
(2002) 48 Journal of Law and Health 169.  
148 Matthew Large, Olav Nielssen and Gordon Elliott, ‘Reliability of psychiatric evidence in serious criminal 
matters: fitness to stand trial and the defence of mental illness’ (2009) 43 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Psychiatry 446. See also Joanmarie I Davoli, ‘Psychiatric Evidence on Trial’ (2003) 56 Southern Methodist 
University Law Review 2191.  
See also Christopher Slobogin, ‘Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not To Junk?’ (1998) 40 
William and Mary Law Review 1.  
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to be presented to the court in a self-consciously scientific style, it is not based on 
any better science than it was in the past, just more commonly couched in scientific 
terms.
149
  Despite research that shows that psychiatrists do it rather poorly, courts 
take a lenient approach to their predictions of a defendant’s future violence.150  The 
tendency of judges is to ignore the reliability of the evidence and focus instead on 
its general acceptance.
151
 They undertake only a cursory review of the qualifications 
of the expert.
152
 Courts often, and unquestioningly, accept unreliable psychiatric 
evidence.
153
  However, judges are given little, if any guidance on how to screen 
expert evidence to determine the question of admissibility
154
 with criminal courts 
adopting a laissez-faire policy in that courts will ‘permit the adduction of any expert 
evidence so long as it is not patently unreliable’.155 
While experts generally must keep questions of fact and opinion separate and, in 
regard to facts, distinguish clearly between those that the expert knows to be true 
and those that are assumed to be true, for the psychiatrist expert, unless otherwise 
indicated, all facts are assumed facts.
156
  Courts generally view research data or 
statistically based information as less helpful than issue testimony.
157 Psychiatrists 
are often called on to testify on issues that they are not able to intelligently answer 
such as whether the accused poses a future danger, and yet, they routinely to do 
so.
158
 Nor do psychiatrists possess a specialised knowledge that enables them to 
answer moral questions such as ‘did the accused know 'right from wrong' or 'good 
from evil’?  When asked to provide the court with a medical answer to what is 
essentially a moral question, they may try to justify the judgment of the court, or 
alternatively, substitute their own morality,
159
 both of which are pretextual 
processes. It appears that the pretext of scientific expertise is given greater weight 
by the court than other, competing versions of ‘truth’ in evidence, if the competing 
                                                 
149 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not To Junk?’ (1998) 40 William 
and Mary Law Review 1. 
150 David Faigman et al., Science in the Law: Social and Behavioral Science Issues (West Group, 2002) 80.    
151 Joanmarie I Davoli, ‘Psychiatric Evidence on Trial’ (2003) 56 Southern Methodist University Law Review 
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152 Slobogin, above n 101.  
153 Ibid.  See also Davoli, above n 151.  
154 The Law Commission, The Admissibility Of Expert Evidence In Criminal Proceedings In England And 
Wales: A New Approach To The Determination Of Evidentiary Reliability, Consultation Paper No 190 (2009) 
3.13 <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp190_Expert_Evidence_Consultation.pdf>. 
155 Ibid 3.14. 
156 Keith J B Rix, ‘The psychiatrist as expert witness’ (2008) 14 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 37.  
157 Richard E Redding, Marnita Y Floyd and Gary L Hawk, ‘What judges and lawyers think about the testimony 
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truth suggests that the court should be less fearful of the accused, and their future 
actions.   
7.2 Civil commitment pretextuality 
It is civil commitment law that, arguably, provides the forum in which pretextuality 
is most apparent.  The involuntary process is a subordinate legal adjunct to the 
clinical act of depriving an individual of their fundamental right to freedom.  It is a 
process in which treatment and control have been conceptually, and in practice, 
intertwined even when the written law, such as the Tasmanian Mental Health Act 
2013, clearly distinguishes the concepts.
160
 It is a system that has as its function and 
aim, to take care of those residual cases that are viewed as problematic by, and for, 
society.
161
  
Civil commitment and compulsory treatment regulations are the result of the 
combination of the state’s parens patriae and police powers so as to deprive a 
citizen of their fundamental rights, or impose on them, discriminatory conditions 
that but for the authority of a mental health act, would be unlawful. Under its police 
power, the state acts to protect people from harm to themselves or others and under 
its parens patriae power, it coercively intervenes in the lives of people, who it is 
alleged, lack the capacity to make decisions in their own best interests.  ‘Best 
interests’, it seems, is a separate, and overriding concept to those of ‘competence’ 
and ‘informed choice’.  
The state is deemed to be duty bound to paternalistically act in the subjective ‘best 
interests’ of its citizens experiencing mental illness. This belief was expressed in 
Tasmania’s Mental Health Act Review Discussion Paper in 2007:  
It is considered that when a person has a treatable mental illness and as a result 
of that mental illness, the person is a danger to themselves or others, the State 
has a duty to intervene and provide treatment to that person, even though they 
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may have made a competent and informed choice not to consent to 
treatment.162  
Psychiatric treatment is a politically discriminate pretext used to impose conformity 
of lifestyle and behaviour on a particular marginalised group. Laws that focus on 
the protection of a person’s individual rights and freedoms inevitably encounter 
resistance from the authorities responsible for their application. This is because 
rights laws contradict the system of social values in which people experiencing 
mental illness are perceived by society to need help and care - treatment - more than 
they need freedom.
163
 One U.S. study on mandated care found that 78% of the 
mental health professionals surveyed believed that legal compulsion made it more 
likely that the person would stay in treatment.
164
 Eighty one percent did not believe 
that the fear of being compelled would deter someone from seeking treatment 
although 36% of patients said that it would deter them from seeking help.   Of the 
patients who had had past experience of having been legally compelled, 68% said 
that it would deter them in future.
165
 
Dorfman suggests that it is the fear of mental illness that plays a significant role in 
the decision to involuntarily commit.
166
 When ‘decisions are predominately a result 
of our fears, rather than based on the evidence presented, they become pretextual 
and potentially antitherapeutic’.167 Such decisions to hospitalise or forcibly 
medicate are often pretextual because they are not necessarily appropriate to the 
needs of the person in all instances, and are contrary to what the person wants. Most 
often, ‘it is what the individual decision maker and society wants’.168  When the 
decision-making composite of admission and review hold sanist attitudes, it is 
logical to suggest that it is ordinary common sense, heuristic reasoning, sympathy 
rather than empathy, and fear and anxiety that guide the decision-makers to seek, 
and favour, the facts that support and reinforce their conscious, or unconscious 
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biases, and to ignore, distort and dismiss information that might direct them toward 
reaching a less desired but more just decision.  
8. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
The legal realist’s caricature of justice is that it is whatever the judge ate for 
breakfast.
169
 Realists argue that, contrary to the formalist’s position that judges 
apply legal reasons to the facts of a case in a rational, mechanical, and deliberative 
manner; judicial decisions are influenced by psychological, political, and social 
factors.
170
 A formalist judge is said to arrive at the answer to ‘what ought I do?’ 
only after giving the situation reflective thought, deliberation and calculation. The 
more accurate the factual and causal information that they have at their disposal, the 
more likely it is that they will know which one action, amongst all of the actions 
that they have available to them, is the one most likely to be the right one.
171
  
In contrast, the realist judge is said to act on hunches and gut instincts: intuition - 
the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for conscious 
reasoning.
172
 The right answer is something that they know or consider likely from 
instinctive feeling (rather than conscious reasoning to reach conclusions) that they 
later rationalise with deliberative reasoning so as to justify their intuition.  This 
latter deliberation also ensures that others might see a path of the logical steps that 
were followed to reach the decision.
173
 Intuitive responses are reached effortlessly 
and typically, ‘without conscious awareness’.174   
Realistic formalists posit that if left to an either or situation, deliberative decision 
making is more likely than intuitive decision-making to lead to just outcomes, 
although they do acknowledge the importance of the judicial hunch and the 
‘importance of deliberation in constraining the inevitable, but often undesirable, 
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influence of intuition’.175 For this reason, they suggest the marrying of the two 
adjudication models, arguing that by following this realistic formalistic dual-
process model, judges will make initial intuitive judgments that are then monitored 
by a deliberative process that will endorse, correct or override the immediate 
intuitive judgement.  In this way, judges are viewed, not as the formalist’s purely 
deductive decision-maker, or the realist’s intuitive rationaliser but as ‘ordinary 
people who tend to make intuitive decisions, but who can override their intuitive 
reactions with complex, deliberative thought’.176  It is this complex, deliberative 
thought process that is often most noticeably absent from decisions in which a party 
has a mental illness.  
8.1 Principlism 
Dworkin’s theory of principlism177 argues in defence of the realists that judges 
choose universally accepted moral values such as autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice
178
 as their guides for determining which of the principles 
they will apply, based on the notion of property of weight.  Principles may conflict, 
and most typically do and when they do, the conflict is resolved by selecting the 
position that is supported by the principles that have the greatest aggregate 
weight.
179
  
Beauchamp and Childress’ Four Principles approach - respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice - is the most widely used framework in 
medical ethics decision-making.
180
 The Principles function as a checklist of 
considerations but do not offer specific direction for action. This is due, in part, to 
the fact that each principle includes quite separate moral matters that are unrelated 
by system considerations, and each case may have a number of competing 
principles which means having to use a number of conflicting moral theories to 
arrive at a decision.
181
   The relevant principles in each case will be those moral 
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values that the judge has identified as being necessary to make the case, and one or 
more of them will provide the ‘one right answer’ to any legal question.182  As every 
person holds their own unique perspectives and preferences, the decision-maker 
will make the decision that is internally consistent and rational to them.  
The pragmatics of principlism can be seen in the Jehovah Witness blood transfusion 
cases which show that without compelling competing circumstances, judges will 
invariably give more weight to a child’s right to life than they will to a parent’s 
right to decide their child’s medical treatment.183  Judges are unwilling to deprive a 
child of the reasonably good chance of survival, recovery and/or quality of life that 
a blood transfusion can offer them even when the child has reached a Gillick
184
 
level of understanding and has expressed a clear and unshakeable objection to a 
blood transfusion on religious grounds.
185
  This moral value given to a child’s life 
has received statutory authority in many jurisdictions, where it is lawfully permitted 
for blood transfusions to be given to minors without parental consent.
186
  In family 
law, the value placed on a perception of a child’s health and wellbeing overrides the 
value placed on the parent’s responsibility to parent when the parent has a mental 
illness.
187
 This is discussed more fully in Chapter Six. 
The often asked question for decision-makers is whether they can, in all good 
conscience, fail to make a beneficent decision when the necessary legal elements 
are not met, but the consequences of making the legally correct decision is that the 
person is left hopelessly unwell, uncared for, and untreated: an entirely morally 
unsatisfactory situation.  This issue was originally addressed by Darold Treffert in 
his seminal article, ‘Dying with Their Rights On’.188  Treffert claimed that the 
pendulum had swung from stifling paternalism to outright abandonment of people 
with a mental illness who were fronting the commitment process. He called on 
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decision-makers to give a proper weighing and balancing to not only the right to 
freedom and the right to be ill, but also the right to be rescued.
189
   
The Rescue Principle is an intuitive morality principle that holds that it is morally 
obligatory to act to prevent another person’s preventable death or grave misfortune 
as long as the rescuer does not risk their own life or safety, or violate other, more 
fundamental principles.
190
  ‘If we can prevent something very bad from happening 
to someone by making a slight or even moderate sacrifice, it would be wrong not to 
do so’.191 Typically, the rescuer is shocked by the person’s desperate circumstances 
and feels that they have an obligation to provide assistance.
192
 This ideal sense of 
obligation flourishes in mental health matters where decision-makers weight 
beneficence heaviest so as to ensure that the person is guaranteed a health outcome, 
not necessarily a just outcome.   Although decision-makers try to be objective, 
impartial, and unbiased they are motivated to arrive at a desired outcome – to see 
the person become healthy and happy – which conflicts with the motive to be 
unbiased.
193
  
8.2 Bias 
Nobody outside of a baby carriage or a judge's chamber believes in an 
unprejudiced point of view. 
Lillian Hellman, US dramatist (1905 - 1984) 
Mental health decision-making is built on beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain 
events happening, commonly expressed in terms such as ‘it appears likely,’ ‘there is 
a clear possibility’ and ‘it is not improbable’. These assessments of the probability 
of an uncertain event happening rely on a limited number of heuristic principles that 
reduce complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations. A rational judge will attempt to make probability judgments 
compatible with their knowledge about the subject matter, the laws of probability, 
and their own judgmental heuristics and biases. Automatic, heuristic-based snap 
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judgments, although surprisingly accurate at times, lack the deliberative processes 
often necessary for good judgment which, in turn, can lead to erroneous judicial 
decisions.
194
 While heuristics are generally useful they can lead to ‘severe and 
systematic errors’195 when subjective probabilities determine a judge’s preferences. 
There is no simple formal procedure for assessing the compatibility of a set of 
probability judgments with the judge's total system of beliefs.
196
  
Geyh suggests that ‘judicial impartiality’ is a ubiquitous, feel-good term similar to 
‘puppies’ that has been used and misused, under-theorised and haphazardly 
analysed, to ‘make legal arguments, score political points, exhort judges and 
reassure the public’.197 An oath to adjudicate impartially does not ensure 
impartiality in decision-making as bias is the consequence of life’s experiences. 
What judges privately think they do, what they publically state that they do, and 
what they actually do when making decisions differs.
198
  While some commentators 
suggest that judges are not as vulnerable to biased decision-making as others 
suggest because they have a ‘chronic awareness of potential biases’199 as well as 
having specific rules to help reduce attitudinal influences,
200
 it is naive to think that 
promises, training and procedural principles can divorce a judge from his or her 
life’s experiences. ‘Prejudices are fixed and largely immovable’.201  
It would be foolish to assert that when judges are engaged in solving problems 
all of their personal attitudes and values become dissipated in the bright glow 
of objectivity.202 
Judges that adopt, and give power to myths or stereotypes about a group are 
biased.
203
 Reliance on false, stereotypical beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour can 
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lead to a biased ‘tunnel vision’ view of the facts.204 Porter et al. suggests that judges 
make rapid intuitive assessments of dangerousness and trustworthiness that are 
enduring in nature; influencing subsequent inferences concerning the person 
making their decision-making about the person increasingly irrational.
205
 Judges are 
susceptible to critical thinking errors and their reliance on false stereotypes is used 
to justify their initial, unreliable assessment.
206
 As chapter six will show, this seems 
to be the case in family law courts where the judge intuitively ‘knows’ that a parent 
experiencing a mental illness is a bad parent and will therefore unconsciously, or 
even consciously, shape the evidence to support that premise, an implication which 
is discussed further in chapter six.   
People experiencing a mental illness are generally perceived to be less honest and 
less credible.
207
 A key role for any judge is to decide the credibility of the parties to 
any matter: who is lying and who is telling the truth.
208
  When an allegation of 
mental illness is made against a parent, their veracity, and the reliability of their 
evidence is immediately brought to the fore of the proceedings. Their evidence may 
be labelled as imagined, paranoid or delusional, and the testimony given by a 
person incapable of perceiving the reality of events is commonly believed to be 
inaccurate and untrue.
209
 Women, in particular report that they are not treated 
equally with other women who do not experience a mental illness, and that they are 
not viewed as credible witnesses.
210
 In attempting to understand the nature of 
biasing influences on judicial decision-making, researchers suggest that judges can 
overvalue a single powerful piece of evidence to the extent that all other evidence is 
                                                 
204 Stephen Porter, Leanne ten Brinke and Chantal Gustaw, ‘Dangerous decisions: the impact of first 
impressions of trustworthiness on the evaluation of legal evidence and defendant culpability’ (2010) 16 
Psychology, Crime & Law 477, 478.  
205 Ibid.  
206 Ibid 478. See also Norbert L Kerr, Robert J MacCoun and Geoffrey P Kramer, ‘Bias in Judgment: 
Comparing Individuals and Groups’ (1996) 103 Psychological Review 687.  
207 Amy C Watson, Patrick W Corrigan and Victor Ottati, ‘Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward and Decisions 
About Persons With Mental Illness’ (2004) 55 Psychiatric Services 49.  
208 Porter and ten Brinke, above n 155.  
209 A Question of Justice: Access and Participation for People with Disabilities in Contact with the Justice 
System, Report of the Disability Council of NSW, 2003. 
210 Council of Social Service of New South Wales and the Women’s Rights Action Network Australia, ‘Our 
Rights, Our Voices: A Forum for Women and Community Groups Working with Women to Discuss, Explore 
and Report on Women’s Rights in NSW’ (Forum Report, Council of Social Service of NSW and the Women’s 
Rights Action Network Australia, 2004) < http://www.ncoss.org.au/hot/voices/our_rights_our_voices.pdf>.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
251 
discounted.
211
  Courts often perceive that it is the mental illness that is the 
problem.
212
  
8.2.1 Implicit bias 
Greenwald and Benaji suggest people seek to hide their bias so as not to appear 
prejudiced.
213
 Their social behaviours may not be entirely within their conscious 
control but are largely driven by learned stereotypes that operate automatically, 
implicitly or unconsciously during human interaction.
214
  Implicit attitudes 
accurately, or inaccurately, identify traces of past experiences that influence 
attitudes and judgments in a way that is not introspectively known, and provoke 
favourable, or unfavourable, feelings, thoughts, or actions.
215
 Also known as 
‘unconscious bias’ and ‘hidden bias’, the terms are widely used to explain the 
persistence of discrimination in society.  As implicit bias is largely an automatic 
response, a person does not have time to deliberate on personal characteristics such 
as race, age, gender and sexual orientation with the result that, although explicitly 
disavowing prejudice and claiming to be wholly committed to the principles of 
antidiscrimination, the person will often be surprised to find that they are in fact, 
biased.
216
   
Factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, or mental status can negatively influence the 
decision maker, albeit unconsciously, although it is highly improbable that the vast 
majority of judges would accept the proposition that they interpret evidence 
pretextually as Perlin suggests, or that factors such as mental illness, gender or race 
adversely influence their decisions. U.S. research has shown, however, that judges 
imposed 25% higher bail amounts
217
 and 12% longer sentences on black 
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defendants
218
 compared to similarly placed, white defendants. They were also more 
likely to impose the death penalty on a black defendant.
219
  A recent Australian 
study found that people with schizophrenia were more than twice as likely the rest 
of the community to have been found guilty and convicted of an offence.
220
 
Everyone has a tendency to interpret information in ways that confirm their pre-
existing beliefs and attitudes about themselves and their social world
221
 and even 
the most egalitarian of judges can harbour invidious mental associations.
222
 Judges 
are more likely to associate cues of violence, neglect, unpredictability, instability, 
poverty, and inadequate parenting skills with a parent who has a mental illness than 
with a parent who does not.   
8.3 Casuistry 
Casuistry is case based reasoning that focuses on pragmatics and precedent rather 
than rules and theories,
223
 and the specious or subtle reasoning that decision-makers 
use to help them make difficult choice decisions.
224
  It serves to publically justify 
any questionable decisions while at the same time permitting them to rationalise the 
decision to themselves and support their view that they are unbiased.
225
  It allows 
decision-makers to creatively structure situations so as to compel their own 
behaviour.
226
 They recruit attributes that support their preferred decision and 
reshape their importance.  This process masks biased decision-making, however, 
unbiased and legally correct decisions are not always valued as being morally right 
decisions.  
Moral decisions, generally, are the result of quick, automatic evaluations or 
intuitions that are shaped during the course of the development of a person’s 
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personality by their internalisation of social and cultural influences.
227
 The function 
of the thinking process is restricted to formulating post hoc justifications for a 
judgment that is based on the decision-maker’s feelings about what they consider to 
be right or wrong.  Social value orientation is expressed automatically in intuitive 
behaviour
228
 and most normative theories of decision-making view it as a process 
requiring trade-offs between values.
229
 The disadvantage from one value is 
compensated by the benefit of another value.
230
  In matters of mental illness, the 
values of health and treatment can often trump other values such as autonomy, 
liberty, privacy and honesty.    
An example of specious reasoning can be drawn from a 2012 case in which a family 
law judge ordered a ‘very Catholic’231 woman with diagnoses of schizophrenia and 
bipolar to be involuntarily aborted and sterilized, even if it meant she had to be 
‘coaxed, bribed, or even enticed ... by ruse’232 into the procedure. The Appeals 
Court, when reversing the order stated that, ‘No party requested this measure ... and 
the judge appears to have simply produced the requirement out of thin air.’233 The 
judge publically defended her ruling by claiming to have ‘known’ that the woman 
would have chosen to have the procedures if she were mentally competent because 
‘[s]he would want to be healthy’.234   
A thing that one ‘knows’ or considers likely from instinctive feeling rather than 
conscious reasoning’ is defined as intuition235 which legal formalists suggest should 
never be used as a substitute for reasoning. However, society generally, and 
decision-makers specifically, inherently ‘know’ that people with a mental illness 
                                                 
227 Jonathan Haidt, ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment’ 
(2001) 108 Psychological Review 814.  
228 Gert Cornelissen, Siegfried Dewitte and Luk Warlop, ‘Social Value Orientation as a Moral Intuition: 
Decision-Making in the Dictator Game’ (Research Paper, April 2007) <SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=978469>. See also Paul A M Van Lange et al., ‘From game theory to real life: How 
social value orientation affects willingness to sacrifice in ongoing close relationships’ (1997) 73 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 1330.  
229 Martin Hanselmann and Carmen Tanner, ‘Taboos and conflicts in decision making: Sacred values, decision 
difficulty, and emotions’ (2008) 3 Judgment and Decision Making 51. 
230 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).  
231 ‘Ex-judge defends ordering an abortion for woman’, CBS News (online), 21 February 2012 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57381855/ex-judge-defends-ordering-an-abortion-for-woman/>. 
232 John Zaremba, ‘Decision blasts judge’s order to force abortion: Ruling to ‘coax’ mentally ill woman sparks 
outrage’, Boston Herald (online), 18 January 2012 
<http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/20220118decision_blasts_judges_order_to_force_abortion_ruling
_to_coax_mentally_ill_woman_sparks_outrage>. 
233 Ibid.  
234 Ibid.  
235 Bruce Moore (ed), The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2009).  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
254 
need treatment because it is a beneficial good that will cure or alleviate symptoms 
and control undesirable behaviours. They ‘know’ it is in the person’s best interests 
to be treated because if left untreated, they represent a risk of harm (harm can be 
defined simply as a deterioration in their illness) to self or others.  And they ‘know’ 
that untreated people exhibit abnormal behaviours, and are unable to function 
acceptably in society because they have a mental illness, and if it were not for their 
mental illness, they would reasonably seek treatment of their own accord. 
9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traced the development of Perlin’s dualistic theories of sanism and 
pretextuality, which he convincingly argues permeate the legal system.  He claims 
stigma, stereotyping and the prejudice associated with mental illness pervade the 
law and dictate its treatment of people who experience mental illness. This chapter 
examined the concepts, and language use of the ‘stigma’ and ‘sanism’ terms, and 
suggests that ‘sanism’ is a more accurate reflection of the prejudiced attitudes of the 
law’s actors.  Perlin controversially contends that rather than offering parties a 
neutral and equal playing field, the legal system is inherently biased against mental 
illness, a proposition, which so far, has failed to a gain significant mainstream legal 
following.  The likely reason for this is because sanism is largely invisible, socially 
acceptable, and frequently practised.
236
   
Sanism is principally evidenced in the observations of those who see its 
consequences in the legal system but, for the most part, these consequences go 
unnoticed, or when seen, they are regarded as socially acceptable by most legal 
actors.  It is in this respect that sanism is unlike other prejudices.  
Chapter Five has tried to lift the public reassurance veil of impartial and unbiased 
decision-making by analysing the ways in which decision-makers arrive at their 
decisions to show that they are not immune to the prejudices associated with mental 
illness.  It examined the law’s reliance on the medical model and the influence of 
the psychiatric expert in what is essentially a ‘treatment and control’ legal system.  
Legal decision-makers commonly base their decisions on stereotypical 
presumptions, heuristic reasoning and a process of balancing and weighing moral 
                                                 
236 Ingram, above n 53.  
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values and principles.  They perceive the person as erratic, unpredictable, without 
credibility and likely dangerous
 
. For example, courts commonly view people who 
have a mental illness as unfit parents, or at the least, are less fit than the other parent 
who does not have a mental illness. They believe that a person who is refusing 
treatment must be legally compelled to undergo treatment because their refusal is 
simply an indicator of the level of unwellness. If they were not so mentally unwell, 
they would voluntarily seek treatment because good health is a social value held in 
the highest regard.   
Sanism results in outcomes that are often much more restrictive, less fair and less 
just than outcomes achieved by similarly circumstanced parties who do not have a 
mental illness.  And according to Perlin, the legal system’s processes are corrupted 
by pretextuality, the artifices the system uses to ensure sanist outcomes are 
achieved.  The following chapter will apply a critical lens to Australia’s family law 
parenting legislation and a sample of recent parenting order decisions in order to 
reveal the sanist consequences of the biased laws and decision-making that resulted 
in harsher and unfair outcomes for the parties who had experience mental illness, or 
whom the courts assessed as having a mental illness despite medical evidence to the 
contrary.  
In a rare empirical testing of Perlin’s ideas, chapter eight will present the results of 
quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a large sample of the legal system’s 
future professionals: law students entering and exiting law school.  It will analyse 
the students’ levels of sanism and attempt to assess whether student participation in 
a therapeutic jurisprudence clinical mental health representation program had a 
positive impact on their attitudes in contrast to students who did not participate in 
the program. Chapter Seven presents the program, the Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme (MHTRS), as a possible solution to sanism.  Although there 
was insufficient consistent data to establish that the MHTRS positively changed the 
attitudes of law students, it did raise the question on how sanism in the legal system 
can be eradicated without the aid of law students helping in the construction of a 
future, fairer legal system for parties with a mental illness.  
  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
256 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Articles 
Adler, Ann K, and Otto F Wahl, ‘Children’s Belief about People Labelled Mentally Ill’ 
(1998) 68 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 321. 
Angermeyer, Matthias C, Andreas Holzinger, and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Emotional 
reactions to people with mental illness’ (2010) 19 Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale 26.  
Appelbaum, Paul S, ‘Almost a revolution: an international perspective on the law of 
involuntary commitment’ (1997) 25 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and 
Law 135. 
Ayres, Ian, and Joel Waldfogel, ‘A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting’ 
(1994) 46 Standford Law Review 987.   
Banks, R Richard, Jennifer L Eberhardt, and Lee Ross, ‘Discrimination and Implicit Bias in 
a Racially Unequal Society’ (2006) 94 California Law Review 1169.  
Birnbaum, Morton, ‘The Right to Treatment’ (1960) 46 American Bar Association Journal 
499.  
Birnbaum, Rebecca, ‘My Father’s Advocacy for a Right to Treatment’ (2010) 38 Journal of 
the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 115.  
Blaska, Betty ‘First Person Account: What It Is Like to Be Treated Like a CMI’ (1991) 17 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 173.  
Borg, Marit, Bengt Karlsson, and Hesook S Kim, ‘User involvement in community mental 
health services – principles and practices’ (2009) 16 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental 
Health Nursing 285.  
Brown, Gerarda J, ‘Sweeping Reform from Small Rules, Anti-Bias, Canons as a Substitute 
for Heightened Scrutiny’ (2000) 83 Minnesota Law Review 363.  
Burris, Scott, ‘Stigma and the Law’ (2006) 367 The Lancet 529.    
Byrne, Peter, ‘Challenging healthcare discrimination’ (2010) 16 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 60.  
Byrne, Peter, ‘Stigma of mental illness and ways of diminishing it’ (2000) 6 Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 65.  
Chamberlin, Judi, ‘The Ex-Patients' Movement: Where We've Been and Where We're 
Going’ (1990) 11 The Journal of Mind and Behavior 323.  
Champine, Pamela R, ‘A Sanist Will’ (2002) 46 New York School of Law Review 547.  
Chodoff, Paul, ‘Involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill as a moral issue’ (1984) 14 
The American Journal of Psychiatry 384.  
Cloud, Morgan, ‘The Dirty Little Secret’ (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 1311. 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
257 
Clouser, K Danner, and Bernard Gert, ‘A Critique Of Principlism’ (1990) 15 Journal of 
Medical Philosophy 219.  
Corrigan, Patrick W,
 and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people 
with mental illness’ (2002) 1World Psychiatry 16.  
Dallaire, Bernadette, et al., ‘Civil commitment due to mental illness and dangerousness: the 
union of law and psychiatry within a treatment-control system’ (2000) 22 Sociology of 
Health & Illness 679.  
Darold A Treffert, ‘Dying with Their Rights On’ (1973) 130 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 1041.  
Davoli, Joanmarie I, ‘Psychiatric Evidence on Trial’ (2003) 56 Southern Methodist 
University Law Review 2191.  
DeMarco, J P, ‘Principlism and moral dilemmas: and new principle’ (2005) 31 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 101. 
Dhami, Mandeep K, and Peter Ayton, ‘Bailing and Jailing the Fast and Frugal Way’ (2001) 
14 Journal of Behavioural Decision Making 141.  
Dolin, Gregory, ‘A healer or an executioner? The proper role of a psychiatrist in a criminal 
justice system’ (2002) 48 Journal of Law and Health 169.  
Dorfman, Deborah A, ‘Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality 
in Mental Disability Law’ (1993) 10 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 805.   
Eastman, Nigel, ‘Mental health law: civil liberties and the principle of reciprocity’ (1994) 
308 British Medical Journal 43.   
Ellis, Heather S, ‘Dealing With Mental Disability in Trust & Estate Law Practice: 
"Strengthen the Things that Remain:" The Sanist Will’ (2003) 46 New York Law School 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 565.  
Fuller, Lon L, ‘An afterword: Science and the judicial process’ (1966) 79 Harvard Law 
Review 1604.  
Garvey, Stephen P, ‘The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing’ (2000) 75 New York 
University Law Review 26.  
Gewirtz, Paul, ‘Notes and Comments, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts’ 1969) 
78 The Yale Law Journal 1175.  
Geyh, Charles G, ‘The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, Social Science Research 
Network’ (2013) 65 Florida Law Review 493.   
Gostin, Larry O, ‘Contemporary, Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health Reform’ 
(1983) 10 Journal of Law and Society 47.  
Gould, Keri A,‘“Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of Sanism’ (1992) 9 New York 
Law School Journal of Human Rights 567.  
Grant, George M, ‘Donaldson, Dangerousness, and the Right to Treatment’ (1976) 3 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 599.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
258 
Greenwald, Anthony G, and Linda Hamilton Krieger, ‘Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations’ (2006) 94 California Law Review 955.   
Greenwald, Anthony G, and Mahzarin Banaji, ‘Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes’ (1995) 102 Psychological Review 4.  
Guadagno, Rosanna E, Kelton V Rhoades, and Brad J Sagarin, ‘Figural vividness and 
persuasion: capturing the "elusive" vividness effect’ (2011) 37 Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 626.   
Gudjonsson, Gisli, ‘Disputed Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice in Britain: Expert 
Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence in the Court of Appeal’ (2006) 31 Manitoba Law 
Journal 489.  
Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey J Rachlinski, and Andrew J Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases’ (2007-2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 1.  
Haidt, Jonathan, ‘The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment’ (2001) 108 Psychological Review 814.  
Hanselmann, Martin, and Carmen Tanner, ‘Taboos and conflicts in decision making: 
Sacred values, decision difficulty, and emotions’ (2008) 3 Judgment and Decision Making 
51. 
Hutt, Peter Barton, and Richard A Merrill, ‘Criminal Responsibility and the Right to 
Treatment for Intoxication and Alcoholism’ (1969) 57 Georgetown Law Journal 835.  
Jonsen, Albert R ‘Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics’ (1991) 12 Theoretical 
Medicine 295.   
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124.  
Kaplan, Honora A, ‘Institutions and Community Mental Health: The Paradox in Wyatt v. 
Stickney’ (1973) 9 Community Mental Health Journal 34.  
Kerr, Norbert L, Robert J MacCoun, and Geoffrey P Kramer, ‘Bias in Judgment: 
Comparing Individuals and Groups’ (1996) 103 Psychological Review 687.  
Kisielius, Jolita, and Brian Sternthal, ‘Detecting and Explaining Vividness Effects in 
Attitudinal Judgments’ (1984) 21 Journal of Marketing Research 54.  
Kozinski, Alex, ‘What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision 
Making’ (1993) 26 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 993. 
Langford, Lorette, ‘The New Mental Health Act in Tasmania (1996): A Comparative 
Review with the Former Act (1963): “Can They Now Die with Their Rights On?”’ (2003) 
10 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 140.  
Large, Matthew, and Christopher J Ryan, ‘Sanism, stigma and the belief in dangerousness’ 
(2012) 46 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 1099.  
Large, Matthew, Olav Nielssen, and Gordon Elliott, ‘Reliability of psychiatric evidence in 
serious criminal matters: fitness to stand trial and the defence of mental illness’ (2009) 43 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 446.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
259 
Luchins, Daniel J, et al., ‘Lawyers' Attitudes Toward Involuntary Treatment’ (2006) 34 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 492.  
McKie, John, and Jeff Richardson, ‘The Rule of Rescue’ (2003) 56 Social Science & 
Medicine 2407.  
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World’ (1996) 38 William and Mary Law Review 5.  
Mitchel, Gregory, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is An Oxymoron’ (2005) 99 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1245.  
Mustard, David B, ‘Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from 
the U.S. Federal Courts’ (2001) 44 Journal of Law and Economics 285.  
Myron W Orfield, ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago 
Narcotics Officers’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1016.  
Napier, Jaime L, and John T Jost, ‘The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited: A Cross-
National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism’ (2008) 64 Journal of Social 
Issues 595.  
Neuborne, Burt, ‘Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and 
Exclusionary Selection Techniques’ (1992) 67 New York University Law Review 419. 
Norton, Michael I, Joseph A Vandello and John M Darley, ‘Casuistry and Social Category 
Bias’ (2004) 87 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 817.  
O’Neil, Kevin M, Marc W Patry, and Steven D Penrod, ‘Exploring the Effects of 
AttitudesToward the Death Penalty on Capital Sentencing Verdicts’ (2004) 10 Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 443.  
Ogloff, James R P, ‘Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder conundrum’ (2006) 40 
Australian New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 519. 
Orfield, Myron W, ‘Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in 
the Chicago Criminal Courts’ (1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 100.  
Perlin,  Michael L, and Deborah A Dorfman, ‘Sanism, social science, and the development 
of mental disability law jurisprudence’ (2006) 11 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 47.  
Perlin, Michael L, ‘"Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and 
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as it Did’ (1999) 10 Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 3. 
Perlin, Michael L, ‘“And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": 
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases’ (2005) 42 San 
Diego Law Review 735.  
Perlin, Michael L, ‘“His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors 
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?’ (2009) 42 Akron Law 
Review 885.   
Perlin, Michael L, ‘“Through the Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, Attitudes, 
Participatory Democracy’ (2008) 13 Texas Journal On Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 413.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
260 
Perlin, Michael L, ‘“You Have Discussed Lepers And Crooks": Sanism In Clinical 
Teaching’ (2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 683.  
Perlin, Michael L, ‘On “Sanism”’ (1992-1993) 46 Southern Methodist University Law 
Review 373.  
Perlin, Michael L, ‘The sanist lives of jurors in death penalty cases: The puzzling role of 
“Migrating” mental disability’ (1994) 8 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public 
Policy 239.  
Perlin, Michael L, 'They’re An Illusion to Me Now': Forensic Ethics, Sanism and 
Pretextuality’ (Research Paper Series No 07/08-27, New York Law School Legal Studies, 
2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1130923>. 
Perlin, Michael L, ‘Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden: The Role of Counsel and 
the Courts in Determining Who Dies’ (1997) 41 New York Law School Law Review 201. 
Phelan, Jo C, Bruce G Link, and John F Dovidio, ‘Stigma and prejudice: one animal or 
two?’ (2008) 67 Social Science and Medicine 358.  
Piel, Jennifer, ‘Mental Disability Law, Evidence, and Testimony: A Comprehensive 
Reference Manual for Lawyers, Judges, and Mental Disability Professionals’ (2010) 38 
Journal of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 619.  
Poole, Jennifer M, et al., ‘Sanism, ‘Mental Health’, and Social Work/Education: A Review 
and Call to Action’ (2012) 1 Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, 
Research, Polity, and Practice 20.  
Pope, Thaddeus Mason, ‘Counting The Dragon's Teeth And Claws: The Definition Of Hard 
Paternalism’ (2004) 20 Georgia State University Law Review 659.  
Popper, Karl, ‘Science : Conjectures and Refutations", Ch. 1, Section VII, 
<http://worthylab.tamu.edu/courses_files/popper_conjecturesandrefutations.pdf> 26. 
Porter, Stephen, Leanne ten Brinke, and Chantal Gustaw, ‘Dangerous decisions: the impact 
of first impressions of trustworthiness on the evaluation of legal evidence and defendant 
culpability’ (2010) 16 Psychology, Crime & Law 477.  
Pronin, Emily, et al., ‘Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias 
in Self Versus Others’ (2004) 3 Psychological Review 781.  
Redding, Richard E, Marnita Y Floyd, and Gary L Hawk, ‘What judges and lawyers think 
about the testimony of mental health experts: a survey of the courts and bar’ (2005) 19 
Behavioral Sciences & the Law 583. 
Rix, Keith J B, ‘The psychiatrist as expert witness’ (2008) 14 Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 37.  
Rose, Mary R, Christopher Ellison, and Shari Seidman Diamond, ‘Preferences for Juries 
Over Judges Across Racial and Ethnic Groups’ (2008) 89 Social Science Quarterly 372.  
Shapiro, David L, ‘Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism’ (1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 
519.   
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
261 
Short, T, et al., ‘Comparing violence in schizophrenia patients with and without comorbid 
substance-use disorders to community controls (2013)  Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 1 
(Early view, First published online - 4 FEB 2013) 
Shutz, Heidi, and Bernd Six, ‘How Strong is the Relationship Between Prejudice and 
Discrimination? A Meta-Analytic Answer’ (1996) 20 International Journey of Intercultural 
Relations 441.  
Slobogin, Christopher, ‘Mental Illness and the Death Penalty’ (2000) 24 Mental & Physical 
Disability Law Report 667.  
Slobogin, Christopher, ‘Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not To Junk?’ 
(1998) 40 William and Mary Law Review 1.  
Slobogin, Christopher, ‘Testilying: Police Perjury And What To Do About It’ (1996) 67 
University of Colorado Law Review 1037. 
Slovenko, Ralph, ‘The past and present of the right to treatment: a slogan gone astray’ 
(1981) 9 Journal of Psychiatry and Law 264.  
Steinberger, Claire B, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Sanist Factor-An Interdisciplinary 
Approach’ (2002) 46 New York Law School Law Review 573.  
Swartz, Marvin, Jeffrey W Swanson, and Michael J Hannon, ‘Does Fear of Coercion Keep 
People Away from Mental Health Treatment? Evidence from a Survey of Person’s with 
Schizophrenia and Mental Health Professionals’ (2003) 21 Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law, 459.  
Tanner, Denise, ‘Crossing bridges over troubled waters?: Working with children of parents 
experiencing mental distress (2000) 19 Social Work Education: The International Journal 
287. 
Thornicroft, Graham, et al., ‘Stigma: ignorance, prejudice or discrimination?’ (2007) 190 
British Journal of Psychiatry 192.   
Treffert, Darold A, ‘Dying with Their Rights On’ (1973) 130 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 1041.  
Van Lange, Paul A M, et al., ‘From game theory to real life: How social value orientation 
affects willingness to sacrifice in ongoing close relationships’ (1997) 73 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 1330.  
Watson, Amy C, Patrick W Corrigan, and Victor Ottati, ‘Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward 
and Decisions About Persons With Mental Illness’ (2004) 55 Psychiatric Services 49.  
William B Swann, Alan Stein-Seroussi, and Brian R Giesler, ‘Why people self-verify’ 
(1992) 62 Journal of personality and social psychology 392.  
Williams, Valerie ‘The Challenge for Australian Jurisdictions to Guarantee Free Qualified 
Representation Before Mental Health Tribunals and Boards of Review: Learning from the 
Tasmanian Experience’ (2009) 16 Psychology and Law 108.  
Winick, Bruce J, ‘The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe 
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier’ (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 785.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
262 
Winick, Bruce, ‘TJ and the Civil Commitment Hearing’ (1999) 10 The Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 37.  
Zientek, Marybeth, ‘Riggins v. Nevada: Medicated Defendants and Courtroom Demeanor 
from the Jury's Perspective’ (1993) 30 American Criminal Law Review 215.  
B. Books 
Ashcroft, Richard Edmund, et al., (eds), Principles in Health Care Ethics (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2007). 
Ayd Jr, Frank J (ed), Medical, Moral, and Legal Issues in Mental Health Care (Williams & 
Wilkins, 1974).  
Bartels, Daniel, et al., (eds), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Volume 50 
(Academic Press, 2009). 
Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford 
University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 1983).  
Braeman, Eileen, Law, Politics and Perception: How Policy Preferences Influence Legal 
Reasoning (University of Virginia Press, 2009).  
Chamberlin, Judi, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health 
System (McGraw-Hill, 1978).  
Diesfeld Kate, and Ian R Freckleton (eds), Involuntary Detention and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003). 
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977).  
Faigman, David, et al., Science in the Law: Social and Behavioral Science Issues (West 
Group, 2002). 
Goffman, Erving, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity (Prentice-Hall, 
1963).  
Gold, Liza H, Sexual Harassment: Psychiatric Assessment In Employment Litigation 
(American Psychiatric Publishing Inc., 2004).  
Henning Plessner, Cornelia Betsch, and Betsch, Tilmann, et al. (eds), Intuition in Judgment 
and Decision Making (Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2010).  
Hogarth, Robin M, Educating Intuition (The University of Chicago Press, 2001).  
Berkowitz, Leonard (ed), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 20, (Academic 
Press, 1987).  
Macquarie Dictionary, (Macquarie University Press, 5
th
 edition, 2009). 
Menzies, Robert, Brenda A LeFrançois, and Geoffrey Reaume (eds), Mad Matters: A 
Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies (Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2013).  
Moore, Bruce (ed), The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 5
th
 
ed, 2009).  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
263 
Parry, John W, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A 
Comprehensive Reference Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Criminal Justice Professionals 
(American Bar Association, 2009). 
Peay, Jill, Seminal Issues in Mental Health Law (Ashgate Aldershot, 2005). 
Perlin, Michael L, et al., Competence in the Law: From Legal Theory to Clinical 
Application (John Wiley & Sons, 2008).  
Perlin, Michael L, Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The Shame of the States 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013).  
Perlin, Michael L, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American 
Psychological Association, 2000).   
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).  
Ross, Brian H (ed), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research 
and Theory (Elsevier Academic Press, 2004).  
Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
Stuart, Heather, Julio Arboleda-Florez, and Norman Sartorius, Paradigms Lost (Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
Suber, Peter, ‘Paternalism’ in Christopher B Gray (ed), Philosophy of Law: An 
Encyclopedia (Garland Publishing, 1999). 
Sylvester, Robert P, The Moral Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Temple University Press, 1990).  
Vandeveer, Donald, Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on Benevolence 
(Princeton University Press, 1986).   
C. Grey Literature -Research Papers, Reports, Submissions, Letters, Memos 
etc 
‘Our Rights, Our Voices: A Forum for Women and Community Groups Working with 
Women to Discuss, Explore and Report on Women’s Rights in NSW’ (Forum Report, 
Council of Social Service of NSW and the Women’s Rights Action Network Australia, 
2004) < http://www.ncoss.org.au/hot/voices/our_rights_our_voices.pdf>.  
‘Review of the Mental Health Act 1996’ (Discussion Paper, Department of Health and 
Human Service, 2007).  
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp190_Expert_Evidence_Consultation.pdf>. 
A Question of Justice: Access and Participation for People with Disabilities in Contact with 
the Justice System, (Report of the Disability Council of NSW, 2003) 
Carr, Lauren Wilson, ‘Wyatt v. Stickney: A Landmark Decision’, Alabama Disabilities 
Advocacy Program Newsletter (online), July 2004 
<http://www.adap.net/Wyatt/landmark.pdf>.  
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
264 
Chalmers, Don, ‘University of Tasmania’s Dean of Law (Media statement, 2009) 
<http://www.media.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/12256/Lawfest-FOR-
WEB.pdf>.  
Cornelissen, Gert, Siegfried Dewitte, and Luk Warlop, ‘Social Value Orientation as a 
Moral Intuition: Decision-Making in the Dictator Game’ (Research Paper, 2007) <SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=978469>.  
Forrest, Ruth, MLC, Speech to Mental Health Legislative Measures Select Committee - 27 
October 2009 <http://www.ruthforrest.com.au/index.php/parliament/speeches/2009/70-
2009-speeches-on-motions/450-mental-health-legislative-measures-select-committee-27-
october-2009>. 
Ingram, R., Sanism in Theory and Practice (Conference paper, 2nd Annual Critical 
Inquiries Workshop, 2011) <http://www.socialinequities.ca/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Ingram.Sanism-in-Theory-and-Practice.CI_.2011.pdf>.  
Kalinowski, Coni and Pat Risser, ‘Identifying and Overcoming Mentalism’ (Research 
Paper, InforMed Health Publishing & Training, 2000) 
<http://counterpsych.com/uploads/23542/uploadedDocuments/Mentalism_07_00.pdf>. 
Karras, Maria, et al., ‘On the edge of justice: the legal needs of people with a mental illness 
in NSW’ (Study Volume 4, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2006) 
<http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articleIDs/CB05FD97AAF2458CCA25718E000
14293/$file/mental.html>. 
Morris, Grant H, ‘Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled’ (Research Paper, 
University of San Diego School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Paper 31, 2005)  
Pizzuro, Salvatore,‘The implications of the Atkins Concept on the Lives of People with 
Disabilities in Criminal and Civil Courts’ (Research Paper, 2009) 
<http://s395229360.onlinehome.us/Research/Legal/PizzuroOnAtkins%282009%29.pdf>. 
Report of the Expert Committee, 1999. 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_c
onsum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4062614.pdf/>. 
The Law Commission, The Admissibility Of Expert Evidence In Criminal Proceedings In 
England And Wales: A New Approach To The Determination Of Evidentiary Reliability 
(Consultation Paper No 190, 2009). 
Weiss, Michael, and Cathy Young, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Equal Rights or Neo-
Paternalism?’ (Policy Analysis No 256, Cato Institute, 1996) 
<http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/feminist-jurisprudence-equal-rights-or-
neopaternalism>. 
D. Legislation and Regulations 
Anti-discrimination Act 1998 (Tas)  
Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas)  
Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas).  
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
265 
E. Cases 
Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup.Ct) 296 N.Y.S.2d 
533 (App. Div. 1968).  
Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976)  
Ceschini v. Warden, 30 App. Div. 2d 649 291 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1968) (per curiam). 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
In re Harris, 2 Crim. L. Rep. 2412 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Juv. Div. 1967) 
Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
R. v. S. (R.D.) [1997] 3 S.C.R 484.    
Re E (a minor) [1993] 1 FLR 386. 
Re S (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376.  
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. I34I, I343 (M.D. Ala. I97I). 
People Of The State Of California Plaintiffs, vs. Orenthal James Simpson, CASE NO. BA 
09721, 1995. 
F. Media and websites 
‘Ex-judge defends ordering an abortion for woman’, (CBS News, 21 February 2012) 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57381855/ex-judge-defends-ordering-an-
abortion-for-woman/>. 
Dylan, Bob, Cold Irons Bound, Colombia Records.  
The Saturday Mercury Newspaper, Tasmania, August 23, 2003. 
Zaremba, John, ‘Decision blasts judge’s order to force abortion: Ruling to ‘coax’ mentally 
ill woman sparks outrage’, (Boston Herald, 18 January 2012) 
<http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/20220118decision_blasts_judges_order_to_f
orce_abortion_ruling_to_coax_mentally_ill_woman_sparks_outrage>. 
Kenneth B. Noble, Ruling Aids Prosecution of Simpson, NewYork. Times, Sept. 20, 1994. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/20/us/ruling-aids-prosecution-of-simpson.html> 
 
 266 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S ‘SANIST TREATMENT’ OF 
PARENTS WHO EXPERIENCE MENTAL ILLNESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mental health commentators often refer to the ‘special relationship’ that exists 
between mental health and family breakdown;
1
 to the high rates of depression, 
anxiety and substance abuse that occurs amongst adults experiencing divorce or 
separation;
2
 and to the fact that people with a history of psychiatric problems have 
much higher marital separation rates than the general population.
3
  When these 
family breakdowns reach the family courts in litigated child care proceedings, the 
law has a tendency to focus its attention on the attributes associated with mental 
illness.
4
 When a parent’s mental illness is raised as an issue, it usually becomes the 
pivotal issue ‘or the case is prepared as though it is’.5  Studies show that parents 
who use the other parent’s mental illness as the central focus of a custodial battle 
win 70-80% of the time
6
 with other studies reporting that as many as 70 % of 
parents experiencing mental illness lose custody.
7
   
The value of alleging a mental illness in a custodial challenge rests in the 
commonly held belief that the court will stereotypically categorise the parent with 
the mental illness as potentially violent, abusive and neglectful, and naturally unfit 
to be a proper parent.  This chapter shows that it is this ‘unfit parent’ stereotype that 
underpins decision-making where, in accordance with applicable law and policy, it 
                                                 
1 Bruce Smyth, Nicholas Richardson and Grace Soriano (eds), ‘Proceedings of the International Forum on 
Family Relationships in Transition: Legislative, practical and policy responses’ (Australian Institute of Family 
Studies, 1 – 2 December 2005).  
2 Bryan Rodgers, ‘Mental Health and the Family Law System’ (2004) 10 Journal of Family Studies 50.  
3 Smyth, Richardson and Soriano, above n 1, 239.  
4 Bruce G Link and Jo C Phelan, ‘Conceptualizing stigma’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 363, 375.  
5 Federal Magistrate Judy Ryan, ‘Mental Health and Family Law - A Question of Degree’ (Paper presented at 
6th Annual Family Law Intensive, Sydney, 11 February 2006)  
<http://federalcircuitcourt.gov.au/pubs/docs/Speech%20-%20Ryan%20-%20mentalhealth%20-%202006.pdf>.  
6 Making the Invisible Visible: Parents with Psychiatric Disabilities, National Technical Assistance Center for 
State Mental Health Planning, Special Issue, Parents with Psychiatric Disabilities, 2000 
<http://www.nasmhpd.org/docs/publications/archiveDocs/2000/ParentswithPsychiatricDisabilities.pdf> 
7 Joanna Nicholson, Elaine Sweeney and Jeffrey Geller, ‘Mothers with mental illness: II. Family relationships 
and the context of parenting’ (1998) 49 Psychiatric Services 643.  
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is in the best interests of the child it is necessary to separate the parent with a mental 
illness from the child.
8
  More often than not, the answer is yes because having a 
mental illness represents a risk that courts find unacceptable.  
Society promotes the parent as being in the best position to nurture, protect, and 
care for the needs of their children
9
 so that when the parent fails, or is unable to 
protect their child from preventable harm, the state through its parens patriae 
powers is authorised to intervene in the parent-child relationship.  But once a parent 
experiencing mental illness becomes caught up in the non-value-neutral legal 
system, it is likely that they will be failingly judged against the amorphic standard 
of the ‘good parent’.  The reason for this is largely because the socially defined 
attributes of bad parenting - neglect, irresponsibility, disorganisation, disinterest, 
and abusive/violent behaviour - mirror the widely accepted abnormal manifestations 
of mental illness that were discussed in Chapter Three.   
Chapter Five applied a generalist approach to sanism which Perlin argues pervades 
the legal system inherently biased against mental illness.
10
 This chapter applies a 
sanist lens across the legal area of conflicted parenting in matters in which a 
parent’s mental illness is an issue for the decision-maker. This particular area for 
study was chosen because it is (1) a small, well regulated and well reported area of 
law and (2) because parents experiencing mental illness have been stigmatised and 
stereotyped as naturally unfit parents long before ever entering the legal system.
11
 It 
explores the nature and the extent that the law uses negative stereotypes to influence 
decision-making in parenting matters to the unfair disadvantage of parents with a 
mental illness.  
This chapter examines the ways that different legal institutions respond to the 
predictor assessment of parental risk to show that family court decisions tend to 
have lower thresholds which result in decisions that appear harsher and less fair 
                                                 
8 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1987, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 2 September 1990) art 9.  
9 Jill Goldman et al., ‘A Coordinated Response to Child Abuse and Neglect: The Foundation for Practice’ 
(Report, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families 
Administration on Children, Youth and Families Children’s Bureau, Office of Child Abuse and Neglect, 2003) 
<https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundation.pdf>.  
10 Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological Association, 
2000).   
11 When a Parent Has a Mental Illness: Issues and Challenges, Mental Health America website < 
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/index.cfm?objectid=e3412bb7-1372-4d20-c8f627a57cd3d00f>. 
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than child protection decisions.  Underlying this unfair treatment is the inextricable 
link of the ‘mentally ill’ parent to the moral notion of the ‘bad parent’.  
Accordingly, the chapter commences with an examination of the good versus bad 
parent debate as this debate continues to influence significantly the development 
and implementation of parenting policies and laws, and the interpretation of 
regulations intended to protect children from risk of harm and ensure that their best 
interests are met.  
It suggests that the ‘potential risks’ identified by the courts are usually defined as 
‘unacceptable risks’ even though the great majority of parents do not, as a 
consequence of mental illness, neglect or harm their children.
12
  To test this 
suggestion, the doctrine of ‘best interests of the child’, and the concept of 
‘meaningful relationships’ in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 were examined 
which revealed the same conceptual and definitional problems that were reported in 
Chapter One. Legislative terms were either not defined or had vague meanings and 
were open to varied judicial interpretations, all of which disadvantaged parents with 
a mental illness.  
This was also the finding of the qualitative review of 296 Australian family law 
parenting orders made between 2006 and 2011 undertaken as part of this thesis.  
The sample of case studies generated from the review presented below at Section 
5.0 shows that parents with experience of mental illness were at significant risk of 
having their parental responsibilities severely restricted, or removed entirely.  A 
decision-makers’ personal, though unsubstantiated, belief that a party had a mental 
illness often predicted their decision that the parent represented an unacceptable risk 
to the child.  The court’s decisions were at times, contrary to the wishes of the other 
parent and/or were in conflict with the medical evidence provided by the expert 
witness.  The case studies indicated that judges often make personal and prejudicial 
judgment calls that reflect the values, perceptions and legal interpretations that 
satisfy their own sense of fairness but risk significantly unfair outcomes for the 
parent.
13
  
                                                 
12 Jo Tunnard, ‘Parental mental health problems: messages from research, policy and practice’ (Research 
Review, Research in Practice, 2004) 44.  
13 Jay Folberg, ‘Family Courts: Assessing the Trade-Offs’ (1999) 37 Family Court Review 448.  
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2. STEREOTYPING THE PARENT WITH A MENTAL 
ILLNESS AS ‘UNFIT’ 
Parenthood is a cherished and highly valued social role within human society:
14
 a 
normative life experience that for many, defines the roles and meaning of 
adulthood.
15
  The societal expectation of parenting is that it will produce an 
acceptable standard of care and will provide a protective buffer between the child 
and the harms and adversities that it will encounter through its journey through 
childhood and adolescence
16
 toward the ideal collective outcome of rational and 
responsible adulthood.  How a child responds to, and is affected by the social 
problems it will encounter such as abuse, truancy, youth crime, teenage pregnancy, 
educational underachievement, substance misuse and mental illness is considered 
largely influenced by their parents’ parenting skills.17   
Poor parenting is considered an indicator of impoverished or uninformed parental 
behaviours and is a predictor of future antisocial behaviours.  Poor parenting 
practices lead to a child’s arrested or maladapted physical, emotional and/or 
psychological development, and are proximal mechanisms for increasing levels of 
antisocial behaviour.
18
  Studies of different parenting styles have, for example, 
identified close associations between inadequate parental management and 
premature autonomy and juvenile offending
19
, and adolescent drinking, and other 
                                                 
14 Barry J Ackerson, ‘Parents with serious and persistent mental illness: Issues in assessment and services’ 
(2003) 48 Social Work 187.  
15 Joanne Nicholson, Elaine M, Sweeney, Jeffrey L Geller, ‘Focus on Women: Mothers with Mental Illness: I. 
The Competing Demands of Parenting and Living With Mental Illness’ (1998) 49 Psychiatric Services 635.  
16 Daphne Blunt Bugental and Joan E Grusec, ‘Socialization Process’ 
 in William Damon, Richard M Lerner (eds),  Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, emotional, and 
personality development (John Wiley & Sons, 2006) 366.    
17 It is much easier to identify the characteristics of a bad parent who is neglectful, irresponsible, disorganized, 
disinterested, abusive, etc. Good parenting tends to be viewed as a conglomeration of different common sense 
attributes such as responsibility, kindness and understanding, sense of humour, stability of personality, similar 
values and beliefs, and faithfulness/loyalty.   
18 John F Knutson, David S DeGarmo and John B Reid, ‘Social Disadvantage and Neglectful Parenting as 
Precursors to the Development of Antisocial and Aggressive Child Behavior: Testing a Theoretical Model’ 
(2004) 30 Aggressive Behavior 187.  
19 United Nations, ‘World Youth Report 2003: The global situation of young people’ (Report,  Secretary-
General, 2003) 195 <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/worldyouthreport.pdf>. “Studies show that 
children who receive adequate parental supervision are less likely to engage in criminal activities.”  
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negative behaviours
20
 that can be precursors of the future adult’s problems with 
alcoholism
21
, criminality
22
, poverty
23
, homelessness
24
 and mental illness.
25
  
Also linked to the undisciplined, antisocial, insecure and aggressive behaviours 
expressed by a child are the commonly accepted intergenerational
26
 characteristics 
of bad parenting: neglectful, irresponsible, disorganised, disinterested, and/or 
abusive parental behaviours.
27
 Children of abusive parents are also considered to 
represent a far greater risk of perpetrating abuse within their own parenting 
regimes.
28
 
29
  However, intervention is frequently viewed as difficult in those 
situations where a child is emotionally and/or psychologically abused by a parent’s 
rejecting, isolating, terrorising, ignoring, corrupting, verbally assaultive and/or 
over-pressurizing behaviours due to the intangible nature of the type of abuse.
30
 
This form of emotional/psychological abuse is commonly associated with mental 
illness. 
The types of provoking actions indicative of emotional and psychological abuse of 
children by parents are often publically and professionally accepted as 
demonstrations of bad parenting rather than the abusive actions of abusive parents, 
thereby negating any expectation of legal intervention by the state.
31
  For example, 
psychiatrists have labelled mild emotional abuse as a form of ‘bad parenting’ that is 
often administered by a misguided, yet caring parent and because the abuse is not 
perpetrated with malicious intent and does not contain an immediate danger of 
                                                 
20 Anna Stewart, Susan Dennison and Elissa Waterson, ‘Pathways from Child Maltreatment to Juvenile 
Offending’ (Research Paper No 241, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2002).  
21 Gregory T Smith, ‘Psychological Expectancy as Mediator of Vulnerability to Alcoholism’ (1994) 708 Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences 165.  See also Tomas Hemmingsson and Ingvar Lundberg, ‘Development 
of alcoholism: interaction between heavy adolescent drinking and later low sense of control over work’ (2001) 
36 Alcohol and Alcoholism 207.   
22 Joan McCord, ‘Family Relationships, Juvenile Delinquency, and Adult Criminality’ (1991) 29 Criminology 
397.  
23 Ronald L Simons et al., ‘Parenting Factors, Social Skills, and Value Commitments as Precursors to School 
Failure, Involvement with Deviant Peers, and Delinquent Behavior’ (1991) 20 Journal of Youth and 
Adolescence 645.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Stewart, Dennison and Waterson, above n 20.  
26 Dante Cicchetti and Donald J Cohen (eds), Developmental Psychopathology (John Wiley New York, 2nd ed, 
2006).  
27 Ibid.  
28 Susan Zuravin et al., ‘The Intergenerational Cycle Of Child Maltreatment Continuity Versus Discontinuity’ 
(1996) 11 Journal Of Interpersonal Violence 315.  
29 Dante Cicchetti and Donald J Cohen (eds), Developmental Psychopathology (John Wiley New York, 2nd ed, 
2006).  
30 Kieran P O'Hagan, ‘Emotional and psychological abuse: Problems of definition’ (1995) 19 Child Abuse & 
Neglect 449.  
31 Adam M Tomison and Joe Tucci, ‘Emotional Abuse: the hidden form of maltreatment’ (Issues in Child 
Abuse Prevention No 8, National Child Protection Clearinghouse, 1997).    
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emotional harm, recommend that the abuse should go legally unreported.
32
  In cases 
where the parent has a mental illness, there is a strong counter-expectation that the 
state should intervene, with the corollary that the parent’s parental rights will be 
limited or terminated by legal proscription.
33
 Imperfect parenting from a parent 
experiencing a mental illness is publically and professionally less tolerated than the 
imperfect parenting by parents without a mental illness diagnosis. 
2.1 The good v the bad parent 
As a coping mechanism for the ‘anxieties engendered by our inability to control the 
world’34, Gilman claims that a Manichean perception of the world being divided 
into the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ produced a universal need for stereotypes to create 
illusions of absolute difference between the ‘us and them’.35 The ‘good parent’, or 
arguably, the far more prevalent ‘good enough parent’,36 is a rather nebulous being 
that possesses a conglomeration of qualities drawn from a group of acceptable 
attributes.  The concept recognises that it is both unrealistic and unhelpful to 
demand perfection from parents as doing so undermines the majority of parents, 
who for all practical purposes, are ‘good enough’ to satisfy their children’s needs.37  
Qualities such as responsibility, kindness and understanding, industriousness, 
stability of personality, faithfulness, loyalty and benevolent discipline are variously 
grouped into different parenting styles which set and enforce a child’s boundaries, 
promote their emotional and physical health, optimise their potential, and maximise 
their opportunities for realising that potential.
38
   
There is, however, a lack of a research-based, empirically driven definition for what 
constitutes acceptable minimal parenting capacity. The parameters of ‘good 
enough’ parenting have been socially constructed from subjective impressions, 
                                                 
32 Stephanie Hamarman and William Bernet, ‘Evaluating and Reporting Emotional Abuse in Children: Parent-
Based, Action-Based Focus Aids in Clinical Decision-Making’ (2000) 39 Journal of the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 928. 
33 Laura J Miller and Molly Finnerty, ‘Sexuality, pregnancy, and childrearing among women with 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders’ (1996) 47 Psychiatric Services 502.  
34 Sander L Gilman, Difference and pathology: stereotypes of sexuality, race, and madness (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985) 12.  
35 Ibid, 18.  
36 Masud Hoghughi and ANP Speight, ‘Good Enough Parenting For All Children—A Strategy for a Healthier 
Society’ (1998) 78 Archives of Disease In Childhood 293. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
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culture bound beliefs and context related thresholds of concern.
39
 This raises the 
question of how parenting risks should be weighed against parenting strengths, or 
how the theoretical concept of a child’s best interests is applied to the complex and 
dynamic circumstances of each individual case.
40
  Even the principle of ‘best 
interests of the child’ discussed at Section 3.2 below is considered too vague.  It 
fails to offer the decision-maker clearly defined boundaries in the sense that the 
parents, legal representatives and expert witnesses all prescribe to be acting in the 
child’s best interests when presenting the court with conflicting alternatives.41   
Although social science research has provided courts with some general guidance, it 
has not advanced to the level of validating any specific behavioural indicators or 
standards of childrearing adequacy that can be applied to individual cases.
42
  Courts 
generally rely on the presumption that as long as the development and behaviours of 
the child are positive, the parental care is ‘good’, and until the time the child 
exhibits inappropriate or unacceptable behaviours, or publically declares their 
parent’s abuse or neglect of them,43 their parental care is accepted as good, unless of 
course, the parent has a mental illness. In this situation, the reverse assumption 
appears to apply.  
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the difference associated with mental illness is 
perceived as bad.
44
  Invariably, the stereotypes, prejudices and discriminations 
generated by ignorance, fear, and the assumptions that people with a mental illness 
are unable to organise their lives within a framework of consistent normalcy; are 
                                                 
39 Peter Reder, Sylvia Duncan and Clare Lucey (eds), Studies in the assessment of parenting (Hove, Brunner-
Routledge, 2003). 
40 Lois Oberland Condie, Parenting evaluations for the court: Care and protection matters (Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum, 2003). See also Karen S Budd, ‘Assessing parenting capacity in a child welfare context’ 
(2005) 27 Children and Youth Services Review 429.  
41 Ibid.  See also Karen S Budd, ‘Assessing parenting capacity in a child welfare context’ (2005) 27 Children 
and Youth Services Review 429.  
42 Karen S Budd and Rachael E Springman, ‘Empirical Analysis of Referral Issues And “Ultimate Issue” 
Recommendations For Parents In Child Protection Cases’ (2011) 49 Family Court Review 34.  
43 In 1978, the adopted daughter of the film star Joan Crawford wrote one of the first ‘tell all’ books in which 
she claimed that she was a victim of child abuse.  Christina Crawford, Mommie Dearest (W. Morrow, 1978). 
Joan Crawford up until 1978 had been cast in the role of ‘good parent’ having had adopted and cared for four 
children. The title of the book has been instilled into popular language as a descriptor for a ‘bad’ mother. In 
2011, actress Jacki Weaver was nominated for an Academy Award for playing the bad mother in the film 
Australian film Animal Kingdom. When Matt Mazur interviewed Weaver for Pop Matters Magazine, 13 August 
2010, he titled the article, Mommie Dearest: An Interview with Animal Kingdom's Jacki Weaver. See Matt 
Mazur, ‘Mommie Dearest: An Interview with Animal Kingdom’s Jacki Weaver’ PopMatters (online), 13 
August 2010 <http://www.popmatters.com/pm/feature/129328-mommie-dearest-an-interview-with-animal-
kingdoms-jacki-weaver/>.  
44 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16, 16.  
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incapable of controlling their disordered, impulsive and maladaptive thoughts, or 
restraining their emotional disturbances; and lack the capacity to maintain 
functional relationships,
45
 stamp them as a ‘bad parent’.   They are deficient in their 
parenting skills. And while there may be no evidence that they are harming their 
child in the present, the potential that they might do so at some point in the future is 
considered by courts to a risk that is unacceptable. This issue is discussed in more 
depth in Section 5.0 below.  
3. PARENTING RESEARCH 
The predominant practice prior to the process of deinstitutionalisation was the, 
often long term, confinement of people to mental asylums which ultimately, denied 
them the opportunity to parent children.
46
  The current public concern regarding the 
maltreating, neglectful, absorbed, cold and distant parent who is experiencing a 
mental illness is a relatively new social issue.  It arose globally in response to 
community care and treatment policies
47
 that have raised the public’s concern that 
the insufficiencies of community services
48
 have left people to ‘fall through the 
cracks’.49  This has led some commentators to declare that community care is a 
failed initiative.
50
 However, living outside institutionalised care has provided more 
opportunities for planned, and unplanned, parenthood
51
 and has resulted in a great 
increase of children, and their parents, coming before child protection and family 
law decision-makers.  
                                                 
45 Nicolas Rüsch, Matthias C Angermeyer and Patrick W Corrigan, ‘Mental illness stigma: Concepts, 
consequences, and initiatives to reduce stigma’ (2005) 20 European Psychiatry 529, 530.  
46 Kathleen Coulborn Faller and Chyrell D Bellamy, ‘Mental health problems and child maltreatment’ (1999) 
<http://141.211.91.162/public/currentProjects/icwtp/mentalhealth/d-mhpar.pdf>. 
47 Alan Rosen, Liz Newton and Karen Barfoot, ‘Clinical Perspectives: Evidence based Community Alternatives 
to Institutional Psychiatric Care’ (2003) 4 Medicine Today 90. 
48 Rachel Merton and Jenna Bateman, ‘Social Inclusion: Its importance to Mental Health’ (Research Paper, 
Mental Health Coordinating Council Inc., June 2007) 
<http://www.mhcc.org.au/images/uploaded/MHCC%20Social%20Inclusion%20booklet.pdf> 
49 Coulborn Faller and Bellamy, above n 46, 1.  
50 Julian Leff, ‘Why is care in the community perceived as a failure?’ (2001) 179 The British Journal of 
Psychiatry 381.  
51 Coulborn Faller and Bellamy, above n 46, 1. 
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3.1 The adversity approach 
While the documenting of negatively affective parental behaviours of parents who 
have a mental illness, particularly mothers,
52
 is well established in the social science 
literature,
53
 
54
 the focus of the research has been on the possible detrimental effects 
to the child. The tendency of the affluence of mainly social work literature has been 
to present the parent as permanently flawed and inherently incapable of fulfilling a 
proper parenting role.
55
 Parents are classified as less emotionally available, less 
reciprocal, less involved, less affectionate, less responsive, less encouraging and 
less positive
56
  and their children more likely to exhibit general difficulties in 
functioning, increased guilt, interpersonal difficulties, problems with attachment, 
marital difficulties and parenting problems.
57
 If required to spend a considerable 
amount of time with the parent, the child is believed to feel less stable.
58
  There is 
also an assumption that parents who exhibit extreme behaviours in their child’s 
presence make their child vulnerable and at-risk of developing their own mental 
health problems.
59
   
Children are deemed to be adversely affected their parent’s mental illness; directly 
by neglect, physical harm, and/or psychological upset, or indirectly as a 
consequence of the associated factors of mental illness including poverty,
60
 repeated 
                                                 
52 Joanna Nicholson, Elaine Sweeney and Jeffrey Geller, ‘Focus on Women: Mothers with Mental Illness: I. 
The Competing Demands of Parenting and Living with Mental Illness’ (1998) 49 Psychiatric Services 635. See 
also Laura J Miller and Molly Finnerty, ‘Sexuality, pregnancy, and childrearing among women with 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders’ (1996) 4 Psychiatric Services 502; R Kumar et al., ‘Clinical survey of a 
psychiatric mother and baby unit: characteristics of 100 consecutive admissions’ (1995) 33 Journal of Affective 
Disorders 11; Jill G Joseph et al., ‘Characteristics and Perceived Needs of Mothers with Serious Mental Illness’ 
(1999) 50 Psychiatric Services 1357. 
53 Joanna Nicholson, Elaine Sweeney and Jeffrey Geller, ‘Focus on Women: Mothers with Mental Illness: I. 
The Competing Demands of Parenting and Living with Mental Illness’ (1998) 49 Psychiatric Services 635. 
54 Clara Hemphill, ‘Hard Choices: Caring for the children of mentally ill patients’ (2009) 17 Child Welfare 
Watch 1.  
55 Barry J Ackerson, ‘Coping with the dual demands of severe mental illness and parenting: the parent’s 
perspective’ (2003) 84 Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services 109.  
56 Carol Mowbray et al., ‘Parenting of mothers with a serious mental illness: differential effects of diagnosis, 
clinical history, and other mental health variables’ (2002) 26 Social Work Research 225.  
57 William R Beardselee, Eve M Versage and Tracy R G Giadstone, ‘Children of Affectively Ill Parents: A 
Review of the Past 10 Years’ (1998) 37 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 
1134.  
58 Marc J Ackerman, Clinician's Guide to Child Custody Evaluations (John Wiley & Sons, 3rd ed, 2006) 190.  
59 David C Factor and David A Wolfe, ‘Chapter 7 Parental Psychopathology and High-Risk Children’ in Robert 
Ammerman and Michel Hersen (eds), Children at Risk; An Evaluation of Factors Contributing to Child Abuse 
and Neglect (New York: Plenum Press, 1990) 172.   
60 Knutson, DeGarmo and Reid, above n 18.  According to the third National Incidence Study (NIS–3) of child 
maltreatment in the U.S., physical abuse was associated with economic disadvantage and children from 
households with annual incomes less than $15K were almost 16 times as likely to be considered physically 
abused when the harm standard was used and 12 times more likely to be considered physically abused when the 
endangerment standard was used, than those from households with incomes greater than $30K. 
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hospital admissions, and marital disharmony.
61
 They are at heightened risk of 
developing mental health problems as they get older, perinatal complications and 
other health problems in infancy, social and behavioural problems in childhood and 
adolescence, and the consequences of stress associated with caring for a mentally ill 
parent.
62
 A child who has a parent with mental illness faces an adversity that is said 
to threaten their basic desire for safety and biological integrity; sense of personal 
control; social relatedness; self worth and attainment of developmental 
competencies.
63
 
3.2 Countering the adversity approach  
The adversity research approach does have its critics. Mordoch and Hall concluded 
from their review of the literature that researchers ignored the child’s perspective, 
focusing instead on factors considered as affecting the children’s pathology.64  
Investigators had defined pathology from a narrow biomedical focus that ‘reflected 
their own normative judgments expressed through the use of restrictive diagnostic 
categories and behavioral measures’.65 Biomedical terms such as ‘unrecognised and 
protracted grief’, ‘psychic loss’ and ‘chronic sorrow’ are claims attributed to 
children living with parents with a mental illness but do not have the necessary 
evidence and explanation as to how those feelings operate in the children’s lives.66 
They suggest that although marital discord is implicated in poor mental health 
outcomes for children, studies of children’s perspectives about parental dynamics in 
families where a parent has a mental illness needs to occur.
67
  
Ackerson’s review of the research found that the researchers tended to focus on the 
parent’s pathology, and the potential risks for their children, without considering the 
parent’s perspective.68  He noted that the literature failed to discuss the strengths 
that many parents bring to managing their illness while caring for their children.  
                                                 
61 Louis Appleby and Chris Dickens, ‘Mothering skills of women with mental illness’ (1993) 306 British 
Medical Journal 348.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Irwin Sandler, ‘Quality and ecology of adversity as common mechanisms of risk and resilience’ (2001) 1 
American Journal of Community Psychology 19.  
64 Elaine Mordoch and Wendy A Hall, ‘Children living with a parent who has a mental illness: A critical 
analysis of the literature and research implications, literature and research implications’ (2002) 16 Archives of 
Psychiatric Nursing 208.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ackerson, above n 55.  
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Parenthood, as a typical and normal role, plays a critical role in a person’s 
conceptualisations of self and identity
69
 and parenting provides value, meaning and 
security in the life of a mother with a mental illness.
70
  Mothers with a serious 
mental illness described their efforts to have meaningful relationships with their 
children as providing them with a sense of being normal, secure and responsible
71
 
and strongly believed that the biomedical entity did little to represent their 
mothering realities.
72
 Ackerson also suggested that parenting might not cause the 
stress or demands commonly feared to negatively affect parent outcomes or 
psychiatric symptoms.
73
  
Mullick found that, as it is in society generally, ‘Parents within any given diagnostic 
category can have parenting skills ranging from excellent to maltreating’74 but that 
researchers focused on the ‘maltreatment’ end of the scale and made little effort to 
show the potential parenting capabilities of parents whose mental illness is properly 
managed.
75
 Despite the temporary inabilities to parent during periods of incapacity, 
with the proper supports, parents with a severe mental illness still have much to 
offer.
76
  Although there is an abundance of studies supporting a negative 
relationship between a parent’s mental illness and their child’s well-being, no 
definite causal relationships can be drawn from the available research as little is 
known about the extent to which illness circumstances predict childhood problems. 
The findings must be interpreted with caution.
77
 
The present negative social scientific attitude toward the parenting abilities of 
people with a mental illness challenges courts to decide whether there can ever be 
sufficient benefit to the child, no matter what interpretation is given to statutory 
                                                 
69 Jennifer P Wisdom et al., 'Stealing me from myself': identity and recovery in personal accounts of mental 
illness’ (2008) 42 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 489.  See also Priscilla K Coleman and 
Katherine H. Karraker, ‘Self-efficacy and parenting quality: Findings and future applications’ (1998) 18 
Developmental Review 47. Coleman and Karraker suggest that labeling a parent as a ‘bad parent’ can cause 
depression.  
70 Mordoch and Hall, above n 64.  
71 Phyllis Montgomery et al., ‘Keeping close: mothering with serious mental illness’ (2006) 54 Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 20.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ackerson, above n 55.  
74 Mrinal Mullick, Laura J Miller and Teresa Jacobsen, ‘Insight into mental illness and child maltreatment risk 
among mothers with major psychiatric disorders’ (2001) 52 Psychiatric Services 488, 489.  
75 Robert M Galatzer-Levy, Louis Kraus and Jeanne Galatzer-Levy, The Scientific Basis of Child Custody 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
277 
requirements such as ‘meaningful relationship with a parent’.78 Even if a court 
decides that there is a benefit, in its mind the child continues to remain vulnerable 
to possible and potential future harms and risks ranging from being murdered to not 
achieving their ‘full potential’.79 ‘In many cases it is often argued that a parent's 
mental illness gives rise to an unacceptable risk to the child’.80 
3.3 The courts’ use of social science research in parenting decisions 
Although an overall discussion of judicial decision-making was undertaken in 
Chapter Five, this section briefly examines the use of social science research in 
parenting matters.  Judges are guided considerably by their subjective judgment as 
to whether a necessary criterion has been met in any given instance. In matters in 
which a parent deviates from the ‘norm’, the degree of subjectivity used by the 
judge frequently escalates.
81
 The ‘fear or loathing’ that the judge may feel toward 
mental illness may cause them to ‘obviously or artfully, disregard the statutory or 
common law standards and to avoid even the pretext of a genuine attempt to 
discover how the interests of the child might be served.’82  Browne and Giampetro 
suggest that judges often make parenting decisions that are in harmony with social 
science findings although it is not necessarily the case that they have deferred to the 
findings, but that the findings are simply consistent with the common sense hunches 
that judges use in discretionary decision-making.
83
   The judicial value of social 
science data in parenting matters in which parental mental illness is a factor 
generally rests in its support of achieving the outcome the judge desires.
84
   
In a society in which rationality is considered the measure of competence generally, 
and parental ability specifically,
85
 it is presumed that a person who has a mental 
illness is an inadequate parent. This stereotypical presumption is well established in 
                                                 
78 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC(2)(a).  
79 Ibid (2)(b).  
80 Ryan, above n 5.  
81 Anne T Payne, ‘The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and Parental Rights of Homosexual, Mentally 
Retarded, Mentally Ill an Incarcerated Parents’ (1977-1978) 16 Journal of Family Law 797.  
82 Ibid 798. 
83 M Neil Browne and Andrea Giampetro, ‘The Contribution of Social Science Data to the Adjudication of 
Child Custody Disputes’ (1985-1986) 15 Capital University Law Review 43.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Robert L Hayman, ‘Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent’ (1990) 103 
Harvard Law Review 1201. While this article deals particularly with parents who have an intellectual disability, 
the author demonstrates that the same legislative presumptions and applications are applied to parents who have 
a mental illness. ‘The purpose of the statute is to protect and promote the welfare of the child. The legislature 
has considered the very real possibility that a mentally ill or retarded individual may be unable to handle the 
responsibility of a child.’ at n.204.  
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the legal system, sitting alongside other stereotypical presumptions such as people 
with a mental illness are not truthful, are manipulative, cannot make rational 
decisions and are likely to be violent. They are thought to have a reduced 
intellectual capacity and are commonly confused with people who have an 
intellectual disability
86
 
87
 which was a finding in the study of the attitudes of law 
students reported in Chapter Eight at Sections 5.6.3 and 5.6.4.  Yet, there are studies 
that show that two-thirds of families with parental mental illness suffer no long-
term behavioural or emotional difficulties,
88
 that many parents regard their bond 
with their children as very strong and close;
89
 and that the negative effects of 
serious mental illness can be offset with adequate supports that enable the parent to 
successfully care for their children.
90
  
Although most social science studies have extremely small samples and tend to 
focus on specific high profile groups, the results are applied within the breadth of 
their judicial discretion generally by judges who seek to use the data to justify what 
they intend to do.
91
   
4. THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 - PART VII AMENDMENTS 
AND THE PARENT WITH A MENTAL ILLNESS  
The Family Law Act 1975 (the Act) is the major of piece of legislation governing 
the operation of family law in Australia. The relevant Part VII provisions applied to 
the court’s decisions about with whom a child is to live, and who they will spend 
time with have gradually become more prescriptive since the Act’s enactment in 
1975.  Part VII was significantly amended in 1995, again in 2006, and then again in 
June 2012 with the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and 
Other Measures) Act 2011.  
                                                 
86 Richard Evans, ‘Seeking Justice for the Mentally Ill’ (1995) 69 Law Institute Journal 642.  
87 The results of the study of the attitudes of law students undertaken as part of this thesis confirmed that there is 
confusion between mental illness and intellectual disability in the community. 
88 Michael Rutter and David Quinton, ‘Parental psychiatric disorder; effects on children’ (1984) 14 
Psychological Medicine 853.  
89 Ackerson, above n 55.  
90 Andrea Reupert and Darryl Maybery, ‘Families affected by parental mental illness; A multiperspective 
account of issues and interventions’ (2007) 77 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 362.  
91 Browne and Giampetro, above n 83.  
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The 2012 amendments were the government’s response to the increasing public 
concern about family violence and abuse. They were intended to remove 
disincentives to disclosing family violence to the courts, update the definitions of 
family violence and child abuse so as to clearly set out unacceptable behaviour such 
as physical and emotional abuse, and the exposure of children to family violence, 
and to ensure that appropriate action is taken to prioritise the safety of children in 
family law disputes. The intention of the reforms was to put the safety of children 
foremost in family law matters without compromising the child’s right to a 
meaningful relationship with both parents in situations in which it is safe.
92
  Courts 
applying the objective ‘best interests’ test were required to address two tiers of 
consideration; (1) primary considerations
93
 and (2) additional considerations,
94
 
giving the greater weight to the s.2 (b) consideration, ‘the need to protect the child 
from physical or psychological harm and from being subjected to, or exposed to, 
abuse, neglect or family violence’.95 
4.1 Parenting Orders 
The role of the family court is to assess effective parenting capacity, modify poor 
parenting behaviours, and if necessary, limit or terminate the parent’s association 
with their child. It must also consider any other fact or circumstance it thinks 
relevant,
96
 a consideration that captures the allegation of a parent’s mental illness. 
When examining a parent’s parenthood responsibilities,97 the court must consider 
the extent to which a parent has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity to 
participate in making decisions about major long-term issues and has 
communicated with, and spent time with the child.
98
 The parent experiencing a 
mental illness may not measure well against this normative measure as their 
symptoms and medications can often supersede desire, intention and direction.  The 
stigma associated with mental illness suggests that the parent is unable to provide 
adequate and proper parenting due to a lack of capacity to interact with their child 
in a meaningful or safe way: a primary consideration requirement in the Act.   
                                                 
92 Australian Family Law Courts website 
<http://www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FLC/Home/Whats+New/FLC_family_law_changes>. 
93 Family Law Act 1975, s.60CC (2). 
94 Ibid (3). 
95 Ibid 2A. 
96 Ibid (3)(m). 
97 Ibid (3)(i). 
98 Ibid (4). 
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Prior to the Family Law Reform Act 1995 amendments, courts had to give ‘regard 
the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration’.99  This was replaced by the 
‘best interests of the child’,100 which had replaced the long standing common law 
‘tender years’ doctrine.  Family law courts were no longer able to overtly apply the 
doctrine to their decision-making although recent U.S. statistics that indicate that 
82.2% of children of divorced families live with their mothers
101
 suggest that courts 
do still demonstrate a preference to placing children into the daily care of their 
mother unless there are compelling reasons why this should not occur. As is 
discussed below at Section 5.0, a compelling reason is often the perceived 
unacceptability of the risk that is associated with having a mental illness.  
The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (SPR) 
amendments introduced the term ‘meaningful’ into the Act with section 60B(1) 
referring to 'the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in 
their lives' and s.60CC(2) making note of  'the benefit to the child of having a 
meaningful relationship with both parents’.  In litigated circumstances of marital 
separation involving children of the relationship, the court is required to make a 
parenting order.
102
  There is a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child 
for parental responsibility to be equally shared by both parents
103
 although the 
presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that there is some undesirable aspect to 
one of the parent’s lifestyles.104   
Mental illness is often raised as a negative and/or disqualifying factor sufficient to 
rebut the presumption.
105
  When raised, courts will often reorient the proceedings to 
make the central question the parent’s mental health diagnosis106  because the 
diagnostic label stamps them as the least credible person in the process. Fear and 
risk, the immutable associates of a psychiatric diagnosis that can weigh heavily on 
the mind of a court challenged under the Act to decide whether there can ever be 
sufficient benefit to the child in having a relationship with a parent who has a 
                                                 
99 Previous s.64(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975. 
100 Family Law Act 1975, s.60CA 
101 Timothy S Grall, ‘Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2009’ (Current Population 
Reports No P60-240, U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration United States 
Census Bureau, December 2011) <http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-240.pdf>.  
102 Family Law Act 1975, s.64B 
103 Ibid 61DA. 
104 Ibid 61DA(4). 
105 Ryan, above n 5.  
106 Judith Mosoff, ‘Motherhood, Madness, and Law’ (1995) 45 The University of Toronto Law Journal 107.  
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mental illness when the decision-maker maintains the belief that if they decide yes, 
the child may be left vulnerable within an environment of potential harms and risks 
that are associated with mental illness.
107
  
4.2 The ‘best interests of the child’ 
The concept of ‘best interests’ is a guiding standard, whereby, in any given 
circumstance, reasonable people make reasonable decisions based on reasonable 
principles and the balancing and weighting of facts. The test has been criticised in 
the legal literature as being overly vague and that it leaves too much to the 
discretion of the judge so as to be little better than no legal standard at all.
108
 When 
a judge applies an objective test to whether it is in the best interests of a child to live 
with their mother or their father, both of whom are loving, caring, responsible 
parents, the decision will be subjective. It is dependent on the weight the judge 
gives to each of the legal elements, and the weight given to each set of specific 
circumstances that are unique to each of the stakeholders involved in the court’s 
decision. The weight given to each factor reflects the judge’s own priority values 
and principles, an issue that was discussed in Chapter Five.   
Although the Act specifies a list of considerations the court must give its thought to 
when reaching a best interests decision, the list is not limited and the court is 
encouraged to consider anything characteristic to the child or their parents that is 
relevant to the well-being of the child.
109
   The almost universally adopted ‘best 
interests of the child’ test110  ‘encourages the court to focus upon the unique needs 
of a particular child and his or her parents' comparative capabilities for meeting 
those ends’.111  It considers not only the practical and tangible influences, but also 
                                                 
107 Family Law Act 1975, s.60CC (2)(b).  
108 Robert E Emery, Randy K Otto and William T O’Donohue, ‘A Critical Assessment of Child Custody 
Evaluations Limited Science and a Flawed System’ (2005) 6 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 1.  
See also Robert H Mnookin, ‘Child custody adjudication: Judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy’ 
(1975) 39 Law and Contemporary Problems 226.  
109 Family Law Act 1975, s.60CC(3)(g). 
110 Convention on the Rights of the Child art 3(1) states that ‘1. In all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’ 
111 Warren T. Reich (editor in chief) Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Revised Edition, Simon & Schuster MacMillan, 
1995, Lucy S McGough, ‘Children/V. Child custody’, 371, 373.  
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the emotional and psychological influences that impact on the child’s world. 112   It 
is predictory.   
While many commentators support the ‘best interests of the child’ principle for its 
responsiveness to the unusual and different circumstance of individual children and 
their families, others, accepting that individualised decision making is appealing on 
the surface, express concern that broad and differing interpretations of the vague 
concept result in unpredictability in judicial decision-making and furtherance of 
litigation,
113
 and that this ‘allows for bias to intrude in the exercise of judicial 
discretion’.114   
Although legislation may provide some guidance on how a best interest decision 
should be made, it is left to the court to define that which may well be indefinable.  
The High Court in Marion’s case115 believed it was impossible to formulate a 
precise test capable of answering the question of ‘best interests’.116 Justice Brennan 
noted the limited usefulness of ‘best interests’ stating that it ‘does no more than 
identify the person whose interests are in question, it does not assist in identifying 
the factors which are relevant to the best interest of the child’.117 Courts have also 
raised their concerns regarding the arbitrary exercise of best interest decision-
making with judges feeling that because they are forced to make their decision by 
balancing all the considerations, it impossible to give a uniquely right answer.
118
  
The consequence of this balancing act is that judges substitute their own principles 
and standards to reach a decision that satisfies them as to the rightness of the 
decision but hauntingly, leaves open the question of whether is it truly the right 
decision for the child.  
In Burke & Van Der Molen,
119
 the mother had a history of paranoid schizophrenia 
and had previously been in a long relationship characterised by domestic violence. 
The pivotal issues for the court were the capacity of the mother to care for her 
                                                 
112 Loretta M Kopelman, ‘The Best-Interests Standard as Threshold, Ideal, and Standard of Reasonableness’ 
(1997) 22 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 271, 273.  
113 Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Submission to the Family Law Council, The Inquiry Into Relocation 
Of Children In Family Law, April 2006.  
114 Emery, Otto and O’Donohue, above n 108, 6.  
115 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
116 Ibid 251.  
117 Ibid 270. 
118 Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson and Juliet M Behrens, Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary 
and Materials (LBC Information Services, 1999) 740.  
119 Burke & Van Der Molen [2002] FMCA 276. 
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daughter by meeting her physical and emotional needs, and her capacity to protect 
the child from family violence.
120
 The expert psychiatric witness provided evidence 
of the mother’s compliance with treatment, her suitable accommodation, and 
recommended that ‘Medically, I feel that [the mother] is at present in a stable 
situation and is capable of resuming care of her daughter’.121    
But ultimately, it was the mother’s mental illness and the unacceptable risk that it 
represented that gave cause for Ryan FM to base his parenting order decision on the 
fact that the father did not have a mental illness in contrast to the mother who did. 
‘In [the father's] care by comparison to [the mother’s] care, she lives with a parent 
who does not have a serious mental illness ... [t]here are not the risks inherent in 
[the girl’s] care if she lives with her father as there are if she lives with her 
mother.
122
  
4.3 Meaningful relationship 
Section  60B(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 refers to 'the benefit of both of parents 
having a meaningful involvement in their lives' while s.60CC(2) notes 'the benefit 
to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents'. 
Unfortunately, what constitutes a ‘meaningful relationship’ or ‘meaningful 
involvement’ is not clear because ‘meaningful’ is not defined in the Act.123  ‘Nor 
does the Act provide any specific criteria to assess how parents either have, or 
should have, a ‘meaningful involvement’ in a child’s life or give guidance to the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘meaningful relationship.’124 Yet, for the few academic 
commentators who have thus far discussed the reform, the concept of ‘meaningful’ 
                                                 
120 Ibid, 47. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 53 
123 McCall & Clark [2009] FamCAFC 92, [109].  
124 Ibid. 
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is an intuitively attractive notion
125
 that is primarily about parental attunement and 
the emotional security that it brings.
 126
  
The conceptual vagueness of the SPR amendments helped in making the task of 
determining what is in the best interest of the child even more complex.
127
 A 
dictionary interpretation of ‘meaningful’ relationship is one that has meaning, 
function, or purpose raising the question of whether a relationship classified as 
‘meaningful’ must be a current relationship or whether a presently non-meaningful 
relationship has the potential for becoming meaningful in the future.  Moloney 
suggested that when making judgements about meaningfulness, courts needed to 
consider the ultimate purpose of the meaningful relationship and whether the 
relationship was meant to be meaningful in its own right or whether it had a wider 
purpose such as helping the child to achieve and develop a sense of identity.  Was a 
‘meaningful relationship’ composed of specific elements (some of its parts) or was 
it the overall experience (the sum of its parts)?
128
  
The vagueness of ‘meaningful relationship’ has resulted in various constructions 
being given to the term by family law judges over the years. Justice Brown in 
Mazorski v Albright defined it as a qualitative adjective rather than a strictly 
quantitative concept,
129
 describing the relationship as one that was ‘important, 
significant and valuable to the child’,130 emphasising that the relationship’s 
importance was from the child’s perspective.131  Justice Murphy disagreed in 
Runcorn & Raine.  He preferred the benefit approach stating that ‘the Act does not 
require a court to consider whether a party’s proposal is important, significant and 
                                                 
125 Richard Chisholm, ‘The meanings of 'meaningful' within the Family Law Act amendments of 2006: A legal 
perspective’ (2009) 15 Journal of Family Studies 60. See also Richard Chisholm, ‘Shared care and children's 
best interests: Working with the amendments of 2006’ (Paper, Legal Aid NSW Family Law Conference, 
Sydney, 22 August, 2008). See also Richard Chisholm, ‘Making it work: the Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Act 2006’ (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Law 143. Also Liz Trinder, ‘What 
might children mean by a 'meaningful relationship'?’ (2009) 15 Journal of Family Studies 20.  Also Lawrie 
Moloney, 'Meaningful relationships' in the Family Law Act Amendments of 2006: A socio-legal perspective on 
fathers, mothers and the 'sharing' of parenting after separation’ (2009) 15 Journal of Family Studies 9.  
126 Lawrie Moloney, 'Meaningful relationships' in the Family Law Act Amendments of 2006: A socio-legal 
perspective on fathers, mothers and the 'sharing' of parenting after separation’ (2009) 15 Journal of Family 
Studies 9, 9. 
127 Daryl Higgins and Rae Kaspiew, ‘Child protection and the family law…Joining the dots’ (Research Paper 
No 34, National Child Protection Clearinghouse, 2011) 
<http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/issues/issues34/issues34.pdf>.   
128 Moloney, above n 126.  
129 This was confirmed in McCall & Clark [2009] FamCAFC 92. 
130 Mazorski & Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 [526] (Brown J).  
131 Ibid 536.  
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valuable to a child. Rather, it appears to require the court to consider that such a 
relationship is of benefit to the subject children.’132   
In Godfrey and Sanders, Justice Kay thought the term to be ‘an aspiration for a 
meaningful relationship, not an optimal relationship’.133 A meaningful relationship 
was the most desirable relationship possible under the restrictions imposed by the 
facts.  The Court found in Champness & Hanson
134
 that a meaningful relationship 
could exist without a parent’s involvement in the daily lives of their children. This 
conflicted with Justice Murphy’s view in Runcorn & Raine that ‘quantity of time is 
an element of a meaningful relationship but not necessarily determinative of it.’135   
When Justice Cronin stated that ‘for there to be a meaningful relationship, it must 
be healthy, worthwhile and advantageous to the child’136 he joined the normative 
standards of value and benefit with the biomedical concept of healthiness.  The term 
‘healthy’ is indicative of good physical or mental health and stresses the absence of 
disease. It is difficult to accept that a parent who has a mental illness could satisfy 
the court using this definition particularly as His Honour added that an assessment 
of the benefit to the child must be made according to ‘the peculiar facts of what the 
parents are offering.’137  The unhealthy state of having a mental illness is a ‘peculiar 
fact’ that in many cases belongs exclusively to one parent, disadvantaging them 
against the parent without a mental illness.   
The court in Korban & Korban in its examination of the term ‘consider’ in the 
context of 65DAA said:  
The consideration of best interests involves an assessment of all the evidence 
presented and the making of factual findings. Some of those findings about 
one parent will demonstrate positive attributes which will benefit a child, other 
findings will highlight deficiencies or factors which are not likely to promote a 
child’s best interests.138 
                                                 
132 Runcorn & Raine (2008) FamCA 837 [47] (Murphy J). 
133 Godfrey and Sanders (2007) 208 FLR 287 [36]. 
134 Champness & Hanson [2009] FamCAFC 96. 
135 Runcorn and Raine (2008) FamCA 837 [45] (Murphy J).  
136 Loddington & Derringford  (No 2) [2008] FamCA 925 [169].  
137 Loddington & Derringford  (No 2) [2008] FamCA 925 [173].  
138 Korban & Korban, [2009] FamCAFC 143 [85].  
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The law clearly views a parent’s mental illness as a clinical deficiency that is 
unlikely to promote the normative ‘best interests of the child’.  This picture of 
parental ineptitude is drawn from the law’s reliance on what the biosocial sciences 
have to say about what constitutes good parenting and healthy, meaningful 
relationships which was discussed above at Section 3.4.  
5. RISK ASSESSMENT 
The discovery of child abuse by the medical profession occurred as a result of the 
early social scientists trying to understand the causes of parental maltreatment.
139
  
The researchers premised their research on the belief that only parents lacking some 
form of inner control; who were experiencing major thought psychopathy, or who 
were themselves victims of childhood trauma could be capable of behaving in such 
an abusive way.  They assumed that a distinct psychiatric syndrome or disorder 
would be found that characterised parents or other caregivers who maltreated 
children.
140
 Psychiatric factors were thought, probably, to be of ‘prime importance 
in the pathogenesis of the disorder’.141 Inspired by this belief, they attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to map the role of parental psychopathology in child maltreatment 
cases.
142
  
There is a considerable amount of evidence to indicate that parents with mental 
illness are over-represented in cases of parental abuse of a child
143
 and yet only ‘a 
small proportion of maltreating parents could be diagnosed with a psychiatric 
condition and most individuals rarely displayed extreme psychopathology’.144  The 
psychiatric-medical model of child abuse causation continues to fuel the stigma and 
prejudice associated with parenting by people who have, or are alleged to have, a 
                                                 
139 Phillip Gillingham, ‘Risk assessment in child protection: Problem rather than solution?’ (2006) 59 
Australian Social Work 86, 89.  
140 National Research Council, ‘Understanding Child Abuse and Neglect’ (Report, National Academy Press, 
1993) 111.  
141 C Henry Kempe et al., ‘The battered child syndrome’ (1962) 181 Journal of the American Medical 
Association 17, 17.  
142 Adam M Tomison, ‘Child Maltreatment and Mental Disorder’ (Discussion Paper No 3, National Child 
Protection Clearing House, 1996) <http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/discussionpaper/discussion3.html>. 
143 Michael Sheppard, ‘Double jeopardy: the link between child abuse and maternal depression in child and 
family social work’ (1997) 2 Child & Family Social Work 91. See also Lawrence M Berger, ‘Income, family 
characteristics, and physical violence toward children’ (2005) 29 Child Abuse & Neglect 107.  See also Leone 
Huntsman, ‘Parents with mental health issues: Consequences for children and effectiveness of interventions 
designed to assist children and their families’ (Literature review, Centre for Parenting & Research Service 
System Development Division New South Wales Department of Community Services, 2008) 
<http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/docswr/_assets/main/documents/research_parentalmentalhealth.pdf>. 
144 National Research Council, above n 140, 111.  
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mental illness even though the finding of a consistent profile of parental 
psychopathology or a significant level of mental disturbance is unsupported.
145
  
Researchers have relied largely on data drawn from retrospective studies of child 
protection cases in circumstances where an abuse has already occurred.
146
 
147
  Also, 
control groups were not used so it is not known whether the factors researchers 
identified were specific to the group.
148
  Generally, study findings across the topic 
have been inconsistent and contradictory with the evidence cited for ‘principal risk 
factors’ for child abuse uncertain.149   
5.2 Assessing the risk 
Decision-making surrounding allegations of child maltreatment intersect two 
different legal systems: child protection and family law.  The differences in their 
approach to risk has led to the court system delivering harsher, and more unfair 
outcomes for parents with a mental illness, a claim that is discussed in more detail 
in the following sections.  Some courts estimating risk use social-scientific risk 
assessment tools such as the family structure/severity of illness category system 
devised by Maybery et al..
150
 The usefulness of these ‘at risk’ models and the 
application of ‘risk management’ - processes identification, assessment and 
prioritisation of risks - have become subject to recent criticism.  The tools are 
claimed to be a statistical rather than psychological concept which Hubbard 
considers to be little better than astrology.
151
 Gillingham reports that in matters of 
child protection, the reliability of the assessment tools is extremely low and that the 
behaviour generalisations in the tools do not always apply.  He notes that ‘Concepts 
                                                 
145 Ibid.  
146 Gwynnyth Llewellyn, David McConnell and Luisa Ferronato, ‘Prevalence and Outcomes for Parents with 
Disabilities and their Children in an Australian Court Sample’ (2003) 27 Child Abuse & Neglect 235. This study 
funded by the Law and Justice Foundation of NSW examined the  court files of all 285 care and protection 
matters (involving 469 children) initiated by the statutory child protection authority and finalized in a nine 
month period at two Children's Courts in NSW, Australia.  Parental psychiatric disability was the most 
prevalent at 21.8% (84 cases) 
147 Rosemary Sheehan and Greg Levine, ‘Parents with mental illness: Decision-making in Australian Children’s 
Court cases involving parents with mental health problems’ (2005) 27 Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 17. In this survey found that of the 114 cases referred to the Melbourne Children’s Court in early 2002 for 
pre-hearing conferences, 25% of the parents (28 parents) had mental health issues.  
148 Nigel Parton (ed), Child Protection and Family Support: Tensions, Contradictions and Possibilities 
(Routledge, 1997).  
149 Ibid.  
150 Darryl Maybery, Andrea Reupert and Melinda Goodyear, ‘Evaluation of a model of best practice for families 
who have a parent with a mental illness’ (Research Report, Charles Sturt University, 2006).  
151 Douglas W Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2009) 46.  
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such as risk of harm and actual harm are, in practice, used interchangeably’.152 This 
interchangeability aspect helps to reinforce the law’s stereotypical conviction that 
parents who have a mental illness harm their children.  
5.3 Risk thresholds in child protection 
Risk to children is considered as measurable and manageable which implies that 
harm ‘can always be effectively predicted and prevented - and that if it is not, then 
someone is to blame’.153  Increased levels of public scrutiny and the community’s 
concern over what it perceives to be poor child protection decisions
154
 have resulted 
in risk-taking becoming strongly associated with blame, fear and aversion.
155
 Much 
has been written nationally and internationally in past decades with regard to the 
perceived deficiencies of the child protection system.
156
 Blame is often reflected in 
the negative media coverage, particularly when the story concerns the death of a 
child, of the child protection officer’s ‘wrong decisions’ or the ‘wrong procedures’ 
that were in place in the child protection system.
157
  
Common system problems such as increasing case numbers, staff burnout and high 
staff turnovers have resulted in young and inexperienced staff conducting investiga-
tions and being required to make recommendations on complex cases
158
 
159
 that 
often intersect issues of domestic violence, mental illness and substance misuse.
160
  
Consequently, decision-making in child protection law has become highly risk 
averse.
161
  Some commentators suggest, however, that the acceptance and 
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157 Marie Connolly and Mike Doolan, M, ‘Child deaths and statutory services: Issues for child care and 
protection’ (2007) 2 Communities, Families and Children Australia 26. 
158 Daryl Higgins and Ilan Katz, ‘Enhancing service systems for protecting children: Promoting child wellbeing 
and child protection reform in Australia’ (2008) 80 Family Matters 43.  
159Australian Association of Social Workers (Qld) Submission to the Queensland Child Protection Commission 
of Inquiry, August 2012  
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(Research Paper No 33, Australian Institute of Family Studies, National Child Protection Clearinghouse, 
December 2010).  
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application of risk assessment tools has more to do with protecting the decision-
maker and their authorities from blame and any mistakes that may have been made 
than trying to more effectively protect children.
162
  
5.4 The measure of harm in Australia’s child protection legislation 
Across Australia’s child protection systems, the risk generally needs to be the 
significance of the harm: Queensland
163
, Northern Territory
164
, South Australian
165
, 
Victorian
166
, Western Australian
167
 and Australian Capital Territory
168
 Acts.  
Recently, as a consequence of the Wood Inquiry into Child Protection in New 
South Wales,
169
 the risk threshold in that state was raised to children needing care 
and protection only when they are at risk of ‘significant harm’.170   
In Tasmania, in contrast to other Australian states and territories, the measure of the 
harm is missing altogether from the legislation. The Tasmanian Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1997, makes no reference to a child in need of care 
and protection but does refer to a child ‘at risk’.  This is the child who has been 
subjected to, is being subjected to or who is likely to be subjected to abusive and 
neglectful acts and behaviours; and who is subject to the consequences that arise 
from such acts and behaviours such as being physically or psychologically injured 
or harmed.
171
  
5.5 Risk threshold in the family courts 
The issue of ‘risk to the child’ has been discussed at length by Australian family 
law judges, most particularly, in regard to sexual abuse although ‘ascertaining and 
giving appropriate weight to any situation which may represent future risk and the 
acceptability of such risk has a much wider application.’172 173 Fogarty offers 
examples of other situations which include ‘the risk of serious violence, including 
                                                 
162 Gillingham, above n 139.  See also Chris R Goddard, Bernadette J Saunders, Janet Stanley and Joe Tucci, 
‘Structured risk assessment procedures: Instruments of abuse? (1999) 8 Child Abuse Review 251. 
163 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) ss 9–10.  
164 Care and Protection of Children Act 2007 (NT) s 15(1).  
165 Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 6(2).  
166 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 162.  
167 Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) ss 28 (1)–(2).  
168 Children and Young People Act 1999 (ACT) ss 151, 156.  
169 Wood, above n 156.  
170 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) s 23.  
171Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas) ss 3, 4. 
172 John Fogarty, ‘Unacceptable risk - A return to basics’ (2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 249, 251.  
173 A v A (1998) FLC 92-800. 
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
290 
domestic violence, risks associated with a dysfunctional or hazardous lifestyle, or 
the imposition of social or religious attitudes which are seen to be outside broad 
community norms.’174 Although he does not mention mental illness specifically, 
‘dysfunctional and hazardous lifestyle’ might be viewed as an encapsulation of such 
intent.  
In M and M,
175
 the High Court, when examining ‘risk’, indicated that a court must 
assess the magnitude of the risk. The efforts of courts to define with greater 
precision the magnitude of the risk has led to a number of different formulations.  
These include ‘risk of serious harm’176; ‘an element of risk’ or ‘an appreciable 
risk’177; ‘a real possibility’178; a ‘real risk’179; and an ‘unacceptable risk’.180  
The phrase ‘unacceptable risk’ was endorsed by the Full Court in Johnson v 
Page.
181
 It is this formulation that appears to be the current authoritative statement 
on the law
182
 although it raises the question of ‘unacceptable’ to whom and seems 
meaningless in the sense that it can be used by judges to mean whatever they want. 
It appears to be a cloak for discretion without much restraint. However, Fogarty 
suggests that the advantage of using this term is that ‘it is calibrated to the nature 
and degree of the risk, so that it can be adapted to the particular case’.183  Yet when 
a court examines whether a parent’s mental health poses an ‘unacceptable risk’ to 
the child, the term ‘unacceptable risk’ is not always explicitly used.184   
Although the courts have tried to define with greater precision the magnitude of the 
risk associated with the harm, there is no absolute criteria on which judges can rely 
when deciding what constitutes ‘serious’ harm.  The United Kingdom government’s 
                                                 
174 Fogarty, above n 172, 251. 
175 M and M (1988) 166 CLR 69; 82 ALR 577; 12 Fam LR 606; [1988] FLC 91-979. 
176 A v A (1976) VR 298, [300].  
177 Marriage of M (1987) 11 Fam LR 765, [770]–[771]. 
178 B v B (Access) (1986) FLC 91-758, [75] [545].  
179 Leveque v Leveque (1983) 54 B CLR 164, [167]. 
180 In re G (a minor) (1987) 1 WLR 1461, [1469]. 
181 Johnson and Page [2007] Fam CA 1235; (2007) FLC 93-344 (May, Boland and Stevenson JJ) [68].   
182 Richard Chisholm, ‘Unacceptable risk – a comparison of the family law and care jurisdictions’ (Article 
derived from a paper prepared for the Children’s Court Conference, Parramatta, 1 September 2010).  
183 Fogarty, above n 172, 252. 
184 Julia Beehag and Mitchell Little, ‘Family Consultant Mental Health Support Training – Case law on 
Unacceptable Risk and Mental Health’ (Research Memo, 12 12 February, 2008) 
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=au&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShtZ_4XYhbnpyBFd8eH0jfi5_OT0cMSHtOazYuALCStpnuTADsfW46cRgwPY5
L4fXmacUd-QI4-sdHp8-
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guidance to its courts is that parenting decisions are to be made by considering the 
maltreatment alongside the child’s own assessment of his or her safety and welfare, 
the family’s strengths and supports, as well as making an assessment of the 
likelihood and capacity for change and improvements in parenting and the care of 
children.
185
  Conversely, the Australian courts’ position is that the views of the child 
will not be given weight even if the child expresses a strong preference for the more 
dangerous placement.
186
  Evidenced by the case studies presented in Section 6.0 
below, the more dangerous placement appears to be the placement in which the 
parent has a mental illness.  
5.6 Conflict between the two legal systems 
The courts and child protection system’s different approaches to risk have brought 
the two systems into conflict. The higher risk threshold of the child protection 
system means that it is not prepared to intervene in some matters for which the 
court holds the belief that it should. In Ray and Males, Benjamin J was critical of 
the Department of Children’s Services (DOCS) and its unwillingness to intervene. 
He held that the Family Court had the power to make an order requiring DOCS to 
intervene.
187
 The order was overturned on appeal to the Full Court which held that 
the Family Court does not have the power to order the intervention of the child 
protection system into a matter that is before the courts.
188
  
5.6.1 Case Study - Michael and Lodders
189
 
The complex case of Michael and Lodders is an example of the level of the conflict 
that exists between the child protection systems and the courts.  In this case, the 
applicant mother sought the formalisation of existing contact arrangements 
(alternate weekends, half block holidays, weekly telephone calls), a mutual non-
denigration order, and shared parental responsibility for the child whom she 
believed should continue to reside with her former partner. The mother was 
                                                 
185 Department for Children Schools and Families, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-
agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’ (Report, Department for Children Schools 
and Families, March 2010) 35  
<www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/safeguardingandsocialcare/safeguardingchildren/workingtogether/workin
gtogethertosafeguardchildren/>. 
186 Franka and Grantham [2011] FamCA 32 (1 February 2011) [33]. 
187 Ray and Males [2009] Fam CA 219 (Benjamin J, 31 March 2009). 
188 Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services & Rollinson & Cheeseman & Ors [2010] 
FamCAFC  258. 
189 Michael and Lodders [2008] FamCA 389.  
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diagnosed with schizophrenia. She had the delusion that her child was not her 
natural child. Due to the mother’s psychiatric status and psychological condition, 
the father sought an order that the mother should only have one day a month 
supervised contact.   
Justice Cohen felt that, as at times the mother had conducted her case without the 
benefit of legal representative, he had had ample opportunity to assess her. He 
decided that she was ‘non-aggressive with very little, if any, animosity toward the 
father’.190  His initial view of her character was that ‘[s]he appears at first to be 
thoughtful, pleasant and essentially a decent person’191 but he would later state that 
she was manipulative, deceptive and would lie to achieve her ends.
192
  He did not 
trust the psychiatric assessments of the mother believing instead that she had gone 
to great lengths to deceive doctors about her mental health.
193
 He formed the view 
that her treating psychiatrist, whom she saw monthly and who had not prescribed 
her any medication because he believed her to be healthy, had been duped.
 194
   The 
judge’s opinion was that the mother’s condition, history and expressed delusions 
meant that she posed a physical and psychological risk to the child’s welfare.  
Justice Cohen was also extremely critical of DOCS which ‘knew that the mother 
was schizophrenic’ and psychotic.195 DOCS’ past supervision of the mother had 
generated reports that she was caring well for the child and that the child was 
happy.
196
  When the mother’s untreated schizophrenic delusions resulted in the 
mother fingerprinting the child twice a day, the child was removed and placed into 
the care and protection of the Director General of DOCS pursuant to s. 43(1) of the 
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW).  However, 
Cohen J formed the belief that DOCS had abandoned, or failed in its essential duty 
to the child, and he expressed his concerns about the Department’s ability to protect 
children who need protection.
197
  Trying to rationalise DOC’s support of the 
‘mentally ill’ mother, and understand why it had refused to inform the father of the 
                                                 
190 Ibid,11. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid 63. 
193 Ibid 99. 
194 Ibid 70. 
195 Ibid 45. 
196 Ibid 47. 
197 Ibid 44. 
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child’s whereabouts,198 he surmised that it was because the mother had complained 
to DOCS, as she had to the court, that the father was violent to her. However, he 
believed that even ‘[i]f her complaints were true, the child would still have been 
safer with the father than with the mother.’199 It seemed that in the judge’s mind, a 
child is better placed with a violent father than with a mother with a mental illness. 
During an incident of irrational behaviour, the mother had thrown three objects at 
the father, and pushed him while he held the child. The trial judge believed that this 
occasion demonstrated the mother’s greater propensity for violence.200 ‘Even if the 
father had been as violent as the nebulous claims of the mother suggest, this would 
be far from a sufficient reason to depart from the orders which would be made if 
there had been no violence’.201 The judge was satisfied, however, that despite the 
mother’s complaints of a history of violence, the only time the father had assaulted 
her was in the circumstances in which his actions, ‘if not wholly excusable, are 
quite understandable and do not indicate that he is a person of violent 
disposition’.202 Cohen J believed that ‘the most worrying risk that the mother posed 
to the child was known and unknown delusional beliefs and any which she might 
develop’.203 He accepted that the risk of the mother’s violence was quite remote but 
stated ‘[n]o matter that this is a very remote possibility, the Court cannot discount 
the risk to the extent that it is regarded as acceptable’.204  Cohen J went on to make 
an order that there was to be no contact, supervised or otherwise, including 
telephone contact, between the mother and the child.  
As a consequence of applying to the court for the formalisation of access 
arrangements, and contrary to the wishes of the child’s father, the law stripped the 
mother with a mental illness of all contact with her child. This case can be 
contrasted with the case of Connor & Hulett
205
 in which the court made an order 
giving regular supervised and telephone contact to a father with a serious psychotic 
illness who had a history of compelled treatment and aggressive and violent 
behaviours.  
                                                 
198 Ibid 43. 
199 Ibid 45. 
200 Ibid 41. 
201 Ibid 127(j) 
202 Ibid 41. 
203 Ibid 127(k). 
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5.6.1.1 ‘Bad mothers’ 
Mothers have long been venerated by the courts which have considered that she 
alone had the patience and sympathy necessary to mould and soothe a child’s mind 
in its adjustment to its environment’.206  In 1945, High Court Chief Justice Latham 
stated that ‘the mother is entitled to custody except where there is the strongest 
evidence that her custody would be detrimental to the child’.207 The Court 
reaffirmed this view point in 1961 when it concluded that there was a strong 
presumption, although not one in law but founded on experience, that a young child 
should be raised by the mother.
208
 However, as Justice Glass made clear in 
Epperson v Dampney, this poeticised bond only exists between a child and the 
‘good mother’.209   
There is a general presumption that a mother who has a mental illness is by 
diagnostic consequence, an unfit parent. The perception of her as a helpless, naïve, 
inexperienced, irresponsible, unpredictable, scatty, tearful, disorganised and 
dangerous ‘mad’ mother continues to fuel society’s belief that she is incapable of 
fulfilling the responsibilities of caring for a child.  Courts will frequently focus on 
the mother's mental illness as the basis for removing a child and terminating her 
parental responsibilities.210 Rather than grounding their findings in demonstrated 
harm to the child, judges frequently base them on stereotypical assumptions of bad 
mothering.
211
  
In making their decisions, judges often rely on the myths of good mothers and 
bad mothers and in so doing, perpetuate and re-create the myths of 
motherhood....In cases terminating parental rights, however, the judges do not 
feel compelled to define the nexus between the behavior or status of the 
mother and harm to the child. Because they assume that their readers have 
internalized the same mythology, they often give information that appeals to 
the reader on a non-rational level: once you know this one piece of 
                                                 
206 Jenkins v Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (Wis. 1921) 
207 Latham C.J., Storie v Storie (1945) 80 CLR 
208 Kades v Kades (1961) 35 ALJR 251 
209 Epperson v Dampney (1976) 1 Family Law Note No 29, 10 ALR 227 
210 Paul Bernstein, ‘Termination of Parental Rights on the Basis of Mental Disability: A Problem in Policy and 
Interpretation’ (1991) 22 Pacific Law Journal 1155.  
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information about this mother (or these pieces of information), it is clear what 
the result in this case should be.212  
The court ordered outcome in Michael and Lodders appears exceptionally harsh and 
unfair for the mother. It is extremely difficult to accept that based on her mental 
illness, she was not labelled, stereotyped, blamed and punished by a sanist court.   
6. RECENT FAMILY LAW PARENTING DECISIONS IN 
WHICH PARENTAL MENTAL ILLNESS WAS AN 
EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT FACTOR 
A review of 322 Australian family law parenting orders made between 2006 and 
2011 was conducted as an original contribution to this thesis.  Judgements of the 
Family Court of Australia and the Federal Magistrates Family Law Court that had 
been uploaded to the Australasian Legal Information Institute (Austlii) were 
searched using the broad key input term, ‘mental illness’.  The search returned 322 
cases. On examination, less than 10% of the 322 cases dealt with other family 
matters such as property, divorce, relocation, name change and procedural issues.   
Once these cases were removed, 296 parenting matters remained. They all featured, 
with varying levels of prominence in the decision-making process, assessments of 
‘meaningful relationship’, ‘best interest of the child’, and predictions of ‘risk’.  
Most commonly, risk was connected to future emotional or psychological harm 
rather than to physical harm.  A reading of the judgments tended to support the 
proposition that parents with a history of mental illness are often viewed by courts 
as an ‘unacceptable risk’.  Even when courts found that the parent did not represent 
a risk, behaviours that the party had exhibited many years earlier were seen to 
influence the current decision-making. For example, in the 2009 case of Fosbery & 
Fosbery, the reasons for judgment included the assessment that ‘[t]he mother’s 
mental unwellness post 2003 did make her detached’.213  The courts rarely appeared 
to consider that it might be in the child’s best interests to grant the parent with a 
                                                 
212 Odeana R Neal, ‘Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights’ (1996) 5 Kansas 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 61, 67. 
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mental illness the outcomes that they sought if those outcomes were contrary to the 
submissions of the party who did not have an experience of mental illness.  
The sample was manipulated by removing those judgments in which a ‘mental 
illness’ label was attached to both parties as were the cases in which convincing 
medical evidence was submitted to show that the parent had a mental illness but 
because of their ‘lack of insight’ into their illness, they denied having a mental 
illness such as was the case in ZSP & AH.
214
 Additionally, cases in which there was 
medical evidence to indicate that the parent was acutely unwell at the time of the 
proceedings were discarded.  This left cases that were circumstantially less 
complicated.  The cases focused on a single parent with a diagnosis of a mental 
illness, and on cases in which certain factors were present that suggested to the 
courts that they could have a mental illness.  
The four cases presented below were selected because they are examples of how 
judges, when undertaking the difficult task of weighing and balancing the interests 
and protection of children in parenting matters, seem to amplify the ‘fear and 
loathing’ associated with mental illness. As argued throughout this thesis, these 
attributes are apparent in the legislation that judges must interpret, and are 
characteristics of the values and beliefs that they consciously or unconsciously 
follow when applying the law (See Chapter Five, Sections 6.1 and 6.2).   
This study lays open a rich avenue for future research to better determine the extent 
that family law judges, consciously or unconsciously, interpret parenting legislation 
and make parenting decisions that are rooted in the stereotypical belief that the 
‘mentally ill’ parent is an ‘unfit parent’.  The review of the 296 cases in this study 
suggests that to varying degrees, parents that are labelled with the tag of mental 
illness are treated more harshly and less fairly than the parent not so labelled.  The 
cases presented below were chosen because they best represent the different types 
of situations in which a court appears to have treated a parent thought to have a 
mental illness extraordinarily harshly and unfairly. 
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6.1 Case study - KN v Child Representatives and Others
 215
 
In the case of KN v Child Representatives and Others, proceedings for a residence 
order were commenced by the grandparents of a child who had been living with the 
grandparents since their daughter had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital.  They 
alleged that the child had complained to them that the mother’s de facto partner had 
acted in a sexually inappropriate manner; that he and the mother had a violent 
relationship; and they asserted that the child was at risk due to the mother’s 
psychiatric condition.  
Regarding the mother’s mental health, the expert psychiatric witness gave evidence 
that at the time the mother showed no evidence of her past severe mental illness; did 
not appear to be in immediate need of psychiatric care;
216
 and that it was unlikely 
the past illness would reoccur.
217
 He advised the court that the return of the child 
into her mother’s care would, in fact, be very positive in terms of the mother’s 
mental health.
218
 The child representative supported this proposed outcome.  The 
trial judge decided, however, that although it was ‘with extreme reluctance in the 
face of the recommendations of the child representative’219 it was an unacceptable 
risk for the child to live with her mother.
220
  
The mother and the child representative challenged the decision on appeal to the 
Full Court which found that the decision was unsafe and the judgment could not 
stand.
221
  The court’s assessment of the evidence of violence did not support the 
trial judge’s finding that there was a serious risk to the child’s welfare222 although 
the court did not know what weight the trial judge had afforded violence in his 
combination decision.
223
 Regarding the issue of sexual abuse the trial judge had 
stated that ‘if I were only to have to take into consideration matters relating to 
sexual abuse I could not find that there would be an unacceptable risk to [K] in her 
living with her mother’.224  
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The Appeal Court found that the trial judge had placed significant emphasis on the 
mother’s mental health and the risk that she might attempt suicide at some time in 
the future.
225
 The judge had expressed his deep concern about this possibility 
which, although he considered that in itself it was unlikely to satisfy ‘unacceptable 
risk’, when contemplated in combination with other matters, it had influenced his 
decision.
226
 In the later case of Johnson v Page,
227
 the Full Court would go on to 
decide that the components that form a conclusion of ‘unacceptable risk’ do not 
each have to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities but that ‘unacceptable risk’ 
can be established by an accumulation of factors which none, or only some of the 
factors reach the standard of proof.
228
    
A difficulty for the court was trying to understanding why the trial judge had 
disregarded the evidence of the expert witness with regard to risk to the child being 
unlikely as well as accepting options available to the court that presented greater 
risks.
229
 Another difficulty was in understanding the judge’s criticism of the 
mother’s response to the allegation that her partner had sexually abused her child.   
Although she is not the abuser, the mother, not the perpetrating father, is 
frequently held responsible for child abuse either because of her presumed 
failure to protect her child or because of her silence.230 
The judge claimed that she denied that the abuse had occurred and he saw this 
attitude of denial as an example of her poor parenting. 
in the circumstances given the gravity of the allegations and their 
consequences I would have expected a different response and it indicates in 
part the attitude of the mother to parenting. This attitude is not so severely 
inadequate as in itself to prevent [K]’s living with her mother but it is one 
further event in the over-all suite of concerns expressed by Ms Tonkin which I 
find to some extent compelling.231  
The Appeal Court found that the judge’s statement did not reflect the evidence.  The 
court determined that when the allegations were first brought to her attention by the 
                                                 
225 Ibid, 100. 
226 Ibid, 133. 
227 Johnson and Page [2007] FamCA 1235; (2007) FLC [93-344]. 
228 Ibid, (May, Boland and Stevenson JJ), 68.   
229 Ibid, 101 
230 Bernardine Dohrn, ‘Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins’ (1995) University 
of Chicago Law School Roundtable 1, 7. 
231 Ibid, 26.  
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Department of Community Services, she had ‘said rather poignantly: “I wanted it 
cleared up for myself, that there was no room for error, that there could have 
possibly anything been done to [K]”.’232 The court was also critical of the trial 
judge’s failure to explain what ‘different response’ he had expected, and how her 
failure to give that different response indicated an inappropriate attitude in regard to 
her parenting obligations particularly, as it was so compelling as to be a relevant 
consideration of the outcome of the case.
233
  
The assumption that the woman is a "bad mother," or at least an inadequate 
mother in a "dysfunctional family," may lead the state to remove her children 
in order to protect them even when there is no child abuse. 
The mother in this case clearly confronted a sanist court driven by myths and 
stereotypes. She was labelled an ‘unfit parent’ because of the combination of 
allegations that she was a victim of domestic violence, that her child was sexually 
abused by her partner, and that she had a past history of mental health problems 
including suicide attempts.  Yet, to arrive at his decision, the trial judge had to 
disregard and distort evidence, and accept assertions that were not supported by 
evidence at all.  He manipulated the case to satisfy his personal value and belief that 
children are best placed in the care of responsible, kindly and loving grandparents 
than in the care of  a ‘mentally ill’ parent. 
6.2 Case study - Langmeil and Grange
234
 
In an adversarial family system, it is almost mandatory to discredit the other 
party.
235
 Allegations of child abuse and neglect are commonly raised in parenting 
disputes although doing so exposes the parent to judicial analysis as to whether 
making the claim is an indicator that they are ‘mentally ill’. New Zealand’s High 
Court Justice Thomas stated in Gooch v Gooch, that when a mother raises such a 
claim in the family court, ‘her motives are viewed with suspicion.  It is suspected 
that she is seeking to discredit the father and so advance her claim to custody or to 
restrict the father’s access.  Her credibility is put squarely in issue’.236  
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Emeritus Professor and child protection expert, Freda Briggs
237
, believes that 
women who accuse their former partners of sexually abusing their children are 
being unfairly labelled as mentally ill in the Family Court.
238
  Allegations are 
commonly explained as products of maternal coaching driven by ‘delusion’, 
‘enmeshment’ or ‘vengeance’, and mother’s who refuse to accept judicial decisions 
face loss of residence and contact with their children.
239
 Some solicitors advise their 
clients not to raise concerns of sexual abuse because they will seem to be 
obstructive,
240
 and an unfriendly parent, the worst thing possible in the family 
court.
241
  
In matters in which a sexual abuse allegation is made and the mother has an 
established diagnosis of a mental illness, courts do not find it too difficult to justify 
their decision that the mother’s mental health issues – her delusional beliefs – is an 
unacceptable risk if it decides that the risk of the sexual abuse by the father is not 
unacceptable. Even when the medical evidence indicates that the mother does not 
have a mental illness, the court may regard the allegation as sufficient evidence to 
decide that the child is at ‘unacceptable risk’ if in the care of the mother.242  
The case of Langmeil and Grange was heard on appeal by the full court from the 
lower court decision of Bell J who had ordered that the children, who had been 
living with their mother, were to live with their father, to whom the judge gave sole 
responsibility for their parental care. The mother had made numerous claims against 
the father and his family, alleging they had sexually abused the children.
243
  The 
judge, however, found that no such abuse had occurred.  He ordered the mother to 
undergo psychiatric counselling that was directed to the issue of ‘the mother’s near 
delusional beliefs concerning what she perceives to be the father’s sexual abuse of 
the children’.244 
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<http://www.smh.com.au/national/cries-of-child-abuse-bounce-back-on-mums-20100327-r49d.html>. 
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The appeal court accepted the psychiatric evidence which had also been presented 
to Bell J, which was that the mother did not have a mental illness and that she was 
not delusional. However, in pointing to statements made by Bell J where he had 
referred to ‘conduct on the part of the mother that he regarded as being ‘delusional 
behaviour’,245 ‘the mother’s “delusional actions”’,246 and ‘the mother’s “delusional 
beliefs”’,247 the court explained that ‘his Honour did not find that the mother 
was mentally ill, nor did he find she was delusional in the psychiatric sense.’248 
Surprisingly, although the court noted that the judge had ordered the mother to 
undergo psychiatric counselling, it distinguished the order by suggesting that it was 
psychiatric counselling for her ‘near delusional beliefs’249 rather than for any actual, 
psychiatric condition. 
Justice Bell did not, in contra regard to the psychiatric evidence which stated that 
the mother did not have a mental illness, expressly state that the mother did have a 
mental illness although his published perceptions of her presentation, behaviour and 
character suggest that that was what he believed. Although not mentioned by the 
Appeal Court, he had referred to the mother’s ‘continued unjustified, bizarre and 
delusional actions in relation to the allegations against the father’.250 Bell J also 
stated that the mother in evidence presented somewhat bizarrely, and had a most 
unfortunate manner in the court. She had tended to laugh inappropriately and was 
not a person that gave him very much confidence in her ability to look at reality.
251
  
It seems that in the judge’s mind, the mother’s ‘delusions’ were clearly distinct 
from her bizarreness, and that overall, the totality of her unacceptable behaviours 
indicated, at least to him, that she was ‘mentally ill’. Given that the medical 
evidence stated that she did not have a mental illness and was not delusional, it 
suggests that the court may have been prejudiced according to the standard 
definition of prejudice which is ‘any unreasonable attitude that is unusually resistant 
to rational influence’.252 This sidestepping or disregard of psychiatric evidence 
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246 Ibid 39.  
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favourable to the party but contrary to the outcomes reached by the decision-maker 
was apparent in a number of the cases. 
6.3 Case study - Velkov & Tudor-Brown 
253
 
The case of Velkov & Tudor-Brown examined the risk of psychological abuse to a 
child. The mother had appealed against interim orders that had radically changed 
the parents’ previous, long standing, equally shared care arrangements.254 The 
interim orders made by Altobelli FM required that the child was to no longer live 
with the mother and instead, live with the father. The mother was only permitted to 
spend three hours of supervised time with the child twice a week.  The catalyst for 
the court proceedings was the mother’s claim that the child had disclosed sexual 
abuse by the father.  In response, the father asserted that the child was subject to the 
risk of ‘unacceptable psychological abuse’ if she remained in the care of the mother.  
It appears that in this case, there was no evidence submitted to the courts that either 
party had experience of a mental illness.  
Appealing the interim orders, the mother and the children’s representative argued 
that the Federal Magistrate had erred in finding that there was an ‘unacceptable risk 
of psychological abuse’ if the child was in the care of the mother. While he had 
thought that there was a risk to the child in the theoretical sense in both households, 
he had considered the risks were different in magnitude.  
I do not regard the risk of exposing the child to sexual abuse in the father’s 
household to be an unacceptable one ... The magnitude of the risk to the child 
in the father’s household is not significant. Nonetheless, I believe that I can 
further reduce the risk by imposing certain restrictions on the father’s activities 
involving the child that might otherwise give rise to the possibility of abuse .... 
Conversely, I am concerned about the magnitude of risk in the mother’s 
household. The risk of psychological abuse to this child is unacceptable. I have 
concerns that the manner in which these allegations have been raised exposes 
the child to harm. I am concerned about what the mother says to the child 
when she is with her. For the time being I am confident that the child can be 
protected in the father’s household. I do not have the same confidence in the 
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mother’s household. My task and responsibility is to protect the child and I am 
satisfied in this case that this is the best way to achieve this.255 
On appeal, the Full Court found that the judge had not given reasons for his finding 
that there was an unacceptable risk of psychological abuse if the child should live in 
the mother’s household.256 He had not conducted an analysis of the risk of 
psychological abuse, nor had he considered what safeguards could be put in place to 
overcome the risk in a similar way to the exercise he had undertaken in respect of 
the alleged risk in the father’s household.257  The court ordered that the relevant 
orders made by Altobelli FM be set aside. 
When fathers who are alleged to have perpetrated sexual abuse upon their children 
come before the courts, the courts are generally willing to set in place safeguards to 
overcome the risk to the child. Courts are prepared to do this even in cases where 
the parent has a history of violence,
258
 is a registered sex offender,
259
 or has actually 
been convicted of sexually abusing their child.
260
  The view of the court has 
traditionally been that ‘[t]he consequences of denying contact between the abusive 
parent, usually the father, and the child may well be as serious as the risk of harm 
from abuse’.261   
This compassion and latitude does not, however, appear to extend to the parent who 
presently has, or in the past has had, a mental health diagnosis. Nor does it extend to 
the parent that the court, contrary to medical evidence, has a conscious, or 
unconscious, irrational belief that they are ‘mentally ill’. Sanism is built on 
irrationality, stereotypes and myths.  In cases of accusations by mothers of their 
former partners sexually abusing their children, even though the mental health of 
the parent is not a factor in the proceedings, the nature of the proceedings can result 
in the label of ‘mental illness’ being applied subconsciously by judges.  In this way, 
judges can justify classifying the accuser as incapable of safe parenting and their 
potential for harm as permanent and irrepairable. Unlike sexual abuse, with mental 
illness there is no need to manage the risk if you remove the child. 
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6.4 Case study - Donaghey & Donaghey
262
 
Justice Murphy’s decision in Donaghey & Donaghey succeeded in raising the ire of 
parents and children’s organisation across Australia. The National Peak Body for 
Safety and Protection of Parents and Children headlined on its website, ‘Raise 
sexual abuse and lose your child for good!’263 Justice Murphy had ordered that a six 
year old be removed from his mother’s care and live with his father, who was 
someone who had no experience in the role of being a single, full-time, primary 
carer. The judge ordered that the mother’s contact with the child was to be delayed, 
and then limited and supervised in the future.  In arriving at his decision, the judge 
dismissed the evidence of witnesses including a psychiatrist and a psychologist, 
whose opinions were that the child was a victim of sexual abuse.   
The parents separated when the child was 16 months old.  For the following five 
years, the father had short access periods that at the mother’s insistence were 
supervised by her.  In 2009, the mother sought orders to continue this arrangement. 
The father successfully sought orders that the child live with his mother but that he 
have increasing periods of access to the point that the child would spend alternate 
weekends and half school holidays with him. The mother alleged that the father 
sexually abused to child during access visits and the child reported that his father 
has threatened to kill him.264  
At this hearing, Justice Murphy pathologically decided that although the mother did 
not have a mental illness diagnosis, she had fixed ideas that, while less than 
delusional were not entirely realistic or rational. He negatively assessed her 
presentation in the witness box, finding her ‘to be a highly anxious person’, ‘upset’ 
and under ‘very severe, stress’.265 Interestingly, the language used by Justice 
Murphy mirrors the statement made by Merrilyn McDonald in her article, The Myth 
of Epidemic False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Divorce Cases: ‘The mother may 
present to the court as anxious, stressed and upset about the situation, which in 
                                                 
262 Donaghey & Donaghey [2011] FamCA 13. 
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some minds seems to support the idea of her insanity’.266 And while the judge 
thought that the mother’s belief that her former husband had sexually abused the 
child was a genuine belief,
267
 and a belief that was also held by the child,
268
 he 
found that the father did not represent an ‘unacceptable risk’ to the child as the 
mother had alleged.  
In arriving at his decision, he had given more weight to the impression that he had 
formed of the father’s ‘good and very healthy relationship’269 with a previous wife 
and the child of that relationship.  In contrast, the intensity of the mother’s views270 
persuaded him that the father did ‘not pose any risk of harm to the child’271 and that 
if the child continued to live with his mother, he would suffer very serious 
psychological harm
272
 from which he needed the court’s protection.273  The idea 
that a woman may be angry, malicious and mentally ill, but her allegations of 
sexual abuse still may be genuine is not a common consideration of the courts.
274
 
The cases reviewed suggest that family courts are not always willing to set in place 
the community supports necessary to reduce risks to enable parents experiencing a 
mental illness continued contact with their child. There are opportunities within the 
community for assessment, support and intervention. There are services that take a 
holistic approach to the needs of families around clinical and social supports for 
parents and children. Education of children about mental illness is available.  There 
is also provision for intensive family therapy
275
 albeit insufficient.  However, the 
courts’ continued use of the measure of ‘unacceptable risk’ rather than ‘significant 
risk’ in parenting matters makes it appear that it is more likely that parents who 
experience mental illness will have their parental responsibilities severely restricted 
or lose them altogether.   
                                                 
266 Ibid 18. 
267 Ibid 230. 
268 Ibid 222. 
269 Ibid 238. 
270 Ibid 96. 
271 Ibid 234. 
272 Ibid 235. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Merrilyn McDonald, ‘The Myth of Epidemic False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Divorce Cases’ (1998) 
Court Review 12, 18. 
275 Ibid.  
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
306 
7. CONCLUSION 
Parenting has been identified as the most significant variable implicated in the 
development of a child and consequently designated as society’s most important 
public health issue.
276
 This import has generated an abundance of primarily, 
pathologically focused research on the parenting capabilities of members of 
marginal and disadvantaged groups such as the intellectually disabled, substance 
users and people who have a mental illness. Research has predominately taken the 
disease approach which carries the implicit presumption that people who have a 
mental illness are abnormal although the findings are at times appear 
contradictory.
277
  Some researchers suggest that research on the effects of mental 
illness on parenting is limited.
278
  The majority, however, conclude that parental 
mental illness results in problematic parenting practices that negatively influence a 
child’s development.279  
The purpose of Chapter Six was not to discount or trivialise the real risks that some 
children in situations of parental mental illness can confront.  Its purpose was to 
highlight the fact that the stigmatising, stereotyping and labelling of all parents who 
experience mental illness often results in the unfair loss or restriction of their 
parental responsibilities. Inherently biased courts fail to draw what should be the 
necessary nexus between the parent’s illness and reliable evidence regarding their 
present and future parenting capacity.  This is largely because established within the 
legal system is the sanist presumption that mental illness is synonymous with poor 
parenting. This presumption is implicitly and explicitly endorsed by health and 
human policies and child protection and family law statues. It provides the 
foundation on which legal decision-makers construct their decisions.  
                                                 
276 Masud Hoghughi, ‘The importance of parenting in child health’ (1998) 316 British Medical Journal 1545.  
277 Maybery, Darryl., Andrea Reupert, Kent Patrick, Melinda Goodyear, Lin Crase, ‘Vic Health Research 
Report on Children at risk in families affected by parental mental illness’ (2005) Victorian Health Promotion 
Foundation Mental Health and Wellbeing Unit, 
http://www.fcms.net.au/documents/documents/Children%20at%20Risk%20in%20Families%20Affected%20by
%20Mental%20Illness%20.pdf> 
278 Huntsman, Leone ‘Parents with mental health issues: Consequences for children and effectiveness of 
interventions designed to assist children and their families’ (Literature review, Centre for Parenting & Research 
Service System Development Division New South Wales Department of Community Services, 2008).  
279 Daphna Oyserman et al., ‘Parenting Among Mothers With a Serious Mental Illness’ (2000) 70 American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 296. See also Sally K Gallagher and David Mechanic, ‘Living with the mentally ill: 
Effects on the health and functioning of other household members’ (1996) 42 Social Science & Medicine 1691. 
See also Diane Garley et al., ‘Children of the mentally ill: a qualitative focus group approach’ (1997) 4 Journal 
of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 97.  
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
307 
Although there is a legal onus on people experiencing a mental illness to prove, in 
limited situations, that they are incapable,
280
 the far more onerous burden is placed 
on parents experiencing a mental illness to prove in family law that they are, in fact, 
capable.
281
 The parent must not only prove that they satisfy the legal standard of 
mental capacity but that they also have the social capacity to function according to 
an amorphous set of idealised parenting norms. They are also required to do this in 
an environment where their parenting skills are assessed against perceived risks that 
are driven by the notion that all parents with mental illness are a risk to their 
children.  The legal system reinforces the public perception that because of their 
mental illness, these parents are, or potentially are, abusive and/or neglectful of 
their children. Their narratives are viewed as less credible when measured against 
the contradictory evidence of more powerful actors such as police officers, welfare 
workers, mental health experts, legal representatives and opposing parties who do 
not have a mental illness diagnosis.  
Having entered the family law system, the parent quickly realises that the making of 
a parenting order may be the most significant issue that they will ever face because 
they can lose the opportunity to parent their child even when it is in the child's best 
interest that they do so.
282
  Carrying the label of mental illness signals to the 
decision-maker that the parent conveys with them an array of potential harms and 
unacceptable risks ranging from not helping the child with their homework or 
hugging them enough to committing infanticide.  This blame approach propels the 
need to subject parents to constant predictive risk assessments. For the decision-
maker, the availability of a broad focus of unspecified risks makes it easier for them 
to err on the side of caution.  
Theoretically, the law guides and controls parenting decisions but in practice, it is 
the prevalence of vague rules and unclear meanings that direct decision-makers 
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toward making value judgements that they believe to be in the child’s future, 
undefined, best interests. In the public mind, mental illness is indelibly associated 
with dysfunction, interpersonal violence, homicide and suicide. In the mind of the 
legal system charged with protecting children, these associations assume that the 
parent’s mental illness makes them unable to keep their child safe from harm from 
self or others.  The child’s interests and welfare is, and should be, paramount when 
predicting the risks associated with inadequate or improper parenting. The problem, 
however, is that sanism magnifies any risk to an unacceptable level.  Sanist courts 
are rarely willing to move beyond blind acceptance of the stigmatised and 
stereotypical relationship of mental illness with unacceptable risk which leads to 
decision-making that can unfairly disadvantage the parent, as well as the child.  
This chapter has demonstrated that, as Perlin has long argued, sanism appears to be 
pervasive in the legal system, or at least, in the small area of the legal system 
examined as part of this thesis: the area in which allegations of unfit parenting are 
made and decided.  A discussion of the concepts of good and bad parenting showed 
that the stigma and stereotypes associated with mental illness significantly influence 
social research which, in turn, reinforced the law’s expectations of what constitutes 
a good parent set out in child protection and family law legislation. They are also 
reflected in the case study decisions drawn from the review of recent Australian 
family law parenting orders which showed that courts determine a good parent to be 
a parent who is devoid of the ‘unacceptable risk’ of mental illness.  
Chapter Six has shown that stigmatising, stereotyping, labelling and discrimination 
is prevalent. Chapter Seven presents an option for changing the negative attitudes 
and behaviours that both fuel sanism in the legal system, and are products its 
insidiousness. Its suggests that the participation of law students in a therapeutic 
jurisprudence based clinical program such as Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme may help to positively improve the attitudes of future legal 
professionals.  They then may help to break down the legal system’s sanist barriers 
thereby increasing the opportunities for people who experience mental illness to 
receive fair and equitable legal outcomes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL 
REPRESENTATION SCHEME 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A premise of this thesis is that law students possess stereotypical and prejudicial 
beliefs about mental illness. It is reasonable to assume that these negative attitudes 
will, on entry into professional practice, help to reinforce Michael Perlin’s 
perception of a sanist legal system that treats people with experience of mental 
illness unfairly and more harshly. This raises the question as to whether an 
intervening factor such as a student’s participation in a therapeutic jurisprudence 
modelled clinical program similar to the Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal 
Representation Scheme (MHTRS) which is evaluated in this chapter might 
positively alter the student’s poor mental health attitudes.  If this was to occur, the 
newly graduated practitioner may contribute to reducing stigma and decreasing 
discrimination in the legal system?  
The earliest chapters studied the failure of public health paradigms and policies to 
provide the law with clear and consistent guidance and examined the law’s reliance 
on the biomedical labelling model which stamps the person experiencing mental 
illness as abnormal, different, disabled, dysfunctional and dangerous.  These 
characteristics, particularly the risk due to the potential capacity to commit harm to 
others were discussed in Chapter Three as factors that both drive stigma, and are 
produced by it. Chapter Four discussed the largely unsuccessful global strategies to 
reduce the stigma associated with mental illness generally, and to decrease its 
related discrimination. Professor Patrick McGorry, psychiatrist, mental health 
advocate and 2010 Australian of the Year suggested that it was society’s inherent 
prejudice toward people with a mental illness, and its acceptance of discriminatory 
language that was responsible for the failure of anti-stigma policies and programs.
1
 
                                                 
1 Mark Metherell, ‘Mental health failure tied to prejudice: McGorry’, The Age (online), 23 June 2010 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/mental-health-failure-tied-to-prejudice-mcgorry-20100622-yvuf.html>. 
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Chapter Five moved on from the broader discussion of the themes of prejudice and 
discrimination to the specific examination of Michael Perlin’s dual theories 
particular to the legal system: sanism and pretextuality.  Similar to McGorry, 
Perlin’s explanation for why it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to combat the 
prejudice associated with mental illness is because of its social acceptability.  
Chapter Six sought to test Perlin’s concept of sanism by examining it within the 
specific legal area of conflicted parenting.  It examined the moral notion of the ‘bad 
parent’ which is inextricably linked to the abnormal, different, disabled, 
dysfunctional and dangerous label attached to a person who has experience of a 
mental illness as discussed in Chapter Three.  It compared family law legislation 
and decision-making with child protection legislation and decision-making to show 
that the evidence suggests that parents with a mental illness are treated even more 
unfairly by the family law system where ‘potential risk’ is commonly interpreted to 
mean unacceptable risk, and ‘unacceptable risk’ is generally interpreted to mean 
‘mental illness’. 
This chapter is important to this thesis because it presents an option for positive 
change.  It reviews the literature related to attitudinal change and identifies that the 
best outcomes have having achieved though short term structured programs that 
combine specific education and contact stratagems and that are directed toward the 
young person demographic.  It then discusses the MHTRS, a program which it is 
suggested, meets the criteria identified for maximum effectiveness in positively 
changing attitudes.  Since 2003, the MHTRS has provided mental health skills and 
awareness training for University of Tasmania law students who are then able to 
effectively represent clients appearing before the Tasmanian Mental Health 
Tribunal (MHT) on civil commitment and compulsory treatment matters. Details of 
the scheme’s objectives and training programs are provided in Appendices 4, 5 and 
6 at the end of the thesis.   
The MHTRS has had a significant impact on Tasmania’s legal landscape.  It has 
also influenced discussion and practice in other jurisdictions. In 2008, Carney wrote 
that ‘[i]n Tasmania, neither the Legal Aid Commission nor community legal centres 
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provide MHT representation, instead relying on student volunteers.’ 2  In the same 
article he also stated that ‘Queensland Legal Aid also rarely appears in the MHT. 
Instead its specialised mental health unit concentrates on people charged with 
criminal offences appearing in the Mental Health Court’.3  While the situation has 
largely remained unaltered in Tasmania, Queensland implemented its own MHTRS 
in 2012. The Queensland scheme is based on the Tasmanian scheme. The 
Queensland Public Interest Clearing House (QPILCH) and Queensland universities 
provide the student volunteers.  
This chapter is valuable as it presents the MHTRS as a potential solution to the 
serious problem of non-representation for parties appearing before mental health 
courts in many jurisdictions. One of the major issues contributing to non-
representation is the financial burden attached to the provision of free legal services. 
The MHTRS is a cost minimal scheme that relies primarily on volunteer services.  
But most importantly, for the purpose of this thesis, Chapter Seven helps in the 
testing of the hypothesis presented in Chapter Eight that the education and training 
that the MHTRS volunteers receive and the contact that they have with the clients 
that they represent can influence their future professional practice and may 
contribute to the creation of a more aware, less sanist legal system.  
2. CHANGING LAW STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD 
MENTAL ILLNESS  
In 2002, Corrigan and Watson identified three main approaches to stigma reduction 
in their seminal article, Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental 
illness.
4
 In 2012, Corrigan et al. undertook a meta-analysis of the research 
published during the intervening decade for the effects that the antistigma 
approaches of protest or social activism, education of the public, and contact had 
had on reducing public stigma associated with mental illness.
5
 They found that 
overall, education and contact had had positive effects on reducing stigma for adults 
                                                 
2 Terry Carney et al., ‘Advocacy and Participation in Mental Health Cases: Realisable Rights Or Pipe-Dreams?’ 
(2008) 26 Law in Context 125, 130. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C. Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16.  
5 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Challenging the Public Stigma of Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis of Outcome 
Studies’ (2012) 63 Psychiatric Services 963.  
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and adolescents with a mental illness although contact was better than education at 
reducing stigma for adults.  Face to face contact was the most effective form of 
contact. The opposite pattern was found to be the case for adolescents with 
education being more effective than contact
6
, a contrary result to the findings of 
earlier research.
7
 Although there appears to be an empirical leap frogging between 
contact and education for the title of ‘most effective’, both strategies have been 
proven to be particularly effective when applied to the 17 – 24 age demographic of 
university students.  
2.1 Education 
Education as an anti-stigma strategy evolved from the belief that the negative 
attitudes associated with mental illness are fuelled by ignorance
8
, which led to the 
global delivery of less than effective
9
 mental health factual knowledge literacy 
programs.
10
 The educational plan for reducing stigma was that educators would 
provide accurate diagnostic information that challenged the knowledge recipient’s 
prejudices and rectified inaccurate stereotypes.
11
 Although some educational 
programs did report successful outcomes in reducing stigmatised attitudes,
12
 
concerns were raised regarding their methodologies, lack of behavioural measures, 
sample sizes, program content, and sustainability of attitudinal changes leading 
researchers to urge concern about relying on education as a mental illness stigma 
reduction tool.
13
   
Education programs have, however, also been shown to have had unintended 
negative consequences.
14
 The biogenetic causal model’s intention of shifting onset 
blame away from the person, and countering culpability and choice, so that the 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Vanessa Pinfold et al., ‘Active ingredients in anti-stigma programmes in mental health’ (2005) 17 
International Review of Psychiatry 123.  
8 Geoffrey Wolff et al., ‘Community Knowledge of Mental Illness and Reaction to Mentally Ill People’ (1996) 
168 The British Journal of Psychiatry 191.  
9 Robert Hayes et al., ‘Stigma directed toward chronic illness is resistant to change through education and 
exposure’ (2002) 90 Psychology Reporter 1161.  
10 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Mental illness stigma: problem of public health or social justice?’ (2005) 50 Social 
Work 363.  
11 Patrick W Corrigan and Jenessa R Shapiro, ‘Measuring the impact of programs that challenge the public 
stigma of mental illness’ (2010) 30 Clinical Psychology Review 907. 
12 Heather Stuart, ‘Fighting the stigma caused by mental disorders: past perspectives, present activities, and 
future directions’ (2008) 7 World Psychiatry 185.  
13 Patrick W Corrigan, ‘How stigma interferes with mental health care’ (2004) 59 American Psychologist 614.  
14 Caroline E Mann and Melissa J Himelein, ‘Putting the person back into psychopathology: An intervention to 
reduce mental illness stigma in the classroom’ (2008) 43 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 545.  
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person is no longer seen as someone responsible for their illness can actually 
worsen offset responsibility so that the person is seen as less responsive to 
treatment, permanently mentally unwell,
15
 and consequently, unpredictable and 
potentially dangerous.
16
 
17
  The literacy programs have also contributed to the 
minimisation of the impact that social and environmental factors have on mental 
health
18
 and have confused the frequency of common mental illnesses with the fair 
treatment of people experiencing the uncommon, severe mental illnesses.
19
  
While the positive impact of public education programs so far appear to be 
limited,
20
 there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the attitudes of young people 
can be improved
21
 through their participation in short courses.
22
 It is important, 
however, that the education is balanced rather than just presenting a one-sided view 
of the symptoms, problems, issues and all that is extreme and ‘wrong’ with the 
person but offer students a sense that there is also much that is whole and right 
about the person, and that each person is unique in their mental health experience. 
This may be achieved by presenting law students with an aspirational model of 
legal practice with social justice as its core component.
23
   
Social justice involves recognition that there will always be people in society who 
will need a significant amount of support and assistance, no matter how much 
treatment, coercion, encouragement, education or training they receive. Law 
students should be taught how to apply a therapeutic jurisprudence approach which 
explicitly values psychological wellbeing to their practice.
24
 Traditional legal 
education has taken a dispassionate approach to the practice of law and has largely 
                                                 
15 Edward E Jones et al., Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships (W.H. Freeman, 1984). 
16 Matthias C Angermeyer et al., ‘Biogenetic explanations and public acceptance of mental illness: systematic 
review of population studies’ (2011) 199 The British Journal of Psychiatry, 367.  
17 Edward E Jones et al., Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships (W.H. Freeman, 1984). 
18 ‘Cosmetic anti-stigma campaigns miss the point’ (2012) 4 North Shore Schizophrenia Advocacy Bulletin 
<http://www.northshoreschizophrenia.org/images/2012%20Feb%20 Advocacy%20Bulletin.pdf>. 
19 Carolyn Shimmin, ‘Understanding stigma through a gender lens’ (2009) 11 Canadian Women’s Health 
Network 14. 
20 Paul E Holmes et al., ‘Changing attitudes about schizophrenia’ (1999) 25 Schizophrenia Bulletin 447, 454.  
21 Vanessa Pinfold et al., ‘Reducing psychiatric stigma and discrimination: evaluation of educational 
interventions in UK secondary schools’ (2003) 182 The British Journal of Psychiatry 342, 344.  
22 Holmes et al., above 20. See also James K Morrison et al., ‘An attempt to change the negative, stigmatizing 
image of mental patients through brief re-education’ (1980) 47 Psychological Reports 334. 
23 Susan L Brooks, ‘Practicing (And Teaching) Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Importing Social Work Principles 
And Techniques Into Clinical Legal Education’ (2005) 17 St. Thomas Law Review 513.  
24 Bruce J Winick and David B Wexler ‘The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical 
Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic’ (2006) 13 Clinical Law Review 605.  
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ignored the teaching of interpersonal skills.
25
  Law schools commonly teach 
students to be impersonal in their professional dealings which, although it may have 
advantages, can also have long term negative mental health consequences for the 
lawyer.
26
  
Adversarialism is said to be deeply embedded in both the formal and hidden 
curriculums of Australian law schools and while most now teach courses that 
include non-adversarial processes, ‘the pervasive ethos is - often unintentionally - 
adversarial’.27  Yet, most legal conflicts are resolved through negotiation and 
compromise. Lawyers work toward achieving win-win conflict resolutions because 
many of their clients may have continuing relationships that might survive the 
conflict
28
 such as disputes amongst family members and employers and employees. 
This is particularly the case in matters of mental health law where treating 
clinicians, allied health workers and families and carers are often fundamental to the 
future well-being of a person experiencing a mental illness.  
2.2 Contact 
Personal contact has shown to be a consistently effective anti stigma strategy as it 
dispels myths and stereotypes through direct experience.
29
 In the absence of direct 
contact, a person’s attitudes are influenced by cultural stereotypes conveyed 
through jokes, newspaper articles, and television and film dramatisations in which 
people experiencing mental illness are commonly portrayed as dangerous and 
unpredictable.
30
 Contact exposure produces a significant tendency to revise negative 
beliefs, not only toward the particular individual contacted, but toward people who 
experience mental illness in general.
31
 Importantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
the literature indicates that the benefits of contact extend to professional 
                                                 
25 Michael S King, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: New Directions in Courts, Legal Practice, Research 
and Legal Education’ (2006) 15 Journal of Judicial Administration 129. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Molly Townes O'Brien, ‘Facing down the Gladiators: Addressing Law School's Hidden Adversarial 
Curriculum’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 43, 43.  
28 Ibid 55.  
29 Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘The effect of personal experience with mental illness on 
the attitude towards individuals suffering from mental disorders’ (1996) 31 Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology 321. See also David L Penn et al., ‘Dispelling the stigma of schizophrenia: what sort of 
information is best?’ (1994) 20 Schizophrenia Bulletin 567.  
30 Judith G Rabkin, Lenore Gelb and Joyce B Lazar (eds) Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill: Research 
Perspectives, Judith G Rabkin, Determinants of Public Attitudes About Mental Illness: Summary of the 
Research Literature, (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980) 15-26. 
31 Bruce G Link and Francis T. Cullen, ‘Contact with the mentally ill and perceptions of how 
dangerous they are’ (1986) 27 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 289.  
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relationships
32
, essential to realising the goal of effecting positive change in the 
legal system. 
2.2.1 Contact reduces prejudice 
Contact leads to improved attitudes and behaviour toward mental illness,
33
 a 
widespread belief held by social scientists since the publication of Allport’s 1954 
contact hypothesis: increased knowledge resulting from increased contact reduces 
prejudice levels.
34
 Researchers have considered it essential to include in their 
studies Allport’s four conditions for achieving optimal outcomes - 1) the contact is 
between relative equals, 2) participants have common goals, 3) there is no 
competition between participants, and 4) the contact is auspiced by those in 
authority.
35
  Pettigrew found, however, that these conditions were not, in fact, 
essential to achieving positive outcomes and that even contact that had not included 
any of Allport’s key conditions still produced significant prejudice reducing 
outcomes.
36
  He reasoned that instead of being necessary, Allport’s conditions only 
acted ‘as facilitating conditions that enhance the tendency for positive contact 
outcomes to emerge.’37 Koschate suggested that rather than treating the contact 
conditions as an interrelated bundle of variables, they should be regarded as 
independent factors.
38
   
These findings are important as they help to inform contact studies between 
professionals and patients/clients where power imbalances in particular, do not 
support the likelihood of relationships that are between equals. They help to explain 
the successful stigma reducing outcomes achieved by programs such as the Mental 
Health Tribunal Representation Scheme in which university students report 
increased awareness of mental health issues, greater understanding of the problems 
faced by people experiencing mental illness, decreased levels of fear and increased 
levels of social acceptance after contact.   
                                                 
32 Patrick Corrigan et al., ‘Three strategies for changing attributions about severe mental illness’ (2001) 27 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 187. 
33 Graham Thornicroft, ‘Reducing stigma and discrimination: Candidate interventions’ (2008) 2 International 
Journal of Mental Health Systems 1.  
34 Gordon W Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley, Oxford, 1954).  
35 Ibid.  
36 Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R Tropp, ‘A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory’ (2006) 90 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 751, 766. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Miriam Koschate and Rolf van Dick, ‘A multilevel test of Allport’s contact conditions’ (2011) 14 Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations 769.  
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2.3 Retrospective and prospective assessment 
Researchers have predominately used two methods, retrospective and prospective, 
to study the impact of contact on stigma associated with mental illness, finding that 
in both methods both direct and indirect contact has proved successful
39
 although 
direct social contact appears to be the most effective approach of the two.
40
  The 
retrospective approach asks participants to report on their prior contact with people 
experiencing a mental illness with the responses assessed for correlation with 
variables such as dangerousness
41
 and social distance.
42
 Although many 
retrospective studies found that previous contact significantly lessened perceived 
dangerousness and the desire for increased social distance, other studies reported 
non-significant findings
43
 which may be explained by the involuntariness of the 
prior contact.
44
   
There are also concerns that retrospective self reporting measures or interviews are 
methods that give rise to the uncertainty as to whether the self reporting is biased in 
a socially desirable direction that only suggests the appearance of true change and 
whether people whose attitudes are adjusted positively, also adjust their 
behaviours.
45
 This study has taken the prospective approach as this is the more 
pertinent approach to changing attitudes and behaviours of law students through 
their direct contact with people experiencing a mental illness while participating in 
training and representation programs while at university.  
2.3.1 Prospective assessment 
The prospective approach differs from the retrospective approach because it does 
not ask participants about prior exposure, instead asking them to have contact with 
people experiencing mental illness as a part of the present research. Early studies 
using university student participants found that their attitudes and behaviours were 
                                                 
39 Sarah Clement et al., ‘Filmed v. live social contact interventions to reduce stigma: randomised controlled 
trial’ (2012) 201 British Journal of Psychiatry 57.  
40 Rebecca R Reinke et al., ‘Examining two aspects of contact on the stigma of mental illness’ (2004) 23 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 377.  
41 Link and Cullen, above n 31.   
42 Sangjun Moon et al., ‘Factors affecting social distance toward mental illness: a nationwide telephone survey 
in Korea’ (2000) 41 Preventive Medicine & Public Health 419.  
43 Holmes et al., above n 20.  
44 Patrick Callaghan et al., ‘Attitudes toward mental illness: Testing the contact hypothesis among Chinese 
student nurses in Hong Kong’ (1997) 26 Journal of Advanced Nursing 33.  
45 Monika E Kolodziej and Blair T Johnson, ‘Interpersonal Contact and Acceptance of Persons With Psychiatric 
Disorders: A Research Synthesis’ (1996) 64 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1387. 
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significantly improved after they had participated in volunteer programs in mental 
health hospitals.
46
  Hochberg recruited university students to spend an hour a week 
for an academic year with chronically ill patients in a hospital setting.  Anecdotally, 
he reported that the students found their participation was an intellectual and 
emotional experience and it had led to increased tolerance, self acceptance, a greater 
sense of social responsibility and changed personalities.
47
  
Similarly, Chinsky and Rappaport found that their student volunteers had gained 
‘[s]ignificantly more favorable attitudes toward "mental patients"’48 and had 
increasingly seen the patients as ‘real, sometimes warm, and even likable people’, 
in contrast to many of the student’s previously held stereotypical beliefs.49  In Kish 
and Hood’s study, after having spent 10 weeks in voluntary contact with patients, 
considerable improvement was recorded in the stereotypical attitudes of students 
that included rating the patients as significantly less dangerous as they had believed 
them to be prior to contact.
50
 Penny’s study showed that student ideas about mental 
health could be changed through positive fieldwork experiences.
51
 
Contact can reduce feelings of anxiety and fear.
52
 There appears to be a significant 
correlation between anxiety reduction and empathy and knowledge, suggesting that 
there is a causal sequence operating which implies that initial anxiety must be 
reduced first through contact before increased empathy, perspective taking, and 
knowledge can effectively contribute to prejudice reduction.
53
  This pattern of 
positive contact-linked change persists across a variety of samples, settings, and 
with various durations of contact.
54
 Contact not only produces meaningful 
                                                 
46 Karl E Scheibe, ‘College students spend eight weeks in mental hospital: A case report’ (1965) 2 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 117.  
47 Jules D Hochberg, ‘The companion program: Implementing the manpower recommendations of the joint 
commission on mental illness and health’ (1963) 18 American Psychologist 224, 226.  
48 Jack M Chinsky and Julian M Rappaport, ‘Attitude change in college students and chronic 
patients: A dual perspective’ (1970) 35 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 388, 392.  
49 Ibid.  
50 George B Kish and Rosa-Weller Hood, ‘Voluntary activity promotes more realistic conceptions of the 
mentally ill by college students’ (1974) 2 Journal of Community Psychology 30. 
51 Neil Penny, Jack Kasar and Tony Sinay, ‘Student attitudes toward persons with mental illness: The influence 
of course work and level II fieldwork’ (2000) 55 The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 217.  
52 Stefania Paolini et al., ‘Effects of direct and indirect cross-group friendships on judgments of Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of an anxiety-reductive mechanism’ (2004) 30 Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 770. See also Irene V Blair, Bernadette Park and Jonathan Bachelor, 
‘Understanding intergroup anxiety: Are some people more anxious than others?’ (2003) 6 Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations 151.  
53 Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R Tropp, ‘How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests 
of three mediators?’ (2008) 38 European Journal of Social Psychology 922, 930.  
54 Kolodziej and Johnson, above n 45.   
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reductions in prejudice, and more favourable attitudes toward the participants in the 
immediate contact situation, e.g. the patients in the mental health ward, it also has 
the same positive impact in reducing prejudice and improving attitudes about 
mental illness generally, and toward everyone who experiences a mental illness.
55
  
2.4 Structured contact 
Contact intervention appears to be especially effective when included as part of the 
training of undergraduate students
56
 but the contact needs to be structured and 
guided as structured contact has achieved higher positive results than situations in 
which contact was unstructured.
57
  Structured contact that is misguided can present 
people experiencing a mental illness as ‘patients’ who are ‘passive victims of 
fate’.58  In this type of situation, the focus is on the person’s problems, deficiencies 
and distress which can reinforce negative stereotypes and evoke aversion and fear.
59
 
It is ‘necessary to specifically tailor the classroom instruction in order to avoid 
increasing negative attitudes.’60 As Perlin states when referring to the pernicious 
impact of bias and stereotypes associated with mental illness, ‘[l]aw teachers are not 
immune. Left-leaning law teachers are not immune. Clinical teachers are not 
immune.’61 It is important that a clinical legal program’s syllabus, and its 
teachers/supervisors, guide students beyond simply gaining valuable practical legal 
skills and experience but also achieving positive attitudinal and behavioural 
changes via non-sanist education and personal contact.   
2.5 Voluntariness 
A number of studies have strongly suggested that in order for contact to be 
beneficial and effect positive attitudinal change, it must be voluntary.
62
 
                                                 
55 Thomas F Pettigrew, ‘Secondary transfer effect of contact: Do intergroup contact effects spread to 
noncontacted outgroups?’ (2009) 40 Social Psychology 55.  See also Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R Tropp, 
‘A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory’ (2006) 90 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 751. 
56 Kolodziej and Johnson, above n 45.   
57 Pettigrew and Tropp, above n 36.  
58 Beatrice A Wright, ‘Developing constructive views of life with a disability’ (1980) 41 Rehabilitation 
Literature 274, 275.  
59 Mike Lyons and Robyn Hayes, ‘Student Perceptions of Persons With Psychiatric and Other Disorders’ (1993) 
47 The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 541.  
60 Helene S Wallach, ‘Changes in attitudes toward mental illness following exposure’ (2004) 40 Community 
Mental Health Journal 235, 247.  
61 Michael L Perlin, ‘They Keep It All Hid: The Ghettoization of Mental Disability Law and Its Implications for 
Legal Education’ (2010) 54 St. Louis University Law Journal 857, 861.  
62 Wallach, above n 60. See also Neil Penny, Jack Kasar and Tony Sinay, ‘Student attitudes toward persons with 
mental illness: The influence of course work and level II fieldwork’ (2000) 55 The American Journal of 
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Voluntariness was a key factor in Wallach’s study in which the student participants 
could decide to volunteer to work with the patients or simply visit them. She found 
that the group who volunteered to work with the mental health patients as compared 
to the group, who chose only to visit them, demonstrated a significant positive 
change in attitudes while the attitudes of the visiting group did not show similar 
improvement.  
Link and Cullen reasoned that this link between benefit and voluntariness might be 
explained by the volunteer’s pre-existing positive attitudes towards mental illness 
which prompted them to seek out the contact in the first place. However, their study 
found that there was no discernible difference between the more voluntary groups 
(contact that is likely to be chosen - a decision is made to work, volunteer or 
associate with people who have a mental illness) and less voluntary contact groups 
(contact that is unlikely to be chosen – where contact is with a family member, 
friend or work colleague who has a mental illness), supporting their notion that 
contact itself has a causative role in the contact–stigma relationship.63  It is contact 
that ‘reduces perceptions of dangerousness rather than the reverse, since several 
different types of contact that are unlikely to be chosen are related to lower levels of 
fear.’64  
2.6 Length of contact 
Link and Cullen suggested that the more contact a person had with someone 
experiencing a mental illness, even if it was not intimate contact, significantly 
reduced the fear they felt toward people experiencing mental illness generally. This 
suggested to them that attitudes can potentially be changed if opportunities to 
become familiar with people experiencing mental illness are increased.
65
 
                                                                                                                                        
Occupational Therapy 217. See also Annie Rousseau and Anton F De Man, ‘Authoritarian and socially 
restrictive attitudes toward mental patients in mental health volunteers and nonvolunteers’ (1998) 83 
Psychological Reports 803. Also Patrick Callaghan et al., ‘Attitudes toward mental illness: Testing the contact 
hypothesis among Chinese student nurses in Hong Kong’ (1997) 26 Journal of Advanced Nursing 33.  
63 Link and Cullen, above n 31.  
64 Ibid 296.  
65 Ibid.  
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
330 
However,
66
 Lyons and Ziviani found that if the length of contact time is too short, 
students are not able to acclimate to the setting and overcome their anxiety.
67
   
Wallach concluded that the influence of exposure on attitudes was not linear, and 
that while extensive experience was shown to be beneficial in changing attitudes, 
limited experience such as a ‘visit to a mental health institution in addition to 
classroom instruction or classroom instruction alone, was harmful not only when 
compared to extensive experience, but even when compared to a no exposure 
group.
68
  On the other hand, Schwartz’s findings did not support the contact 
hypothesis that contact is related to attitudes and contact reduces stereotyping and 
discrimination, instead suggesting that it was the type and situational factors of the 
contact which were more important than the dichotomous measure of ‘some 
contact’ as opposed to ‘no contact’.69 However, Corrigan’s recent study 
demonstrated that contrary to these earlier study findings, in the 10-24 age group 
both education and contact are effective in changing attitudes, with education being 
the more effective of the two.
70
  
What is clear in the literature is that personal contact with people experiencing 
mental illness, and the receipt of thoughtful education, either delivered in 
combination or on its own, does reduce stigma and decrease prejudice among 
university students. The evidence suggests that undergraduates who have 
volunteered to participate in structured and guided programs have undergone a 
positive attitudinal change, which supports the view that participation in clinical 
programs similar to the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme presents the 
best opportunity for positively changing the attitudes of law students, and hopefully, 
ultimately, the legal system.   
                                                 
66 Wallach, above n 60. See also Laurel A Alexander and Bruce G Link, ‘The impact of contact on stigmatizing 
attitudes toward people with mental illness’ (2003) 12 Journal of Mental Health 271.   
67 Michael Lyons and Jenny Ziviani, ‘Stereotypes, Stigma, and Mental Illness: Learning From Fieldwork 
Experiences’ (1995) 49 The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 1002.  
68 Wallach, above n 60, 245.  
69 Chaya Schwartz and Rinat Armony-Siva, ‘Students' Attitudes to the Inclusion of People with Disabilities in 
the Community’ (2001) 16 Disability & Society 403.  
70 Corrigan et al., above n 5.  
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3. THE MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL REPRESENTATION 
SCHEME (MHTRS) 
The MHTRS is a Tasmanian initiative implemented in 2003 to offer free, competent 
representation to all persons appearing before the Tasmanian Mental Health 
Tribunal (MHT). The scheme was created, developed, implemented, and in its first 
two years, administered by the author of this thesis. Its inception was as a direct 
response to the social, political and legal failure to ensure that the legislative right to 
be represented before the MHT in Tasmania
71
 could be exercised by people 
experiencing mental illness at a time when their basic rights and freedoms were at 
issue. The scheme is funded by the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Mental Health Services and is administered by Advocacy Tasmania Inc. (ATI), a 
non-government disability and aged care advocacy organisation, in collaboration 
with the MHT and the University of Tasmania Law Faculty.  
The idea for MHTRS representation emerged in 2000. The new president of the 
MHT wrote to the author who, at the time, was Tasmania’s first and only mental 
health advocate. The advocate’s role was specifically created in 1998 by the then 
Minister of Health, Hon. Judy Jackson, to represent the patient’s rights and interests 
was safeguarded during the closure of Royal Derwent Hospital, Australia’s oldest 
mental asylum. In 1999, the position was broadened to a state-wide role.  The 
president inquired whether the advocate’s new role included representing patients 
who appeared before the tribunal. She advised that almost 100% of patients 
appeared unrepresented. This was a legal failing and a human rights breach 
according to the president.  The large number of hearings that were held across the 
three regions of Tasmania each year made it impossible for her to include a fair and 
equitable tribunal representational service within her already demanding workload.  
Instead, she made MHT non-representation her primary systemic issue.  
For the next two years, the mental health advocate unsuccessfully lobbied Legal 
Aid and the Department of Health and Human Services.  Eventually, she decided 
with the support of ATI to develop a scheme that used a trained law student 
volunteer force. She set about strategically planning the scheme, building 
relationships and forming agreements with the MHT, the government and the 
                                                 
71 Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas) s 54. 
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UTAS Law Faculty. She recruited legal mentors.  She worked to gain the support of 
what was initially, a very suspicious group of mental health professionals. She 
obtained government seed funding for a pilot project in Hobart, developed a 
training program and published a training manual, and recruited volunteers from the 
law school.  In August 2003, seventy three law students attended the first training 
session. Sixty nine students completed this first phase of the training and received a 
Certificate in Skills and Awareness in Mental Health.  Students could then continue 
on to participated in the second phase of the training. The numbers for entry into the 
second phase representation training was limited to 30 final year students.  
The first clients were represented at a MHT hearing by trained volunteer law 
students in December, 2003.  During the following two years, the scheme gained 
full funding, employed a qualified legal coordinator, expanded to a state-wide 
service, and was added as a compulsory module to the curriculum of the Tasmanian 
Legal Practice Course. In the 11 years since its inception, well over 1000 
Tasmanian lawyers and future lawyers have participated in the scheme.
72
 They have 
gained an appreciation of the barriers facing people with mental illness and of their 
social obligation to help remove those barriers. By 2010, 
...the Tribunal has considerably exceeded the performance of like bodies in 
other Australian jurisdictions.  In Tasmania 64% of patients attended their 
hearing compared to the 50% achieved in other jurisdictions.
73
  79% of 
patients received advice from an advocate prior to appearing, well exceeding 
the 4.3% in Victoria.
74
  This level of advocacy has been achieved in no small 
measure as a result of the Tribunal’s continued championing of the Mental 
Health Representation Scheme.  
Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal Annual Report, 2009/10, 8-9. 
In the year under review 52% of persons appearing before the Tribunal were 
represented by an advocate from the Mental Health Representation Scheme 
and 78.5% had been given advice and support, via the telephone, prior to 
hearing.  The level of representation in hearings continues to rise. 
Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal Annual Report, 2009/10, 19-20. 
                                                 
72 Interview with Diane Sharman, MHTRS Coordinator, (Hobart, June, 2012). 
73 Annual Report Mental Health Review Board of Victoria 2009/10, Annual Report Queensland Mental Health 
Review Tribunal 2008/9 
74 Annual Report Mental Health Review Board of Victoria 2009/10 
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4. LEGAL REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE MHT 
Mental health law has made a significant contribution to the development of non-
adversarial justice in Australia.  For the past forty years, mental health tribunals and 
boards of review have dealt with issues of adversarialism, legal formality and legal 
representation as matters of daily practice.
75
 In particular, the issue of legal 
representation has caused consternation and debate.  There is plenty of research to 
suggest that represented people feel empowered; less intimidated by the legal 
process, more informed and listened to, and feel that they have someone who is on 
their side.
76
  One recent study found that the contact and support a person had from 
their legal representative could have a positive impact on their tribunal experience, 
particularly their acceptance of, and satisfaction with, the hearing outcomes.
77
 
Representation can have a therapeutic impact by increasing the perception of the 
overall tribunal experience for the client as being one that is fair and participatory. 
On the other hand, there is research that is highly critical of legal representation, 
suggesting that it in fact, it can produce anti-therapeutic outcomes.
78
 One study 
indicated that 36% of represented people were less than satisfied with their legal 
representation
79
 while another study found that legal representatives and medical 
professionals in guardianship hearings formed alliances.
80
 This had the potential of 
alienating clients who perceived their lawyer as just another member of the mental 
health team.
81
 An analysis of the research shows that it is not the fact of having a 
representative but the type and quality of the representation that is crucial to 
whether a therapeutic or anti-therapeutic outcome is achieved.
82
   
                                                 
75 Penelope Weller, ‘Taking a Reflexive Turn: Non-Adversarial Justice and Mental Health Review Tribunals’ 
(2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 81, 82. 
76 Valerie Williams, ‘The Challenge for Australian Jurisdictions to Guarantee Free Qualified Representation 
Before Mental Health Tribunals and Boards of Review: Learning from the Tasmanian Experience’ (2009) 16 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 108. 
77 Rosie McLeod et al., ‘Court experience of adults with mental health conditions, learning disabilities and 
limited mental capacity’ (Report No 2, Ministry of Justice Research Series, 9 – 10 July 2010).  
78 Terry Carney et al., ‘Mental Health Tribunals: 'TJ' Implications of Weighing Fairness, Freedom, Protection 
and Treatment’ (2007) 17, Journal of Judicial Administration 46.  
79 Mairead Dolan, Robert Gibb and Placid Coorey, ‘Mental health review tribunals: A survey of special hospital 
patients’ opinions’ (1999) 10 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 264, 268.   
80 Anne K Vittoria, ‘The Elderly Guardianship Hearing: A socio-legal encounter’ (1992) 6 Journal of Aging 
Studies 165.    
81 David Tait, ‘The Ritual Environment of the Mental Health Tribunal Hearings: Inquiries and reflections’ 
(2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law 91. 
82 Bruce J Winick, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing’ (1999) 10 Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 37.  
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In 2006, the President of the Tasmanian MHT presented a paper to the 3
rd
 
International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence titled Tasmanian Mental 
Health Representation Project – A Practical Example of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence.
83
  In it she asked whether legal representation was in the best 
interests of patients appearing before the tribunal if their lawyer had no training in 
mental health representation. It was her experience, that lawyers without training 
conducted mental health tribunal proceedings as adversarial contests between the 
psychiatrist and patient, quoted irrelevant case law, and cross-examined 
psychiatrists and family members. She perceived that they believed that their role 
was to get the order revoked and liberate the patient from the hospital. They gave no 
regard to the patient’s welfare in the community, their current mental state, their 
ability to be able to properly instruct, or to the potential that the adversarial style of 
questioning would break down the patient’s ‘necessary’ relationships with their 
treating teams, and their families.
84
 Detailing just one of a number of strikingly 
similar occasions to which she referred, she gave an example of the lasting 
problems that were caused to the patient, their family, and to the clinical staff. ‘The 
consultant psychiatrist was “shell shocked” and refused to attend another Tribunal 
hearing unless, she too, was represented by a lawyer’.85    
After describing the creation, training and practices of the Tasmanian MHTRS, the 
President concluded that prior to 2003, Tasmanian patients detained in psychiatric 
hospitals and deprived of their freedoms, did not have access to justice. As they 
could rarely afford legal representation they appeared unrepresented before the 
Tribunal. The rare few with means ‘were in many ways still denied access to 
justice’ because Tasmanian lawyers had no training in mental health issues ‘and 
were unskilled in coping with the difficulties that arose as a result of dealing with a 
client who had, at the time of the hearing, limited capacity to understand the nature 
of the hearing or a distorted view of reality’.86 The MHTRS, however, ‘supplied 
                                                 
83 Debra Rigby, ‘Tasmanian Health Representation Project – A Practical Example of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’ (Paper presented at 3rd International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Perth Western 
Australia, 7-9 June 2006). 
84 Ibid 4. 
85 Ibid 5. 
86 Ibid 9. 
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trained advocates with skills in mental health issues, at no cost, to all patients 
appearing before the Tribunal’87 and at minimal cost to the government. 
4.1 The right to representation before the MHT 
The right to legal representation is a fundamental right for any person whose liberty 
is at risk.
88
 It is a right reinforced by the European Court of Human Rights.
89
 In Li 
Shi Ping v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
90
, it was 
stated that if a person affected by an administrative decision lacked the capacity to 
represent themself, the right to legal representation is an element of natural justice.  
The right to representation is enshrined in Principle 18(1) of the United Nation’s 
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care. The Principles define the person’s entitlement to ‘counsel’ to 
mean ‘a legal or other qualified representative’ and that counsel shall be made 
available without payment if the person lacks sufficient means to pay.
91
 
Australian mental health statutes have generally taken a flexible approach to 
representation with most state mental health acts authorising representation as a 
right.  A 2008 review of Australia’s statutory requirements by this author showed 
that there was quite a lot of variation across states as to who could provide 
representation before a tribunal or board of review.
92
 Revisiting the provisions five 
years later shows that there have been a number of amendments in mental health 
acts that indicate that a legislative shift toward increased support for representation 
by non-legal representatives has occurred. 
Section 26 (3) of the reformed Victorian Act replicated the previous s.6 (3) in which 
no reference was made specifically to legal representation, stating broadly that 
patients may be represented by any person they authorise to do so.
93
  The previous 
South Australian Act had restricted representation to legal practitioners
94
 but this 
position was reversed in the new Act which now allows representation by a legal 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Gideon v Wainwright (1963) 372 US 335, 345 (Black J).  
89 LM v Latvia [2011] ECHR, Application No 26000/02, 19 July 2011.  
90 Li Shi Ping v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 35 ALD 557. 
91 United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, GA Res 46/119, 75th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/46/119 (17 December 1991).  
92 Williams, above n 76. 
93 Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic). 
94 Mental Health Act 1993 (SA) s 27. 
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practitioner or ‘by any other person.’95  The Western Australian,96 New South 
Wales
97
 and Queensland
98
 Acts all allow representation by a lawyer, or with the 
board or tribunal’s leave, any other person. Similarly, the Northern Territory allows 
representation by ‘a legal practitioner or other person’99 although leave of the 
tribunal is not required. The Australian Capital Territory Act merely simplified the 
language of the provision in its old Act which authorised representation by ‘an 
agent or a legal practitioner’.100 This was changed in the new Act to the plainer, ‘by 
a lawyer or someone else.’101 Although the previousTasmanian Act refered to 
representation by ‘a legal practitioner or other person’,102 the new Mental Health 
Act 2013 legislatively acknowledges the role of the trained volunteers of the state’s 
11 year old MHTRS by the inclusion of a third term, ‘advocate'.103   
What the research shows is that in the past decade, the statutory requirements 
authorising representation before mental health tribunals and boards of review in 
Australia have broadened out, and away from, legal practitioner representation. In 
doing so, however, every Australian jurisdiction has chosen to ignore the Principle 
18(1) requirement that people who appear before mental health tribunals should do 
so represented by a legal, or other ‘qualified’ representative.  
4.2 Qualified representation 
The ordinary meaning for a ‘qualified person’ is someone who has the abilities, 
qualities, attributes or meets the proper training and competency standards for an 
office or position, or to perform a particular job or task.
104
 For example, if a home is 
to be rewired, to satisfy the legal requirement, a qualified electrician is engaged.  
The quality of the work and particularly, the safety of the work, are better ensured if 
the worker has the proper training and experience. An unqualified worker would not 
be knowingly contracted based solely on their caring or empathetic connection to 
the home owner. Yet, despite human rights dictates, most Australian jurisdictions 
                                                 
95 Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) s 84(4). 
96 Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) Schedule 2 s 3(1)(b). 
97 Mental Health Act 2000 (NSW) s 154(3).  
98 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 450(2). 
99 Mental Health and Related Services Act 2009 (NT) s 131(1). 
100 Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) s 89(3). 
101 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 30.  
102 Mental Health Act (1996) (Tas) s 57 (3). 
103 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) sch 4 Part 2 s 7(3). 
104 Collins English Dictionary, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/qualified accessed 20 May, 
2013. 
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discourage qualified representation for vulnerable people appearing before a mental 
health tribunal or board of review.
105
  
Instead, tribunals and boards encourage unqualified people to represent people at a 
time when the serious issues before the decision-makers include the possible 
deprivation of their liberty for significant periods of time, a breach of their bodily 
integrity, their forcible treatment, and the removal of their right to autonomous 
lifestyle decision-making.
106
 There are no Australian mental health laws that require 
that the representative should be measured against an appropriate standard of skills 
and knowledge, for example, knowing the relevant provisions of the Act, being 
aware of available community supports and options, understanding ethical 
responsibilities, and possessing good communication and advocacy skills which do 
not harm the person’s important relationships with their treating professionals, 
families and service providers.  
Weller suggests that the mental health decision-making structure seems to have 
assumed that the multi-disciplinary composition of tribunals and boards of review, 
in conjunction with informal supports, ‘obviates the need for formal legal 
representation and is consistent with the alternative dispute resolution principles of 
individual empowerment and the concern to ensure that cost burdens do not limit 
access to justice’.107 There is a marked difference, however, between the benefits 
that a highly vulnerable person experiencing a serious mental illness gains from 
having an unqualified, inexperienced person providing information and advice, 
support and comfort at a hearing and the benefits gained from a trained 
representative clearly articulating their client’s legal rights and interests within a 
non-adversarial, therapeutic jurisprudence model of representation.
108
  
The debate should not be about whether the representative is a legal practitioner or a 
lay advocate but about whether the legal practitioner or lay representative who is 
appearing before the tribunal or board on behalf of their client is competent to 
properly represent the person’s rights, needs and interests in a non-adversarial, 
                                                 
105 Alfred Allan, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Mental Health Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis’ 
(2003) 20 Law in Context 24.  
106 The Mental Health Review Tribunal, New South Wales Government, The Tribunal (21 Februry 2013) 
<http://www.mhrt.nsw.gov.au/>. 
107 Weller, above n 75, 96.  
108 Williams, above n 76.  
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therapeutic forum. In Western Australia for example, the Council of Official 
Visitors presently provides the majority of the small number of representations that 
occur before the Mental Health Review Board.  Visitors are appointed from the 
general community as having an interest in mental health. The Visitor who wishes 
to provide representation in a hearing receives in-house training from the Council 
Head, who is a lawyer, and additional outsourced training from the Mental Health 
Law Centre.
109
  It is this training that provides them with qualifications that many 
lawyers to not possess.  This representation model is worth funding consideration 
by governments that are failing in their international obligation to provide free 
representation to individuals appearing before mental health tribunals and boards of 
review.  It draws from a committed, aware and trained pool of lay advocates. 
4.3 Cost of representation 
There is a wealth of research that shows that people who experience mental illness 
commonly have low levels of income
110
 and are, therefore, less likely to be able to 
afford private legal representation,
111
 and are most often dependent on the services 
that they receive from Legal Aid and community legal centres. The limited 
availability of funded legal services presents an access barrier for the disadvantaged 
that often places them in a position where they are unable to assert or defend their 
legal rights.
112
 Although the purpose of legal aid is to ensure access to legal 
representation for those people who cannot afford it, tight eligibility criteria have 
made it impossible for everyone who is in need of funding support to receive it. 
Funding applicants must satisfy a three tier eligibility criteria: (1) a financial means 
test; (2) a merit test; and (3) their legal problem must be a type of case that qualifies 
for financial support.
113
 Legal aid centres view these gate-keeping eligibility criteria 
as an organisational necessity due to severe under-funding, budget blow outs, 
                                                 
109 Interview with Debora Colvin, Head of the Council of Official Visitors (Telephone Interview 20 February 
2013).   
110 Prue Cameron and Jo Flanagan, ‘Thin Ice: Living With Serious Mental Illness and Poverty in Tasmania’ 
(Report, Social Action and Research Centre, Anglicare Tasmania, May 2004) 10.  
111 Maria Karras et al., ‘On The Edge Of Justice: Access To Justice And Legal Needs’ (Report, Volume 4, Law 
And Justice Foundation Of New South Wales, May 2006) 
<http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articleIDs/CB05FD97AAF2458CCA25718E00014293/$file/EdgeOfJ
ustice.pdf>. 
112 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee, Access to Justice, December 2009, 30.  
113 Richard Denniss, Josh Fear and Emily Millane, ‘Justice for all: Giving Australians greater access to the legal 
system’ (Institute Paper No 8, The Australian Institute, 8 March 2012) < 
https://www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=/.../IP8%20Justice%20for%20all.pdf >.  
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
339 
under-resourcing,
114
 and overwhelming workloads.
115
  Increasingly, fewer grants of 
aid are provided each year.
116
  
In 2004, the Law Council of Australia claimed that the consequence of the 
insufficient levels of public funding was that, progressively, more and more 
disadvantaged Australians were being prevented from accessing the justice 
system.
117
 The Council reported that legal aid fees were below the real cost of 
providing legal services; that there had been a significant withdrawal of experienced 
lawyers from publicly funded legal work;
118
 and that there had been some 
diminution in the quality of publicly funded legal representation.
119
  The 2012 
Justice for All research paper found that these problems had not improved but had, 
in fact, worsened and that ‘the current legal aid funding model is inadequate and 
unjust.’120  
Similar problems plague Australia’s community legal centres (CLC). The 
Australian Council of Social Services reported that CLCs are under-resourced 
compared to other community sector providers.
121
 It estimated that that in 2007, 
72% of eligible people who had sought assistance from CLCs were turned away 
because the centres’ services were operating at maximum capacity.122  In an attempt 
to manage the persistent funding and resourcing deficits, CLCs have applied 
informal, widely unacknowledged filters on the work that they are prepared to 
undertake.
123
  They have tended to ‘focus on providing legal assistance and advice 
                                                 
114 Hugh de Krester, ‘Frontline aid needs funding lifeline’, The Australian (online), 1 February 2013 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/frontline-aid-needs-funding-lifeline/story-e6frg97x-
1226566254383>. 
115 Louis Andrews, ‘Legal Aid calls for funding increase’, The Canberra Times (online), 5 October 2012 
<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/legal-aid-calls-for-funding-increase-20121004-272n0.html>. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Law Council of Australia and the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration National Legal Aid, 
‘Erosion of Legal Representation in the Australian Justice System’ (Report, Law Council of Australian and the 
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration National Legal Aid, February 2004) < 
http://www1.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/fmsdownload079a.pdf>.  
118 Don Fleming and Anne Daly, ‘The retreat of the legal profession from legal aid: labour market change in the 
Australian mixed model’ (2007) 14 International Journal of the Legal Profession 21. 
119 Law Council of Australia and the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration National Legal Aid, above n 
115.  
120 Denniss, Fear and Millane, above n 113, 10.  
121 Australian Council of Social Service, ‘Are you being served: indicators for capacity building of community 
sector services’ (Research Paper, Australian Council of Social Service, 2005).  
122 Australian Council of Social Services, ‘Australian Community Sector Survey: 2007 National Report’ 
(Report, Australian Council of Social Service, February 2007) 10.  
123 Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales, ‘Review of the NSW Community Legal Centres Funding 
Program’ (Final Report, Legal Aid Commission of NSW, February 2006) 100.  
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and community legal education. Representation is not usually available except in 
cases of unusual disadvantage or if the case is in the public interest.’124  
Representation before mental health tribunals is almost entirely dependent on these 
limited publically funded legal services. Williams showed that under the previous 
NSW Act, only 18.3% of people had appeared represented in hearings before the 
tribunal in 2003.
125
  During the past decade, this statistic increased to 63%
126
  
although it appears that as a consequence of funding issues, this statistic is likely to 
significantly decrease in the coming years unless more funding is achieved, or 
alternative representation processes are put into effect.
 
The tribunal reported in its 
2011/12 Annual Report that representation is usually provided by the Mental Health 
Advocacy Service which recently advised the tribunal that due to funding 
restrictions it could no longer automatically provide representation.
127
 
In 2003, the Victorian Mental Health Review Board Annual Report stated that 9.2% 
of hearings had involved legal representation.  A breakdown showed that it was 
provided by Victoria Legal Aid (68%), the Mental Health Legal Centre (18%), 
private lawyers (13%) and the Office of the Public Advocate (1%).
128
  Almost a 
decade later, the representation figure has only increased by 0.2%. The board 
reported in its 2011/12 Annual Report that 9.4% of its clients had legal 
representation, a decrease on the 9.6% on the previous reporting year (2010/11) and 
an increase on the 4.5% reported the year prior (2009/10).   
In its submission on the Draft Mental Health Bill, December 2011, the Western 
Australian Mental Health Law Centre (MHLC) stated that ‘At present, the legal 
representation rate at MHRB hearings is less than 8%. Without the provision of 
adequate funding for mental health advocacy services, it can be expected that this 
figure would drop significantly’.129 The MHLC had also reported in 2003 that it had 
                                                 
124 Karras et al., above n 111.  
125 Williams, above n 76, 113.  
126 Mental Health Review Tribunal, ‘Mental Health Review Tribunal 2011/12 Annual Report’ (Report, Mental 
Health Review Tribunal, 2012) as required by section 147 of the Mental Health Act 2007, 
<http://www.mhrt.nsw.gov.au/assets/files/mhrt/pdf/Annualreportfinal2012.pdf> 
127 Annual Report of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, as 
required by section 147 of the Mental Health Act 2007, 16 
<http://www.mhrt.nsw.gov.au/mhrt/pdf/Annualreportfinal2012.pdf>. 
128 Mental Health Review Board of Victoria, ‘Annual Report for the year ending 30 June 2003’ (Report, Mental 
Health Review Board of Victoria, 13 October 2003) 33 
<http://www.mhrb.vic.gov.au/images/stories/mhrb/publications/annualreports/ar2003.pdf>. 
129 Draft Mental Health Bill 16 December 2011, Mental Health Law Centre (WA) Inc. Submission Legal 
Representation At Mental Health Tribunal Hearings, 14. 
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represented 9.7% of people appearing before the Mental Health Review Board
130
 
although ten years on (2011/12), this figure had decreased to 9.3%.
131
  It was, 
however, a significant increase on the previous year’s (2011/10) figure of 5.4%.132   
The likelihood that any funding for legal representation will be increased in 
Western Australia, or elsewhere, is minimal due to the poor global economic 
climate and the fiscal concerns experienced across all jurisdictions.  But an 
increasingly likely reason for the failure of governments to increase funding to 
Legal Aid and CLCs may well be the presence of more cost effective alternative 
representation options.  In Western Australia, the Council of Official Visitors has 
the authority to provide assistance before and during mental health hearings.  As 
part of its 2003 strategic plan, the Council had decided to increase its representation 
by 25% in each of the following three years.
133
  Although this was not achieved, 
increased representation continued to remain a strategic goal and in 2011/12 the 
Council reported that of the 33.2% of people who had appeared represented before 
the Board, 23.9% had been represented by an Official Visitor.
134
  
In Tasmania, the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania had historically refused to 
give grants of aid for representation before the MHT.  During talks with Mental 
Health Services in 2002, the Director indicated that the Commission would employ 
a mental health lawyer in the Hobart area if it received funding of $100,000.
135
 This 
did not occur but in 2007 the Commission did receive funding from the Department 
of Justice to develop and implement a representation program. Representation 
commenced in late 2007.  In the Tribunal’s Annual Report 2011/12, it stated that:  
Despite the Legal Aid Commission now providing a statewide service to 
persons appearing before the Tribunal, the Mental Health Representation 
                                                 
130 Mental Health Review Board Western Australia, ‘Annual Report 2003’ (Report, Mental Health Review 
Board Western Australian, 2003) <http://www.mhrbwa.org.au/publications/pdfs/Annual_Report_2003.pdf>. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Office of the Official Visitors Western Australia, Annual Report 2009/10’ (Report, Office of the Official 
Visitors Western Australia, 2009/10)  
133Mental Health Review Board Western Australia, ‘Annual Report 2003’ above n 128.   
134 Office of the Official Visitors, Western Australia, ‘Annual Report 2011/12’ (Report, Office of the Official 
Visitors Western Australia, 2011/12) <http://www.mhrbwa.org.au/publications/pdfs/Annual_Report_2012.pdf> 
135 Advocacy Tasmania Inc., ‘Inquiry into Legal Aid and Access to Justice’ (Submission, Advocacy Tasmania 
Inc., September 2003) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_
inquiries/2002-04/legalaidjustice/submissions/sub39.doc>.  
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Scheme continues to represent the majority of patients. Legal Aid appeared in 
less than 10% of matters.
136
 
The creation of the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme and the strategic 
direction taken by the Council of Official Visitors in Western Australia were in 
direct response to the problem of low, or non-existent, representation for one of 
society’s most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups when its members, at times of 
crisis, are brought before mental health tribunals and boards of review for decisions 
to be made that can severely restrict their freedoms.  Carney and Tait referred to the 
continuing problems that had given impetus to the foundation of the MHTRS when 
they wrote that given Australia’s legal aid resource constraints, reservations about 
the wrong styles of mental health advocacy, and the high numbers of people with 
limited, or indeed any access to legal assistance,
137
 ‘[a]dvocacy could also be 
broadened to include trained lay advocates, along the lines of the volunteer mainly 
undergraduate and postgraduate students coordinated under the Tasmanian scheme 
(Williams, 2009, p.118)’.138  
Sanism is a key factor in the issue of non-representation in mental health law.  
People who experience a mental illness are perceived as unworthy of the limited 
available funding dollars that are needed as desperately elsewhere. They are locked 
in hospitals to receive treatment and not in prison to receive punishment. They are 
forcibly injected or subjected to electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to make them 
‘well’. Legal representation is regarded by many as unnecessary and sanism 
justifies their deprivation of their rights.  
                                                 
136 Mental Health Tribunal Tasmania, ‘Annual Report 2011 – 12’ (Report, Mental Health Tribunal Tasmania 
2011/2012) 16 
<http://www.mentalhealthtribunal.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/226493/Website_Copy_-
_MHT_2011-12_.pdf>.  
137 Williams, above n 76. See also Fleur Beaupert, ‘Mental health tribunal processes and advocacy 
arrangements: ‘Little Wins’ are No Small Feat'’ (2009) 16 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 90. See also Terry 
Carney and Fleur Alleen Beaupert, ‘Mental health tribunals: Rights drowning in un-“chartered” health waters’ 
(2008) 13 Australian Journal of Human Rights 181. 
138 Terry Carney and David Tait, ‘Mental Health Tribunals - Rights, Protection, or Treatment? Lessons from the 
ARC Linkage Grant Study’ (2011) 18 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 137, 148.  
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4.4 Non-adversarial representation 
The adversary system assumes, in the interests of both justice and efficiency 
that cases will be presented to courts by skilled professionals. To the extent to 
which that assumption breaks down, so does the system.139 
There has been extensive discussion regarding the role and function of lawyers 
appearing before mental health tribunals
140
 with a significant number of 
commentators claiming that the involvement of lawyers in mental health tribunal 
hearings inevitably results in damaging adversarial practices which cause distress to 
all parties; are counterproductive; and harm doctor-patient relationships.
141
 The 
counter position is that lawyers are necessary to mental health representation as they 
bring with them an intellectual rigour to the relevance and probative value of the 
information presented to the tribunal.
142
 Clients are generally judged to be more 
informed, feel less intimidated, and are satisfied that that their views have been put 
to the tribunal. Lawyers are said to be able to use their problem-solving, mediation 
and other non-adversarial skills to good effect
143
  but this interpretation presumes 
that the effective lawyer is someone who is knowledgeable in mental health law; 
practiced in non-adversarial forums; has an awareness of mental health issues; and 
possesses the skills necessary to achieve therapeutically beneficial outcomes for 
their clients.  However, this is most often not the case. 
4.5 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
Perlin suggests that sanism and pretextuality may eventually be neutralised by 
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).
144
 TJ as it is, somewhat affectionately, called by its 
proponents has been a quiet revolution in law: a part of a wider trend towards more 
comprehensive, participatory and psychologically optimal means of resolving 
                                                 
139 The Hon. Murray Gleeson AC, Current Issues For The Australian Judiciary,  Speech to Supreme Court of 
Japan, Tokyo - 17 January 2000, <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_Japanj.htm>. 
140 Ian Freckelton, ‘Mental Health Review Tribunal Decision-Making: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens’ 
(2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 49. See also Bruce J Winick, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Civil Commitment Hearing’ (1999) 10 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 37. Also Alfred Allan, ‘The Past, 
Present and Future of Mental Health Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis’ (2003) 20 Law in Context 24.  
141 Rigby, above n 83. See also Weller, above n 75.  
Also Terry Carney and David Tait, ‘Mental Health Tribunals - Rights, Protection, or Treatment? Lessons from 
the ARC Linkage Grant Study’ (2011) 18 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 137. Also Terry Carney et al., 
‘Mental Health Tribunals: 'TJ' Implications of Weighing Fairness, Freedom, Protection and Treatment’ (2007) 
17, Journal of Judicial Administration 46. See also Stern, R.S., ‘The cost of Mental Health Review Tribunals 
(1994) Psychiatric Bulletin 18, 578. <http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/18/9/578.1.full.pdf>. 
142 Weller, above n 75.  
143 Ibid.   
144 Michael L Perlin, ‘A Law of Healing’ (1999-2000) 68 University of Cincinnati Law Review 407, 409.  
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
344 
conflict within the legal system.
145
 Having had its beginnings in the 1980s in the 
works of David Wexler and Bruce Winick, TJ is an interdisciplinary approach to 
the role and reform of the law that is viewed as a therapeutic agent.
146
  It is 
concerned with the impact that legal processes and justice agents have upon the 
well-being of participants in the legal system, and the implications for attaining 
justice system objectives. Its claim is that the processes used by courts, lawyers and 
other justice agents can impede, promote or be neutral in relation to outcomes 
connected with participant wellbeing.
147
  
The TJ approach has particularly gained the attention of the supporters of problem-
solving courts such as drug, mental health, and indigenous courts commonly 
conceived to resolve the underlying problems of their participants.
148
 It has a strong 
practical focus and an application that borrows heavily from the behavioural 
sciences that have provided legal professionals with a new set of techniques that 
reach beyond simply deterrence and punishment.
149
 By using these behavioural 
science tools to facilitate an enhanced understanding of the law and its application, 
antitherapeutic outcomes are minimised while therapeutic potential is maximised.
150
 
TJ offers a humanistic and psychological dimension to mental health law. 
But TJ does have its critics, who claim that it is too vaguely defined and 
undistinctive in its content, relying instead on the therapeutic effects of particular 
actions.
151
 It is a descriptive and instrumental tool rather than an analytical 
theory.
152
  ‘[T]herapeutic jurisprudence is simply a form of consequentialism, the 
view that the morally best action is that one that will maximize the good.’153  Petrila 
claims that TJ is paternalistic and although it uses the language of autonomy and 
                                                 
145 Michael S King, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary’ (2011) 1 Alaska Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 1 <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2100632>.  
146 David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 
1991).  
147 Ibid. 
148 Michael S King, ‘Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book’ (Bench Book, Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Incorporated, 2009) <http://www.aija.org.au/Solution%20Focused%20BB/SFJ%20BB.pdf> See 
also Justice Peggy Fulton Hora, ‘Therapeutic What?’ (2006) 
<http://www.judgehora.com/therapeutic_what.pdf>.   
149 David B Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Comparative Law Context’ (1997) 15 Behaviour Science 
and Law 233. 
150 Ibid.  
151 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Public 
Policy & Law 193. 
152 Valmaine Toki, ‘Will Therapeutic Jurisprudence Provide a Path Forward for Maori’ (2005) 13 Waikato Law 
Review 169.  
153 Ken Kress, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Resolution of Value Conflicts: What We Can Realistically 
Expect, in Practice, from Theory’ (1999) 17 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 555, 558. 
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choice, it reinforces the existing distribution of power in the relationship between 
the ‘treater and treated.’ 154 He also questions who should be making decisions 
about what a therapeutic outcome is.
155
 There is also criticism that TJ cannot 
resolve value conflicts, especially between autonomy rights and therapeutic 
values;
156
 that it places a strain on court finances, time and resources; it fragments 
the court system; and it disregards traditional legal principles such as judicial 
impartiality and due process.
157
  
In response, supporters of TJ argue that it does not deserve reverence.
158
 Ian 
Freckleton reflects that TJ is a problematic concept which deservedly has its critics 
‘from whose perceptions there is much to learn’.159 TJ is a facilitator of 
consciousness and awareness of outcomes not a justification for simply acting ‘in 
what someone considers a person's "best interests.".’160 It does not legitimise 
paternalism or coercion
161
 but acknowledges that there are times where a 
therapeutic approach can be paternalistic rather than empowering, and 
discriminatory rather than right enhancing.  A mental health hearing is a process of 
balancing values and while therapeutic interests of treatment/wellbeing should not 
be the dominant values, they are a justifiable part of the balancing process.
162
 They 
should sit alongside other equally important values including autonomy, integrity 
and public safety. The unashamed goal for therapeutic jurisprudence is to restore 
balance through healing.   
4.5.1 The fiscal crisis 
Rottman and other commentators suggest that the long-term fate of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in the court system is dependent on its migration from specialist 
courts to the larger mainstream court system, ‘Otherwise they are likely to have 
                                                 
154 John Petrila, ‘Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ in David B 
Wexler and Bruce J Winick (eds) Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996) 688. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Kress, above n 153, 558.  
157 Arthur G Christean, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Embracing a Tainted Ideal’ (2002) Focus On Utah 
<http://psychrights.org/articles/TherapeuticJurisprudenceTaintedIdeal.htm>. 
158 Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of 
Influence’ (2008) 30 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 575.  
159 Ibid 595.  
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid.  
162 Kress, above n 153.   
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limited life spans and do as much harm as good.’ 163  Court administrators and 
funding providers are becoming increasingly unwilling to fragment judicial 
operations, jurisdictions and resources.  There is also an expectation that less 
adversarial problem-solving and solution-focused courts and tribunals meet higher 
standards and achieve better and faster outcomes, than their mainstream 
equivalents,
164
 and that ‘if they prove too expensive, they will eventually lose their 
privileged status and will have to compete with the next ‘vogue.’ 165  
The concerns of Rottman and Freiberg are being realised as governments driven by 
fiscal concern claim that low success rates and high recidivism rates have 
necessitated the closures of problem-solving courts.
166
 The Queensland 2012/13 
State Budget, delivered on 11 September, 2012, removed all state funding from 
Court Diversionary Programs such as the Murri Court, Drug Court, Special 
Circumstances Court and Queensland Alcohol Diversion Program, and also from 
the Tenants Union and Tenants Advice and Advocacy Service.
167
 The Northern 
Territory government reported in its 2012/13 budget that ‘Savings of $4.2 million 
per year by 2014-15 will be made by disbanding the Substance Misuse and Referral 
for Treatment (SMART) Court, the Alcohol and Other Drugs Tribunal and the 
Community Court.’168 And a government cost cutting measure169 in 2012 resulted 
in the sudden closure of the Youth Drug and Alcohol Court in New South Wales.
170
 
Governments are increasingly withdrawing their funding support of legal services 
for marginalised and disadvantaged groups, mainstreaming the services back into 
the traditional legal forums and neo liberalist user pay system. They claim the 
                                                 
163 David B Rottman, ‘Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized Courts (and Do 
Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?’ (2000) Court Review 26.   
164 Nigel Stobbs and Geraldine Mackenzie, ‘Evaluating the Performance of Indigenous Sentencing Courts’ 
(2009) 13 Australian. Indigenous Law Review 90. 
165 Arie Freiberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic Incrementalism?’ 
(2003) 20 Law In Context 6, 19.  
166 Adele Horin, ‘Youth drug court victim of budget cuts, say Salvos’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 11 
July 2012 < http://www.smh.com.au/national/youth-drug-court-victim-of-budget-cuts-say-salvos-20120710-
21ty6.html>. 
167 Queensland Council of Social Services, ‘QCOSS Commentary State Budget 2012-13’ (Commentary, 2013) 
< https://www.qcoss.org.au/sites/default/files/QCOSS_Budget_Commentary_2012-13.pdf>. 
168 John Elferink, Northern Territory Attorney-General and Minister For Justice, ‘Focus on Providing Core 
Services’ (2012 -13 Mini Budget Media Release, 4 December 2012) 
<http://newsroom.nt.gov.au/index.cfm?fuseaction=printRelease&ID=10130>. 
169 Horin, above n 166. See also Editorial, ‘Quiet death of the youth drug court’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 9 July 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/editorial/quiet-death-of-the-youth-drug-court-
20120708-21p7h.html>.  
170 Council of Social Services New South Wales, ‘Government's short sighted cost-cutting trumps rehabilitation 
of young offenders’ (Media Release, 5 July 2012) <http://www.ncoss.org.au/content/view/6907/98/>. 
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establishment of problem-solving courts ‘were inefficient policies that focused on 
‘looking good’ instead of positive results.171  
Although attempting to quantify feelings of well-being, integrity, and 
accomplishment is wrongheaded, the distribution of government dollars is 
inextricably connected to key performance indicators and statistical outcomes. 
Governments that have historically failed to fund, or to fund adequately, 
representation before mental health tribunals and boards of review, are unlikely in 
the present economic climate or into the foreseeable future, to fund expensive legal 
representation. Funding bodies are more likely to fund cost efficient and non-
adversarial statutory and community sector schemes that use trained peer and lay 
volunteers.  Philanthropic funding support may also be attracted to a more healing 
model of representation which was the case in Queensland where QPILCH 
achieved funding for its MHTRS which was based on the Tasmanian model. The 
QPILCH scheme is discussed in more detail below in Section 6.0  The topic is ripe 
for further research, and it is recommended that discussion should commence in 
earnest between governments, universities, community sector organisations and the 
legal system so that the issue of mental health non-representation may be eventually 
resolved.  
4.6 Creating a TJ lawyer 
Lawyers need to have ‘an understanding of basic psychological principles and 
psychodynamic processes as they inevitably influence and inform all human 
relationships: the lawyer-client relationship is no exception.’172 Recent years have 
seen an emergence of the therapeutic jurisprudence model of lawyering which 
contemplates lawyers practicing with an ethic of care and finely tuned sensitive 
inter and intra personal counselling skills that emphasise the prevention of legal 
problems.
173
 While ideally lawyers should be trained in these personal skills at law 
school, the reality is that very few are.
174
 Psychology and social work insights have 
helped lawyers to better understand their role in the mental health process as an 
effective lawyer. The trend toward emotional competence being an essential 
                                                 
171 Elferink, above n 168.  
172 Marjorie A Silver, ‘Supporting Attorney’s Personal Skills’ (2009) 1 Restiva Juridica Upr 147, 148.  
173 Winick and Wexler, above n 24.  
174 Silver, above n 172, 157.  
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element for effective lawyering has not, however, been generated by traditional 
legal education which does little, if anything at all, to prepare law students for the 
psychological and emotional aspects of legal practice.
175
   
Exposure to therapeutic jurisprudence while in law school helps students to move 
beyond ‘black letter law’ and readies them for the complex problems, psychological 
and emotional pain, and distrust they will encounter in the world outside university.  
It can provide a ‘moral framework’ for conceptualising legal issues.176  By bringing 
the insights across from psychology and social work, programs such as the MHTRS 
are able to provide law students with an ‘experiential setting that is a natural 
laboratory for applying therapeutic jurisprudence.’177 The lawyer who practices 
within this broadened concept of their professional role will strive to avoid, or to 
minimise the psychologically damaging effect they have on their client while they 
seek to protect and promote their client’s rights and interests, and improve their 
well-being.
178
  
Therapeutic jurisprudence is committed to client centred lawyering and although 
lawyers may have their own opinions regarding the choices and decisions  to be 
made in their client’s best interests, the lawyer must not act paternalistically or try 
to manipulate as ultimately, it is the client’s right to decide.179  Law students 
participating in the MHTRS are taught how to interact with their clients in a non-
judgmental, non- paternalistic way. They are taught to converse in a motivational 
manner with clients who are often being detained in an acute mental health facility. 
Students are provided with interdisciplinary insights to enable them to work 
collaboratively with the health and allied health professionals to develop 
successfully enhanced outcomes for their client: e.g. a community support plan or a 
supported housing placement. (See Appendices 4, 5 and 6) 
MHTRS volunteers represent a new generation of lawyers who are being trained to 
more effectively represent the rights and interests of some of Australia’s most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged citizens.  The education and skills that they learn and 
                                                 
175 Ibid 149.   
176 Paul G Haskell, ‘Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School’ (1991) 66 Notre Dame Law Review 1025.  
177 Gregory Baker and Jennifer Zawid, ‘The Birth of a Therapeutic Court’s Externship Program: Hard Labor 
But Worth the Effort’ (2005) 17 St. Thomas Law Review 711, 712. 
178 Winick and Wexler, above n 24.  
179 Winick and Wexler, above n 24, 607.  
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practise within a therapeutic jurisprudential model of representation bring 
sensitivity into their practice of law.  Continuing their therapeutic jurisprudence 
practice is likely to increase their job satisfaction, lower levels of stress, improve 
morale, and positively influence the public’s present perception of the general 
decline in lawyers’ values, ideals, and morals.180 It may also help to reduce stigma 
and decrease discrimination across the legal system to the advantage of people who 
experience mental illness.      
5. EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION: THE GENESEE 
STUDY181 
The United States National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect has encouraged and 
funded projects that explore and evaluate alternative ways of providing 
representation to children in civil protection matters since 1976.
182
  When Duquette 
and Ramsey undertook an empirical examination of what constituted effective 
representation in 1982, the dissatisfaction and uncertainty surrounding the 
representation and advocacy provided to children in child abuse and neglect cases 
was widespread.  Although their study related to children, the parens patriae 
doctrine makes people experiencing mental illness subject to similar protective 
laws, and the problems of representation that cause concern in the area of juvenile 
law are exactly the same problems that cause concern in mental health law. The 
possible options for rectifying these problems are also the same. 
Duquette and Ramsey’s study took place in Genesee County U.S.A which, in 1980, 
had a population of 450,449.  In that jurisdiction, all children in child protection 
matters were represented by legal practitioners who were generally recognised as 
having little by way of education and training that enabled them to properly serve 
the special interests of their clients. Duquette and Ramsey indicated that the 
representation problems indentified in Genesee County were the same throughout 
                                                 
180 Susan Daicoff, ‘Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on 
Professionalism’ (1997) 46 American University Law Review 1337.  
181 Donald N Duquette and Sarah H Ramsey, ‘Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: 
An Empirical Look at what Constitutes Effective Representation’ (1987) 20 University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform 341.  
182 Ibid 350. 
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the United States.  Because the lawyers had no special training, ‘[u]nfortunately, 
these attorneys tend to provide poor quality representation.’183 
Many lawyers also had little knowledge of the physical, psychological and 
developmental aspects of their client or of the complexities of the problems that 
they experienced. Few had any specialist training or expertise in working in the 
protective court arena. As law schools did not usually provide training in non-
traditional roles and non-legal responsibilities, lawyers often felt ill-equipped and 
uncomfortable performing their role. Overall, Duquette and Ramsey found that 
legal representation was haphazard and of variable quality, with many children not 
receiving effective representation.
184
 
The researchers used a control group comprised of lawyers who regularly worked in 
child protection matters but who had had no specific training in child advocacy, and 
a demonstration group that was subdivided into three groups (1) lawyers, (2) law 
students, and (3) lay volunteers. The lawyers, law students and lay volunteers in the 
demonstration group participated in 12.5 hours of training before representing 
clients and being evaluated on performance and case outcomes. The researchers 
found that although there were significant differences between the control and 
demonstration groups in performance and outcomes, there were few significant 
differences among the demonstration groups of law students, lay volunteers, and 
trained lawyers. ‘The three demonstration groups performed very much alike and 
achieved very similar results for their young clients.’185 The researchers found that 
the trained non-lawyers performed as well as the trained lawyers, and better than the 
lawyers in the control group who had not received the special training. They also 
found that the lawyers who had received the training behaved differently to their 
untrained fellow lawyers.
186
  
The importance of these findings is that Duquette and Ramsey clearly suggest that it 
is the specialist training rather than the legal qualifications or legal experience that 
achieves effective representation.  It is irrelevant whether the representative is a 
MHTRS law student, a Western Australian Official Visitor, or a peer advocate from 
                                                 
183 Duquette and Ramsey, above n 181, 391.  
184 Ibid 351. 
185 Ibid 342. 
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a community sector mental health service; if the person has been specially trained, 
the quality of their representation is equal to that of a specially trained lawyer and 
better than that of the lawyer who has not undertaken specialist mental health 
training.  
Duquette and Ramsey advised policymakers to base their representative funding 
decisions on cost and availability. Using lawyers is costly, while lower costs are 
associated with using law students and volunteers, although selection training and 
supervision of the volunteers is extremely important and this could be expensive. 
Law students or social work or psychology students could be used but would 
require careful monitoring, and due to the transience of university education, 
regular training would be necessary. These had all been factors that had been 
independently considered during the development process of the MHTRS. 
Because of the high quality of child representation provided by the project's 
lay volunteers and the potential cost savings of such volunteer programs, we 
recommend that other jurisdictions consider whether they could benefit from 
initiating programs that rely on non lawyer representation of children, under 
lawyer supervision, with representation provided by carefully selected and 
trained volunteers, such as law students, social workers, psychologists, or 
graduate students in those disciplines. The least expensive model of 
representation would utilize law students, whose training and supervision are 
provided by a law school without cost to the court system. This project would 
also help produce attorneys trained in representing children.187 
Thirty years after Duquette and Ramsey’s recommendations, Walsh and Douglas 
again raised the issue of using well-trained laypeople, including law students, to 
represent children in child protection matters in Australia. They suggested that 
lawyers working in child protection should be specially trained, and where legal 
representation was unavailable, trained non-legal advocates should be used, which 
was ‘something that Australian law schools could practically support.’188  
In protective systems, such as child protection and mental health, which are based 
on detailed legislation that involves questions of rights and interests, and which 
                                                 
187 Duquette and Ramsey, above n 181, 390.   
188 Tamara Walsh and Heather Douglas, ‘Lawyers, Advocacy And Child Protection’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 621, 649. 
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have serious consequences for people’s lives, it is difficult to argue that there is no 
role for lawyers but it can equally be argued for the same reasons that their 
representation must be effective.  For representation to be effective, lawyers must 
undertake specialist training. When effective legal representation is not available 
because of cost restraints, cost-effective alternatives using trained law students and 
volunteer lay people should be supported by the community, government, 
universities and particularly, the legal fraternity.  
Lawyers can be monopolistic and territorial,
189
 believing strongly in the importance 
of their presence and the unique skills and insights that they bring to a case and to 
the decision-making process.
190
 ‘Lawyers have a long-standing monopoly over the 
business of law, and have generally believed that this business belongs exclusively 
to lawyers’.191 To hold a monopoly, the public must be convinced that the 
organisation has a code of professional conduct and philosophical theories based on 
the notion of a service ideal and the public interest.
192
 For the legal profession, 
fulfilling the service ideal means that although it is primarily motivated by an 
objective altruism, it can supply ‘a competent service to all at a reasonable cost.’193 
The reality is that it does not, and that it probably cannot. 
‘For too long, the legal profession has focused on legal aid, pro bono and charitable 
assistance as the solution to the crisis in access to justice. The approach is 
admirable, but futile’.194 Many lawyers resist the incursion of law students and lay 
people representing clients before tribunals, boards and courts. The research 
suggests that this resistance is not derived from the poor quality of lay 
representation and is more likely an outdated territorial response. What should be of 
ultimate importance to all is attempting to rectify the injustice of people 
experiencing mental illness unable to access effective legal representation for 
mental health hearings. The solution seems simple as it only needs to satisfy three 
                                                 
189 Alexandra M Ashbrook, ‘The Unauthorized Practice of Law in Immigration: Examining the Propriety of 
Non-Lawyer Representation’ (1991) 5 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 237.  
190 Walsh and Douglas, above n 188, 649. 
191 Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, ‘Lawyers, Non-Lawyers And Mediation: Rethinking The Professional Monopoly 
From A Problem-Solving Perspective’ (2002) 7 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 235, 238.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Harry Cohen, ‘Confronting Myth in the American Legal Profession: A Territorial Perspective’ (1970) 22 
Alabama Law Review 513, 518.  
194 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Lawyers, make room for nonlawyers’ CNN (online) 25 November 2012 
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requirements: (1) lawyers undertake specialist mental health training; (2) lawyers 
share the field with the trained members of other less-expensive non-lawyer 
schemes who provide a competent representational service; and (3) governments, 
law schools, and community sector organisations work collaboratively to develop 
cost effective schemes that use law students and other lay volunteers.  
4.1 Ensuring effective mental health representation 
The adversarialism approach of lawyers is not an insurmountable problem but one 
that can be overcome through education and training. An example is the English 
Mental Health Accreditation Scheme (MHAS) which covers the representation of 
people in all proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 (UK). In England, any lawyer who wishes to represent a 
client before the tribunal must be a member of the scheme. To become a member, 
the lawyer must attend, within the six months prior to applying for membership, a 
compulsory two day training course provided by a specifically approved training 
organisation. Membership is for three years and during this time the lawyer is 
required to demonstrate their continued suitability to remain in the scheme by 
successfully completing a process of re-accreditation. They must show that within 
the 12 month period preceding their reapplication that they represented at, or 
observed, four particularly defined, different types of tribunal hearings. They must 
also provide four written case reports between 750 and 1,000 words to demonstrate 
that they have both an understanding of the law and procedure, and an ability to 
represent clients effectively in tribunal proceedings.
195
 
MHAS members are required to demonstrate the following standards:  
• Knowledge of the law and procedure which are essential to representing 
clients before First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health);  
• Ability to prepare and present cases effectively for clients in proceedings 
before First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health);  
• Sufficient knowledge of those areas of law, such as mental capacity, 
community care and human rights, which are relevant to advising and 
representing clients within the scope of the mental health franchise;  
                                                 
195 The Law Society, Mental Health (January 2013) Accreditation Scheme Guidance 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/accreditation/specialist-schemes/mental-health/>. 
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• Sensitivity to and awareness of the particular difficulties clients may face 
because of mental disorder and by virtue of being subject to Mental 
Health Act powers.  
• Commitment to representing clients with mental disorder; 
• Adherence to the terms and conditions of Law Society Accreditation 
Scheme Membership;  
• Adherence to the Mental Health Accreditation Scheme code of practice.196 
Lawyers must also complete six hours of mental health law-related continuing 
professional development training each year and are required to show, to the 
satisfaction of the Law Society, that they have, and will maintain a high level of 
knowledge, skills, experience and practice in the area of mental health law.
197
 If 
similar schemes were implemented in the different Australian states it would help 
ensure that lawyers worked more effectively within the non-adversarial, therapeutic 
legal framework of mental health tribunals.  
6. MHTRS - QUEENSLAND STYLE 
Carney, in his 2008 article, reported that Queensland Legal Aid rarely appeared 
before the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
198
  The Tribunal reported that in that 
2007/08 year, only 1.3% of people had appeared before the Tribunal represented.
199
 
Three years later, this figure had increased to 1.8%.
200
  In August 2012, the 
Queensland Public Interest Clearing House (QPILCH) commenced a program using 
volunteer law students to provide support and advocacy for patients on involuntary 
treatment orders who were required to appear before the tribunal.  These volunteers 
are drawn from QPILCH’s already existing large volunteer base and also from 
Queensland’s universities such as the University of Queensland Pro Bono Centre.  
Philanthropic funding for the scheme has been secured until 2015.   
                                                 
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid. 
198 Terry Carney et al., above n 2, 130.   
199 Mental Health Review Tribunal Quuensland, Annual Report 2007/08,  
<http://www.health.qld.gov.au/mentalhealth/docs/annualreport_0708.pdf>. 
200 Mental Health Review Tribunal Queensland, Annual Report 2010/11, < http://www.mhrt.qld.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/mhrt-annual_report_2010-11.pdf>. 
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When the Coordinator of the scheme, Ann Herriot, was asked why she and her 
colleagues at QPILCH believed that a representation scheme needed to be 
developed and implemented, she replied: 
Through our student mental health law clinic, we became aware of the 
appalling rate of assistance and representation of patients in the MHRT in 
Queensland (less than 2% which is the lowest rate in the country).
201
 
The Queensland scheme was patterned on the Tasmanian MHTRS which provided 
ongoing support and resources during the development process. Ann Herriot 
travelled to Tasmania and undertook the training course. When asked why QPILCH 
believed that the MHTRS was a suitable model to fill the representational void that 
had become so apparent in Queensland, she responded that: 
We became aware of the Tasmanian model and given our relationship with 
University of Queensland (through the Mental Health Law Clinic) and the 
high numbers of competent, enthusiastic student volunteers already at 
QPILCH, we thought we could use this valuable resource to assist in 
addressing this issue. (QPILCH runs 6 student clinics in partnership with 4 
universities and also has approximately 50 volunteers each year as well as PLT 
students).  Our experience with students gave us confidence that students 
could provide competent non-adversarial assistance and this was confirmed by 
our research into the Tasmanian scheme.  Personally, I also wanted to expose 
students, prior to embarking on their careers,  to social justice issues to which 
they may not otherwise be exposed as a way of "inoculating" them - and 
hopefully encouraging a lifelong commitment to social justice issues.
202
 
When asked to identify the reasons why some groups have been supportive of the 
process and other groups have not, Ms Herriot replied: 
We have had tremendous support from students, University of Queensland, the 
Tribunal, hospital staff though we have not yet had access to a group of 
doctors at the hospital so we don't yet know whether they will be supportive of 
the scheme.  There has been some anxiety from some lawyers.  My impression 
is that this stems from the belief that only lawyers should be doing advocacy.  
This may be a lack of confidence in students or it may be territorial.  It also 
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could stem from the essentially adversarial/rights based approach of lawyers 
and a misunderstanding of therapeutic jurisprudence and the role of lay 
advocates.203 
Although it is still very early days in Queensland’s implementation of the scheme, 
the Coordinator was asked whether there was, as yet, any qualitatively identified 
advantages, or disadvantages for patients, tribunal, government, families, students, 
lawyers, and community from the scheme’s implementation in Queensland. Her 
reply was: 
We did our first official hearing a couple of weeks ago and the patient reported 
that it was the first time she felt that the Tribunal listened to her. The Tribunal 
adjourned the hearing because they were not convinced that the treating team 
had adequately considered the treatment criteria.   This was a great outcome 
for the patient.
204
 
While Queensland has implemented the MHTRS model, organisations in other 
states have begun lobbying for similar schemes in their jurisdictions. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, the Women’s Centre for Health Matters Inc. Report 
2010, ‘Out of Reach: Women living with mental health issues in the ACT: What 
hinders their access to legal support?’ put forward the Tasmanian MHTRS as a 
model representation program that was ‘sensitive to the needs of clients with mental 
health issues’205 The report referred to the lack of legal support and representation 
for people with mental health issues across Australia which was reported by the 
Mental Health Council of Australia in its 2005 report, Not for Service
206
 which 
stated that the MHTRS, ‘in a short time, alleviated these deficiencies.’207  
The Victorian Law Reform Commission released its Guardianship Consultation 
Paper 10
208
 in 2011 in which it presented an option that a model the same as the 
Tasmanian MHTRS could be created in which law students were engaged and 
trained to provide voluntary representation for people appearing before the 
                                                 
203 Ibid.   
204 Ibid. 
205 Kate Judd and Leigh Hale, ‘Out of Reach: Women living with mental health issues in the ACT: What 
hinders their access to legal support?’ (Research Report, Women’s Centre for Health Matters, June 2010) 32. 
206 Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Disability Rights: Not for Service - Experiences of Injustice and 
Despair in Mental Health Care in Australia’ (Report, Mental Health Council of Australia, 19 October 2005). 
207 Judd and Hale, above n 205, 31.  
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Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
209
 In its Draft Mental Health (WA) 
Bill 2011 response submission to the Western Australian Parliament, the Aboriginal 
Legal Service Western Australia (ALSWA) also referred to the MHTRS, stating 
that ALSWA endorsed the Tasmanian approach and recommended ‘that efforts 
should be made to source and train Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law 
students, court officers or lawyers to be made available for any Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander applicants who seek culturally or linguistically appropriate 
representation.’210 
There are different types of advocacy such as self advocacy, family and friend 
advocacy, peer advocacy, professional advocacy, statutory advocacy and legal 
advocacy, all of which may be linked, and all of which can help meet the needs and 
interests of a person during their lifetime situations.  However, the person appearing 
in an administrative law forum at a time when authoritative decisions are being 
made that may deprive them of their fundamental rights and civil freedoms, is 
entitled to be represented by a legal, or other qualified representative
211
 who, if the 
client is unable to afford to appoint, must be paid by the state.
212
 As discussed 
previously, this is rarely the case in most Australian jurisdictions - evidence of the 
barriers to justice faced by people with a mental illness. It does raise the question, 
however, whether lawyers and law students who underwent specialist education and 
training similar to the education and training central to the MHTRS program would, 
in turn, become the more aware politicians, policy-makers, decision-makers and 
lawyers who could recognise the prejudice and unfairness associated with mental 
illness in the legal system, and promote plans for positive change.      
6. CONCLUSION 
A mental health hearing is a legal circumstance in which a compelled member of 
one of society’s most vulnerable groups is placed at risk of having fundamental 
                                                 
209 Ibid. 
210 Aboriginal Legal Service Of Western Australia (INC), Submission to the Western Australian 
Parliament, Draft Mental Health Bill (WA) 2011, March 2012, 16 
<http://www.als.org.au/images/stories/publications/Submissions/ALSWA_Submission_on_Draft_Mental_Healt
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211 United Nations, Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and for the improvement of 
mental health care, Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 46/119 of 17 December 1991. Definitions - 
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212 Ibid Principle 18. 
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freedoms taken away from them. It is a condition involving an imbalance of power 
where the powerful make life impacting decisions in a disempowered person’s best 
interests.  It is a complex issues forum where competing rights such as the person’s 
rights to liberty and freedom from unnecessary intervention; to treatment, protection 
and care; and the right of the community to safety and protection are weighed and 
balanced. It is a judicial environment in which the right to qualified, effective 
representation is enshrined in law and yet, it is more often than not, a forum in 
which non-representation, or ineffective representation are the norms. 
One purpose of Chapter Seven was to discuss the high costs associated with legal 
representation. From the perspective of both the potential client and the funding 
bodies, fiscal concern is a major barrier to the universal provision of legal 
representation before mental health tribunals and boards of review: an economic 
condition that is highly unlikely to improve in the coming years.  The extremely 
low representational figures recorded in almost every Australian state and territory 
over the past decades have markedly improved when a structured lay volunteer 
representation strategy or program such as the Office of Official Visitors in Western 
Australia and the MHTRS in Tasmania has been implemented in the jurisdiction.  
This chapter evaluated the Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal Representation 
Scheme as a prospective solution for resolving the financial problems contributing 
to the problem of non-representation. The use of law student schemes has proven to 
be a cost effective option for governments and philanthropists, and one that 
academic commentators have suggested is a model that should be seriously 
considered as having the potential to rectify the unacceptable situation of non-
representation.  Australian organisations have lobbied to have schemes similar to 
the MHTRS implemented in their jurisdictions.  In late 2012, the Queensland Public 
Interest Clearing House became the first organisation to implement its own program 
based on the Tasmanian MHTRS. 
Research identifies law students as presenting an untapped, willing volunteer work 
force that, with training and supervision can provide effective representation in a 
number of poorly legally represented areas of law including child protection, anti-
discrimination, and mental health and guardianship law. The evidence also suggests 
that a specially trained student is commonly a better representative than the 
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untrained legal practitioner who is usually adversarial in their practice and limited 
in their understanding and practical approach toward achieving therapeutic 
outcomes for their client.  
A second intention of Chapter Seven was to show that through a program of 
specialist education, training and contact law students may achieve new and deeper 
understandings regarding the complexities of life for a person who is living with 
mental illness. They can grow in their awareness of the barriers that the person will 
encounter when they come face to face with the sanist legal system. By 
participating in clinical legal programs founded on principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence that maximise appropriate mental health education and incorporated 
contact stratagems, students can learn skills and gain experience necessary to 
provide clients with mental illness with a legal service that holistically meets the 
needs of the client while zealously advocating their rights and interests.    
The first six chapters of the thesis examined stigma and the prejudice and 
discrimination associated with mental illness. Chapters Seven followed on from the 
anti-stigma discussion in Chapters Three and Four.  It reviewed the program 
elements that appear to have had the most success in positively changing the 
negative attitudes of university students.  Importantly, for the purposes of this 
thesis, it presented the MHTRS as a program that fits within the parameters 
necessary to achieve successful attitudinal change.  The following chapter 
quantitatively and qualitatively tests the proposition, and degree, of attitudinal 
negativity associated with mental illness that students have on entering law school, 
and again, on exiting law school. Can it be empirically supported that law students 
are sanist?  Chapter eight tries to establish whether offering law students the 
opportunity to participate in programs similar to the MHTRS is likely to result in a 
long lasting, positive influence on their attitudes, which in future might contribute 
to ensuring greater access to effective representation; a reduction in stigma and 
prejudice in the legal system; and an increase in fairer outcomes for the vulnerable 
people who experience mental illness. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF LAW STUDENT ATTITUDES 
TO PEOPLE WHO EXPERIENCE MENTAL ILLNESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Perlin argues that sanism is far more troubling than any of the other, more familiar, 
‘isms’ such as racism and sexism because the prejudices associated with mental 
illness shape what is, a widely practiced, and socially acceptable, type of bigotry.
1
  
And, rather than being immune to this bigotry, the legal system propagates it. He 
suggests that it is the legal system’s acceptance of sanist myths that are constructed 
from stereotypes, typification and deindividualisation, which leads inevitably to the 
implicit and explicit questioning of the competence, capability and credibility of a 
legal party who has experienced mental illness, and the trivialisation of their legal 
problems.
2
  The importance of sanist theory is its potential to expose the stigmatised 
and prejudicial attitudes of the law’s actors and the entrenched discriminatory 
practices, which Perlin contends pervades the legal system, largely unnoticed and 
unquestioned. However, Perlin does concede that his understanding of sanism 
developed from his personal observations and that it lacks a scientific basis.
3
  
This chapter presents the results of an empirical study undertaken for the purpose of 
testing aspects of Perlin’s observations and assertions. As is explained at Section 
2.0, below, studies have researched law student prejudices generally, but when a 
study has focused on mental illness prejudice expressly, its locus has tended to be 
the impact that stigma has on law students’ failure to seek help and treatment. To 
the best of this author’s knowledge, the present study is the first to compare the 
attitudes of law students on their entry into law school with the attitudes of students 
on their exit from legal education.  The study examines the influences that social 
dominance orientation, liberalism, curriculum, gender and age have on the students’ 
                                                 
1 Michael L Perlin, ‘You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism in Clinical Teaching’ (2003) 9 Clinical 
Law Review 683.   
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
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reported attitudes toward people who experience mental illness, generally, and legal 
clients who experience mental illness, specifically. Assessing and understanding the 
attitudes of law students is the incipience of positive systemic change. 
This chapter builds on the discussion contained in the preceding chapter in an 
important way. Chapter Seven discussed the Mental Health Tribunal Representation 
Scheme (MHTRS). It suggested that the MHTRS might positively alter student 
attitudes, thereby reducing sanism in the legal system. This was argued on that basis 
that the MHTRS was built on principles of therapeutic jurisprudence; that it 
delivered a short, appropriate mental health education program that was developed 
particularly for law students; and that it provided student participants with the 
opportunity for professional face to face contact between themselves and their 
mental health clients.  As discussed in Chapter Four, research has shown that 
participation in short structured mental health courses can have a small, but positive 
impact on the attitudes
4
 of young people
5
 and that attitudes are more improved if 
the program includes personal contact between the students and people who 
experience mental illness.
6
 The second contribution of Chapter Eight is its 
examination of the influence that participation in the MHTRS has on its 
participants.  It questions whether MHTRS participant respondents express more 
positive, less sanist sentiments compared to non-participant respondents.  
This chapter has seven main sections. The first, Section 2.0, notes previous research 
on student attitudes to mental illness. At Section 3.0, literature on the use of 
university students in attitudinal research is briefly outlined.  Section 4.0 is the 
method section, which essentially follows a science structure. It explains the 
objectives of the study and details the development and procedures of the survey 
instrument. It discusses the methodological issues pertinent to Likert scales – 
notably explaining how the phenomena of social desirability and acquiescence bias 
can affect data.  The results of the study are presented at Section 5.0, which 
responds to each of the core research questions, examines variables such as gender, 
                                                 
4 Patrick Corrigan, ‘How Stigma Interferes With Mental Health Care’ (2004) 59 American Psychologist 614.  
5 Amy C Watson, ‘Changing Middle Schoolers' Attitudes About Mental Illness Through Education’ (2004) 30 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 563. See also Petrus Ng and Kai-Fong Chan, ‘Attitudes towards people with mental 
illness. Effects of a training program for secondary school students’ (2002) 14 International Journal of 
Adolescent Medical Health 215.  
6 Sosei Yamaguchi, Yoshio Mino and Shahir Uddin, ‘Strategies and future attempts to reduce stigmatisation and 
increase awareness of mental health problems among young people: a narrative review of educational 
interventions’, (2011) 65 Psychiatry and clinical neurosciences 405. 
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personal experience of having a mental illness and MHTRS participation, and 
presents Tables and Figures that show data outcomes.  Section 6.0 discusses the 
influence that concepts such as ‘no opinion’ reporting and ‘social desirable’ 
reporting had on the analysis of reported responses when trying to determine the 
levels of authoritarianism and benevolence, and the use of stereotypes amongst 
students.   
The conclusion at Section 7.0 reports that, in broad terms, the findings of the 
present study show that opinionated law students are sanist as they hold strongly 
benevolent and authoritarian prejudices. There were few discernible differences 
between the prejudices of the entry level 1
st
 year law students and the exit level, 
final year law students.  The 1
st
 year group was more stereotypical in its attitudes. 
There were inconsistencies and insufficiencies in the data that prevented reaching a 
determination that participation in the Mental Health Tribunal Representation 
Scheme positively influences participant respondent’s attitudes.  Important areas 
requiring further research are identified. This chapter supports the contention of this 
thesis that there is a need for politicians, judges, lawyers, legal academics and law 
students to work together to ensure that in future, the legal system provides people 
experiencing mental illness with access to a respectful, fair and equal, non-
prejudiced and non-discriminatory, non-sanist playing field.  
All statistical analyses presented in this chapter were undertaken by a research 
assistant, Dr Jason Little, in collaboration with the PhD candidate and her 
supervisors.  
2. CURRENT ATTITUDES OF LAW STUDENTS TOWARD 
MENTAL ILLNESS  
University student prejudice is a topic of enquiry that has generated a considerable 
body of social science research, which has consistently found that university 
students exhibit high levels of intolerance toward mental illness.
7
  Examining 
                                                 
7 Darcy Haag Granello and Paul F Granello, ‘Defining Mental Illness: The Relationship Between College 
Students' Beliefs About the Definition of Mental Illness and Tolerance’ (2000) 3 Journal of College Counseling 
100. See also Mike Lyons and Robyn Hayes, ‘Student Perceptions of Persons with Psychiatric and Other 
Disorders’ (1993) 47 The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 541. Also Ashum Gupta and Pushpa 
Bonnell, ‘Opinions about mental illness among college students’ (1993) 9 Journal of Personality and Clinical 
Studies 63.  
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prejudice broadly, Guimond undertook four separate studies using university 
students. Two of his studies used law students and psychology students while the 
other two selected participants randomly from educational disciplines. Guimond 
found that, as a consequence of social dominance orientation (SDO), law students 
were more prejudiced than students who were not studying for the ‘power 
professions’.8   
According to SDO theory, prejudice is simply a manifestation of a universal human 
tendency to form group based structures of social dominance  in which the members 
of one group have the means and desire to subjugate the ‘Others’.9 ‘The mere fact 
of being in a dominant social position is sufficient to generate prejudice and ingroup 
bias’.10 Teachers, families and students perceive that within the hierarchical 
structure of academic disciplines, legal study has the higher prestige and status.  
This perception has an immediate impact on law students as they enter their first 
year of law school.
11
  By comparing the levels of prejudice of the first year 
respondents against those of the final year respondents, Guimond concluded that 
because SDO is a generating mechanism, students become more prejudiced as they 
advance through to final year study.
12
   
Despite recent efforts to reduce stigma on university campuses, relative mental 
illness bias, both implicit and explicit, continues to remain evident amongst 
students.
13
  This was the finding of the recent major Australian depression study, 
Courting the Blues, which presented a cross-sectional survey of 741 law students, 
924 solicitors and 756 barristers.
14
 Students were recruited from 13 Australian 
universities. The study concluded that, generally, law students hold negative 
attitudes and stigmatising views regarding mental illness and that they have a low 
level of knowledge of mental health issues.  It found that 22.8% of the respondents 
(more than one in five) thought that depressed people were dangerous to others; 
7.4% believed that the person only had themselves to blame for their illness; and 
                                                 
8 Serge Guimond et al., ‘Does Social Dominance Generate Prejudice? Integrating Individual and Contextual 
Determinants of Intergroup Cognitions’ (2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 697, 723. 
9 Rupert Brown, Prejudice: Its Social Psychology (John Wiley & Sons, 2010).   
10 Guimond, above n 8, 709. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Bethany A Teachman, Joel G Wilson and Irina Komarovskaya, ‘Implicit and Explicit Stigma of Mental 
Illness in Diagnosed and Healthy Samples’ (2006) 25 Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 75. 
14 Norm Kelk et al., ‘Courting the Blues: Attitudes towards depression in Australian law students and legal 
practitioners’ (Report, Brain & Mind Research Institute, 2009) 
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36% thought that they were bad parents, a common contention that was discussed at 
length in Chapter Six.
15
  
The study suggested that a reason for the students’ display of negative attitudes 
could be because they belong to a cohort of clever and competitive perfectionists 
that have high expectations of themselves and others, and who are, generally, rather 
hard on themselves, and others.
16
  Courting the Blues demonstrates that Australian 
law students share the same mental illness prejudices as the rest of the community 
at levels that are statistically comparable, or higher, than indicated in the general 
public studies discussed in previous chapters.   
3. UNIVERSITY STUDENT ATTITUDES USED IN 
RESEARCH 
The use of university students as research subjects is widely practised.  It is 
estimated that 90% of prejudice researchers rely on student samples.
17
 In 1986, 
Slade suggested that 75% of all published research in social psychology employed 
student participants.
18
  This had not altered when twenty years later, Arnett found 
that 67% of all American samples, and 80% of all samples from other countries, 
were comprised solely of psychology undergraduates.
19
  Given the required 
consents and practical, financial and ethical challenges that are associated with 
subject recruitment, it is understandable why researchers have become reliant on the 
minimum time and cost, convenience samples of university students. However, the 
saturated involvement of student participants from Western industrialised 
countries
20
 has given cause for criticism, skepticism, and suggestions, which try to 
mitigate the barriers and increase the diversity of the samples.
21
  The issue of the 
external validity of generalisations from student samples applied to larger adult 
                                                 
15 Ibid Table 38a, 32. 
16 Ibid iii. 
17 P J Henry, ‘College Sophomores in the Laboratory Redux: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social 
Psychology's View of the Nature of Prejudice’ (2008) 19 Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for 
the Advancement of Psychological Theory 49.  
18 Michael E Gordon, L Allen Slade and Neal Schmitt, ‘The “Science of the Sophomore” Revisited: from 
Conjecture to Empiricism’ (1986) 11 Academy of Management Review 191.  
19 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, ‘The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American’ 
(2008) 63 American Psychologist 7, 602.  
20 Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan, ‘The weirdest people in the world?’ (2010)  33 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 61.  
21 Nilanjana Dasgupta and Matthew Hunsinger, ‘The Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: When Do Student 
Samples Help Versus Hurt the Scientific Study of Prejudice?’ (2008) 19 Psychological Inquiry 90. 
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populations of interest has become a widely endorsed concern for critics
22
 who 
view student samples as a major hindrance to drawing inferences from experimental 
studies.
23
    
Emerging adulthood has been categorised as a period of the life course distinct to 
adulthood and consequently, unrepresentative of the adult public.
24
  Bender 
suggests that the motivational and cognitive characteristics of student participants 
change from week to week.
25
  Sears indicates that young adults change their 
attitudes more often, have less stable social and political views, have attitudes that 
are less likely crystallised, have a less-formulated sense of self, stronger cognitive 
skills and tendencies to comply with authority, and more unbalanced peer-group 
relationships.
26
 Henry claims that because of the many known constructs and 
developmental differences related to prejudice, especially with respect to attitudes, 
identity, and the self that exist between students and non-students, the prejudice 
literature is likely to be vulnerable to generalisability problems.
27
  He argues that 
‘the university setting itself is an exceptional place where prejudice issues are made 
particularly salient and politicised within a liberal climate’28 which may influence 
student responses in prejudice research as well as influence the ‘very questions and 
topics’29  studied.  
Generalisation is not, however, a major issue in this study. The primary purpose of 
the research is not to apply its findings to the wider public but to collect data 
regarding the attitudes of students at the time of entry into law school, and compare 
and analyse the data with data collected from students exiting law school. The 
characteristics and attributes of students used by critics to support the 
unrepresentativeness of the adult public argument, such as having less crystallised 
                                                 
22 Robert Rosenthal and Ralph L Rosnow, Essentials of behavioral research: Methods and data analysis 
(McGraw-Hill, 1991).  
23 James N Druckman and Cindy D Kim, ‘Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the “Narrow 
Data Base”’ in James N Druckman et al., (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
24 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, ‘Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the 
twenties’ (2000) 55 American Psychologist 469.  
25 Timothy A Bender, ‘Time of participation effect and grade-orientation’ (2007) 43 Personality and Individual 
Differences 1175.  
26 David O Sears, ‘College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social 
Psychology’s View of Human Nature’ (1986) 51 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 515.   
27 Henry, see above n 17.  See also Arnett, above n 24 and Sears, above n 26.  
28 Henry, above n 17, 50. 
29 Ibid.  
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attitudes are the same characteristics and attributes which stamps the present 
research sample as a fertile field ready for sowing attitudinal change.  
4. METHODS 
This section describes essential features of the study; the development of the 
instrument; the procdures used to  administer the survey; and the methodological 
issues raised. 
4.1 Development of the instrument  
The instrument used was a reformulation of the Emotional Reaction to Mental 
Illness Scale (ERMIS)
 30
  and the Cohen and Struening’s Opinions about Mental 
Illness Scale (OMI).
31
 As discussed in Chapter Three, since the first studies were 
designed in the late 1940s, a substantial body of research has emerged rising from a 
need to know about public attitudes to mental illness. Along side this need, a 
parallel need to produce a reliable and valid instrument for measuring stigmatisation 
has developed.
32
  The OMI scale was one of the earliest of these instruments. It 
drew upon existing scales such as the Custodial Mental Illness Ideology Scale.
33
 It 
comprised five Likert scales empirically derived from a five factor analysis of 
responses to 100
34
 opinion statements.   
The five OMI factors were authoritarianism, benevolence, mental hygiene ideology, 
social restrictiveness and interpersonal etiology.  Factor analysis identified that the 
two factors that accounted for the greatest variance were authoritarianism and 
benevolence, both of which are considered to be prejudices rather than stereotypes 
as they are representative of the respondent’s agreement with these attitudes.35  It is 
                                                 
30 Matthias C Angermeyer, Anita Holzinger and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Emotional reactions to people with 
mental illness’ (2010) 19 Epidemiolgia e Psichiatria Sociale 26.     
31 Jacob Cohen and E L Struening, ‘Opinions about mental illness in the personnel of two large mental 
hospitals’ (1962) 64 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 349.   
32 Glenn V Ramsey and Melita Seipp, ‘Attitudes and opinions concerning mental illness’ (1948) 22 Psychiatric 
Quarterly 428. See also Glenn V  Ramsey and Melita Seipp, ‘Public opinions and information concerning 
mental health’ (1948) 4 Journal of Clinical Psychology 397.   
33 Doris C Gilbert and Daniel J Levinson, ‘Ideology, Personality and Institutional Policy in the Mental Hospital’ 
(1956) 53 Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 263.   
34 The OMI was reduced in a later paper to 51 Items. 
35 Patrick W Corrigan et al., ‘Prejudice, Social Distance, and Familiarity with Mental Illness’ (2001) 27 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 219, 220.   
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these two factors, authoritarianism and benevolence, that are used in this thesis’ 
study.    
1. authoritarianism, whereby obedience to authority is critical and people 
experiencing mental illness are considered different and inferior and require 
coercive handling;  
2. benevolence, a moral point of view that represents sympathetic, kind, 
encouraging and paternalistic although fearful attitudes which are supported 
by humanistic and religious theories rather than scientific ones.  
Social psychologists have, until recently, predominately focused their stigma 
research on stereotypes and degrees of social distance, to the extent that they had 
become ‘“stereotypical” about stereotypes’.36  The early belief was that if 
misleading and destructive stereotypes could be eliminated, inter-group harmony 
would be enhanced.
37
 This centreing of mental health research on the concept of 
stigma prejudice resulted in little being published on the emotional reactions people 
had to mental illness. Much of the available literature on emotional reaction comes 
from Angermeyer and Matschinger who developed the Emotional Reaction to 
Mental Illness Scale (ERMIS)
 
.
38
  This tool is used to assess the extent that personal 
experience with mental illness influences attitudes.  
Prejudice is not just negative thoughts but also includes ‘emotionally laden attitudes 
involving anxiety, anger, resentment, hostility, distaste or disgust’.39  Angermeyer 
summated that there were three types of emotional reactions to people with mental 
illness - fear, pity, and anger. The public demonstrated so-called positive emotions 
(pity) most frequently, followed by fear then anger. It is questionable, however, 
whether pity can ever constitute a positive emotional reaction as it is an element of 
benevolence that stigmatises a person as helpless and childlike; someone to be 
tolerated and pitied by the normal person. Attitudes of benevolence are 
counterintuitive because while categoriaing people as helpless and childlike might 
lead to helping behaviours, it can also engender perceptions of irresponsibility and 
                                                 
36 Vlad Glăveanu, ‘Stereotypes Revised – Theoretical Models, Taxonomy and the Role of Stereotypes’ (2007) 3 
Europe’s Journal of Psychology (online) <http://ejop.psychopen.eu/article/view/409/308>. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Angermeyer, above n 30.  
39 Graham Thornicroft and Aliya Kassam, ‘Public attitudes, stigma and discrimination against people with 
mental illness’ in Craig Morgan, Kwame McKenzie and Paul Fearon (eds), Society and Psychosis (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 18.  
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uncontrollability, attributes that can reinforce the fear and anger that drives the 
establishment of restrictive processes and laws.
40
 It was important for the present 
study to compare the responses of the students who identified as having had a 
mental illness with those who had not to identify any discernible differences. 
4.1.1 Final page Q4 coding system 
The instrument also included a final page of 8 additional questions (See Appendix 
3). Question 4 was one of the most important questions on the survey because it 
gave little guidance or ‘clues’ to respondents as to what might be an appropriate 
response. It simply asked respondents to write down five words that best described 
their feelings about people who experience mental illness.  So as to produce 
quantitative data from the qualitative responses, a coding system was developed by 
the researcher which was based on Cohen and Struening’s OMI scale41. It included 
four constructs of which, the first three (a) ‘benevolence’, (b) ‘authoritarianism, fear 
and avoidance’, and (c) ‘mental health literacy’ were derived from the OMI Scale. 
An additional category, (d) ‘other’ was included.  The researcher individually coded 
all responses. 
According to Cohen and Struening, the three most commonly held stereotypical 
misconceptions underpinning stigmatising attitudes are benevolence, 
authoritarianism and fear.
42
  The benevolent construct was taken to include all 
sentiments that expressed paternalism/maternalism - pity, incapability, dysfunction, 
vulnerability and restriction.  Research shows that authoritarians report high levels 
of fear, and that the strongest association between authoritarianism and fear 
involves social differences of appearance or behaviour that deviate from the 
common social norms.
43
 Avoidance is a correlation of authoritarianism
44
 so it was 
decided to combine authoritarianism, fear and avoidance into the one construct. It 
                                                 
40 Corrigan, above n 35, 223. 
41 Cohen, above n 31. 
42 Patrick W Corrigan and Amy C Watson, ‘Understanding the impact of stigma on people with mental illness’ 
(2002) 1 World Psychiatry 16. See also Patrick W Corrigan, Amy Kerr and Lissa Knudsen, ‘The stigma of 
mental illness: Explanatory models and methods for change’ (2005) 11 Applied and Preventive Psychology, 
179. Also Paul E Holmes et al., ‘Changing attitudes about schizophrenia’ (1999) 25 Schizophrenia Bulletin 447.  
43 Corey J Butler, ‘Authoritarianism and fear responses to pictures: The role of social differences (2013) 48 
International Journal of Psychology 18. 
44 Corrigan, above n 35. See also Doyle P Johnson, ‘Religious Commitment, Social Distance, and 
Authoritarianism’ (1977) 18 Review of Religious Research 99.  
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included sentiments that expressed intolerance, social distance, legal restriction and 
compulsion and fear.  
The third construct, ‘mental health literacy’ was derived from Cohen’s ‘mental 
hygiene ideology’ which had as its main tenet that ‘mental illness is an illness like 
any other’.  It gave an indication of the level of awareness respondents had 
regarding mental illness, and the issues faced by people who experience mental 
illness. This construct included sentiments that expressed feelings of ignorance and 
the need for more scientific factual information.  It also included sentiments that 
indicated the medical model ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ approach. 
This was particularly important in the evaluation of the impact that participation in 
the MHTRS had on respondents as the variances between participants and non-
participant groups could be analysed. 
4.2 The use of the Likert scale 
The survey format was a summated, multi-point Likert scale questionnaire design 
which, despite criticism from some commentators,
45
 is generally considered to be 
an efficient method for gathering factual information and opinions from large 
numbers of respondents.  The simplicity and versatility of the Likert scale
46
 with its 
classic structure of a series of statements, or Likert Items, divided into two parts, 
stem statement and response, is ubiquitous in academic research. It is most 
particularly utilised when the value sought is one of opinion, belief or attitude
47
 as 
was the aim of this study.  Familiarity and ease of use also contributed to the 
researcher’s decision to use a Likert scale.  
The questionnaire in the present study included five response options ranging from 
‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’ with the semantic midpoint anchor, ‘No 
opinion’. The instrument also afforded respondents additional opportunities to 
provide free response information. 
                                                 
45 Carl J Chimi and David L Russell, ‘The Likert Scale: A Proposal for Improvement Using Quasi-Continuous 
Variables’ (2009) Proceedings Information Systems Education Conference, 4333.  
46 Rensis Likert, ‘A technique for the measurement of attitudes’ (1932) 22 Archives of Psychology 55.  
47 Chien-Ho Wu, ‘An empirical study on the transformation of Likert-scale data to numerical scores’ (2007) 1 
Applied Mathematical Sciences 2851.   
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4.2.1 The midpoint 
The most contentious issue in the literature on constructing a questionnaire is 
whether it is desirable to include a fulcrum on a see saw rating scale
48
 – a 
midpoint.
49
 Likert had originally labeled the midpoint ‘undecided’ however the 
more commonly accepted view is the midpoint response provides the respondent 
with the opportunity to express a truly neutral position: the respondent neither 
agrees nor disagrees with the statement.
50
  The purpose of the midpoint is to avoid 
forcing respondents to express a non-existent opinion and reduce the risk to data 
quality by deterring random choices of agreement or disagreement.
51
  While there is 
a case for forcing respondents to take a substantive position as some respondents 
use the midpoint to avoid providing what they believe to be less than socially 
acceptable answers,
52
  evidence suggests that when the midpoint is omitted, 
respondents move to the positive or negative end of the scale according to the 
specific content of the survey.
53
   
Being politically correct, or telling the researcher what the respondent thinks that 
they want to hear in a survey of attitudes toward people with mental illness, is more 
likely to weigh forced responses toward the positive end of the scale, particularly as 
the survey is conducted in a centre for learning amongst future legal professionals.  
In practice, respondents will interpret the midpoint in different ways making 
midpoints compatible, both with ambivalence (i.e. definite but mixed feelings) and 
indifference (i.e. no particular feelings about the statement).
54
  The numerical data 
is unable to sufficiently account for the reasons why a respondent chose the 
midpoint option but whatever the reason, it will fall within one of two categories: 
true neutrals or non-responses.
55
   
                                                 
48 Chester H McCall, ‘An empirical examination of the Likert scale: Some assumptions, developments, and 
cautions’ (Paper presented at the 80th Annual CERA Conference, South Lake Tahoe, CA, November 15-16, 
2001) <http://faculty.pepperdine.edu/cmccall/CERAFinal.pdf>. 
49 Ron Garland, ‘The Mid-Point on a Rating Scale: Is it Desirable?’ (1991) 2 Marketing Bulletin 66.   
50 Quinten A W Raaijmakers et al., ‘Adolescents’ Midpoint Responses on Likert-Type Scale Item: Neutral or 
Missing Values?’ (2000) 12 International Journal of Public Opinion Research 208.   
51 Rob Johns, ‘Likert Items and Scales’ (Survey Question Bank: Methods Fact Sheet, 1 March 2010) 
<http://www.surveynet.ac.uk/sqb/datacollection/likertfactsheet.pdf>. 
52 Robert A Johns, ‘One size doesn’t fit all: Selecting response scales for BES attitude Items’ (2005) 15 
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 237. 
53 Garland, above n 49. 
54 Johns, above n 51. 
55 Chimi and Russell, 44n 43. See also John T Kulas, Alicia A Stachowski and Brad A Haynes, ‘Middle 
Response Functioning in Likert-responses to Personality Items’ (2008) 22 Journal of Business Psychology 251. 
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The true neutral presupposes that the respondent has sufficient knowledge of the 
subject matter and has formed the belief that their response falls in the middle of the 
two endpoints.  Respondents may default to the midpoint because (a) although 
knowledgeable on the subject, they are indifferent; (b) lack sufficient knowledge to 
know what it is that they are neutral about;
56
 (c) they are unwilling to exert the 
effort needed to address the Item; (d) they lack the literacy or fluency skills required 
to comprehend the question; (e) they can feel ‘rushed’ and if a ‘bypass’ feature for 
the Item is not offered, can resort to the neutral simply to be finished.
57
   
On the other hand, the non-response respondent maybe undecided, and although 
unable to express a definite opinion, wants to provide a genuine response. Or it may 
indicate carelessness, confusion or intentional behaviour; a random guess or an 
omission; a systemic but irrelevant response that is non-informative about the 
attribute of interest; a deliberate effort to present certain impression or some 
unconscious stable response-style such as leniency, neutrality or an acquiescent 
response tendency. It may also mean ‘never thought about it’, ‘don’t know’ and 
‘have no opinion’.58 
4.2.2 The midpoint for young people 
When providing a response to questions of attitude, the respondent must either 
compute an evaluative judgment, or simply retrieve one.  The younger the person, 
the less likely it is that they will retrieve an already formed opinion. The decision to 
include a midpoint response on the questionnaire was informed by the fact that a 
higher proportion of young people compared to adults are, in fact, ‘undecided’, 
having not as yet formed an opinion. Knowledge involvement is essential because it 
is associated with a respondent’s willingness to move on to expressing a substantive 
preference.   
A longitudinal study of Dutch youth aged 12-24 years investigating whether young 
people’s midpoint responses reflected non-responses in the sense of being 
                                                 
56 Chimi, above n 45. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Kathy E Green, Gary Allen and Tony CM Lam, ‘Is Neutral on a Likert Scale the Same As “Don’t Know” For 
Informed and Uniformed Respondents? Effects of Serial Position and Labelling on Selection of Response 
Options, Paper presented and the National Council on Measurement in Education, Denver, CO, May 2010.   
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undecided found this to be the case.
59
  While the youngest respondents gave far 
more ‘don’t know’ responses, the use of this option decreased as they got older and 
a simultaneous increase occurred in the number of ‘undecided’ midpoint responses.  
Younger people will use the midpoint when there isn’t an alternative response of 
‘don’t know’, however, when offered an explicit midpoint, respondents give fewer 
‘don’t know’ responses.60   For this reason, the midpoint on the UTAS 
questionnaire was titled ‘No opinion’ with the intention of directing respondents to 
the option if they had, in fact, not formed an opinion. 
The age demographic for the current study was that 90% of respondents in the first 
year cohort and 85% of the final year group were aged below 24 years.  The vast 
majority of first year respondents were between the ages of 17 and 19 while the 
greater proportion of the final years was aged between 22 and 24.  The variances 
based on age groupings in the Dutch study demonstrated that the pattern of age does 
affect midpoint responses, and that the presence of a midpoint is valuable in 
mapping the shifts from non-substantive responses to substantive responses in 
young people as they age.
61
  As it was assumed that for many of the respondents, 
there was insufficient knowledge on which to form a substantive opinion,  the 
researcher’s preference62 was to give the young people the option of declaring that 
they were undecided rather than forcing from them potentially ill formed, false or 
socially desirable substantive responses.   
4.2.3 Socially Desirable Responses  
A significant reporting error affecting statistical inference is socially desirable 
responding (SDR) which is the tendency of respondents to project favourable 
images of themselves.
63
  SDR is most likely to occur in response to socially 
sensitive questions
64
 which respondents answer through a filter of concern as to 
what will best depict them in a positive light or in a way that they presume to be 
most acceptable to the researcher.  Motivations for providing dishonest or 
                                                 
59 Raaijmakers, above n 50. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Garland, above n 49. 
63 Timothy P Johnson and Michael Fendrich, ‘A validation of the Crowne‑Marlowe Social Desirability Scale’ 
(Paper Presented at the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, St. Pete 
Beach, FL, 2002) <http://www.srl.uic.edu/publist/Conference/crownemarlowe.pdf>. 
64 Maryon F King and Gordon C Bruner, ‘Social desirability bias: a neglected aspect of validity testing’ (2000) 
17 Psychology and Marketing 79.  
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inaccurate SDR responses are (1) the need to respond in culturally sanctioned ways 
in order to obtain social approval;
65
 (2) the inclination to say, or admit to, only good 
things about oneself;
66
 and (3) the tendency to offer ‘socially approved responses as 
an interaction strategy characterised by responding in normatively correct and 
conformist ways and generally trying to present a good face.’67  If respondents think 
that they may be met with social disapproval, they will tailor their answers in a way 
that is consistent with popular or positive opinion. They may even believe the 
information they report (self-deception), or they may ‘fake good’ to conform to 
socially acceptable values, avoid criticism, or gain social approval.
68
 
4.2.4. Acquiescence bias 
Another issue for the researcher was acquiescence bias, which is characterised as 
uncritical agreement by respondents who although attentive, select agreement 
responses regardless of Item content. Although acquiescence may result from a 
number of psychological, social and cultural factors, supporters of the ‘Spinozan’ 
dual model of belief
69
 promote the theory that propositions are believed upon 
comprehension and disbelieved during a subsequent evaluation stage. This suggests 
that the underlying cognitive process of acquiescence lies in the initial 
comprehension of the statement which invokes automatic acceptance of its 
content.
70
   
The acquiescent respondent omits the second stage of evaluation, failing to retrieve 
relevant, and potentially contraindicating, information. The automatic acceptance 
does not depend on Item polarity, therefore, there are no comprehension based 
differences between negative and positive acquiescence.  An acquiescence response 
does not distinguish between true and false Items.  Some people are predisposed to 
agree or disagree in which case, their acquiescence response sets are the 
                                                 
65 Timothy P Johnson, Michael Fendrich and Mary Ellen Mackesy-Amiti, ‘An evaluation of the validity of the 
Crowne-Marlowe need for approval scale’ (2012) 46 Quality & Quantity 1883.   
66 Derek L Phillips and Kevin J Clancy, ‘Response Biases in Field Studies of Mental Illness’ (1970) 35 
American Sociological Review 503.  
67 Catherine E Ross and John Mirowsky, ‘The worst place and the best face’ (1983) 62 Social Forces 529, 530. 
‘Face,’ says Goffman, ‘is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes’.  
68 King and Bruner, above n 64. Also Ted G Harvey, ‘Comment on Response Biases in Field Studies of Mental 
Illness’ (1971) 36 American Sociological Review 510.  
69 Daniel T Gilbert, ‘How Mental Systems Believe’ (1991) 46 American Psychologist 107.  
70 Eric S Knowles and Christopher A Condon, ‘Why People Say ‘Yes’: A Duel-Process Theory of 
Acquiescence’ (1999) 77 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 379. See also Eric S Knowles and 
Nathan T Kobi, ‘Acquiescent responding in self-reports: Cognitive style or social concern?’ (1997) 31 Journal 
of Research in Personality 293.  
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manifestations of their personality type
71
 which are categorised into four groups: (1) 
yea-sayers who score high on both negative and positive Items; (2) nay-sayers who 
score low on both negative and positive Items; (3) assenters who score high on 
positive Items and low on negative Items; and (4) dissenters who score low on 
positive Items and high on negative Items.
72
  
Other sources of acquiescence bias are response pattern anxiety and central 
tendency bias.  In the response pattern anxiety situation, the respondent becomes 
anxious about repeating the same responses and will break up the emerging pattern 
by inserting different responses. Respondents demonstrating central tendency bias 
(end aversion bias) naturally avoid using extreme response categories, preferring 
instead, to provide ‘middle-of-the-road’ albeit, inaccurate response. These forms of 
responses are a reaction to a response pattern or a reflection of the respondent’s 
preference to ‘play it safe’.  They do not reflect the respondent’s true attitudes, 
thereby limiting the insightfulness of the responses.  
4.3 Minimising acquiescence bias and socially desirable responses 
To minimise acquiescence bias and socially desirable responses the structure of the 
questionnaire was designed so that positive and negative Likert Items were 
randomly presented on each question page. Respondents were required to cross 
between linguistic affirmations and negations.  For example, an affirmative 
statement such as ‘Mentally ill clients can instruct their lawyer just fine’ was 
followed further down the page by the negation, ‘Mentally ill clients are unable to 
instruct their lawyer’.  
4.4 Research questions 
The first research question was whether the reported attitudes and beliefs of the law 
student sample would reasonably match other research findings that indicate that 
the general population holds stigmatised and prejudiced (sanist) perceptions about 
people who experience mental illness.
73
  The second research question focused on 
                                                 
71 Arthur Couch, Kenneth Keniston, ‘Yeasayers and naysayers: Agreeing response set as a personality variable’ 
(1960) 60 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 151.  
72 Gary M Maranell, Scaling: A Sourcebook for Behavioral Scientists (Transaction Publishers, 2009).  
73 This thesis and its research study use ‘mental illness’ as a broad umbrella term to encompass the range of 
mind-related states and behavioural disturbances that attract stigma and discrimination. See Chapter One for a 
fuller discussion on its meaning.  
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whether the final year cohort would report more sanist attitudes when compared 
with the first year cohort.  It was anticipated that the final years would exhibit more 
authoritarian, treatment focused, and socially restrictive attitudes due to their study 
of legal concepts such as compulsion and restriction, capacity, violence, public 
protection and criminal law insanity, and because the literature on Social 
Dominance Orientation attributes greater prejudice to upper level study. The final 
year data was also analysed for differences between respondents who identified as 
having a personal experience of mental illness to determine whether they reported 
less sanist attitudes than the group who did not identify.  
The third research question examined whether the reported views of final year 
students who identified as having participated in the MHTRS were more positive 
than the reported views of the final year non-participant group. It was posited that 
as a consequence of the specialist therapeutic jurisprudence training, and the 
personal contact with clients that the MHTRS participants had experienced, they 
would report less authoritative, fearful and socially restrictive attitudes and more 
rights focused, therapeutic, socially inclusive views founded on principles of 
fairness, equality and justice.  
4.5 Implementation of the instrument 
The instrument was designed to inform this, and another research project. Although 
administered together, the projects were separate and distinct. For this study, 204 
first year students completed the questionnaire at a point four weeks after their entry 
into legal education while 81 final year law students completed the questionnaire at 
a point four weeks prior to their departure from legal education.  Participants 
responded in two domain areas, each including a stem statement with 
approximately 20 Item responses relevant to the study (See Appendices 1 and 2). 
The first statement had Items specific to attitudes toward people experiencing 
mental illness generally while the second statement related specifically to legal 
clients experiencing mental illness. The last page of the instrument included five 
additional questions with three additional statements. These provided the researcher 
with both quantitative and qualitative data intended to measure prejudice, social 
distance, familiarity and mental health literacy (See Appendix 3). 
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Respondents were recruited from the undergraduate cohort at the University of 
Tasmania (UTAS) School of Law.  Tasmania is an Australian state categorised as a 
regional area with a dispersed population of just over 500,000.  UTAS is the state’s 
only university and in 2010, it had approximately 25,000 student enrolments overall 
including more than 3000 international students.  All new law students at UTAS are 
required to enrol in the unit ‘Introduction to Law 121’. In 2010, there were 301 
enrolled students indicating a response rate of 67%. There were 134 final year 
students enrolled of whom 81 completed the survey. This indicated a response rate 
of 60%. 
Students were given the opportunity to complete the survey during the last 20 
minutes of their scheduled lecture period. They were informed that completing the 
anonymous survey was voluntary and unconnected to their legal course. Students 
who did not wish to complete the survey were advised that they could leave the 
auditorium. Students were told the purpose of the study and advised of their rights, 
particularly their right to consent which was also detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet (See Appendix 7), which accompanied each questionnaire. 
Participants were given a short explanation of socially desirable reporting and the 
negative influence it can have on research results.  A financial incentive was 
offered.  Students who chose to include their student ID number on the front of the 
survey were placed into the draw for a $200 book gift voucher (first year students) 
and four $50 cash draws (final year students).  Procedures were stringently followed 
to ensure that anonymity was maintained throughout the ‘draw’ process.  The study 
was approved by the the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee (H11049).  
5. RESULTS 
Participants were categorised into different groups. The entire student cohort was 
labelled Group 1.  After reviewing the initial results, the responses of the 
international participants were removed from the study.  The rationale behind this 
decision is discussed below at 5.3.  The action decreased the number of Group 1 
participants from 285 to 256.  Group 1 was then deconstructed into Group 2, 
comprising first year students (N=193) and Group 3, comprising final year students 
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(N=63).  Group 1 responses were compared by gender. Group 2 and Group 3 
responses were then compared with the aim of determining whether there were 
noteworthy differences in Group 3’s attitudes as a result of variables such as 
additional education, maturation, and greater life experiences.  The Group 3 
responses were further analysed based on (a) gender; (b) identification with having 
experienced a mental illness; and (c) participation in the MHTRS. 
A number of precautions were taken to prepare the data for analysis.  The categories 
for the most part were collapsed for analysis into a trichotomous model:  ‘Strongly 
agree’ and ‘Agree’ were combined as were ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Disagree’ 
while the ‘No opinion’ response remained a separate category and was excluded.  
Although the collapsing of data into fewer response categories infringes 
methodological conventions about questionnaire data, there are fundamental issues 
with the problematic measurement properties of multi-choice response categories 
per Item.  This has given rise to different assumptions about the measurement 
properties, resulting in conflicting ‘rules of thumb’ for analysing Likert data.74   
There is a tendency to interpret an ordinal scale as an equal unit scale so that 
‘Strongly agree’ is thought of as a response which is ‘twice as much’ as ‘Agree’ 
even though there is no way of measuring how much stronger ‘Strongly agree’ 
reflects the respondent’s opinion.  The strategy to collapse the response categories 
is based on the belief that it improves the intelligibility of the outcomes of analysis 
because Likert Items are not interval data and the interval between levels remains 
uncertain and unquantifiable.
75
  Data-slicing in this way can facilitate dynamic 
inferences about the data.
76
  There is also a real potential that the existence of actual 
differences will not show up if Likert scores are summed or averaged. The decision 
to use percentages made it easier to assess the real implications of the Item because 
the differences across the responses could be clearly identified.
77
  
                                                 
74 Peter Grimbeek et al., ‘Use of data collapsing strategies to identify latent variables in questionnaire data: 
Strategic management of junior and middle school data on the CHP questionnaire’ (Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the 3rd Annual International Conference on Cognition, Language and Special Education, Griffith 
University Gold Coast, Queensland, 2005) <http://www.grimbeek.com.au/Papers/CHP%20instrument.pdf>. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 
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5.1 Demographic characteristics of the participants 
First year participants were recruited from the compulsory, ‘Introduction to Law 
121’ unit.  Final year participants were recruited from the compulsory ‘Criminal 
and Civil Procedure 423’unit. As noted previously, there was a response rate of 
over 60% for both groups. Table 1 presents the main demographic characteristics of 
the first and final year cohort. 
5.2 Gender, age and degree 
The percentage of females 
graduating law in Australia in 
2010 was estimated at 60%.
78
  
As Table 1 indicates, the UTAS 
numbers were situated alongside 
the national statistic with 
females comprising 61% of the 
first year cohort and 63% of the 
final year cohort.  As expected, 
the overwhelming majority of 
first year respondents (90%) and final year respondents (80%) were under the age 
of 24.  The 10% variation can be explained by the number of final year students 
achieving their 24
th
 birthday during their undergraduate course.  More than half 
(53%) of the first year participants were enrolled in Arts/Law in contrast to 39% of 
final year participants.   
5.3 International students  
Of the 204 first year respondents, 11 were international students while 15 
international students were included in the 81 final year students who completed the 
survey. The study had not intended to focus solely on domestic student responses 
but an initial examination of the results indicated that the international students 
represented an Asian cultural group, which held different views on mental illness to 
                                                 
78 In 2010, the NSW Women Lawyers puts the portion of female law graduates at 60%, ‘Women leading with 
the law’, Lawyers Weekly, 10 March 2011 <http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/women-leading-with-the-
law>. 
 
Table 1 – Demographics of study participants 
Academic Year 1st Year Final  Year Total 
 First year 204 81 285 
Sex     
 Female 124 49 173 
 Male 80 29 109 
 Not recorded 0 3 3 
Age     
 17-24 184 69 253 
 25-39 15 7 22 
 40-55 5 2 7 
  over 55 0 0 0 
 Not recorded 0 3 3 
Student Status     
 Domestic student 193 63 156 
 Overseas  student 11 15 26 
 Not recorded 0 3 3 
Degree Type     
 Arts/Law 107 29 136 
 
Com/Law, Econ/Law 
Straight law 
60 41 101 
  Science/Law, other 36 5 41 
 Not recorded 1 6 7 
• Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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those of the domestic student group.   A selection of the international student 
responses in contrast to domestic student responses is presented in Table 2 below.  
Table 2 – Participant numbers and percentages 
- ‘strongly agreed’ and ‘agreed’ to statements that the mentally ill are: 
 
Morally weak Uneducated Unintelligent Dangerous 
 
n 
% 
n 
% 
n 
% 
n 
% 
Domestic 
n63 
0 
0 
2 
10 
3 
15 
6 
11 
International 
n15 
3 
33 
2 
19 
9 
78 
5 
40 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS  
Table 2 indicates that the international respondents were much more likely to (a) 
view people experiencing mental illness as morally weak, uneducated and 
unintelligent and (b) more dangerous than the domestic respondents. Figure 1a 
shows that the international students have largely stereotyped clients with a mental 
illness as ‘difficult’. The data showed that they perceived their clients as generally 
lacking in cognitive and functional abilities sufficient to enable them to assist their 
lawyer, and that they required others to make their decisions for them. 
Figure 1a – MI legal clients would be difficult to represent 
 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS  
Figure 1b shows the strength of disbelief of the statements that people who 
experience a mental illness are, generally, stigmatised and discriminated against 
between domestic and international students.  
0% 50% 100% 
Overseas 
students 
Domestic 
students 
Strongly Disagree & Disagree 
No opinion 
Strongly Agree and Agree 
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Figure 1b – MI are stigmatised and discriminated against 
 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS  
The data showed a slight trend indicating that international students were more 
paternalistic and  authoritarian; although admittedly, this was not statistically 
significant, but was likely due to the small sample size N=15.  It did raise the 
concern, however, that what was being measured was cultural difference, which 
was not an intention of the study.  As a result, the decision was made to cut the 11 
international respondents from Group 2 and the 15 international respondents from 
Group 3. 
5.4 No opinion 
The rationale for providing respondents with the option of a ‘No opinion’ midpoint 
was discussed above at 4.2.1. Table 3, below, reports the percentages of 
respondents who reported (‘No opinion’) on the Likert scales. Although very few 
participants reported ‘No opinion’ to IA13 (‘the mentally ill have rights that must 
be protected’), for the bulk of Items between 15%-30% of the participants reported 
‘No opinion’; the rate for a handful of Items was as high as 40% and 50%. Of the 
41 Items, the 1
st
 years expressed sentiments of ‘No opinion’ greater than 25% at 26 
Items.  The final years recorded ‘No opinion’ sentiments greater than 25% at 18 of 
the 41 Items. The final year respondents were more opinionated than their first year 
counterparts. The preponderance of ‘No opinion’ responses, particularly amongst 
the 1
st
 year cohort, was not an unexpected finding. Given the literature on the value 
of ‘No opinion’ for young cohorts (discussed above at 4.2.2), it was anticipated that 
many of the participants – aged largely between 17 to 24 – would be undecided on 
the issues raised in the questionnaire, or would not have formed a substantive 
opinion because of their lack of knowledge of the subject.  
0% 50% 100% 
Overseas 
students 
Domestic 
students 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
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Table 3 – Percentage of ‘No opinion’ responses to all Items by 1st year and Final year 
students 
Items 
GENERALLY, the 
mentally ill  
‘No opinion’ 
responses % 
Items 
GENERALLY, 
mentally ill legal clients 
‘No opinion’ 
responses % 
1st 
Year 
(N=193) 
Final 
Year 
(N=63) 
1st 
Year 
(N=193) 
Final 
Year 
(N=63) 
IA1 
should be treated 
differently to other people 
12 18 IB1 
would be difficult clients 
for lawyers to represent 
13 10.5 
IA2 
can’t look after themselves 
properly 
27.5 29 IB2 
would be unable to 
properly instruct their 
lawyer 
28.5 23 
IA3 behave badly in public 26 18 IB3 
could help in developing 
their case strategy      
36.5 34 
IA4 
are treated equally and 
fairly by the law 
34 22 IB4 
should do what their 
lawyers tells them  
31 28 
IA5 are dangerous  27.5 22 IB5 
would find the law too 
complicated to understand 
33 32 
IA6 
need doctors to make 
decisions for them 
28.5 18 IB6 
always have their rights 
respected 
29 21 
IA7 
are stigmatised and 
discriminated against  
15.5 13.21 IB7 
would need their behaviour 
controlled by their lawyer 
34 19 
IA8 
should be in psych 
hospitals and asylums 
16.5 12 IB8 
want what is often not a 
medically good option for 
them 
38.5 43.5 
IA9 
don’t know right from 
wrong  
27.5 24 IB9 
can instruct their lawyers 
just fine 
49 43.5 
IA10 
can’t make rational 
decisions 
31.5 23 IB10 
know that their lawyer 
only acts in their best 
interests  
40 46 
IA11 
want to live together in 
hospitals instead of living 
in the community 
15.5 8.5 IB11 
lack the ability to know 
what is their own best 
interests 
37 49 
IA12 
are erratic and emotionally 
unstable   
35 27 IB12 
have to be treated 
differently to other types of 
legal clients 
22.5 20 
IA13 
have rights that must be 
protected    
4 3.5 IB13 trust their lawyers 54 53.5 
IA14 
need to be controlled by 
laws 
34 29 IB14 
just want someone to help 
them    
19 12.5 
IA15 
are treated badly by the 
media 
25 21 IB15 
are dangerous and put their 
lawyer’s safety at risk 
22.5 
 
24 
IA16 need to be protected    21.5 12.5 IB16 
are labeled and judged 
unfairly 
20 31 
IA17 commit crimes 38.5 42 IB17 
should be able to get a 
lawyer for free    
25 26.5 
IA18 need their own special laws    27.5 19 IB18 
don’t really know what is 
going on anyway 
26 30.5 
IA19 are morally weak  22.5 15 IB19 don’t listen well 33 45 
IA20 
lack intelligence and 
uneducated 
19.5 21 
 
 
  
IA21 scare me 22 31     
IA22 are unpredictable 29.5 28.5  Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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5.5 Agreement and disagreement 
In examining the responses where an opinion was recorded, two steps were taken. 
First, the ‘No opinion’ responses were excluded. Secondly, the percentage opinion 
results were then examined using the trichotomous model of collapsed categories 
that was discussed above at Section 5.0.  When Likert scores are summed or 
averaged, there is the potential that actual differences will not be detected.  By 
combining ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’, and, ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Disagree’, 
the intelligibility of the data can be improved, and dynamic inferences about the 
data can be made. Percentages are reported below to make it easier to identify 
trends in the data and differences between groups of survey respondents. 
5.6 Research question 1 - Are law students prejudiced toward people who 
experience mental illness?   
As outlined above at Section 4.1, a questionnaire was completed by 285 (204 first 
years and 81 final year) law students. After the international cohort was removed 
from the data, the responses of 193 first year and 63 final year participants (n=256) 
were analysed for the purpose of this study.  A total of forty one Items with Likert 
scales were used to gauge the cohort’s perceptions of two issues: (a) people who 
have a mental illness generally, and (b) legal clients who have a mental illness, 
specifically.   Table 3 presents the ‘No opinion’ responses.  Tables 4 and 5 present 
the reported ‘Agreement’ and ‘Disagreement’ Item percentages which have been 
broken down by gender.  Gender is discussed more particularly below at Section 
5.6.4.  The results of the 41 Likert Items are presented below at Sections 5.6.1 and 
5.6.2.   The following Section 5.6.3, presents the results of the final page of the 
instrument, which incorporated multi choice and free response options (quantitative 
and qualitative). The data was also analysed using the gender variable and is 
discussed at Section 5.6.4.  
5.6.1 Group 1 responses: Likert Items regarding ‘people with mental illness’ 
Table 4 consists of 22 Items relating to general perceptions of people who 
experience mental illness.  The 1
st
 year respondents  reported ‘No opinion’ 
responses greater than 25% in 12 out of the 22 Items and the final years in 6 out of 
22 Items) (See Table 3 above). 
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As discussed above at Section 4.1, the factor analysis done by Cohen and Struening 
in their Opinions about Mental Illness (OMI) study
79
 showed that of the five factors 
- authoritarianism, benevolence, mental hygiene ideology, social restrictiveness and 
interpersonal etiology - authoritarianism and benevolence, which are now 
                                                 
79 Cohen, above n 31.   
Table 4 – Percentage of ‘Agreement’ and ‘Disagreement’ responses  by 1st year and 
Final year students by gender (total females = 158,  total males = 98) 
GENERALLY, the ‘mentally ill’  
Females 
Agree 
% 
Males 
Agree 
% 
Total 
Agree 
% 
Females 
Disagree 
% 
Males 
Disagree 
% 
Total 
Disagre
e 
% 
IC1 
should be treated differently to 
other people 
31 46 38.5 52.5 34.5 43.5 
IC2 
can’t look after themselves 
properly 
21.5 29.5 25.5 55 38 46.5 
IC3 behave badly in public 4.5 9 7 70 65 67.5 
IC4 
are treated equally and fairly by 
the law 
20 23.5 22 47.5 43 45 
IC5 are dangerous  5.5 10 8 65 64 64.5 
IC6 
need doctors to make decisions 
for them 
7 13 10 63 60 61.5 
IC7 
are stigmatised and discriminated 
against  
76 71.5 74 11 11 1 
IC8 
should be in psych hospitals and 
asylums 
2 5 3.5 85 74.5 80 
IC9 don’t know right from wrong  11 11 11 65 56 60.5 
IC10 can’t make rational decisions 20 21.5 21 50 46 48 
IC11 
want to live together in hospitals 
instead of living in the community 
0.5 5 3 83 80.5 82 
IC12 
are erratic and emotionally 
unstable  
22 22.5 22 46 41 43.5 
IC13 have rights that must be protected 95 91 93 1 4 2.5 
IC14 need to be controlled by laws 16.5 29.5 23 43.5 41 42 
IC15 are treated badly by the media 54.5 48 51 18.5 30.5 24.5 
IC16 need to be protected  76.5 68.5 72.5 22 29.5 26 
IC17 commit crimes 19 21.5 20 42.5 44.5 43.5 
IC18 need their own special laws 13 20.5 17 59.5 52 56 
IC19 are morally weak  7.5 6 7 73 68.5 71 
IC20 lack intelligence and uneducated 4 12 8 76.5 64 70 
IC21 scare me 10 10 10 70 58 64 
IC22 are unpredictable 40.5 42 41 28 24.5 27 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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considered to be prejudices, recorded the greatest variance.
80
 This same pattern is 
observed in Table 4 where the responses indicate strong authoritarian and 
benevolent attitudes.  Three quarters of respondents reported agreeing that people 
with mental illnesses need to be protected (IC16) and 38.5 % agreed that they 
should be treated differently to other people (IC1). Furthermore, 23% reported that 
they needed to be controlled by laws (IC14) and 17% thought that they should have 
their own special laws (IC18).  
The concepts of difference, inferiority and incapability were consistently apparent 
throughout the data. One in four reported that people experiencing a mental illness 
cannot look after themselves properly (IC2) and 18% considered that they are 
unable to make rational decisions (IC10).  A fifth of the respondents categorised 
them as criminal, twice the number of a recent Dutch study
81
 while 22% thought 
that they are erratic and emotionally unstable (IC12).  Seven percent blamed the 
person for their illness, which is a similar result to that reported in a major UK 
study (6%).
82
   However, in contrast to some recent studies the positive response 
rate of 41% to the Item of ‘unpredictable’ represents a high negative statistic.83   
Angermeyer, in his review of public attitude studies found that the most prevalent 
negative attribute attached to people with mental disorders was that they are 
‘unpredictable’84 with the statistical associations ranging across 54-85 % for 
schizophrenia, 28-56% for depression, and 50% for anxiety disorders.
85
  In this 
study, 41% appears to be a comparable result, particularly as the respondents were 
reporting against the general term ‘mental illness’ rather than specific diagnoses.  
The fact that only 8% reported that they are dangerous (IC5) and 10% reported 
feeling scared (IC21), however, does not reflect the results of most other studies 
which inextricably link the public’s fear of violence to mental illness, 
                                                 
80 Corrigan, above n 34, 220. 
81 Job T van‘t Veer, Herro F Kraan, Stans HC Drosseart, and Jacqueline M Modde, ‘Determinants that shape 
public attitudes towards the mentally ill’ (2006) 41 Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology 310.  
82 Arthur Crisp et al., ‘Stigmatisation of people with mental illnesses: a follow-up study within the Changing 
Minds campaign of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ (2005) 4 World Psychiatry 106. 
83 Elaine Brohan, Claire Henderson, Kirsty Little and Graham Thornicroft, ‘Employees with mental health 
problems: survey of UK employers’ knowledge, attitudes and workplace practices’ (2010) 19 Epidemiol 
Psichiatria Sociale 326. 
84 Matthias C Angermeyer and Sandra Dietrich, ‘Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental 
illness: a review of population studies’ (2005) 113 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 163.  
85 Ibid170. 
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dangerousness and unpredictability.
86
  For example, Phelan found that 59% of 
respondents thought that it was definitely, or probably, true that ‘it's only natural to 
be afraid of a person who is mentally ill’87 while 27% of Canadians reported being 
fearful of being around people suffering a serious mental illness.
88
 This point is 
examined further at Section 5.6.3 where the free text qualitative survey responses 
are discussed. 
5.6.2 Group 1 responses: Likert Items ‘legal clients with mental illness’  
Nineteen Items in the questionnaire focused on lawyers interacting with clients with 
mental illnesses. The likelihood that respondents had not worked in a legal capacity 
with clients experiencing mental illness resulted in the unsurprising assessment that 
the responses tended heavily towards ‘No opinion’ (See Sections 4.2 and 5.4. 
above).  The 1
st
 year respondents  reported ‘No opinion’ responses greater than 25% 
in 14 out of the 19 Items and the final years in 12 out of 19 Items) (See Table 3 
above).   With regards to Table 5, even though there was a high overall percentage 
of ‘No opinion’ responses, two thirds of respondents (67.5%) stereotypically 
reported that they believed that people with mental illness would be difficult clients 
(ID1). Twenty percent disagreed while only 12.5% reported having ‘No opinion’ 
(ID1). 
Table 5 suggests that the responses were consistent with Cohen and Struening’s 
research showing a strong authoritarian trend in which clients were viewed as 
different, inferior and requiring restrictive and coercive handling.
89
   The responses 
also showed a strong level of benevolence, woven within an idealistic naiveté about 
the lawyer client relationship held by respondents, predominantly without practical 
professional experience or personal contact.  For example, 76% reported that clients 
who experience mental illness just want someone to help them (ID14); 29% 
                                                 
86 Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘Violent attacks on public figures by persons suffering 
from psychiatric disorders. Their effect on the social distance towards the mentally ill’ (1995) 245 European 
Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience 159.  
See also Heather Stuart, ‘Violence and mental illness: an overview’ (2003) 2 World Psychiatry 121.  
87 Jo C Phelan and Bruce G Link, ‘Fear of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Personal and Impersonal 
Contact and Exposure to Threat or Harm’ (2004) 45 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 68, 72. 
88 Canadian Medical Association, ‘8th Annual National Report Card on Health Care’ (Report, Ipsos Reid Public 
Affairs, 18 August 2008) 
<http://www.cma.ca/multimedia/CMA/Content_Images/Inside_cma/Annual_Meeting/2008/GC_Bulletin/Nation
al_Report_Card_EN.pdf>. 
89 Cohen, above n 31. 
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reported that clients know that their lawyers act in their best interests (ID10); and 
28% reported that clients trusted their lawyers (ID13). 
Table 5 – Percentage of ‘Agreement’ and ‘Disagreement’ responses  by 1st year and 
Final year students by gender (total females = 158, total males = 98) 
GENERALLY, ‘mentally ill’ 
legal clients  
Females 
Agree  
% 
Males 
Agree 
% 
Total 
Agree  
% 
Females 
Disagree  
% 
Males 
Disagree  
% 
Total 
Disagree  
% 
No 
opinion 
% 
ID1 
would be difficult clients for 
lawyers to represent 
63 72 67.5 22 18.5 20 12.5 
ID2 
would be unable to properly 
instruct their lawyer 
36 39 37.5 37.5 30.5 34 28.5 
ID3 
could help in developing their 
case strategy 
46 44 45 15 21.5 18 37 
ID4 
should do what their lawyers tells 
them  
23.5 35.5 29.5 43 36.5 37 33.5 
ID5 
would find the law too 
complicated to understand 
24 36.5 30 42 29.5 36 
 
34 
ID6 always have their rights respected 24.5 24.5 24.5 49.5 45 47 28.5 
ID7 
would need their behaviour 
controlled by their lawyer 
7.5 12 8 66.5 50 55.5 36.5 
ID8 
want what is often not a 
medically good option for them 
23 35.5 29 32.5 27.5 30 41 
ID9 can instruct their lawyers just fine 30 21.5 26 20 31.5 26 48 
ID10 
know that their lawyer only acts 
in their best interests  
34 24.5 29 28.5 26.5 27.5 43.5 
ID11 
lack the ability to know what is 
their own best interests 
19 22.5 21 42 34.5 38 41 
ID12 
have to be treated differently to 
other types of legal clients 
50.5 58 54 26.5 19.5 23 23 
ID13 trust their lawyers 25 30.5 28 17 16.5 17 55 
ID14 just want someone to help them 79 73.5 76 2 9 5.5 18.5 
ID15 
are dangerous and put their 
lawyer’s safety at risk 
2 2 2 76.5 71.5 74 24 
ID16 are labeled and judged unfairly 61.5 52 57 14.5 24.5 19.5 23.5 
ID17 
should be able to get a lawyer for 
free 
23.5 34.5 26 47 42 44.5 29.5 
ID18 
don’t really know what is going 
on anyway 
6 11 8.5 64 62 63 28.5 
ID19 don’t listen well 9.5 11 10 54.5 50 53 37 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
There was also support for the legal system’s interventionist role and the power 
imbalance between lawyer and client due to client difference.  Stereotypically, 
nearly three quarters of respondents reported that clients with experience of mental 
illness are hard to represent (ID1) while 54% indicated that they have to be treated 
differently to other clients (1D12). More than a third of respondents reported that 
they are unable to properly instruct their lawyers (ID2), 18% reported that they are 
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unable to help with their case (ID3) and 29.5% indicated that they should just do 
what their lawyer told them to do (ID6).  More than a quarter reported that clients 
do not want what is in their medical best interests (ID8) while more than a fifth 
reported that they lack the ability to know what is in their best interests (ID11).  
Thirty percent reported that the law is too complicated for them to understand 
(ID5). 
In contrast to the 10% response to the general Item concerning the dangerousness of 
people with mental illnesses (IC5), only 2% of respondents agreed that clients with 
a mental illness are dangerous. A surprising result was that, although 91% agreed 
that people with mental illness have rights that must be protected, only a quarter of 
the respondents reported that they should be able to access a lawyer for free while 
almost half (44.5%) reported that they, in fact, should not (ID17).  
An overall assessment of the first research question and the results presented in 
Tables 4 and 5 is that while respondents were disinclined to express opinions, when 
they did, they showed that law students hold stereotypical, and authoritarian and 
benevolently prejudicial attitudes.  While there were some unexpected statistical 
inconsistencies with other studies, e.g. dangerousness, the level of negative attitudes 
is comparable, or higher, than similar global stigma research.  The results tend to 
support Perlin’s argument that the legal system is sanist because within less than a 
year of completing the survey, many of the respondents became practicing legal 
professionals.  
5.6.3 Group 1 responses: multi choice and free response  
As explained at Section 4.5, the final page of the survey asked participants to 
respond to five questions and three statements that had a mix of multi choice and 
free response options (See Appendix 3). Respondents provided information and 
description regarding performance and frequency that addressed the variables 
intended to measure prejudice, social distance, familiarity and mental health 
literacy. 
Question 1 asked respondents how often they encountered media portrayals of a 
‘mad psycho killer’ with the options of ‘This week, Past month, Past year, Never 
and Don’t remember’. Approximately half reported seeing such media coverage in 
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the week or month preceding completing the survey. Question 1 also allowed 
respondents to provide qualitative explanations of the media coverage. These 
responses were eclectic. No dominant themes emerged but there was a clear 
association between mental illness and serial offenders.  The vast majority of film 
and television descriptions referred to the perpetrator killing, raping and kidnapping 
multiple times.  
Question 2 asked how often respondents had read or seen a news article in which 
they thought that the person must have been insane to have committed such a 
terrible crime. Seventeen percent reported ‘often’ while 52.5% reported thinking so 
occasionally. Question 3 asked respondents to report how often they used pejorative 
language relating to mental illness including words such as ‘loony’, ‘nutjob’, 
‘wacko’ and ‘bananas’. Twelve percent reported using pejorative language ‘often’; 
36% reported using it ‘occasionally’; and 37% reported using it ‘rarely’. This 
indicates that while pejorative language was not largely reported as frequently used, 
85% of respondents reported using it sometimes. 
Question 4, as discussed above at Section 4.1.1, required the creation of a coding 
system that included four constructs (a) ‘benevolence’, (b) ‘authoritarianism, fear 
and avoidance’, (c) ‘mental health literacy’, and an additional category of (d) 
‘other’.  The bulk of the responses fell into the ‘benevolent’ category.  This result is 
consistent with Angermeyer’s claim that the most common emotional response is 
pity.
90
  Eighty percent of responses expressed sentiments of sympathy. Twenty two 
of 63 respondents used the word ‘sympathetic’. Nine used ‘sad’; eight ‘vulnerable’; 
eight ‘concerned’; six ‘pitiful’; five ‘sorry’; and four used the word ‘helpless’. The 
five word strings included ‘disabled - handicapped - disadvantaged - pitiful – 
misjudged;  ‘sympathetic - empathy - concerned - vulnerable – challenging’; and 
‘sympathetic - helpless - emotionally unstable - do not want to be discriminated - 
needs lots of support’.   
Many respondents chose to write statements such as: ‘Don't think I can be so 
succinct as to put it in five words. They need help with their illness but also can't let 
dangerous people get away with illegal behaviour’; ‘Smart in their way - friendly - 
have their own opinion - they feel humiliated by normal people’; ‘Uncertain - 
                                                 
90 Angermeyer, above n 84. 
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caring - scared for their well being - concerned - but they are still human’; and 
‘Unsure, in as in unsure of how I should interact with them - indifferent as in the 
way I might feel about anyone I don't know but they are still human’.    
With regards to the ‘authoritarian, fear and avoidance’ construct, 38% of 
respondents used words that expressed feelings of fearfulness and avoidance toward 
people with mental illness. The word ‘scared’ was included 21 times. This is an 
interesting finding because it is in conflict with the Likert Item responses in which 
fear was not widely reported (5.6.1 and 5.6.2).  This finding suggests that as many 
as one third of respondents associate mental illness with emotional constructs of 
fear/avoidance.   
The ‘mental health literacy’ construct saw 19% of respondents’ report that they 
were ignorant about mental illness, and that they thought they needed to be more 
educated.  One respondent included the term ‘recovery’ which is the term used for 
the principle of recovery-oriented mental health services. Otherwise, none of the 
respondents expressed sentiments indicating a scientific, medical and treatment 
approach to people who experience mental illness. This result would suggest that 
the public health approach to stigma reduction has not been particularly successful 
amongst young adults. This is supported by the results of the ‘other’ construct, 
which was included to incorporate responses that did not fall into the three main 
categories.  
Although unintended, what occurred was that a construct was included, which gave 
19% of respondents the opportunity to expressly include disrespectful and offensive 
terms and strings of terms such as ‘crazy - wack job - nutcase - psycho ‘;‘looney - 
loopy - bananas’ and ‘ loony - loopy - basket case - nut – nutter’.  A breakdown of 
the data showed that less than half of the final years (27% 1
st
 years, 11% final 
years) responded in this way. The results of the ‘other’ construct  suggests that final 
year students  are less puerile in their reporting and may have less negative attitudes 
toward mental illness than 1
st
 years. 
At Question 5, of the 68.5% of respondents who reported having seen a person with 
mental illness in the year prior to completing the survey, the qualitative data 
indicated that 14% of participants reported that they knew the person had a mental 
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illness because of their appearance while 19% knew because of their behaviour. Six 
percent reported knowing because they had an aid such as a wheel chair or a carer. 
The data suggests that respondents hold stereotypical and prejudiced perceptions of 
people with a mental illness and that there is a tendency to group all disabilities 
(physical, intellectual, cognitive, developmental) together under the mistaken 
banner of mental illness. This can be seen below at Table 6, which provides 
examples drawn from the qualitative data. This finding supports past research that 
shows that young people confuse learning difficulties, physical disabilities and 
mental health problems.
91
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Diana Rose, Graham Thornicroft, Vanessa Pinfold, and Aliya Kassam, ‘250 labels used to stigmatise people 
with mental illness’ (2007) 7 BMC Health Services Research 97. 
Table 6          Recognizing a person as ‘having a mental illness’ 
A sample of the responses to ‘How did you know the person had a mental illness’ included- 
 Black eyes and twitching mouth 
 They walked in a strange way, made tiny sounds and acted in a manner not 
conducive to social norms 
 Looks = height, limb size  
 They had all the physical features of severe autism  
 Could not walk properly, tongue out etc  
 The look, they were all huddled in a group with carer making loud noises  
 They looked retarded  
 Facial features of mild Downes Syndrome otherwise he was a happy, maybe overly 
excited man  
 Wheelchair bound with helper/ odd look on their face   
 They had a strange way about them and they lived in a supported housing 
establishment  
 They swam for special Olympics  
 She could not speak normally and she had a guardian who was guiding her in 
everything. She looked a bit different too  
 Family friend with Downes Syndrome  
 Strange look - touching young children  
 Wheelchair and inability to communicate  
 Very emotional eyes  
 They were unable to speak, being pushed in a wheelchair  
 From the look in their eyes  
 They had a carer, speech difficulties  
 Making an assumption based upon the fact they were gnashing their teeth and glaring 
at people walking by. They were also dressed in old clothing and had an unkempt 
appearance 
 They were in a wheelchair and speaking very slowly to their mother   
 They were usually disabled 
Couldn't control their actions, they were in a wheelchair. 
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Respondents were asked at Question 6 whether they would enter into a marriage or 
a civil union with a person who had a mental illness. Marriage is a well established 
measure for researchers assessing social distance although most researchers broaden 
the question to refer to a family member’s marriage.92 Question 6 asked specifically 
whether the respondent would personally enter into such a committed arrangement. 
Twenty one percent (nearly a quarter) of respondents reported that they would not 
while 41.5% said that they would and 37.5% were not inclined to give an opinion.  
Ostensibly, these results suggest a moderate level of social distancing but it is 
difficult to know whether this ‘liberal’ view would be matched by action, or the 
influence that idealistic or romantic notions had on the results. This question seems 
particularly susceptible to the biases discussed above at Section 3.0, below and 
Section 6.3, above, when survey respondents are young university students. 
Question 7 presented the mental health literacy question, ‘Schizophrenia is an 
illness like any other illness such as asthma, diabetes etc’.  English data gathered in 
2011 indicated that 77% of the population response was in agreement with 
schizophrenia being an illness like any other.
93
 
94
  In this study, responses were 
divided with 36% disagreeing that schizophrenia is an illness like any other and 
47% agreeing that it is.
95
   These results suggest that the global public health disease 
approach to mental illness discussed in Chapter One has not achieved the desired 
success particularly amongst the educated cohort of UTAS law students.   
Recent research has also shown that while there has been an increase in the public’s 
endorsement of a biological causation for schizophrenia, it has been accompanied 
by parallel increases in the public’s fear of, and desire for, greater social distance 
                                                 
92 Allison L Smith and Craig S Cashwell, ‘Social Distance and Mental Illness: Attitudes 
Among Mental Health and Non-Mental Health Professionals and Trainees’ (2011) 1 The Professional 
Counselor 13. See also Jennifer E Boyd, Emerald P Katz, Bruce G Link, and Jo C Phelan, ‘The relationship of 
multiple aspects of stigma and personal contact with someone hospitalized for mental illness, in a nationally 
representative sample’ (2010) 45 Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology 1063. See also Matthias C 
Angermeyer, Herbert Matschinger and Patrick W. Corrigan, ‘Familiarity with mental illness and social distance 
from people with schizophrenia and major depression: testing a model using data from a representative 
population survey’ (2004) 69 Schizophrenia research 175.  See also Matthias C Angermeyer and Herbert 
Matschinger, ‘Social distance towards the mentally ill: results of representative surveys in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (1997) 27 Psychological medicine 131. 
93 Attitudes to Mental Illness - 2011 (Survey report, National Health Service, U.K., 2011) 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB00292 
94 Bernice A Pescosolido et al., ‘“A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of Change in Public Reactions to 
Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence’ (2010) 167 American Journal of Psychiatry 1321. 
95 President Clinton, We must make it clear, once and for all: mental illness is no different from physical illness, 
Remarks at the White House Conference on Mental Health, 1 Published Papers 896, 1. 
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from people with schizophrenia.
96
 The fact that more than a third of respondents 
differentiate schizophrenia from somatic illness emphasises difference and the 
categorising of ‘Otherness’ which, as was discussed in Chapter Three, helps to 
create the image of someone who is incapable, dangerous and unpredictable: a 
member of a group that is marginalised, subordinated and ostracised.  On the other 
hand, the fact that nearly half of the respondents agree that schizophrenia is ‘an 
illness like any other’, may, as Angermeyer suggests, be accompanied by an 
increased level of fear and desire for social distance.  The low statistical responses 
from the Likert Items relevant to ‘dangerousness’ appear to conflict with this 
proposition.  
Finally, Question 8 asked respondents ‘whether the mentally ill should be forced to 
take medication’.  One in five respondents indicated that they should. ‘The use of 
legal coercion to compel individuals to participate in mental health treatment is 
expanding despite a lack of empirical support for many of its forms.’97  Studies 
examining the public’s views on legally mandated treatment suggest that fear is a 
particularly strong predictor of support for coercive treatment.
98
   The public levels 
of concern regarding ‘dangerousness’ operate to increase or decrease its level of 
fear.
99
 A limitation for this study was that it was unable to determine whether the 
one fifth of respondents who agreed with forced medication did so as an indication 
of their intention to ‘help’ or whether it was prompted by their fear of the 
behavioural manifestation of people who experience mental illness.  Similarly to 
Question 7, the low Likert ‘dangerousness’ Item suggests that fear is not a major 
motivator although, as previously discussed, Question 4 suggests that fear is 
significant in the attitudes of the respondents. A third of respondents were not 
inclined to answer this question. It is hoped that this study stimulates further 
investigation into the role of fear in developing the attitudes of law students. 
                                                 
96 Matthias C Angermeyer, Herbert Matschinger and Georg Schomerus, ‘Attitudes towards psychiatric 
treatment and people with mental illness: changes over two decades.’ (2013) 203 The British Journal of 
Psychiatry 146. 
97 Amy C Watson, Patrick W Corrigan and Beth Angell, ‘What motivates public support for legally mandated 
mental health treatment?.’ (2005) 29 Social Work Research 87, 87. 
98 Corrigan, Patrick, Fred E. Markowitz, Amy Watson, David Rowan, and Mary Ann Kubiak. ‘An attribution 
model of public discrimination towards persons with mental illness’ (2003) 44 Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior 162. See also Bruce G Link, Jo C. Phelan, Michaeline Bresnahan, Ann Stueve, and Bernice A 
Pescosolido, ‘Public conceptions of mental illness: labels, causes, dangerousness, and social distance’ (1999) 89 
American Journal of Public Health 1328.  
99 Corrigan, above n 98. 
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5.6.4 Group 1 responses by gender:  Likert Items and multi choice and free 
responses  
Overall, few gender differences were observed in the Group 1 Likert Item 
responses; a result consistent with previous studies.  Some slight trends were 
apparent, however, when the data was examined by year groups. There were no 
significant differences between the responses of the males and females in the final 
year cohort.  However, statistically significant differences were found between the 
males and females in the responses given by the first year cohort at 8 Items (IC1= 
p<0.001, IC2= p<0.015, IC14= p<0.016, IC15= p<0.033, IC20= p<0.016, ID5= 
p<0.021, ID7= p<0.030 and ID8= p<0.054).  Regarding the stereotype that people 
who experience mental illness lack intelligence and are uneducated (IC20), only 4% 
of the first year females agreed in contrast to 16% of the males. There was less of a 
percentage gap between the final year females (2.6%) and the males (4%).  
In 10 of the overall Group 1 Items, males appeared slightly more inclined toward 
controlling, authoritarian approaches while females were more benevolent in their 
responses. This can be noted above in Table 4 (IC1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 18) and Table 5 
(ID1, 6, 16).   With regard to the additional eight questions included on the final 
page, slight trends were observed.  Twenty eight percent of males reported that they 
would never marry someone who had a mental illness, but only 17% of female 
respondents.  Females were also more accepting of the ‘illness like any other’ 
policy with 57%, agreeing that schizophrenia was like any other illness, as 
compared to 37.5% of males. The only finding that met statistical significance was 
Question 4, which required respondents to provide five words to describe their 
feelings about people who experienced mental illness.  Chi square contingency tests 
indicated that compared with males, females were more likely to use words 
indicating sympathy, sadness and pity when reporting how they perceived people 
with mental illness (p<0.01). In percentage terms, 84% of females referred to the 
benevolence construct compared with 76.5% of males. 
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5.7 Research question 2 – Are final year law students more prejudiced 
toward people who experience mental illness than first year law students?   
It was noted above, at Section 5.4, that a high proportion of respondents reported 
‘No opinion’ in response to the questionnaire Items. Although the final year 
students were slightly more prepared to offer opinions than the first years, overall, 
the data reflected a relatively high degree of homogeneity between the two groups. 
Once comparison was conducted without the ‘No opinion’ responses – that is, only 
‘Agree’ (compressed with ‘Strongly agree’) and ‘Disagree’ (compressed with 
‘Strongly Disagree’) – the same essential pattern was observed in the data; the 
views of first and final year students are arguably homogenous.  
Table 7, below, presents the responses of first and final year students to the Likert 
Items regarding more broadly, people who experience mental illness.  
Table 7 – Group 1 - agreement and disagreement by year  (total 1st years  = 193,  
total Final years = 63) 
GENERALLY,  the mentally ill 
First years 
Agree  
% 
Final years 
Agree 
% 
First years 
Disagree  
% 
Final years 
Disagree  
% 
IE1 should be treated differently to other people 36 38 47 41 
IE2 can’t look after themselves properly 25 24 48.5 47.5 
IE3 behave badly in public 6 6 68 70 
IE6 are treated equally and fairly by the law 19 28.5 45.5 46 
IE5 are dangerous  8 4.5 64 66.5 
IE6 need doctors to make decisions for them 9 9.5 60.5 66.5 
IE7 are stigmatised and discriminated against  74 74.5 11.5 8 
IE8 should be in psych hospitals and asylums 3.5 1.5 81 81 
IE9 don’t know right from wrong  12 8 61 63.5 
IE10 can’t make rational decisions 23 12.5 45 59 
IE11 
want to live together in hospitals instead of 
living in the community 
2.5 1.5 81.5 84 
IE12 are erratic and emotionally unstable  25 14.5 41 54 
IE13 have rights that must be protected 93 93.5 2.5 1.5 
IE14 need to be controlled by laws 23 16 40.5 49 
IE15 are treated badly by the media 50 56 25 39.5 
IE16 need to be protected  71 81 7 3 
IE17 commit crimes 20.5 17.5 41 41 
IE18 need their own special laws 12 24 58.5 50.5 
IE19 are morally weak  8.5 1.5 69 78 
IE20 lack intelligence and uneducated 8 3 72.5 70 
IE21 scare me 12 5 67.5 60.5 
IE22 are unpredictable 47 22 23.5 36.5 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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Of the 22 Items in Table 7, a statistically significant difference was observed in 
only one (IE18). This asked respondents whether they thought that people who 
experienced a mental illness needed their own special laws.  Of the final years, 24% 
reported that they did, in contrast to 13.5% of the first year respondents; and 81% of 
the final year respondents, compared to 71% of the first years, reported that they 
needed to be protected (IE16).  On the other hand, more than double the number of 
first years thought that people with a mental illness were unpredictable (IE22) and 
nearly double again thought them to be erratic and unstable (IE12).    
With respect to the more narrow Items relevant to legal clients with mental 
illnesses, Table 8 (below) indicates that even fewer differences were discernible 
between first and final year responses. 
Table 8 – Group 1 - agreement and disagreement by year  (total 1st years  = 193, total 
Final years = 63) 
GENERALLY, mentally ill legal clients  
First years 
Agree 
% 
Final years 
Agree 
% 
First years 
Disagree 
% 
Final years 
Disagree 
% 
IF1 would be difficult clients for lawyers to represent 67 63.5 19.5 35 
IF2 would be unable to properly instruct their lawyer 38 36.5 33.5 38 
IF3 could help in developing their case strategy 43.5 55.5 18 16 
IF6 should do what their lawyers tells them  30 22 39 46 
IF5 would find the law too complicated to understand 29 28.5 38 39.5 
IF6 always have their rights respected 24 25.5 46.5 50.5 
IF7 
would need their behaviour controlled by their 
lawyer 
8 14.5 59 63.5 
IF8 
want what is often not a medically good option for 
them 
31 17.5 29 35 
IF9 can instruct their lawyers just fine 25 31.5 25.5 22 
IF10 
know that their lawyer only acts in their best 
interests  
31 28.5 29 24 
IF11 
lack the ability to know what is their own best 
interests 
23 12.5 40 36.5 
IF12 
have to be treated differently to other types of 
legal clients 
51 60 26 17.5 
IF13 trust their lawyers 27.5 27 16.5 17.5 
IF14 just want someone to help them 75 82.5 5.5 1.5 
IF15 are dangerous and put their lawyer’s safety at risk 2 4.5 75.5 71.5 
IF16 are labeled and judged unfairly 57.5 58.5 21 39.5 
IF17 should be able to get a lawyer for free 26.5 31.5 46.5 39.5 
IF18 don’t really know what is going on anyway 9.5 1.5 63 63.5 
IF19 don’t listen well 13 1.5 53 50 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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Table 8 shows that almost 40% of final year respondents reported that people 
experiencing a mental illness were not labeled or judged unfairly (IF16) which was 
nearly twice the number of the first year respondents. However, this difference did 
not achieve statistical significance when chi squared.  
Analysing the data in Tables 7 and 8 indicates that there are no markedly different 
attitudes between the two cohorts of students.  In terms of trends that may be of 
interest to future research, the 1
st
  year respondents did report more stereotypical 
attitudes toward people who experience mental illness, such as that they are 
unstable, unpredictable and irrational. On the other hand, the final year group 
appeared to have a more authoritarian focus to its responses.  Only 0.5% separated 
the groups in their disagreement with the statement that, generally, people with a 
mental illness are treated equally and fairly by the law (IE6).  But almost double the 
number of final years disagreed with the statement that legal clients with a mental 
illness were labeled and judged unfairly (IF16) (39% compared to 21%).  
5.7.1 The influence of respondent’s personal experience of mental illness on data 
The number one health issue facing young people aged 16-24 in Australia is mental 
illness with 26% affected in any year.
100
  By age 21, just over half will have 
experienced a diagnosable psychiatric disorder
101
  and over 75% of common mental 
health problems will occur by the age of 25.
102
  The demographical gathering 
questions on the survey cover sheet asked respondents whether they had personally 
experienced a mental illness. The broad term, ‘mental illness’ was not defined.  The 
final year cohort had an additional question asking whether, if they answered yes, 
the onset of the illness had occurred during their university legal studies.  Of the 
Group 1 cohort (256), 47 respondents answered yes.  Of the 63 final year 
respondents, 14 answered in the positive with 65% reporting that they had become 
ill during their academic legal studies.  Seventy one percent of the positive 
responses were from females and 29% from males.   
                                                 
100 Tim Slade et al., ‘The mental health of Australians 2: Report on the 2007 national survey of mental health 
and wellbeing’ (Report, Department of Health and Ageing Australian Government, May 2009). 
101 Ronald C Kessler et al., ‘Age of onset mental disorders: a review of recent literature’ (2007) 20 Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry 359.  
102 Kelk above n 14, v. 
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Although WHO claims that ‘Overall rates of psychiatric disorder are almost 
identical for men and women’,103 this claim is strongly criticised by researchers as 
simply untrue, with suggestions that psychological disorders are 20% to 40% more 
common in women than men.
104
 The Courting the Blues study reported that 
psychological distress was statistically higher amongst female law students
105
 with 
females also more willing than males to report their illness.
106
 The results of this 
study support those findings and suggest that the results may be underestimated. 
 
                                                 
103 Gender and women's mental health, Gender disparities and mental health: The Facts, World Health 
Organization, Mental Health (Fact Sheet, WHO, 2013)   
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/genderwomen/en/. 
104 Daniel Freeman and Jason Freeman, The Stressed Sex: Uncovering the Truth About Men, Women, and 
Mental Health (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
105 Kelk above n 14, 41. 
106 Ibid, 11. 
Table 9 – Group 2 - Agreement and disagreement by  personal experience of 
mental illness reporting 
Item GENERALLY, the mentally ill 
No MI  
N=49 
Agree  
% 
Yes MI  
N=14 
Agree 
% 
No MI  
N=49 
Disagree  
% 
Yes MI  
N=14 
Disagree  
% 
IG1 should be treated differently to other people 36.5 43 37 28.5 
IG2 can’t look after themselves properly 22.5 28.5 45 57 
IG3 behave badly in public 8 0 71.5 64.5 
IG6 are treated equally and fairly by the law 28.5 28.5 43 57 
IG5 are dangerous  6 0 65.5 71.5 
IG6 need doctors to make decisions for them 12 0 61 86 
IG7 are stigmatised and discriminated against  69.5 93 10 0 
IG8 should be in psych hospitals and asylums 2 0 81.5 78.5 
IG9 don’t know right from wrong  8 7 61 71.5 
IG10 can’t make rational decisions 12 14.5 55 71.5 
IG11 
want to live together in hospitals instead of 
living in the community  
2 0 83.5 85.5 
IG12 are erratic and emotionally unstable  14.5 14.5 59 35.5 
IG13 have rights that must be protected 94 93 2 0 
IG14 need to be controlled by laws 20.5 0 47 57 
IG15 are treated badly by the media 57 57 16.5 21.5 
IG16 need to be protected  81.5 92.5 4 0 
IG17 commit crimes 16.5 21.5 39 21.5 
IG18 need their own special laws 28.5 7 49 57 
IG19 are morally weak  2 0 79.5 71.5 
IG20 lack intelligence and uneducated 2 7 67.5 78.5 
IG21 scare me 6 0 57 71.5 
IG22 are unpredictable 22.5 21.5 30.5 57 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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The Chi squared test showed that there was no significant difference in the final 
year responses to the general Items, but statistically significant differences were 
found in Items regarding legal clients who experienced a mental illness (IO2; 
p<0.001, IO3; p<0.05 and IO17; p<0.05). Although the group reporting having had 
a mental illness was small (N=14), slight trends in attitudinal difference were 
apparent in the percentages.  Perhaps most appreciably, 93% of the group that 
reported having had a mental illness indicated that people who experience a mental 
illness are stigmatised and discriminated against as compared to 69.5% of the non-
mental illness group (IG7).  The identifying group was also 25% more inclined to 
disagree with the need for doctors to make decisions (IG6) as well as disagreeing 
with the statements that they were unable to make rational decisions (16.5% IG10); 
were erratic and unstable (24.5% IG12); and committed crimes (17.5% IG17). 
There was a noticeable trend that the participants who reported having had a mental 
illness appeared to be less accepting of the stereotypes than their counterparts (See 
Table 9 above). 
With regard to the Items specific to legal clients below at Table 10, respondents 
who reported having had a mental illness demonstrated less stereotypical attitudes 
towards the functioning capabilities of clients. For example, 47% of the non-mental 
illness group agreed that the client would be unable to properly instruct their lawyer 
compared to 0% in the mental illness group (IH2) while 71.5% of the mental illness 
group disagreed with the statement that the client would be unable to properly 
instruct their lawyer compared to 28.5% in the non-mental illness group (IH2).  Of 
the two groups, 30% more in the mental illness group reported that the client could 
help to develop their case strategy (IH3) and 22.5% more reported that clients 
should be able to access a lawyer for free (IH17). However, over half of the non-
mental illness group thought that clients should not be able to access a lawyer for 
free compared to 14% of the mental illness group who thought they should not be 
able to access a lawyer for free (IH17).   
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Table 10 – Group 2 - Agreement and disagreement by  personal experience of 
mental illness reporting 
Item 
I think that mentally ill legal clients 
GENERALLY 
No MI 
N=49 
Agree 
% 
Yes MI 
N=14 
Agree 
% 
No MI 
N=49 
Disagree 
% 
Yes MI 
N=14 
Disagree 
% 
IH1 
would be difficult clients for lawyers to 
represent 
65.5 57 22.5 28.5 
IH2 
would be unable to properly instruct their 
lawyer      
47 0 28.5 71.5 
IH3 could help in developing their case strategy      49 78.5 18.5 7 
IH6 should do what their lawyers tells them  24.5 14 43 57 
IH5 
would find the law too complicated to 
understand 
30.5 21.5 28.5 57 
IH6 always have their rights respected 26.5 21.5 51 50 
IH7 
would need their behaviour controlled by 
their lawyer 
16.5 7 61 71.5 
IH8 
want what is often not a medically good 
option for them 
18.5 14.5 34.5 35.5 
IH9 can instruct their lawyers just fine 28.5 35.5 20.5 28.5 
IH10 
know that their lawyer only acts in their best 
interests  
28.5 28.5 18.5 43 
IH11 
lack the ability to know what is their own best 
interests 
16.5 0 32.5 50 
IH12 
have to be treated differently to other types of 
legal clients 
59 64.3 18.5 14.5 
IH13 trust their lawyers 30.5 14.5 16.5 21.5 
IH14 just want someone to help them 81.5 85.5 2 0 
IH15 
are dangerous and put their lawyer’s safety at 
risk 
2 0 71.5 71.5 
IH16 are labeled and judged unfairly 59 58 8 14.5 
IH17 should be able to get a lawyer for free     28.5 43 51 14 
IH18 don’t really know what is going on anyway 2 0 61 71.5 
IH19 don’t listen well 2 0 53 64.5 
         Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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5.7.1.1 Final page 1-8 responses 
It was an unexpected result to find that at Question 3, respondents in the mental 
illness (MI) group reported using pejorative language more often and more 
occasionally than respondents in the non-mental illness (No MI) group. Thirty 
percent also reported using it rarely which was only slightly less than the non-
mental illness group.  This finding is somewhat inconsistent with the findings of a 
recent study indicating that people who have personal experience of mental illness 
have a more respectful attitude toward to others who experience mental illness.
107
  
 
 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
The Question 4, benevolence factor achieved significance when chi squared.  
Ninety six percent of the mental illness group reported more benevolent responses 
compared to the non-mental illness group (78%).  
The Question 6, social distance responses indicated that 76.5% of the mental illness 
group reported that they would marry a person with a mental illness compared to 
32% in the non-mental illness group.  Also, 6.5% said that they would never marry 
a person with a mental illness in contrast to a quarter of the non-mental illness 
group.  Fifty three percent of the mental illness group agreed that ‘schizophrenia 
                                                 
107 Jennifer E Boyd, Emerald P Katz, Bruce G Link, and Jo C Phelan, ‘The relationship of multiple aspects of 
stigma and personal contact with someone hospitalized for mental illness, in a nationally representative sample’ 
(2010) 45 Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology 1063. 
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Figure 2 – Final Page Q3 – ‘Do you use terms such as loony...’ - MI/no MI 
Groups 
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
410 
was an illness like any other’, 12% more than the no mental illness group of which, 
43% also disagreed that mental illness was an illness like any other compared to 
25.5% of the mental illness group, which disagreed.   
5.7.2 The influence of respondent’s participation in the MHTRS on data 
The demographic questions included whether the respondent had undertaken the 
MHTRS training.  Respondents who replied in the affirmative were asked the 
additional question of whether they had gone on to represent a client before the 
Mental Health Tribunal (MHT). Twenty one percent (13) of Group 2 reported 
having completed the MHTRS training (6 males and 7 females). Five of the trained 
respondents represented a client before the MHTRS. The 8 respondents who did not 
represent a client may have had their client discharged from their order prior to the 
hearing, a common occurrence which was discussed in Chapter Seven; may not 
have yet been allocated a representation; or chose not to offer a representation 
service after training. The fact that it is unknown how many of the 8 actually had 
some level of personal contact with a client has a limiting influence on the results of 
the study because contact is considered to be a crucial factor in helping reduce 
stigma and decrease discrimination.  
There was a slight difference in the number of ‘No opinion’ responses to the Items 
relating to people who experience mental illness generally.  Of the group who had 
not done the MHTRS training, 7 of the 22 Items reported a ‘No opinion’ Item 
response greater than 25%.  Of the group that had done the training, this statistic 
proved lower (5 of the 22 Items). With regard to the client specific Items, the 
participant group demonstrated a primarily ‘No opinion’ sentiment at 9 of the 19 
Items in contrast to the non-MHTRS group’s 12 Items. 
The responses to the first Item at Table 11 indicating that people who experience a 
mental illness should be treated differently (II1) seemed to set the trend for most of 
the Items. The MHTRS group tended to be less authoritarian and less benevolent in 
their responses compared to the non-participant respondents (See Figure 3, below). 
The MHTRS group also reported less support of stereotypes such as at Item II22 
which shows nearly 20% less agreement with the non-participant group that people 
who experienced mental illness are unpredictable. 
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There were a few Items where a more benevolent response was indicated such as at 
Item II16 where 14.5% more of the participant group reported that people 
experiencing a mental illness should be protected and 19% more than the non-
participant group reported that they thought that people experiencing a mental 
illness are not stigmatised and discriminated against (II7).  
Table 11 – Group 2 - Agreement and disagreement by MHTRS participation 
GENERALLY, the mentally ill 
N=50 N=13 
No  
MHTRS 
Agree  
% 
Yes 
MHTRS 
Agree 
% 
No  
MHTRS 
Disagree  
% 
Yes 
MHTRS 
Disagree  
% 
II1 
should be treated differently to other 
people 
42 23 36 61.5 
II2 can’t look after themselves properly 22 30.5 48 46 
II3 behave badly in public 8 0 70 69 
II6 are treated equally and fairly by the law 26 38.5 46 46 
II5 are dangerous  6 0.0 64 77 
II6 need doctors to make decisions for them 10 7.5 64 77 
II7 are stigmatised and discriminated against  74 77 4 23 
II8 should be in psych hospitals and asylums 2 0 80 84.5 
II9 don’t know right from wrong  6 15.5 64 61.5 
II10 can’t make rational decisions 14 7.5 56 69 
II11 
want to live together in hospitals instead of 
living in the community 
2 0 82 92 
II12 are erratic and emotionally unstable  18 0 50 69 
II13 have rights that must be protected 96 83.5 0 7.5 
II14 need to be controlled by laws 16 15 50 46 
II15 are treated badly by the media 54 69 16 23 
II16 need to be protected     78 92.5 4 0 
II17 commit crimes 20 7.5 30 54 
II18 need their own special laws 24 23 52 46 
II19 are morally weak  2 0 82 61.5 
II20 lack intelligence and uneducated 2 0 70 69 
II21 scare me 4 7.5 38 30.5 
II22 are unpredictable 26 7.5 38 30.5 
                                                                                                                           Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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Figure 3 – MI should be treated differently to other people (II1 –Table 11) 
 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
This slight trend was also noticeable at the Items specific to clients who experience 
a mental illness (see Table 12, below).  MHTRS participants were less inclined to 
see the client with a mental illness as being different and requiring marginalisation 
(see Figure 4, below). 
Figure 4 – MI legal clients should be treated differently (IJ12 Table 12) 
 
Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
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Table 12 – Group 2 - agreement and disagreement by MHTRS participation    
GENERALLY, mentally ill legal clients  
N=50 N=13 
No 
MHTRS 
Agree  
% 
Yes 
MHTRS 
Agree 
% 
No 
MHTRS 
Disagree  
% 
Yes 
MHTRS 
Disagree  
% 
IJ1 would be difficult clients for lawyers to represent 60 77 26 15 
IJ2 would be unable to properly instruct their lawyer 38 31 38 38.5 
IJ3 could help in developing their case strategy 56 54 16 15.5 
IJ6 should do what their lawyers tells them  24 15.5 42 61.5 
IJ5 would find the law too complicated to understand 30 23 32 46 
IJ6 always have their rights respected 30 7.5 46 69.5 
IJ7 
would need their behaviour controlled by their 
lawyer 
16 7.5 60 77 
IJ8 
want what is often not a medically good option for 
them 
18 15.5 36 31 
IJ9 can instruct their lawyers just fine 30 38 20 38 
IJ10 
know that their lawyer only acts in their best 
interests  
30 23 20 38.5 
IJ11 
lack the ability to know what is their own best 
interests 
14 7.5 34 46 
IJ12 
have to be treated differently to other types of legal 
clients 
64 46 14 31 
IJ13 trust their lawyers 28 23 16 23 
IJ14 just want someone to help them 84 77 2 0 
IJ15 are dangerous and put their lawyer’s safety at risk 2 0 74 61.5 
IJ16 are labeled and judged unfairly 60 54 8 15.5 
IJ17 should be able to get a lawyer for free 32 30.5 38 46 
IJ18 don’t really know what is going on anyway 0 7.5 66 54 
IJ19 don’t listen well 2 0 54 38.5 
                                                                                                                          Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
5.7.2.1 Questions 1-8 written responses 
It was reported at Section 5.7.1.1 that respondents who had an experience of mental 
illness reported a higher tendency to use pejorative language than respondents who 
did not.  In this instance, respondents who had participated in the MHTRS reported 
using pejorative language less than the non-participant group (see Figure 5, below). 
The analysis of Question 4 indicated that in the participant group, the benevolence 
factor was present 20% more (at 92%) than in the non-participant group (at 72%). 
The Question 4 responses also showed the mental health literacy factor present in 
13% more of the responses of the participant group.  This supported the Question 7 
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mental health literacy question which showed that 20% more MHTRS participants 
agreed that schizophrenia was an illness like any other (70% - 50%).  The questions 
showed slightly higher positive responses and slightly lower negative responses 
from the participant group other than at Question 6 where 23% compared to 24% of 
the non-participant group agreed that they would never marry a person with a 
mental illness. However, 54% of the participant group compared to 42% disagreed 
with the statement.  
Figure 5 – Final Page, Q3 – ‘Do you use terms such as loony...’ - MHTRS/no MHTRS 
Groups 
 
 Source: Computer file, Law Faculty, UTAS 
6. DISCUSSION 
Attitudinal research regarding mental illness has been examined extensively across 
western
108
 and non-western societies.
109
 The studies have consistently arrived at the 
similar finding that, generally, the public’s attitudes are unfavourable. Research 
particular to the attitudes of law students
110
 has largely been consequential, arising 
out of studies primarily focused on the poor mental health status of law students.  
                                                 
108 Corrigan et al., above n 35. See also Bruce G Link et al., ‘Public conceptions of mental illness: labels, 
causes, dangerousness and social distance’ (1999) 89 American Journal of Public Heath 1328. 
109 Amresh Shrivastava, Megan Johnston and Yves Bureau, ‘Stigma of Mental Illness-1: Clinical reflections’ 
(2012) 10 Mens Sana Monographs 70. See also Ritsuko Kakuma et al., ‘Mental Health Stigma: What is being 
done to raise awareness and reduce stigma in South Africa?’ (2010) 13 African Journal of Psychiatry 116. See 
also Charmaine J Hugo et al., ‘Community attitudes toward and knowledge of mental illness in South Africa’ 
(2003) 38 Social Psychiatry Psychiatric Epidemiology 715. Also Haluk  Arkar and Doğan Eker, ‘Effects of 
psychiatric labels on attitudes toward mental illness in a Turkish sample’ (1994) 40 International Journal of 
Social Psychiatry 205. 
110 Lawrence S Krieger, ‘Institutional Denial about the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance 
for Constructively Breaking the Silence’ (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 112. See also Kelk above n 14. 
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These studies indicate that students enter law school suffering from clinical stress 
and depression rates that mirror national averages but that the rates increases during 
the first year of law school and continue to rise throughout the duration of the 
student’s legal education, and on into their professional careers.  In this study, 17% 
of first year respondents reported having a mental illness. This increased in the final 
year group of whom 22% reported having experience of a mental illness. Almost 
two thirds (64%) indicated that their mental illness developed while they were 
studying law.  
This study supports previous research that shows that law students experience high 
rates of mental illness.  The research suggests that law students have clinically 
elevated anxiety, hostility, depression, and other psychiatric symptoms ranging 
across levels that are eight to fifteen times higher than the general population.
111
 
Law students have a twenty to forty percent incidence of clinical depression.
112
  
However, it is, usually, only when the reasons behind why law students are 
unwilling to access treatment for their mental health problems are discussed that the 
topic of stigma invariably rises as the probable cause.
113
     
The essential focus of this thesis is an examination of the negative attitudes 
associated with mental illness that is, according to Perlin, so apparent in the legal 
system.  The empirical research undertaken specifically targeted law students: the 
future politicians, policy-makers, legal academics, judges, lawyers and court 
administrators, to assess broadly their attitudes to people who experience mental 
illness, and more narrowly, toward legal clients who experience mental illness. To 
the best of our knowledge, it is the first attitudinal study that has focused on the 
relationship between the lawyer and their client with a mental illness. The research 
examined the attitudinal influences of gender; self history of mental illness; and 
participation in the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme (MHTRS), the 
therapeutic jurisprudence clinical legal education program discussed in Chapter 
Seven. In a number of respects, the results delivered in this chapter were somewhat 
                                                 
111 Stephen B Shanfield and G Andrew H Benjamin, ‘Psychiatric Distress in Law Students’ (1985) 35 Journal 
of Legal Education 65.  
112 Matthew M Dammeyer and Narina Nunez, ‘Anxiety and Depression among Law Students: Current 
Knowledge and Future Directions’ (1999) 23 Law and Human Behavior 55. See also Ruth Ann McKinney, 
‘Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are We Part of the Problem and Can We Be Part of the Solution’ 
(2002) 8 The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute 229. 
113 Kelk, above n 14. 
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surprising. These will be addressed below by referral to the research questions 
presented at Sections 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10.   
6.1 International students 
In 2011, international students made up almost a quarter (21.3%) of the total student 
population on Australian university campuses.
114
  The results of this study suggest 
that researchers need to be mindful of the attitudinal and belief dissimilarities 
between domestic students and international students otherwise their findings may 
be skewed.  There was a very small but noticeable indication that different cultural 
dynamics were being reflected in the data.  This also included a question 
surrounding ‘social desirability’, that is whether international students were 
culturally inclined to respond to a prediction of what they thought the researchers 
wanted to hear.   
The study’s findings also have pedagogical implications. Academics wanting to 
develop curricula that approach the topic of mental illness with sensitivity and 
respect need to be cognisant of what appear to be significant differences in the 
mindset of international students, or at least, within the Asian (Malaysian and 
Singaporean) cultures captured in our study.  As 12% of the Australian population 
in 2011 was Asian-Australian
115
, anti-stigma researchers and public strategists must 
also give serious regard to the attitudinal differences of the multicultural Australian 
population if they want to maximise the opportunities for successful outcomes for 
future public anti-stigma campaigns. 
6.2 No opinions   
Although the sample size was a large one, there were a high number of ‘No 
opinion’ responses.  It was foreseen that this might be the case (see the discussion at 
5.4). It was also anticipated that the final year respondents would provide more 
opinions than the first years. It was thought that the four or five years separating the 
ages of the two groups meant that the final year respondents were more likely to 
                                                 
114 The Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Australian – Educating Globally: Advice from the International Education 
Advisory Council’ (Advice, International Advisory Council, February 2013) < 
https://aei.gov.au/IEAC2/theCouncilsReport/Documents/Australia%20–
%20Educating%20Globally%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf>.  
115 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Guide to Migrant Statistical Sources, 2011 (Edition 2)’ (Reference source, 
ABS, 29 March 2011) <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/3414.0>.= 
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have experienced employment, lived independently and developed diverse social 
networks. It was presumed that they would be more mature, educated, 
knowledgeable and aware, and therefore, more opinionated - which they were but 
overall, only marginally.  
In response to the Items that related generally to people who experience mental 
illness, the first year group had twice the number of Items that recorded ‘No 
opinion’ responses greater than 25% than the final year group (12 Items compared 
to 6 Items).  The frequency of the final year’s ‘No opinion’ reporting increased 
when asked to provide opinions that were specific to legal clients who experienced 
a mental illness (12 in contrast to 1
st
 years’ 14).  Final year students are more 
opinionated when responding to general mental illness statements but are much 
more circumspect when reporting opinions on legal clients.  There was no 
discernible difference in the 1
st
 years general and specific ‘No opinion’ reporting.  
This might suggest that as law students progress through their legal education, they 
become less willing to express opinions on the law’s treatment of people who 
experience mental illness. The possible reasons for why this may be the case could 
provide rich ground for future research.  
6.3 Socially Desirable Response and ‘dangerousness’ 
What quickly became apparent was that the positive results were significantly more 
positive than in other, generalised population studies.  In Angermeyer’s study for 
example, 30.2% reported that people experiencing a mental illness were just as 
intelligent as normal people
116
 compared to our study in which 64% of the 
respondents reported thinking that they were equally intelligent. Seventy four 
percent thought that they were discriminated against, in contrast to 47% in 
Angermeyer’s study.  That the responses would be more positive was not 
unexpected as research shows that age and education variables act independently of 
each other.  Lower age and/or higher levels of education have been shown to be 
associated with more liberal attitudes toward mental illness.
117
 It is also likely that 
                                                 
116 Matthias Angermeyer and Herbert Matschinger, ‘The Stigma of Mental Illness in Germany: A Trend 
Analysis’ (2005) 51 International Journal of Social Psychiatry 276.   
117 Laurel A Alexander and Bruce G Link, ‘The impact of contact on stigmatizing attitudes toward people with 
mental illness’ (2003) 12 Journal of Mental Health 271. See also The Scottish Government, ‘Well? What Do 
You Think? (2008): The Fourth National Scottish Survey of Public Attitudes to Mental Wellbeing and Mental 
Health Problems’ (Report, The Scottish Government, 2008) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2009/09/15120147/10>. 
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the ‘liberal’ university environment was also a major variable in influencing the 
students’ responses.118  
University liberalism is linked to Socially Desirable Responses (SDR) (see 4.2.3). 
The tendency in SDR is to be seen in the best possible light
119
 so respondents 
provide a positive response when they may actually have a negative attitude. The 
cause for this can be a consequence of an unconscious deception where they believe 
what it is they are reporting or it can be the result of a conscious deception whereby 
the respondent wants to be classed as a person who conforms to socially acceptable 
values.
120
  Even though the questionnaire is anonymous, respondents may have a 
genuine need to be ‘counted’ in the socially approved group when the data is 
dispersed into groupings. 
This is what may have occurred with the ‘dangerousness’ issue in this study.  One 
recent study suggested that about a fourth of people are caring and sympathetic 
toward people who experience mental illness
121
 but that even if the majority of the 
public feels sorry for people and sees them in need of help, ‘a substantial part 
perceives them as unpredictable and dangerous and reacts with fear’.122  A recent 
Scottish study reported that this ‘substantial part’ was 57%.123  Our results did not 
correspond with this view despite the fact that a quarter of the respondents 
considered that they are unpredictable and almost a fifth thought them to be erratic 
and emotionally unstable. And yet, only 8% reported that they were dangerous; 
10% reported feeling scared by them; and 2% thought that they were dangerous and 
put their lawyer’s safety at risk.  One explanation for the low result may be that it is 
a reflection of the feelings of immortality of youth
124
, a topic worthy of further 
research if only for its importance as an occupational health and safety issue for 
                                                 
118 Henry, above n 17. 
119 Ross, above n  67, 530. 
120 King, above n  68. Also Ted G Harvey, ‘Comment on Response Biases in Field Studies of Mental Illness’ 
(1971) 36 American Sociological Review 510.  
121 Rosemarie Kobau, Colleen DiIorio, Daniel Chapman and Paolo Delvecchio, ‘Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration/CDC Mental Illness Stigma Panel Members. Attitudes about mental illness and 
its treatment: validation of a generic scale for public health surveillance of mental illness associated stigma’ 
(2010) 46 Community Mental Health Journal164. 
122 Angermeyer and Dietrich, above  n 84, 174. 
123 The Scottish Government, ‘Well? What Do You Think? (2008): The Fourth National Scottish Survey of 
Public Attitudes to Mental Wellbeing and Mental Health Problems’ (Report, The Scottish Government, 2008) 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2009/09/15120147/10>. 
124 Edward Bulwer, Thomas  Talfourd and Charles Lamb (eds)  Literary Remains of the Late William Hazlitt: 
With Notice of His Life v.2 (Saunders and Otley, 1836). William Hazlitt, On the Feeling of Immortality in 
Youth. 
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practicing lawyers. It is more likely that the low reporting of ‘dangerousness’ in 
response to the statement Items was a result of SDR reporting.   
The final page written responses were more elucidating.  The fear and avoidance 
factor analysis showed that the factor was present in the female responses at 43% 
and in the males at 40%.  Also, 22% of respondents reported that people 
experiencing a mental illness should be forced to take medication if they refused.  
This result was much lower than Minster’s study which found that 60.9% of 
lawyers support compulsory medication for schizophrenia, but was slightly higher 
than Minster’s finding that only 13% of lawyer’s support forced medicating for 
depression.
125
  The generalised use of the term ‘mentally ill’ should have suggested 
a result higher than 22% because many respondents would have interpreted ‘mental 
illness’ as a serious mental illness such as schizophrenia126, a disorder inextricably 
linked to harm to others in the mind of the public.
127
 There were considerable 
incompatibilities in the quantitative multi-choice responses with the qualitative, free 
response data sufficient to suggest that the reporting of some issues such as 
‘dangerousness’ was not an accurate reflection of respondent attitudes. 
6.4 Authoritarianism, benevolence and stereotypes 
Previous factor analyses have derived two clusters from the Opinions of Mental 
Illness questionnaire that reflect prejudicial attitudes toward mental illness.
128
 The 
first, authoritarianism, is the belief that people who experience mental illness are 
inferior to normal people, and require coercive handling.  Authoritarian values view 
the person as being incapable of self-care. The second, benevolence, is the kindness 
shown to the world’s unfortunates who are classed as child like, irresponsible and 
requiring oversight by a compassionate caretaker.  Perceptions of irresponsibility 
can lead to anger, and both authoritarian and benevolent attitudes lead to decisions 
to avoid people who experience mental illness.
129
 In this study, benevolence was 
statistically significant with respondents pitying, and being saddened by people who 
they classed as helpless and vulnerable, but who were, nonetheless, ‘still human’.   
                                                 
125 Judith Minster and Ann Knowles, ‘Exclusion or Concern: Lawyers' and Community Members' Perceptions 
of Legal Coercion, Dangerousness and Mental Illness’ (2006) 13 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 166. 
126 Alison MacPhail and Simon Verdun-Jones, ‘Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System (Symposium, 
Re-Inventing Criminal Justice: The Fifth National Symposium Montreal Quebec, January 2013). 
127 Minster, above  n 125.   
128 Cohen, above n 31. 
129 Corrigan, above n 35. 
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For the most part, the negative results indicate that a large portion of the sample 
holds prejudicial and stereotypical attitudes toward people who experience mental 
illness. About a quarter of respondents thought that they should be controlled by 
laws, and have their own special laws, while a fifth  stereotyped them as criminal, 
irrational, erratic and emotionally unstable.   Notably, three quarters reported that 
they should be protected while nearly 40% thought that they should be treated 
differently from other people.  More than half reported that the legal client needs to 
be treated differently to other clients while more than a third indicated that they 
would be unable to properly instruct their lawyer. And although 60% of the final 
year students (a 9%  increase on the 51% response of first years) expressed the 
attitude that the client should be treated differently to other clients, they had had no 
practical instruction in how that different treatment might be played out, leaving 
them susceptible to avoidant, distancing and discriminatory behaviours.   
Forty seven percent of first years reported them to be unpredictable, a stereotype 
largely perpetrated by the media. A 1999 survey by the American Screen Actors’ 
Guild found that 60% of the characters portrayed in prime time as experiencing a 
mental illness were involved in crime or violence.
130
  Most news accounts portray 
people with a mental illness as dangerous, or focus their stories on negative 
characteristics such as unpredictability and unsociability.
131
  More than half of the 
respondents reported seeing a television show in which there was a ‘mad psycho 
killer’ within the previous month, while three quarters reported seeing newspaper 
articles, often or occasionally, at which time they thought the person who 
committed the crime ‘must be insane’. However, as discussed at Section 5.6.1, only 
8% reported that they believed that people who experience a mental illness are 
dangerous. 
Without experiential evidence, nearly three quarters of respondents in our study 
have already stereotyped clients experiencing a mental illness as ‘difficult’.  Some 
clinical law students representing clients who have a mental illness have assessed 
them to be a difficult or demanding client.  They also report being appalled by their 
                                                 
130 Rich Bayer, Mental illness & violence: A flawed connection, Cecil Daily, April 26, 2013, 
http://www.cecildaily.com/opinion/columns/article_875109aa-ae0e-11e2-b810-
0019bb2963f4.html?TNNoMobile 
131 Otto F Wahl, Amy Wood and Renee Richards, ‘Newspaper coverage of mental illness: is it changing?’ 
(2002) 6 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills 9. 
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lack of gratitude which they claim makes it hard for the students to maintain their 
zeal.  ‘Time spent on an ungrateful client or a client whom the lawyer or student 
takes time away from helping someone else, someone about whom a lawyer can 
feel good.’132   
Sometimes, when two sets of emotions working independently of each other 
conflict, ambivalent prejudice can occur.
 133
 Individualistic attitudes formed on 
negative stereotypes can collide with positive humanitarian attitudes,
134
 resulting in 
the reporting of attitudes that are more positive or more negative than they actually 
are. For example, the law student may see himself or herself as a tolerant, accepting 
person concerned with the disadvantages experienced by the mentally ill group but 
believing that ‘mentally ill’ should seek and engage in treatment. Experiencing a 
conflict in beliefs, the student can respond more positively to a good interaction 
than a person who is not ambivalently prejudiced or alternatively, react more 
negatively to a bad interaction. 
The ‘difficult’ label may be a consequence of ambivalent prejudice, associated with 
the emotional need of the lawyer to feel appreciated, valued and respected.  This 
transference from the lawyer’s expectations and desires to the client’s expectations 
and desires can be seen in our study where, for example, three quarters of 
respondents reported that the client ‘just wants someone to help them’.  More than a 
quarter of respondents also felt comfortable in reporting that clients ‘know’ that 
their lawyer acts in their best interests and, they ‘trust’ their lawyer.  
6.5 Gender differences 
The study provided minimal evidence to suggest that there are individual 
differences in the attitudes of females and males to people experiencing a mental 
illness. Factor analysis was statistically significant in regard to the benevolence 
factor: females were more benevolent than the males. They felt sorry for the person.  
                                                 
132 Marjorie Silver, ‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship’ (2000) 6 
Clinical Law Review 259, 300. 
133 Mary Kite and Bernard Whitley, ‘The Psychology of Prejudice and Discrimination. Wadsworth’, Cengage 
Learning, 2010.  See also Tara MacDonald and Mark Zanna, ‘Cross-dimension ambivalence toward social 
groups: Can ambivalence affect intentions to hire feminists?’ (1998) 24 Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 427. 
134 Hisako Matsuo and Kevin McIntyre, ‘Ambivalent Prejudice toward Immigrants: The Role of Social Contact 
and Ethnic Origin’ (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 
Philadelphia PA, 2009) <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p20113_index.html>. 
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Although not statistically significant, the percentage comparisons showed that they 
were also slightly more accepting of the disease model of mental health.  Disease is 
a negative attribute associated with abnormality and avoidance that brings with it 
external value judgments regarding the person’s capacity, vulnerability, and level of 
responsibility.
135
 Females were also more supportive of forcibly treating the 
disease.  On the other hand, the male responses were slightly more authoritarian. 
They desired a greater level of social distance. They tended to view the person as 
different, inferior and dysfunctional, yet conversely, they were less prepared to 
accept that they were treated differently or unfairly. These findings were consistent 
with the notion that dominant gender role ideologies shape attitudes toward mental 
health.
136
  
6.6 Free legal representation 
An unanticipated finding was that respondents did not, in the main, support free 
legal representation for people experiencing a mental illness.  Only a quarter 
reported that they agreed with free legal representation while nearly half disagreed. 
The final year group reported slightly higher than the first years with 5% more in 
agreement and 7% less in disagreement.  These low results appear to run contrary to 
current pro bono trends around the world.  In the United States, universities such as 
Harvard Law School make it a graduation condition that students contribute at least 
40 hours of legal pro bono work.
137
  To be admitted as a legal practitioner in the 
state of New York, it is mandatory that the applicant has completed 50 hours of 
voluntary legal work.
138
 Some have described this compulsory plan as ‘deeply 
flawed’.139 Its critics view law students as unqualified and inexperienced and 
therefore, their services are classed as second rate.
140
 This is a common assessment 
amongst practising lawyers in particular that was discussed in Chapter Seven. 
                                                 
135 Juha Räikkä, ‘The social concept of disease’ (1996) 17 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 353, 356. 
136 Viren Swami, ‘Mental Health Literacy of Depression: Gender Differences and Attitudinal Antecedents in a 
Representative British Sample’ (2012) 7 PLOS ONE. See also Sarah Payne, Viren Swami and Debbie L 
Stanistreet, ‘The social construction of gender and its impact on suicidal behaviour’ (2008) 5 Journal of Mens 
Health Gender 23. 
137 Harvard Law School <http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/pro-bono/index.html>.   
138 Advisory Committee on New York State Pro Bono Bar Admission Requirements, ‘Advisory Committee on 
New York State Pro Bono Bar Admission Requirements’ (Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York 
and the Presiding Justices of the Four Appellate Division Departments, September 2012) 
<http://files.equaljusticeworks.org/Pro-Bono-Req-Committee-Report.pdf>. 
139 Ben Trachtenberg, ‘Rethinking Pro Bono By Ben Trachtenberg’, New York Times (online), 13 May 2012 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opinion/a-better-pro-bono-plan.html>. 
140 Ibid. 
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A 2001 survey of Australian law schools found that very few Australian law 
schools had a considered or coherent policy in relation to developing a pro bono 
ethos in law students
141
, however, by 2009, retired High Court judge Michael Kirby 
was arguing that Australia's 31 law faculties should make it mandatory for students 
to gain work experience on ‘pro bono’ cases.142 In March 2013, Attorney-General 
Mark Dreyfus admitted to feeling very strongly that compulsory pro bono 
requirements for students to be admitted as lawyers ‘would enhance the sense of 
social justice in aspiring lawyers… help foster a pro bono culture, while also 
providing very valuable and practical legal experience’.143  However, the focus in 
Australia has clearly remained on voluntariness with Australian universities 
encouraging law students to ‘recognise the value of pro bono work, and to commit 
to undertaking pro bono work both while they are students and in their professional 
careers.’144  
Every year in most Australian jurisdictions, thousands of citizens with a mental 
illness are brought before administrative courts where, without the benefit of legal 
representation, decisions are made that will deprive them of their basic rights, 
including their right to liberty. While there is clearly a global push by many 
politicians, academics, social justice advocates and committed law students for law 
students to take on the role of ‘free lawyer’ to the disadvantaged, this study suggests 
that the majority of respondents report holding the view that disadvantaged people 
who experience mental illness should not have an entitlement to a free legal service. 
The fact that 93% of respondents reported that people with a mental illness have 
rights that ‘must’ be protected seems incongruous with this view.  Whether the 
students’ reported position is relative to all disadvantaged groups or is a sanist 
manifestation is a subject for further research.  
                                                 
141 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘National Pro Bono Task Force: Recommended Action Plan for 
National Co-Ordination and Development of Pro Bono Legal Services’ (Report, ALRC, 14 June 2001). 
142 Michael Kirby, ‘The Need for Clinical Experience in Australian Law Schools’ (Paper presented at the 
International Association of Law Schools Conference, Canberra Australia, 26 May 2009) < 
http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeches/2000s/2009+/2357.International_Association_Of_La
w_Schools_-_26_May_2009..pdf> 
143 Michael Legg and John Corker, ‘Take care in pushing student pro bono’, The Australian (online) 26 April 
2013 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/take-care-in-pushing-student-pro-bono/story-
e6frg97x-1226629553945>. 
144 TC Beirne School of Law, Pro Bono Roster (2010) The University of Queensland 
<http://www.law.uq.edu.au/pro-bono-roster>. 
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6.7 The influence of personal experience of a mental illness on responses  
The responses of respondents who identified as having had a mental illness were 
significantly less authoritarian, less benevolent and less stereotypical than the non-
mental illness group although the study was limited by the small sample of final 
year respondents (14).   There were indicators of an emotional reaction
145
 from the 
subgroup responses. Nearly all of the respondents reported that people who 
experience a mental illness also experience stigma and discrimination. ‘The stigma 
associated with mental illness has to be experienced to be believed’.146  An example 
was the group responses to the stigmatising stereotype that a person experiencing a 
mental illness could not properly instruct their lawyer.  Almost half of the non-
mental illness group agreed with the stereotype compared to 0% of the mental 
illness group.  Seventy one percent of the mental illness group disagreed with the 
stereotype but only 28.5% of the non- mental illness group disagreed.  
It was interesting that the mental illness group reported using more pejorative 
language. This might be a result of ‘mad pride’ and the reclamation of ‘mad speak’ 
along the lines of ‘gay pride’ and reclaiming ‘queer’ language which was discussed 
in Chapter Four.  Using language in this way can simultaneously build up and tear 
down boundaries of identity.  Possibly, the results are also a reflection of the 
obligation that people who do not experience a mental illness feel to be politically 
correct in their speech, or at least, to report that they are politically correct in their 
speech. However, the high numbers of both groups reporting the use of offensive, 
dehumanising and disrespectful language supports the claims of mental health 
advocates that mental illness prejudice and stigma still operate at all levels
147
 
including, amongst Australia’s future lawyers. 
  
                                                 
145 Bruce Q Link, Lawrence H Yang, Jo C Phelan and  Pamela Y Collins, ‘Measuring Mental Illness Stigma’ 
(2004) 30 Schizophrenia Bulletin 511. 
146 The Mental Health Legal Centre Inc., ‘20/20 Hindsight: A History of the Mental Health Legal Centre Inc.’ 
(Report, Mental health Legal Centre Inc., November 2006) 5  
<http://www.communitylaw.org.au/clc_mentalhealth/cb_pages/images/20_20_Hingsight_Final.pdf>. 
147 Mark Metherell, ‘Mental health failure tied to prejudice: McGorry’ The Age (online), 23 June 2010 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/mental-health-failure-tied-to-prejudice-mcgorry-20100622-yvuf.html>. 
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6.8 Research question 1 – Are law student attitudes sanist? 
As discussed in Chapter Five, prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behaviours are 
components of stigma and sanism. Stigma encompasses the sanist framework of 
prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs, attitudes and practices.
148
  Stereotyping and 
prejudice against different groups does not always take the same form but it does, 
usually, involve members of the out-group being pitied, marginalised, and 
patronised.  The results of this study indicate that the ‘mentally ill’ as a group is 
largely pitied by law students who perceive its members to be incapable of proper 
functioning and requiring protection and control. Eighty one percent of final year 
and 71% of first year respondents reported that people who experience a mental 
illness need to be protected.  Overall, the Group 1 responses appear to suggest that 
there is a high level of sanist attitudes amongst law students, particularly benevolent 
prejudice which is considered to be as detrimental to an out-group as the hostile 
prejudices.
149
  
6.9 Research question 2 – Are final year law student attitudes more sanist 
than the attitudes of first year law students? 
It had been anticipated that the final year group would exhibit more sanist attitudes 
than the first year group.  Guimond’s social dominance orientation research, 
discussed above at Section 2.0, showed that law students were more prejudiced than 
students studying other academic disciplines. He suggested that law students would 
become more prejudiced as they continued in their legal education.  It was also 
assumed therefore that as the final year respondents had 4/5 years of university 
education compared to the few weeks experienced by the first year respondents, 
their responses would reflect the greater liberal/tolerant/benevolent attitudes 
reported in the findings of previous research. There was a concern that the 
‘liberalist’ stereotypical expectation attached to ‘university students’ might increase 
the respondent’s susceptibility to socially desired reporting which could 
significantly influence the results.  
                                                 
148 Jennifer M Poole et al., ‘Sanism, ‘Mental Health’, and Social Work/Education: A Review and Call to 
Action’ (2012) 1 Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, Research, Polity, and Practice 
20.  
149 Dale Miller and Benoit Monin, ‘Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice’ (2001) 81 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 33. 
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Additionally, it was thought that 4/5 years of legal education in which only extreme 
cases of mental incapacity and functional incapability were studied might result in 
more authoritarian and benevolent responses from the final year students.  This 
appeared to be somewhat the case. The only statistically significant difference 
observed indicated that twice as many final years than 1
st
 years reported that people 
who experience mental illness need their own special laws.  On the other hand, 
more than double the number of first years compared to final years thought that 
people with a mental illness were unpredictable and almost double thought that they 
were erratic and unstable. This suggests that reliance on stereotypes decreases as 
students continue in their studies.   
The slight increase in benevolence and authoritarianism in the final year group was 
matched by a slight decrease in its social awareness. For example, almost half of the 
final year respondents disagreed with the notion that legal clients who experience a 
mental illness might be labeled or judged unfairly. There was a faint, but noticeable 
trend of final year respondents reporting a more positive view of the law’s role and 
practices in relation to mental illness. This view may underlie the respondents’ 
conviction that legal clients with mental illness are not labelled and unfairly treated 
by the legal system. It may also suggest a humanitarian justification for the 
respondent’s career choice: a career in which lawyers help disadvantaged people 
who ‘just want someone to help them’.  
Although there was little statistically discernible difference in the levels of sanism 
demonstrated by both groups, the final year group appeared to be slightly more 
benevolent and authoritarian in their attitudes, and less informed by stereotypes 
than was the first year group.   Overall, both groups were sanist in their attitudes.  
6.10 Research question 3 – Are Mental Health Tribunal Representation 
Scheme (MHTRS) participants less sanist?   
The third research question examined whether the reported views of final year 
students who identified as having participated in the MHTRS were less sanist than 
the group that had not participated in the scheme. The results were limited by the 
fact that only five respondents reported having had contact with a client. As 
discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, contact, in combination with specialist 
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education is an important component for positive attitudinal change. It was clear 
from the responses that the participant group was more opinionated. This may have 
been the result of the respondent’s confidence in having gained accurate knowledge 
of the topic from their MHTRS training.   
The responses were inconsistent.  At some Items, the participant group showed 
more benevolent or authoritarian attitudes while at other Items, it showed much 
less. The participant group also indicated a higher level of fear than the non-
participant group. A possible reason for the mixed results might be that the 
participant group respondents had personal contact with clients who had a serious 
mental illness. These clients were also so acutely unwell that they were detained 
involuntarily in a locked mental health hospital setting.  Research has shown that 
acquiring knowledge of the symptoms associated with the acute phase of 
schizophrenia increases negative reactions to people who have schizophrenia.
150
 
Following this logic, contact with people manifesting the behaviours of acute 
phases of serious mental illnesses may increase participant’s negative reactions.  
Also, the environments in which respondents worked with their clients are not the 
stereotypical asylum ‘snake pits’ but comfortable, well appointed, hospital visitors’ 
room. Hearings before the Mental Health Tribunal were held in well appointed 
meeting rooms where informal and non-adversarial processes were undertaken by 
parties, all of whom indicated that they wanted only that which was in the best 
interests of the client.  
Respondents may have reported attitudes particular to a group of people having a 
specific type of mental illness. Their attitudes had been formed based on actual 
experiences with mental health law, both positive and negative, and working with 
clients who were acutely mentally unwell, and of whom, some, were indeed 
dangerous. While the majority of the participant group had not had contact with a 
client, they had undergone specialist training relevant to working with acutely 
unwell clients including mental health literacy topics and occupational health and 
safety strategies (see Chapter Seven).  As participants, they also attended regular 
                                                 
150 David L Penn, Kim Guynan, Tamara Daily, William D Spaulding, Calvin P Garbin and Mary Sullivan, 
‘Dispelling the stigma of schizophrenia: what sort of information is best?’ (1994) 20 Schizophrenia Bulletin 
567. 
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mentoring events and had ongoing relationships with their peers who had had 
contact experience. 
The most unexpected result, however, was that a higher percentage of participant 
group members reported that people experiencing mental illness should not have 
access to a free lawyer. The MHTRS is a social justice initiative that provides a free 
legal service to a vulnerable and disadvantaged group who, prior to the inception of 
the scheme 11 years ago, appeared before the tribunal without representation.  It 
was anticipated that the volunteer law students would, through their participation 
and commitment to the scheme, develop a strong pro-bono ethic. This does not 
seem to have occurred. The influence of participation in therapeutic jurisprudence 
type clinical education programs, similar to the MHTRS, is clearly an area requiring 
further research, using larger samples than was used in this study.   
7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of Chapter Eight was twofold. First, it offered an empirical test of the 
attitudes of law students regarding people who experience mental illness to 
determine whether, as Perlin suggests, law student attitudes are sanist
151
 and 
whether they become more sanist as they progress their legal education.  The 
decision was made to remove the international cohort from the study because the 
intention was to explore the phenomenon of sanism in the Australian legal system 
and cultural differences appeared to be impacting on the data.  However, it is 
important to recognise and combat sanism in every culture so it is hoped that future 
researchers will examine the impact of sanism on Asian the legal systems.  
Secondly, Chapter Eight tried to quantify the impact that participation in the Mental 
Health Tribunal Representation Scheme (MHTRS) has on influencing the attitudes 
of its participants.   
The chapter builds on the discussion contained in the preceding chapter in an 
important way. Chapter Seven discussed the MHTRS. It pointed to theory that the 
MHTRS could work to alter student attitudes and reduce sanism in the legal system. 
This was argued on that basis that the MHTRS was built on principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence; delivered a short, appropriate mental health education 
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program that was developed specifically for law students; and provided student 
participants with the opportunity for professional face to face contact between 
themselves and their mental health clients.  Consequently, the second contribution 
of Chapter Eight is that it examines the influence that participation in the MHTRS 
has on law students’ attitudes.   
A weakness of the study was the high level of ‘No opinion’ responses, particularly 
from the final year respondents exiting legal education.  This presented the author 
with the concern that soon so many new, un-opinionated lawyers would enter the 
sanist and pretextual legal system that Perlin describes, a description that Chapter 
Six in this thesis gave support to in the limited area of family law parenting 
decisions.  These new legal professionals would be susceptible to the perpetuating 
influence of sanist legal actors, and the embedded sanist and pretextual practices 
that stereotype and label, and prejudice and discriminate against legal parties who 
have a mental illness.  
The responses suggest that, overall; the students reported more positive attitudes 
than were evident in other, generalised population studies. Due to age and education 
variables, this was anticipated; however, the degree of positivity when examined in 
conjunction with the apparent factor inconsistencies imply that there may have been 
a significant scale of socially desirable reporting, a process that weakens the 
predictive validity of results obtained in socially sensitive domains such as 
prejudice and stereotyping. Over recent decades, the concern attached to appearing 
prejudiced has become a real source of debilitating anxiety, ‘akin to the stereotype 
threat experienced by the stigmatised’.152 As discussed in Chapter Four, when 
negative stereotypes persist but there are ramifications for expressing outward 
hostilities toward negatively stereotyped groups, prejudice commonly manifests 
itself in benevolent behaviors.
153
  In this situation, it is safe to suggest that the 
results show that that a large number of respondent law students are sanist, and that 
this number might be even greater than the results indicate. 
                                                 
152 Jennifer Crocker, Brenda Major and Claude Steele, ‘Social stigma’ in Daniel T Gilbert, Susan T Fiske and 
Gardner Lindzey (eds), The handbook of social psychology (McGraw-Hill, 1998) 540.  
153 Peter Glick and Susan Fiske, ‘An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary 
justifications for gender inequality’ (2001) 56 American Psychologist 109. 
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Overall, the opinionated students entering and exiting the University of Tasmania 
law school reported strongly benevolent attitudes although both groups had a 
considerable authoritarian viewpoint. There was a slight trend showing that the final 
years had developed more authoritarian attitudes.  Benevolence was the dominant 
feature of the female respondent groups while males were more authoritarian in 
their reported views.  Considering that females make up over half of all law 
graduates of Australian universities, it is not improbable to think that future 
government policies, legislation and legal decision-making, procedures and 
practices will reflect a benevolent approach to mental health in Australia.   
Many of the students had clearly prejudged their future clients. Prior to leaving 
university and before any actual professional contact with clients with a mental 
illness had occurred; the students had negatively stereotyped and labeled clients 
with mental illness as ‘difficult’. They had pessimistically presumed their clients 
capabilities and assumed, probably erroneously, what would be their client’s 
feelings and thoughts.   
While almost all of the respondents reported holding the benevolent belief that 
people, and their rights, require protecting, few supported their access to free 
representation which did not appear to support a strong pro bono ethic amongst the 
students.  This inconsistency raises the question of exactly how their rights can be 
protected, and by whom, if not through access to a free legal service. Students who 
identified as having experienced a mental illness were more aware of the issues of 
stereotypes, stigma and discrimination, and more cognisant as to the functioning 
capabilities of a person experiencing a mental illness.  In particular, they were more 
supportive of the need for access to a free legal service than the other respondents, 
and surprisingly, than students who had participated in the MHTRS.  
The study confirmed the high level of often and occasional use of pejorative and 
disparaging language amongst law students. This is not surprising because the 
casual use of language stigmatising mental illness is generally, exceedingly 
common.  The problem is that in a world in which people who experience mental 
illness are still struggling for increased understanding and acceptance, the 
continuation of this language, as discussed in Chapter Four, is considered by mental 
health advocates to be largely responsible for the continual reinforcement of 
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negative attitudes and discriminatory behaviours. Students who experience a mental 
illness might better protest rather than claim its use. Language is an important topic 
in the necessary process for attitudinal change and requires further research. 
Finally, there was insufficient data to reach a concrete finding as to whether 
participation in the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme had a positive 
influence on the attitudes of students. The sample was small, and less than half had 
had contact with a client with a mental illness. The results were also inconsistent. 
Some Items indicated that the group was more sanist in its reporting, and at others, 
it was less. Possible reasons have been offered for why this was so, however, it is 
clearly an area of important discussion requiring further research as more mental 
health representation programs commence operations.  
8. MAJOR FINDINGS: 
1. This study found that the law students reported significantly more positive 
attitudes toward people who experience mental illness than respondents in other, 
general population studies. 
2. The law students predominately reported attitudes that were strongly indicative 
of benevolent prejudice. 
3. The law students also reported attitudes that indicated a high level of 
authoritarian prejudice. 
4. The overseas law students reported significantly higher levels of prejudiced 
attitudes than the domestic law students. 
5. The reported attitudes of female law students were more benevolent compared 
to male law students whose attitudes were more authoritarian. 
6. The reported attitudes of law students indicated a slight trend that attitudes 
become more authoritarian as students progress through law school. 
7. A very high percentage of law students indicated that they had negatively 
stereotyped and labelled clients who experience a mental illness. 
8. The majority of law students did not support the access of a person who 
experiences mental illness to free legal representation 
9. Law students who identified as having experienced a mental illness were more 
informed; more aware of the barriers; and more supportive of the need for free 
legal service access. 
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10. A high percentage of law students reported using offensive, insulting and 
disrespectful language often, including students who identified as having a 
personal experience of mental illness. 
11. The results comparing the attitudes of law students who had participated in the 
MHTRS with respondents who had not were inconsistent, and inconclusive, 
because of the small sample size, and the different levels of involvement that 
participants’ had had in the program.  
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CONCLUSION 
A most important lesson learnt by law students is that the law only works well when 
there is a level playing field - that justice will be done only when rules are applied 
evenly and decisions are made impartially. The lesson learned from legal practice, 
however, is that the legal system does not always provide a level playing field and 
that power and powerlessness have a major impact on when, and how, the law is 
applied. Michael Perlin first learned this lesson while working as a mental health 
law public defender in New Jersey during the 1970s.  His early experiences laid the 
foundation for over thirty years of practice, teaching, thinking and writing in the 
area of law and mental illness. He became convinced that the legal system is 
inherently biased against mental illness and that it is impossible to understand truly 
the law’s prejudiced treatment of people who experience mental illness - its 
doctrines, discourse, decisions and dissents - without first dealing with the reality of 
this proposition. It is Perlin’s contention that the apparent contradictions, internal 
inconsistencies and cognitive dissonance of mental health law are incapable of 
understanding, without first appreciating fully, the power and pervasiveness of 
sanism.   
The first intention of this thesis was to examine Perlin’s claim that sanism 
permeates the political and legal systems. It would test the validity of Perlin’s 
assertions that sanism riddles social policy, is written into law, and influences 
judicial decision-making.
1
 Commencing this task required an examination of the 
varied perceptions of what stigma, sanism and prejudice are, and a discussion of the 
theories about why, and how stigma associated with mental illness continues to 
perpetuate.  Despite the significant global attention directed toward reducing 
stigma, decades of anti-stigma measures have largely been unsuccessful in changing 
public attitudes. ‘Abnormal’ people who experience mental illness continue to 
evoke fear and fuel the desire for social distance within society’s ‘normal’ group.   
                                                 
1 Michael L Perlin and Deborah A Dorfman, ‘Sanism, social science, and the development of mental disability 
law jurisprudence’ (1993) 11 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 47. 
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The discussion in Chapter One explored the seemingly indifferent approach that 
public health policy-makers have taken toward creating a universally agreed, 
unique, coherent and ideologically appropriate mental health model. A review of 
Australia’s mental health policies showed significant jurisdictional variances. While 
it was found that a number of jurisdictions favour the psychosocial model, some 
jurisdictions continue to support the pathologisation, categorisation and 
objectification characteristics of the biomedical model, while other jurisdictions are 
increasingly relying on incongruous paradigms such as the social disability model, 
which have been seconded from other areas of social disadvantage. The theoretical 
and definitional inconsistencies that exist between the different mental health 
policies within a jurisdiction were also identified, as was significant non-
compliance with international human rights instruments.   
Policy-makers appear to have become dependent on inspirational rhetoric in their 
attempt to achieve important social goals while generally ignoring the importance 
of developing clear, precise language and consistent mental health definitions. As a 
consequence, the mental health system is inculcated with problems of competing 
and conflicting paradigms, ideological differences, and language deficiencies that 
have failed to provide the law with clear and consistent messaging that offers real 
interpretive value.  These policy deficits have left the Australian legal system 
standing atop a poorly defined and conceptually confused mental health law 
foundation that lacks the required clarity, precision and consistency needed by the 
law if it is to achieve predictable, fair, non-arbitrary outcomes for parties 
experiencing mental illness.  
The law’s interests in mental health have historically rested on the negative 
perception of mental health as a disease and an illness. Legal decision-makers are 
positioned to determine whether a legal party (1) has a mental illness, (2) has legal 
capacity now, or had it at the time of a specific instance of legal import, (3) needs to 
be compulsorily detained and/or treated, and (4) represents a risk. Arriving at the 
answers, decision-makers use biased reasoning, ignorant as they are to their own 
prejudices, and rely on medico/legal doctrines and legislation, that promote 
abnormality and difference, forced intervention and separation. The legal system 
has been, and continues to remain, disconnected from the aspirational, and to date, 
largely ineffectual goals of the public health mental health policies. But while 
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policy-makers have neglected to provide the legal system with clear and consistent 
definitional guides, the law has been just as lax in attempting to redress the 
doctrinal, conceptual and definitional problems, which leave it susceptible to claims 
of arbitrariness, and discrimination in its application.
2
   
When a person medically labelled as ‘mentally ill’ comes into contact with the legal 
system, that system additionally labels them with a slew of negative characteristics 
that immediately disadvantages them in their legal matters. They are stereotyped as 
unpredictable, disorganised, incredulous, incapable, untruthful and dangerous.
 3
  
These harmful attributes grounded in myths, stereotypes, superstition and de-
individualisations
4
 are what drive the law’s presumptary beliefs, which maintain the 
law’s injurious and irrational prejudice. Understandably, the legal system has not 
widely embraced Perlin’s notion of sanism, most probably because accepting 
sanism can be extremely confronting, personally and professionally for legal actors. 
Perlin does not have a light touch. Rather than suggesting that some legal actors 
may be prejudiced, Perlin emotes emphatically that sanism ‘infects the judiciary, 
the legislature, the bar and the legal academy’.5  He insists that because of sanism 
and pretextuality - the court’s legal artifices - the law proceeds on the edge of 
hidden prejudice in its dealings with people who experience mental illness: a 
prejudice that, Perlin argues, has led to the corruption of mental health law.
6
 He 
uses language such as ‘infects’ and ‘corrupts’ as weapons in his war against the 
mental health law injustices that he has witnessed.  
The legal system has conceptually, long been satisfied with the biomedical model 
with its characterisation of mental health ‘patients’ as abnormal, different, disabled, 
dysfunctional and at risk of harming self or others.  In particular, it is the ‘risk of 
harm to others’ factor that has occupied the minds of legislators and legal decision-
makers to the extent that it is most usually the determinant factor.  Acceptance of 
the biomedical approach has meant that psychiatry has been permitted to penetrate 
every area of law in which mental illness is a factor, and where a party’s credibility, 
                                                 
2 Bruce J Winick, ‘Ambiguities in the legal meaning and significance of mental illness’ (1995) 1 Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 534. 
3 Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American Psychological 
Association2000). 
4 Michael L Perlin, ‘Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental 
Disability Law Developed as it Did’ (1999) 10 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 36, 5. 
5 Perlin, above n 1, 48. 
6 Ibid xviii. 
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culpability, competency, compensation, and custody are at legal issue.
7
 The law has 
become wholly reliant on the expertise of psychiatrists to understand, assess, and 
explain mental illness - its causation and cures - to legal decision-makers even 
though psychiatry itself is an unscientific discipline that is dependent on a system of 
unreliable categorisations.  Psychiatric assessments are based on observations and 
psychiatric explanations, which consist of intuitive predictions comparable to 
educated guesses.  Once a person has been diagnostically labelled as ‘mentally ill’, 
however, legal decision-makers view their predicted futures as suspect, in line with, 
or at times despite, the pronouncements of the psychiatric expert witness. 
Chapter Three demonstrated that stigma is a multi-faceted, pervasive and harmful 
social construct involving attitudes, feelings and behaviours and existing within the 
context of social power in an environment of social inequality. The major stigma 
theory presented in this thesis is Erving Goffman’s classic devaluation and 
dehumanisation theory, which activates when human differences are identified.
 8
 
These differences are then linked to undesirable characteristics that are exaggerated 
through the use of symbolic reductionist stereotypes and used to reify the social, 
cultural, medical, behavioural and political myths that are attached to mental 
illness.
9
 Stereotypes inform how the public thinks about mental illness, and how it 
treats people labelled ‘mentally ill’.  Labelling the person in this way marks them as 
inferior and dysfunctional, characteristics that are used to justify society’s 
prejudicial and discriminatory responses to the person’s exaggerated differences.   
The worst form of discrimination is structural/institutional discrimination, because 
of the impact that basic institutions have on the daily lives of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable people. The institutional embeddedness of mental illness stigma reacts to 
the individual’s psychiatric difference.  The public’s inherent desire to be separated 
from the abnormal ‘Other’ - labelled as ill, damaged and damaging, incapable, 
insensible and dangerous - is animated.  The law’s role in distancing the abnormal 
from the normal is regulating and managing the ‘Other’s’ unacceptable behaviours 
and anomalous life experiences in ways that control and restrict autonomy and 
                                                 
7 Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry in law/law in psychiatry (Taylor & Francis, 2009) xi. 
8 Erving Goffman was a sociologist prominent for his analyses of human interaction. He relied less on formal 
scientific method than on observation to explain contemporary life.  
9 Michael L Perlin, ‘Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence 
(1990) 40 Case Western Reserve Law Review 599. 
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opportunities, keeping normal society safely distanced from unwarranted and 
dangerous interactions.  Perlin argues that the law’s response to this responsibility 
has been stigmatic. The legal system applies exactly the same harmful stereotypes, 
myths and prejudices that people who experience a mental illness encounter in their 
everyday lives. 
This is not to suggest that the law has not been instrumental in trying to reduce the 
impact that stigma, prejudice and discrimination has on society.  During the last 
fifty years, the world has experienced major social change driven by liberal social 
policies influenced by cultural interventions and regulated by anti-discrimination 
laws.  Immutable qualities of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality and youth have 
gained newly respected rights and protections, which are reflected world-wide in 
landmark legal cases such as Roe v. Wade
10
 and Mabo.
11
 The ideology of political 
correctness has been incorporated into statute to regulate out of cultural convention 
those forms of expressions that exclude, marginalise, disrespect and insult certain 
social groups.    
Language has intended and unintended meanings that can influence how people 
think and feel about particular subjects such as immigration issues.  It is a 
communication medium through which messages that are vague, ambiguous and 
contradictory can be transmitted with unintended stigmatising meanings, which are 
often more insidious and socially destructive than messages that have intended 
negative meanings.
12
  These messages are absorbed into common parlance from 
whence they perpetuate the socially constructed power dynamics between the 
rational and the irrational, the mentally healthy and the mentally unwell, and the 
normal and the inferior ‘Other’.  The greatest threat lies in the invisibility of the 
‘commonplace’: the social acceptance of that which, if it was other than mental 
illness, would be socially unacceptable. Stigma is highly resistant to change but 
when it is associated with mental illness, it is uniquely acceptable to courts blind to 
this ‘hidden prejudice’. 
                                                 
10 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
11 Mabo v Queensland (No. 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (‘Mabo case’) [1992] HCA 23 
12 Mona Shattell, ‘Stigmatizing Language with Unintended Meanings: “Persons with Mental Illness” or 
“Mentally Ill Persons”?’ (2009) 30 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 199. 
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Distinct from matters of racial or gender offensive language, courts have generally 
shown a willingness to validate offensive, disrespectful or deprecating language 
when it is connected to mental illness based on the cultural assimilation of the 
offensive, insulting, disrespectful words and terms into everyday language, and the 
frequency of their use.  For example, Roget’s online Thesaurus offers 22 synonyms 
for the term ‘mentally ill’ of which all of the suggested words and phrases including 
‘nuts’, ‘loony’ and ‘off one’s rocker’ are inappropriate, disparaging or offensive.13 
On the other hand, when the word ‘disabled’ is keyed in, it will produce 24, 
appropriate and inoffensive examples such as ‘stalled’, ‘incapacitated’ and ‘out-of-
commission’.   
The purpose of Chapter Six was to test whether, as Perlin contends, sanist law and 
sanist judges treat people who experience mental illness unfairly. This was done by 
critically reviewing the non-neutral domain of parenting decision-making, and 
undertaking a specific case study of conflicted parenting family law cases in which 
one parent had a mental illness. The social science empirical parenting literature 
tends to represent parents with a mental illness as permanently flawed and incapable 
of good parenting.
14
 Having a ‘mentally ill’ parent is widely considered detrimental 
to the child who is, or potentially will be, adversely affected by their parent’s 
neglect, physical harm, psychological upset, or as an indirect consequence of the 
social and environment factors associated with mental illness. The negative 
attributes of bad parenting - neglect, irresponsibility, disorganisation, disinterest, 
and abusive/violent behaviour - mirror the stereotypically accepted abnormal 
manifestations of mental illness. It is this social perception of the ‘mentally ill’ 
parent as permanently damaged, and damaging, which helps to negatively shape the 
major life decisions that are made about, and for the parent and child, by social 
workers, police officers, welfare workers and judicial officers.    
The legal system has absorbed the biomedical disease model, which implicitly 
presumes that people who have a mental illness are unfit.  Consequently, the legal 
system generally views parents who have experience of a mental illness as unfit 
parents.   This is confirmed by an application of the social scientist’s adversity 
                                                 
13 Roget’s Thesaurus, (Dictionary.com, 2013) http://thesaurus.com/Roget-alpha-index.html%E2%80%8E  
14 Barry J Ackerson, ‘Parents with serious and persistent mental illness: Issues in assessment and services’ 
(2003) 48 Social Work 187.   
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
448 
paradigm which labels the parent as detrimental to the well-being and healthy 
development of their child.  It is this predominately pathologically focused social 
scientific research into parenting capabilities that has instilled the stereotypical 
image of the unfit parent into the social mind. The parent is deemed less 
predictable, less emotionally available, less reciprocal, less involved, less 
affectionate, less responsive, less encouraging and less positive than what is socially 
expected of the idealised ‘good’ parent.  But most importantly, they are also 
categorised as dangerous, or potentially so; a risk that the law finds ‘unacceptable’.   
A review of the Family Law Act 1975 revealed that the ‘unfit parent’ stereotype has 
been anchored into the legislation within provisions that lack the necessary 
precision and definitions discussed in Chapter One. The statute lays down 
assessment measures. For example, it must be shown that the parent has a 
‘meaningful relationship’ with the child, however, the Act does not define the term 
nor does it provide guidance for judges as to how it should be interpreted.  Judges 
hold the same negative attitudes and cultural presumptions, rely on the same myths 
and stereotypes, and demonstrate the same biased behaviours borne out of fear, 
anxiety, and paternalistic beneficence as does the rest of society.  They use heuristic 
reasoning to arrive at quick, intuitive assessments regarding character and future 
prospects, and just as people have a tendency to interpret information in a way that 
confirms their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes about themselves and their social 
world, legal decision-makers do the same.   
This became apparent in the review of Australian family law conflicted parenting 
order cases. The review found that if courts were of the mind that a parent had a 
mental illness, this fact significantly increased their risk of receiving a harsher and 
more restrictive parenting outcome. The case studies showed that judges followed 
the social sciences’ adversity approach.  They used unfavourable characteristics to 
prejudge with a level of certainty the potential detriment to the child’s well-being 
that would be caused by the parent’s poor parenting.  Judges were much more likely 
to associate cues of violence, neglect, unpredictability, instability, poverty, and 
inadequate parenting skills with the parent who had a mental illness than with a 
parent who did not.  They also tended to interpret the parent’s mental illness as 
representing an ‘unacceptable risk’ to the child.   Although the study was conducted 
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in a small, well defined area of judicial determination, the research provided support 
for Perlin’s claim that the legal system is sanist.  
Having established this level of validity to Perlin’s claim that the legal system is 
sanist, the thesis turned its attention to how it might counteract the prejudices of the 
legal system.  The first six chapters provided a great deal of academic insight into 
what stigma, sanism and prejudice are, and how the legal system discriminates 
against parties that experience a mental illness.  Chapter Seven offered an option for 
positive change by presenting a clinical legal model for academic evaluation.  Since 
2003, the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme (MHTRS) has provided 
mental health skills and awareness training for University of Tasmania law students 
who then represent clients appearing before the Tasmanian Mental Health Tribunal 
(MHT) on civil commitment and compulsory treatment orders.  
The MHTRS is built on the therapeutic jurisprudence model that Perlin believes to 
be the only theoretical solution ‘that has the potential power to “strip the sanist 
facade”’.15  He considers therapeutic jurisprudence to have far reaching potential in 
enabling society to come to grips with the pernicious power of sanism and 
pretextuality. It provides opportunities to make coherent the incoherent and expose 
the hidden.
16
   Attitudinal change literature has shown that the best outcomes have 
been achieved though short term, structured programs, which combine education 
and contact stratagems targeting young people. It was surmised that due to the 
length of time that the MHTRS had been operating (11 years), and the large number 
of law students that had participated in its training and delivery of representation 
services, the MHTRS would provide valuable data for the empirical research 
reported in Chapter Eight. 
Perlin argues that sanist attitudes are prevalent in the teaching of law students, both 
overtly and covertly, through sanist thoughts and sanist myths but that the extent 
that it affects law teachers and law students is not known.
17
  The intent of Chapter 
Eight was, to some extent, to make the unknown known.  A survey of 204 first and 
fifth year law students was conducted with the purpose of empirically testing 
                                                 
15 Michael L Perlin, ‘“His Brain Has Been Mismanaged With Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond To 
Neuroimaging Testimony In Insanity Defense Cases?’ (2009) 42 Akron Law Review 885. 
16 Perlin, above n 3, 303. 
17 Michael L Perlin, ‘‘You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks’: Sanism In Clinical Teaching’ (2003) 9 Clinical 
Law Review 683. 
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Perlin’s claims to determine whether the reported attitudes and beliefs of the 
respondents were sanist. It also assessed whether the responses of the final year 
students were more, or less sanist, than the first year students, and whether a 
student’s participation in the MHTRS could be shown to have a positive influence 
on improving attitudes.   
Although the study had a number of weaknesses, which were discussed in Chapter 
Eight, it did return some important findings. A major weakness was the high level 
of ‘No opinion’ responses. The opinionated responses, however, indicated that law 
students are sanist. They strongly reported benevolent and authoritarian responses.  
Females were more benevolent and males were more authoritarian. There was a 
slight, overall trend, showing that the final years had developed more authoritarian 
attitudes and 1
st
 year students were more stereotyping in their responses. Both 
groups had labelled their future legal clients as ‘difficult’. Surprisingly, there was 
limited support for ‘free’ legal Mental Health Tribunal representation except from 
the small group who identified as having personally experienced a mental illness. 
Unfortunately, there was insufficient data to reach a finding that participation in a 
therapeutic jurisprudence clinical program similar to the MHTRS had a positive 
influence on the attitudes of students. The smallness of the sample meant that the 
results were unreliable.   
Importantly, the study identified the popular use among law students of offensive 
and disparaging language, which reinforces Perlin’s concept of sanism as socially 
acceptable. Prejudicial beliefs are wired into language and using stereotyping terms 
succeeds in evoking negative associations in listeners even when the speaker does 
not consciously endorse the stereotypes. When in December 2012, the American 
House of Representatives, ‘at the urging of psychologists, who argued the definition 
is outdated and offensive’18 voted 391-1 to ban the word ‘lunatic’ from all federal 
legislation because ‘antiquated terms as “lunatic” perpetuates the social stigma 
surrounding mental illness’, the lone dissenter referred to his fellow Representatives 
as ‘lunatics’.19  
                                                 
18Timothy R Homan, Congress Ousts Lunatics. Idiots Remain, Bloomberg Business Week, 13 December, 2012, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/congress-ousts-lunatics-dot-idiots-remain 
19 Emma O’Connor, Congress Overwhelmingly Votes to Ban the Word ‘Lunatic’, Time, December 6, 2012, 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/12/06/congress-overwhelmingly-votes-to-ban-the-word-lunatic/ 
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While government actions such as this represent a positive sally for attitudinal 
change, it is important to note that sanism does not flourish because the occasional 
offensive word is incorporated within statutes, of which the vast majority of 
society’s members will be unaware.   A more productive question might be how 
many of the 391 politicians who voted to remove the legislative term returned home 
to their families to call their wife, a ‘mad shopping fiend’; their husband a ‘crazy 
bike rider’; their son a ‘psycho on the skateboard track’; and their moody teenage 
daughter, ‘schizophrenic, with a split personality’. 
Society does not condone prejudice, or its discriminations being perpetrated against 
people with mental illness, it commonly just fails in its ability to recognise them 
when they occur.  It expects that people who experience mental illness will be 
controlled and treated for their own good, and for the good of the rest of society’s 
members, because they are incompetent, incapable, unpredictable, erratic, 
irresponsible, vulnerable, and dangerous, or potentially so. This layer of negative 
stereotyping supports an additional layer of stereotypical assumptions such as they 
are poor employees, poor tenants, bad financial and health risks, and they are bad 
parents, all of which reduce lifestyle opportunities, and impact on the person’s 
mental health.  
Society also holds the belief that if it were not for the mental illness, the person 
would be grateful for the imposition of laws and judicial decision-making that 
ensure that they are protected, controlled and treated.  This collective belief is 
justification for the loss of autonomy, loss of rights, deprivations of liberty, loss of 
bodily integrity and forced treatments imposed on people with a mental illness. 
There are no similar, acceptable, justifications in issues of race, gender or 
homosexuality, and no-one believes that a suffragette would have been grateful for 
being imprisoned and gastric fed; or an African American would have been grateful 
for being enslaved; or a cancer patient who is refusing treatment will be grateful for 
being locked up until they agree, or are compelled, to undergo chemotherapy.    
If society generally, and the legal system specifically, are to become less sanist, 
they must first recognise and acknowledge the prejudices and discriminations 
experienced by people who experience mental illness. It is essential that judges and 
lawyers, legislators and educators become aware of their own assumptions about 
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human behaviour, values, biases, preconceived notions, personal limitations, and 
that they try to actively understand the different world view of a person 
experiencing a mental illness, without negative judgment.  This can be achieved 
through the establishment of compulsory, ongoing education and training schemes 
that require legal professionals to annually attain a certain number of professional 
development credits in mental health.  Better informed and more aware lawyers will 
proceed to becoming better informed, and more aware, policy makers, judges and 
legislators.   
A crucial first step is recognising that sanist attitudes and behaviours are present on 
law school campuses. Law schools have a duty to support and implement policy, 
practice and curriculum changes that challenge the negative attitudes of students 
and staff, and help to develop a culturally affirmative orientation for students. While 
more research is needed to clarify and extend the findings regarding the influence of 
the Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme on attitudinal change, this thesis 
did provide evidence for the value of well structured and well supervised programs 
of experiential learning; clinical legal programs that offer students therapeutic 
jurisprudence based mental health education, and the opportunity for students to 
have personal contact with mental health consumers (guest speakers) and 
professional contact with clients experiencing a mental illness. Further research is 
also needed to assess whether these types of schemes can inculcate a pro bono ethos 
in law students prior to practice. 
This thesis has demonstrated the importance of settling on universal concepts, 
agreed definitions, consistent messaging and common language that transverses 
public policy and law.  It is hoped that the thesis has provided a necessary impetus 
for future research and policy development to achieve this outcome. Most 
commentators define the negative stereotyping, labelling, prejudice and 
discrimination associated with mental illness in a broad, umbrella sense as ‘public 
stigma’.  Perlin calls it ‘sanism’; an ‘ism’ no different to racism, sexism, and every 
other ‘ism’ society no longer tolerates. A first step in achieving a universal message 
is gaining global agreement that the term ‘sanism’ is used broadly to describe the 
stereotyping, stigma, prejudice and discrimination associated with mental illness.  
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Both the doctrinal and empirical research undertaken in this thesis provides clear 
and coherent evidence that the legal system is prejudiced against people who 
experience mental illness, and as Perlin argues, it is hidden in its social 
acceptability. Public health antistigma campaigns need to move beyond the ‘health 
facts’ approach because sanism is embedded in language. Negative social attitudes 
infect language and negative language creates negative attitudes. Public health 
policy-makers, mental health antistigma literacy programs, social scientists, 
legislators, courts, lawyers, academic commentators and legal educators need give 
attention to making sanism visible, and ensuring that it is no longer acceptable. 
Until this happens, people who experience mental illness will continue to be 
disadvantaged by a legal system blind to its own prejudices and discriminations.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Please answer the question below by circling the number to the right that best 
describes how you feel about the statement being made.  Please rate all the 
statements. 
Question 4 
I think that GENERALLY the mentally ill -  
Scale of Importance 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
No 
Opinion 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
should be treated differently to other people 1 2 3 4 5 
can’t look after themselves properly 1 2 3 4 5 
behave badly in public 1 2 3 4 5 
are treated equally and fairly by the law 1 2 3 4 5 
are dangerous  1 2 3 4 5 
need doctors to make decisions for them 1 2 3 4 5 
are stigmatized and discriminated against  1 2 3 4 5 
should be in psych hospitals and asylums 1 2 3 4 5 
don’t know right from wrong  1 2 3 4 5 
can’t make rational decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
want to live together in hospitals instead of 
living in the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
are erratic and emotionally unstable   1 2 3 4 5 
have rights that must be protected 1 2 3 4 5 
need to be controlled by laws 1 2 3 4 5 
are treated badly by the media 1 2 3 4 5 
need to be protected  1 2 3 4 5 
commit crimes 1 2 3 4 5 
need their own special laws 1 2 3 4 5 
are morally weak and deviant 1 2 3 4 5 
lack intelligence and are uneducated 1 2 3 4 5 
scare me 1 2 3 4 5 
Are unpredictable 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Other…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………….…………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………................................................................................................................. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Please answer the question below by circling the number to the right that best 
describes how you feel about the statement being made.  Please rate all the 
statements. 
Question 6 
I think mentally ill legal clients 
GENERALLY 
Scale of Importance 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
No 
Opinion 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
would be difficult clients for lawyers to 
represent 
1 2 3 4 5 
would be unable to properly instruct their 
lawyer 
1 2 3 4 5 
could help in developing their case strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
should do what their lawyers tells them  1 2 3 4 5 
would find the law too complicated to 
understand 
1 2 3 4 5 
always have their rights respected 1 2 3 4 5 
would need their behaviour controlled by 
their lawyer 
1 2 3 4 5 
want what is often not a medically good 
option for them 
1 2 3 4 5 
should be able to instruct their lawyers OK 1 2 3 4 5 
know that their lawyer only acts in their best 
interests  
1 2 3 4 5 
lack the ability to know what is their own 
best interests 
1 2 3 4 5 
have to be treated differently to other types 
of legal clients 
1 2 3 4 5 
trust their lawyers 1 2 3 4 5 
just want someone to help them 1 2 3 4 5 
are dangerous and put their lawyer’s safety at 
risk 
1 2 3 4 5 
are labeled and judged unfairly 1 2 3 4 5 
should be able to get a lawyer for free 1 2 3 4 5 
don’t really know what is going on anyway 1 2 3 4 5 
don’t listen well 1 2 3 4 5 
Other…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………….................................................................................................................. 
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(Please circle your most appropriate response to each question) 
1. When did you last see a film or television show in which a ‘mad psycho 
killer’ was portrayed? 
This week Past month Past Year  Never Don’t remember  
Briefly describe the character. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Have you read/seen a news article when you thought that the person who 
committed such a terrible crime must be insane?   
Often Occasionally Rarely  Never Don’t Remember 
 
3. Do you use terms such as looney, loopy, basket case, nut, nutter, nutso, 
nutjob, crazy, psycho, wacko, potty, screwy, bonkers, cuckoo, batty, 
bananas, etc?  
Often Occasionally Rarely  Never Don’t remember 
 
4. What 5 words best describe how you feel about the mentally ill? 
1. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
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5. When did you last see a mentally ill person in the street? 
This week Past month Past Year  Never Don’t remember 
Briefly describe how you knew they were mentally ill. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. I would never marry a person who had a mental illness. 
Strongly agree  Agree  No opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
7. Schizophrenia is an illness like any other illness such as asthma, diabetes 
etc.  
Strongly agree  Agree  No opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
8. The mentally ill should be forced to take medication if they refuse.  
Strongly agree  Agree  No opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX 4 
Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme 
Skills and Awareness Certificate Training 
Three One Hour Lecture Series 
Objectives  
 
Certificate in Skills and Awareness in Mental Health  
The certificate is awarded to all students who attend all three lectures. The five 
goals of awarding the certificate are; 
• to increase awareness of mental illness and the issues and barriers faced by 
people with a mental illness 
• to provide some skills for future professionals to better work with clients 
who experience a mental illness 
• to offer greater opportunity for law students to gain employment. 
• to offer potential employers with an additional gauge to assess employment 
applicants 
• to deliver the initial training necessary for persons wanting to proceed on 
to further training as a representative of the scheme 
Lecture 1 – Social Perspective: Barriers for People Living with Mental Illness 
Objective 1 
Trainees have a greater awareness of stigma and the prejudice and discrimination 
experienced by people with mental health issues. 
Key Points 
• Explore stigma and discrimination 
• Examine the roles that myth and media play in perpetuating stigma, 
prejudice and discrimination. 
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• Show how individuals and social institutions including the health system 
(doctors, nurses and allied health professionals) and the legal system 
(judges, lawyers, probation officers etc) stigmatise and discriminate against 
people who experience mental illness.   
Objective 2 
Trainees are aware that in order to provide the best possible future services to their 
clients experiencing a mental illness, they must reflect on their own subjective 
biases, and be flexible enough to overcome them. 
Key Points 
• Provide an analysis of the ‘normal’ expectations that professionals have of 
clients, and client/professional relationships, and show why some clients 
will never fit this standard expectations model. 
• Show that in the provision of a non-discriminatory best service, the 
professional must adjust their practices to better meet the needs of their 
client. 
• Provide additional skills required to ensure that future clients receive an 
optimal service. 
Lecture 2 – Clinical Perspective: Mental Illness, Symptoms and Signs 
Objective 1 
Trainees have the ability to recognise, and understand, the associated symptoms and 
behavioural signs of the different disorders.  The lecture is delivered by a mental 
health clinician using a program that is a condensed version of the Mental Health 
First Aid training developed by Kitchener & Jorm in 2002. (Red Cross Tasmania 
specifically designed the MHTRS program in early 2003)    
Key Points 
• Increase knowledge of the major mental health disorders and their 
symptoms and signs 
• Provide an understanding of how mental health disorders can affect 
thought processes, and trigger behaviours that do not fit social norms 
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Lecture 3 – Skills in Working with Clients with a Mental Illness 
Objective 1 
Positive outcomes for clients experiencing a mental illness will be increased 
Key Points 
• Improve the communication skills of the future professionals working with 
clients who are experiencing mental illness. 
Objective 2 
Trainees have the practical skills to minimise personal risks 
• Ensure trainees are able to implement appropriate occupational health and 
safety strategies  
Objective 3 
Trainees are able to connect the skills theory with practical implementation through 
listening to the experiences of guest speakers. Guest speakers are chosen from 
current and former magistrates, Official visitors, practising lawyers, social workers 
and former MHTRS representatives, all of whom give practical insight into working 
with mental health clients, both in legal and non legal professional capacities, and 
the ways that can improve the trainees’ future service delivery 
Key Points 
• Ensure that trainees understand the practicalities and difficulties of 
working with clients experiencing a mental illness 
• Trainees can connect theory and implementation of the different learned 
skills 
• Trainees can apply the newly learned skills so as to provide better 
outcomes for both the client, and the lawyer/professional themself 
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Objective 4 
Trainees have contact with mental health consumers.  Consumer guest speakers are 
lawyers and magistrates who have personally experienced mental illness. They 
provide trainees with   an understanding of the need to protect their own mental 
health and the mental health of their colleagues. They identify the barriers that they 
have faced in their professional careers and the barriers faced by their clients. 
• Ensure trainees are aware of the mental health issues that face the legal 
profession.  
• Ensure that trainees are aware of the strategies to protect their mental 
health. 
• Ensure that trainees are aware of the stigma associated with mental illness 
in the legal profession and the need combat the discrimination that it fuels.  
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APPENDIX 5 
Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme 
Representation Training 
One Hour Lecture 
plus 
Four Hour Intensive Tutorial 
Objectives 
Lecture 4 - Appearing before the Mental Health Tribunal 
This is a 1 hour lecture delivered by the President of the Tasmanian Mental Health 
Tribunal (MHT) on the role and function of the Tribunal. 
Objective 1 
Representatives will be familiar with the Mental Health Act 2013 and the required 
provisions for review of involuntary orders undertaken by the MHT 
Key Points 
• An analysis and history of the sections of the Mental Health Act 2013 
relevant to the review of involuntary orders 
• An understanding of the Administrative Court processes relating to the 
MHT 
Intensive Tutorial 
The objectives of the four hour intensive training program are that representatives 
will have; 
• a good understanding of the Mental Health Tribunal Representation 
Scheme (MHTRS) model 
• a good understanding of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
• a good understanding of the relevant law 
• a good understanding of the legal functions, processes and practices of the 
MHT 
• a good understanding of natural justice 
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• a good understanding of ethics and professionalism 
• a good understanding of the rights of people who experience mental illness 
• skills in communicating with clients who have a mental illness 
• knowledge and skills to ensure competent representation 
• occupational health and safety skills 
• good interview skills 
• the ability to ensure that relevant information provided by the client during 
the interview is conveyed to the MHT  
• the skills to provide a closing statement with direct reference to the 
legislative provision under review 
The objectives are achieved through a combination of training methods: 
• lectures 
• group work 
• interactive exercises 
• role plays/interviewing exercises 
The intensive tutorial is divided into the 6 sections outlined below. 
1. Initial Session 
• Welcome 
• Overview of the scheme 
• Background of the scheme 
• How volunteers work within the scheme 
2. The Model: Therapeutic Jurisprudence – The Representative 
• Theory of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and its benefits 
• The role of the representative in a Therapeutic Jurisprudential framework 
• Lawyer or advocate? 
• Pro Bono 
• Principles of advocacy 
• Who is the client when families are involved? 
• Confidentiality 
• Professional conduct 
• Professional boundaries and conflict of interest 
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• Ethical dilemmas 
• Debriefing 
• The MHT Precepts and Environment 
• Participants 
• Non adversarial 
• Informality 
• Time management 
• Rules of evidence 
• Substitute decision-making and the issue of blame 
3. The Law 
• International Law and Human Rights 
• The Mental Health Act 2013 (TAS) 
• The right to representation 
• The doctor’s report 
• Initial order 
• Continuing care order and the necessary elements 
• Community treatment order and the necessary elements 
• Authority for temporary admission order and the necessary elements 
4. Mock Hearing 
 
5. The Client 
• Client allocation and the procedural steps of a representation 
• Occupational health and safety issues 
• Communicating with the client 
• Using the doctor’s report and client information to develop the case 
• Empowering the client 
• The importance of reporting 
6. Role Plays and Practice Interviewing 
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APPENDIX 6 
Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model 
The Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme draws upon the therapeutic 
jurisprudential theory for its underpinning philosophies. It: 
• encourages healing 
• recognises the role that law has to play as a therapeutic agent 
• is less confrontational 
• is problem solving 
• examines underlying social issues and the impact of law on society 
• promotes a mixture of justice and psychology 
• focuses on the mental well being of all participants 
• focuses on the reduction of recidivism 
• focuses on reaching desired outcomes for all participants 
• resists a strict application of rules and laws 
• promotes individualism 
• focuses on what is right with a person rather than what is wrong 
• searches for creative alternatives 
• borrows tools used by other disciplines such as the ‘personal contract’ and 
the ‘voiced commitment’ 
• uses a cooperative approach rather than an adversarial approach 
• promotes responsibility. 
The Mental Health Tribunal Representation Scheme Therapeutic Jurisprudential 
Model; 
• competently represents the client’s rights and obligations 
• is non-adversarial 
• tries not to harm the client’s existing relationships 
• works co-operatively with the Mental Health Tribunal  
• empowers clients by; 
 having a trained person ‘on their side’ 
 being informed 
 feeling supported 
 being listened to 
